



**SHOCK  
RESPONSIVE  
SOCIAL  
PROTECTION**



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BISP	Benazir Income Support Programme
BLT	Bantuan Langsung Tunai
CBT	Cash Based Transfer
CSG	Child Support Grant
CT-PwD	Cash Transfer for Persons with Severe Disabilities
DFID	Department for International Development
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
FAP	Family Assistance Programme
FIN	Financing and Financial Management
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOV	Governance
ICROP	Integrated Community Registration Outreach Programme
ID	Identity
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LEAP	Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NREGA	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
PKH	Programme Keluarga Harapan
PMT	Proxy Means Test
PPPP	Philippines Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PSSB	Basic Social Subsidy Programme (Programme Subsidio Social Basico)
SAGE	Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment Scheme
SASSA	South African Social Security Agency
SCT	Social Cash Transfer
TSA	Targeted Social Assistance
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

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## INTRODUCTION

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### 1.1 OBJECTIVES, STRUCTURE, LIMITATIONS

This document, together with its accompanying Curriculum, aims to support strategic players at country level to engage in the topic of ‘shock responsive social protection’. Specifically, this document aims to:

- Introduce the key **stakeholders and counterparts**, across sectors, that can play a role – via enhanced coordination, and by improving their own programming – in better addressing the needs and handling the pressures on the system imposed by covariate shocks (Section 1.2)
- Clarify **the rationale** in terms of why this topic is important and why ‘business as usual’ is no longer a sustainable strategy (Section 1.3)
- Provide a **strong framing** to support decision-makers to assess the potential roles that can be played by social protection Programmes and their underlying systems in different shock-prone contexts, and the **analytical tools** to understand potential tradeoffs in these design choices (Section 2)
- Set out system **strengthening measures, ‘design and implementation tweaks’ and preparedness actions** along each of the social protection ‘building blocks’ (Section 3)
- Stylise the **key steps** required to advance ‘shock responsive social protection’

While the document aims to be comprehensive, it does have several caveats and limitations:

- The materials focus predominantly on the role of social protection vis-à-vis other complementary sectors (namely DRM/emergency/humanitarian). However, there may be cases where social protection may have no role; the materials for this curriculum does not look at the actions required by other sectors to respond in these contexts (e.g. enhance early warning systems).
- The materials primarily focus on social assistance (while acknowledging the fundamental role that can be played by social insurance and by social care services – see also Annex C).
- The materials are not a comprehensive ‘how to’ manual on every single relevant topic or every single context (but it does provide links to the most useful literature for those who want to know more). For example, we focus primarily on natural hazards and less on political and economic shocks.

Importantly, this document complements the other 8 TRANSFORM [Base Documents](#) and accompanying curriculums.



What is TRANSFORM? TRANSFORM is an innovative approach to strengthening national capacities for the implementation of national Social Protection Floors (SPFs) in Africa at the national and decentralized levels. It encompasses learning materials and methods for adult learning, to help decision makers and practitioners take ownership in building national social protection systems through continuous learning and reflective practice.

### 1.2 CORE AUDIENCES – WHO ARE WE?

This document was designed to be relevant for both national and international actors, working on both development (e.g. social protection) and emergency preparedness and response (e.g. DRM, Humanitarian). However, it does have a primary focus on social protection actors and, more broadly, government actors.

Because it is often the case that we work in siloes and don't engage with – or fully understand – other sectors, we give a broad overview of each below while acknowledging the way we are organised in country may not reflect this exact division.

\* NOTE: The accompanying Curriculum for this Base Document starts with an exercise to understand how the different actors who are predominately engaged in managing shocks are in country. That lens should be used to engage with all the content in the Base Document.

#### Social protection

Defined as the 'set of policies and Programmes aimed at preventing or protecting all people against poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion throughout their lifecycle, with a particular emphasis towards vulnerable groups' (SPIAC-B<sup>1</sup>). Social protection is led and implemented by and through governments, sometimes with technical and financial support from international partners (especially for non-contributory Programmes<sup>2</sup>).

Social protection encompasses a wide range of instruments<sup>3</sup>, with varying objectives and financing mechanisms (e.g. 'non-contributory' vs 'contributory') that can be classified broadly as 'social assistance', 'social insurance', 'social care' and 'labour market policies<sup>4</sup>'. The [TRANSFORM curriculum](#) discusses these extensively and the key 'building blocks' of social protection systems are further analysed in Sections 2.3.2 and 3 below. Each of these 'instruments' are typically provided regularly, and often on a multiyear basis. Moreover, their provision is increasingly enshrined in legislation, integrated in sectoral policies, financed from domestic budgets, and represents a cornerstone in government-citizens' social contracts<sup>5</sup>.

Social Protection is multi-sectoral, and depending on the country could include other sectors such as health (e.g. health insurance) and education (e.g. stipends, school feeding Programmes etc.).

#### Disaster Risk Management (DRM)<sup>6</sup>

DRM activities are all the processes that aim to reduce the likelihood of a disaster, lessen the impact of hazards and improve people's ability to cope if a disaster occurs. DRM is often viewed as having five focal areas: prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. The types of activities that are often run by DRM actors but that might be relevant to people working in social protection include:

- **early warning systems**, that give early alerts of potential threats such as droughts or cyclones, or even small variations in weather patterns (these alerts can be used to trigger interventions that can help avert or mitigate the threat);
- **risk assessments and vulnerability assessments**, that can help identify locations and populations likely to be in greatest need of assistance.

<sup>1</sup> This is the Social Protection Inter-agency Cooperation Board, see [here](#)

<sup>2</sup> In 17 Sub-Saharan African countries, over half of spending in social assistance is donor funded (Beegle et al. 2018)

<sup>3</sup> These are also referred to as 'Programmes', 'schemes' etc.

<sup>4</sup> O'Brien 2018b; SPaN (2019a) Note: Not all classifications of social protection encompass labour market policies

<sup>5</sup> Gentilini, Laughton and O'Brien (2018)

<sup>6</sup> Drawing on O'Brien et al, (2018b) and Jha and Stanton Geddes (2013).



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- contingency plans, that set out what will be done in different types of emergency, and that might include a role for social protection in the planned response;
- local disaster response teams that may coordinate the targeting and distribution of support to communities after a shock; and
- disaster risk financing mechanisms that can release funds for emergency measures which might include social protection.

### Humanitarian

Humanitarian assistance is intended to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and disasters associated with natural hazards, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for when such situations occur<sup>7</sup>. The use of the term 'humanitarian' varies across countries and contexts (meaning it will be important to understand how it is defined in your country)<sup>8</sup>:

- In some cases, 'humanitarian assistance' is synonymous with support funded or implemented by the international community in response to shocks classified as requiring a humanitarian response. These funds are classified as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Examples of 'international humanitarian' organisations include the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), among many others.
- In others, the key question is not the origin of the support, but what it is intended for, i.e., to stabilise or improve the status of shock-affected households. Under this definition, humanitarian assistance is more or less synonymous with 'emergency response' and can be led by national government and non-government partners. In this case, it is simply a part of the 'response' element of DRM.

In practice, the sector has evolved to fulfil a wide variety of functions and has dramatically increased in scope and reach in the last two decades. Most importantly, "the stereotype of humanitarian assistance being short-term is inaccurate because the problems that it seeks to address rarely are" (Bailey, 2018).

A trend in the humanitarian sector of particular relevance to linkages with social protection is the increased use of cash transfers as a substitute or complement to in-kind assistance. Cash transfers were virtually non-existent in the humanitarian sector before 2005, and cash and vouchers together accounted for \$2.8 billion (10%) of humanitarian assistance in 2016<sup>9</sup>.

Moreover, many countries deploy a cluster-based approach for a multi-sectoral coordinated humanitarian response. Depending on the characteristics of the emergency, the clusters may be led by the same actors working both on social protection and/or DRM activities (e.g. health, nutrition, education etc.).

**humanity  
impartiality  
independence  
neutrality**

One of the key characteristics that distinguishes humanitarian assistance from development interventions, including social protection, are the **four core Humanitarian Principles** of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence which mandate humanitarian actors to prioritise human need and dignity over any economic, political, religious, ideological, or other interests. See [OCHA 2012](#). Beyond the Humanitarian Principles, humanitarian actors are also held accountable to the [SPHERE Standards](#) (encompassing the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response



NOTE: Given the focus on saving lives, humanitarian assistance tends to be calculated to meet a higher/ more comprehensive value based on immediate lifesaving needs than that under social protection (focused on longer term support based on fiscal and policy space).

<sup>7</sup> Development Initiatives, 2018

<sup>8</sup> Gentilini, Laughton and O'Brien (2018)

<sup>9</sup> Bailey, 2018; CaLP, 2018



### 1.3 WHY AN IMPORTANT TOPIC?

Hazards, stresses and shocks (and the crises they may lead to if mismanaged)<sup>10</sup> have been around for ever – the topic is definitely not new! So why is it such a hot topic now and what is it that has not worked in the past? And why is TRANSFORM developing a Module on this?

#### 1.3.1 What has been changing?

To date, multiple actors (both at national and international level) have had different approaches – often based on their mandates – for responding to household needs. Nevertheless, experience in recent years has shown that those strategies are no longer viable or sufficient.

In recent years there has been a swiftly changing global landscape, with increasing disaster risk<sup>11</sup>:

- The number, severity, complexity and duration of recent crises<sup>12</sup> has been on the rise over the past 30 years and has overburdened traditional government and international humanitarian systems
- Recent crises have caused displacement on an unprecedented scale
- Most shocks are broadly predictable<sup>13a</sup>, recurrent and/or protracted<sup>13b</sup> – with routine caseloads and ‘humanitarian’ caseloads blurred in practice in many contexts.
- Climate change projections show more frequent and intense climate shocks, but there is also a high level of uncertainty associated to climate change
- Shocks and crises<sup>14</sup> have come to play a large and increasing role in determining the life outcomes faced by individuals and their families, affecting the poorest and most vulnerable disproportionately. In the case of climate change, rural poor people in low and middle-income countries (who are the least responsible for the current climate crisis) are experiencing significant changes in weather patterns, affecting livelihoods.

#### Questions for reflection

Is a recurrent seasonal stress – such as a dry spell – really a ‘crisis’ that requires humanitarian actors to step in?

If increasing shocks are the ‘new norm’, should we not be building our core government systems to anticipate them?

...and the international community has understood that ‘business as usual’ is not a viable and sustainable strategy in this changing context<sup>15</sup>:

- The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) outcome document, [Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#) recognizes the impacts of earthquakes, violent conflict, disease outbreaks, climate change and extreme weather, while acknowledging that children, women, individuals with disabilities and the most impoverished are disproportionately vulnerable to, and affected by, the impact of crises.
- Short-term humanitarian strategies, funding cycles and Programmes have serious weaknesses in addressing the long-term nature of many crises and the interplay of shocks with poverty and chronic vulnerability

<sup>10</sup> See Section 1.4.

<sup>11</sup> OPM, 2017; O’Brien et al 2018a/b; Bailey 2018; Cabot Venton 2018; SPaN 2019a; UNICEF 2020

<sup>12</sup> In practice, a humanitarian crisis is a situation that has been deemed to require humanitarian assistance: that is, it is defined by the nature of the response rather than by the scale or nature of people’s needs, or by any classification of causes.

<sup>13a</sup> “predictable” of course some remain more predictable and regular than others, meaning emergency and routine caseloads are de facto blended. These are the contexts where routine social protection have an important role to play.

<sup>13b</sup> E.g., most humanitarian funding is concentrated in the same places over time. In 2015, most (88%) official humanitarian assistance went to medium- and long-term recipients, with two-thirds of funding in places affected by conflict (Development Initiatives, 2016). The stereotype of humanitarian assistance being short-term is inaccurate because the problems that it seeks to address rarely are.

<sup>14</sup> See Section 1.4 for definitions

<sup>15</sup> O’Brien et al 2018a/b; SPaN 2019a; UNICEF 2020





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- International humanitarian assistance can be very costly, sometimes struggles to guarantee timeliness of response<sup>16</sup>, often creates duplicative structures compared to government systems (which often reaches the same households), and rarely leads to sustainable long-term solutions that are owned by governments
- The [Grand Bargain](#) made by the humanitarian and development communities at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 has therefore called for the use of 'existing resources and capabilities better to shrink humanitarian needs over the long term'. This may include doing more before a crisis (preparedness) and in the early stage of a crisis, rather than reactively
- This goes hand in hand with a call for a '[New Way of Working](#)' for the humanitarian sector, hinged on three objectives: 1) Reinforce - do not replace national and local systems; 2) Transcend the humanitarian development divide by working toward collective outcomes, based on comparative advantage and over multiyear timelines; 3) Anticipate - do not wait for crises
- The 2030 Agenda also incorporates the importance of promoting efforts by countries to "build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters" (Goal 1, SDG, 2015); and to take urgent action to "strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries"; and integrating "climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning" (Goal 13, SDG, 2015). At the same time, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development clearly points toward the creation of social protection systems that allow all people to enjoy basic standards of living
- Likewise, the Paris Agreement, within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), recognizes adaptation as a key component in the long-term global response to climate change to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems (Article 7)

while a well-designed response via national systems, and especially social protection, offers room for improved effectiveness<sup>17</sup>:

- In some contexts, there are very significant overlaps across the intended caseloads, objectives and instruments of social protection and international humanitarian assistance (e.g. the use of cash transfers)
- There is increasing evidence on the cost-effectiveness of early action (including long term resilience building to reduce needs) rather than ad-hoc, ex-post responses<sup>18</sup>. This is especially important in a context where the cost of responding to global covariate shocks has been increasing<sup>19</sup>
- Increasing social protection system 'maturity' in many low- and middle-income countries means that governments are now increasingly able to reduce households' vulnerability year-round, which should also have benefits when covariate shocks occur. A side-effect of this increasing maturity is that some countries have been exploring options for leveraging social protection systems as part of an emergency response. Building on these, national governments, donors, UN agencies and NGOs are increasingly generating important learning on the topic (see Annex A).

<sup>16</sup> e.g. as it often relies on an official declaration of emergency that governments sometimes delay

<sup>17</sup> O'Brien et al 2018a/b; SPaN 2019a; UNICEF 2020. Cost effectiveness here is defined across the range of potential other approaches to addressing the same problem, including not responding at all, responding too late and responding via other sectors (e.g. international humanitarian actors).

<sup>18</sup> For example, a recent USAID study found that donors could save 30 per cent on humanitarian aid spending if they invest in earlier and more proactive responses such as SRSP (Cabot Venton 2018).

<sup>19</sup> As an example (not only linked to increasing needs of course), the humanitarian sector has dramatically increased in scope and reach in the last two decades – from about \$2 billion in 2000 (High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, 2015) to \$11 billion in 2012 and \$27 billion in 2016.



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TRANSFORM has a particular focus on Africa, where these challenges and opportunities are deeply relevant – and the potential for learning high:

- Africa is demonstrably shock-prone, across a wide range of shocks with differing characteristics (droughts, floods, cyclones, refugee crises, conflict, outbreaks of epidemics, the triple F crisis, etc).
- Many shocks in the region are predictable and protracted, and often slow-onset. Longer-term approaches, including social protection, could clearly play a greater role in reducing the vulnerability of populations over time and providing complementary support in response to stresses and shocks.
- In light of increasing maturity of social protection systems across the continent<sup>20</sup>, there has been a high pressure from many donors to incorporate a focus on covariate shocks, without sufficient understanding about whether such a focal point is either desirable or feasible. To date there has often been insufficient focus on building national capacities to assess country systems/contexts and understand what approach may be most relevant and effective.
- The bulk of evidence from the region has become quite strong and the potential for south-south learning high. In this context, it is also important to 'debunk' the hype around some of the most famous 'shock responsive' Programmes that have been heavily supported by donors and function well in relation to the specific context they work in – which is very different to other contexts.

We can of course learn from these Programmes, but also need to be able to understand what applies to our context and what doesn't – and why!

### 1.3.2 So why social protection?

As discussed above (1.3.1), the intended caseloads, objectives and instruments of social protection and humanitarian assistance are often very similar. Most importantly, **social protection's core mandate is to address poverty and vulnerability – no matter how these are 'generated'**. While lifecycle risks, idiosyncratic shocks and other drivers of vulnerability play a very important role in the equation – so do covariate shocks, which include economic crises, disasters associated with extreme weather and climate events, and conflict-related crises (see Figure 2).

**Covariate shock:** Shocks that affect a large proportion of the population simultaneously (e.g. drought).

**Idiosyncratic shock:** Shocks that affect individuals or households (e.g. loss of bread-winner, illness)

**Overall, strengthening social protection systems to better support individuals and households in need will therefore be an important step forward in years to come, especially in contexts facing an increasing frequency, magnitude, or intensity of shocks.** There are two key, but distinct policy reasons for leveraging social protection (that may coexist in any country – see Figure 1):

#### Policy reason 1:

Certain events (such as recurrent and predictable seasonal stresses) are being treated as if they are 'crises' when they are not actually exceptional, unpredictable or unmanageable. Existing cyclically recurring need, and/or projections of cyclical need<sup>21</sup> should therefore fall under social protection's core mandate.

#### Policy reason 2:

There are many times when countries are faced with a crisis/emergency/disaster<sup>22</sup> which happens less frequently, but perhaps at a higher magnitude/intensity (severity).<sup>23</sup> It is useful to analyse the potential role of social protection Programmes and systems to achieve improved outcomes, either by mitigating the effects of the shocks through adaptations to regular Programmes, or by actors leveraging the social protection systems to meet the need as part of a response.

<sup>20</sup> UNDP (2019)

<sup>21</sup> Certain persistent factors (e.g. population growth, climate change) often drive trends of heightened levels of vulnerability (e.g. the 'new norm'). Regular social protection can anticipate these increasing trends as part of their regular plans to meet needs.


<sup>22</sup> See Section 1.4.

<sup>23</sup> See Section 1.4.



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
Figure 1. Two distinct types of 'policy problem'



Source: adapted from ADB 2013 (on layered approaches to risk financing)

Before explaining this further in Section 3, we provide a set of key definitions that will be helpful throughout this curriculum.

Figure 2. Risks and shocks along the lifecycle, compounded by covariate shocks<sup>24</sup>



"Vulnerabilities underpinning the lifecycle could include: malnutrition, disability, chronic illness, poverty, refugee status etc"

Source: S&I Base Doc: TRANSFORM

<sup>24</sup> See Selection & Identification TRANSFORM Module


## 1.4 KEY DEFINITIONS

As any other evolving field – at the intersection of different disciplines – it is worth taking a further step back to agree on broad definitions that will be used throughout the document going forward.

While we are suggesting the definitions below for the shock responsive social protection module of TRANSFORM, this does not mean these are the only way these terms should be defined. Different countries, institutions and people may adopt different definitions for historical and contextual reasons.

What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.

*William Shakespeare*



Ultimately, *'a rose by any other name would smell as sweet'* (Shakespeare): it is important not to get stuck over the terminology in this field and to focus on underlying function. Moreover, sometimes it may be worth using certain terms for 'tactical' (political economy, including the financial landscape) reasons: we know they will resonate with our audiences helping us to better achieve our objectives.

Defined very differently by different actors, we define these as<sup>25</sup> :

- **Hazard:** A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption and/or environmental damage.
- **Shock:** A potentially damaging hazard or other phenomenon. A shock can also refer to the moment at which a low-onset process (a stress) passes its 'tipping point' and becomes an extreme event.

### **Covariate vs Idiosyncratic – see Section 1.3.2**

**Different characteristics of shocks\*:** shocks can be categorised in many different ways<sup>26</sup> :

- *by their cause.* E.g. natural, human-induced, a combination of the two
- *by their symptoms.* E.g. war, disease, hunger, displacement, etc.
- *by the capacity and willingness* of the government of the affected state to respond
- *by their broad 'type'.* E.g. seasonal stress, economic, natural hazard, conflict, pandemic, etc.
- *by their speed of onset.* E.g. rapid <sup>27</sup>, slow <sup>28</sup>
- *by their recurrence* (and hence 'predictability'). E.g. protracted (usually conflict), recurrent (usually repeated natural hazards such as droughts, floods or crop failures), occasional/one-off.
- *by their broad consequences* (magnitude, severity, etc) and what these imply for those who are mandated to address them. E.g.
  - *scale:* number of people and % population affected
  - *level of urgency:* urgent (need for speedy action), non-urgent
  - *threat to human lives:* life threatening (requires action to save lives), non-life threatening
  - *type of need generated:* temporary, chronic

<sup>25</sup> UNICEF (2018); Jha and Stanton Geddes, 2013; SPAN 2019

<sup>26</sup> Levine and Sharp (2015)

<sup>27</sup> Triggered by a hazardous event that emerges quickly and often unexpectedly. Could be associated with, e.g., earthquake, volcanic eruption, flash flood, critical infrastructure failure, etc

<sup>28</sup> One that emerges gradually over time. Could be associated with, e.g., drought, desertification, sea-level rise, epidemic disease

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- **Stress:** Similar to a shock, a stress is a longer-term trend that undermines the potential of a given system and increases the vulnerability of actors within it.
- \* For simplicity, in this document and curriculum, we will sometimes use the word 'shock' to broadly encompass these first three terms. Where relevant, we will nuance the discussion, acknowledging these are different concepts with different implications.
- **Exposure:** the presence of people, property, livelihoods, systems (or other) in areas that can be – or have been – impacted by shocks/stresses
- **Capacity:** the combination of the strengths, attributes and resources available within a community, society or organisation
- **Risk:** There is no universally agreed definition of risk. It is a term used generally in all aspects of life and is related to the concept of future harm or the likelihood of a negative impact occurring. For example, UNISDR defines risk as: "The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a system, society or a community in a specific period of time, determined probabilistically as a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity". Represented as a formula:

$$\text{HAZARD, SHOCK OR STRESS} \times \text{EXPOSURE} \times \text{VULNERABILITY}$$

**RISK =**

$$\frac{\text{HAZARD, SHOCK OR STRESS} \times \text{EXPOSURE} \times \text{VULNERABILITY}}{\text{CAPACITY}}$$

- **Emergency and crisis.** Broadly similar terms that refer to situations which are caused by events (hazards, shocks or cumulative stresses) combined with pre-existing vulnerabilities and lack of capacity to manage them.
- **Disaster.** Often used as a synonym of emergency and crisis, but after their effects are fully played out (e.g. outcomes are apparent). "An emergency can turn into a disaster, while a disaster is inherently an emergency situation". Disasters are also often defined as being very large in scale, high impact, and overwhelming capacity to withstand, cope and recover<sup>29</sup>. Disaster results from the combination of: the exposure to a hazard; the conditions of vulnerability that are present; and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce or cope with the potential negative consequences<sup>30 - 31</sup>.

Not every shock results in an 'emergency', 'crisis' or 'disaster'. In fact, these could almost be defined as un-managed or mis-managed shocks!

- "The rationale for early action and resilience-building (see below) is precisely to minimise the impact of shocks and, if possible, to prevent a crisis developing, thus avoiding suffering and loss for the people affected and also reducing the scale and cost of humanitarian assistance" (Levine and Sharp, 2015).
- "Extreme events do not need to lead to as much hardship and loss of life as at present. Three things need to be put in place before a disaster to protect lives and livelihoods:
  - a) A coordinated plan for post-disaster action agreed in advance
  - b) A fast, evidence-based decision-making process
  - c) Financing on standby to ensure that the plan can be implemented (Clarke and Dercon), 2018 in their must-read "[Dull Disasters, How Planning Ahead will Make a difference](#)"



<sup>29</sup> Al Dahash et al (2016)  
<sup>30-31</sup> UNISDR (2015)



## INTRODUCTION

- **Vulnerability:** The characteristics and circumstances of a system and its component parts (individuals, households or communities) that make them particularly susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazardous event, shock or stress. The concept of vulnerability has a strong 'social/actor' focus have been so far ahead of resilience in terms of emphasising issues around social justice or power distribution.
- **Resilience:** The ability of a system and its component parts (individuals, households, communities) to anticipate, absorb, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event, shock or stress in a timely and efficient manner.
  - It is important to add that resilience is not intrinsically pro-poor. A poor person can bounce back and recover after a shock, but will go back to the previous state of poverty and deprivation the person was experiencing in the first place. In other words, a person can be both poor and resilient. There are also criticisms that resilience can have a potential trade-off with well-being, as poor people adjust their expectations and aspirations when coping with deterring changes in their living conditions<sup>32</sup>
  - "Resilience, like vulnerability, has two dimensions: one internal and one external. You can increase resilience either by enhancing the inherent ability of an individual, a household, a community, a system or a country to withstand a shock, or you can act externally to reduce the potential for damage from that shock" (Freeland, 2012).



**A crucial step in anticipating shocks is to analyse and address vulnerability to specific, predictable types of hazardous events, stresses and shocks (i.e. to increase resilience)**

(Levine and Sharp, 2015).

### Main frameworks addressing social protection in the context of shocks

Given this topic has been 'hot' for a few years now, there has been a lot that has been written, said and defined by different actors working in different countries and contexts (see e.g. Annex A). As always in these cases, this has led to some confusion and overlaps regarding the core terminology and definitions. We suggest there is no full 'resolution' to the issue, but it is useful to understand the history of different terms (in extreme summary)<sup>33</sup> :

- 2009. The '**adaptive social protection** framework'<sup>34</sup> was developed at the Institute of Development Studies with the support of the World Bank and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and was the first scholarly effort to explore the linkages between social protection, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation – worlds that had worked in silos to that date.
- 2012. The World Bank built on this contribution, issuing a paper on 'making social protection **climate responsive**' and starting to discuss scalable social protection systems<sup>35</sup>
- 2012. A strong focus on '**resilience**' was placed within the so-called "**3P&T – 3D**"<sup>36</sup> Analytical Framework by IDS, discussing the role of Absorptive coping capacity, Adaptive capacity and Transformative capacity and introducing a focus on time and scale issues<sup>37</sup>

<sup>32</sup> For more on resilience frameworks and approaches see [Bahadur, A. V. et al \(2010\) The resilience renaissance? Unpacking of resilience for tackling climate change and disasters. Strengthening Climate Resilience Discussion](#)

<sup>33</sup> Solórzano and Cárdenas (2019)

<sup>34</sup> Davies et al. 2009

<sup>35</sup> Kuriakose et al 2012/2013

<sup>36</sup> This combines the 3D resilience framework with the Protection-Prevention-Promotion-Transformation (3PPT) framework by Devereux and Sabates Wheeler.

<sup>37</sup> Bene' et al 2012



## INTRODUCTION

- 2015-2018 The [DFID funded, OPM led global study](#) on **Shock Responsive Social Protection** set out to answer the questions: what are the constraints to social protection systems being more responsive to (covariate) shocks, and, conversely, what factors would enable them to become more responsive to shocks?<sup>38</sup> Further research alongside WFP focused on similar issues, strengthening the evidence on the social protection delivery systems that can be leveraged for shock preparedness and response<sup>39</sup>. Overall, this body of research did not focus on resilience-building – not because this wasn't deemed important, but because it wasn't a core focus of that specific research agenda.
- 2015. At around the same time, the [BRACED resilience 3A framework](#) was introduced by ODI, focusing on the capacities to adapt to, anticipate and absorb climate extremes and disasters<sup>40</sup> – and how social protection can play a role in that<sup>41</sup>
- 2018. The World Bank amended their own conceptualisation of the term '**adaptive social protection**', building on their work in the Sahel, choosing to drop the climate-change focus and operationalising the concept as "two interrelated approaches focused on building household resilience and increasing the responsiveness of programming"<sup>42</sup>
- 2019. The EU SPaN guidance on **Social Protection across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus** focused on better understanding the conditions under which humanitarian action and social protection can coexist, converge and be mutually supporting<sup>43</sup>.
- 2020. The UNICEF Guidance on **Shock Responsive Social Protection** framed 'shock responsive' very broadly, acknowledging strong overlaps with other frameworks (adaptive etc).

Ultimately, it is not worth using these terms (alongside others you may have encountered, e.g. risk informed social protection) as the tools for an ideological/epistemological battle<sup>44</sup>. What really matters is what they have in common: the acknowledgement that **social protection could play an important role in the context of increasing hazards, shocks and stresses**. This can be achieved in many different ways, before, during and after any given shock – and in the long term in anticipation of future events. This is the core of Sections 2 and 3.

### 1.5 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

- Social Protection's core mandate is to address poverty and vulnerability – no matter how these needs are generated'. Whilst DRM/ humanitarian sectors also aim to mitigate or respond to needs driven by a shock. All three sectors are trying to address the needs of a household.
- In the context of the changing nature of covariate shocks, 'business as usual' is not sustainable, particularly in contexts where shocks/ heightened need is happening on a much more frequent scale. Social protection Programmes and systems may be increasingly relevant when trying to meet these needs; the relevance depends on the country context.
- The first step in this process is to understand each other's sectors and acknowledge overlaps between them: there is value in working together towards joint outcomes and social protection can play an important role in this collective action.
- There is some confusion in the core terminology: ultimately it is worth avoiding conceptual tensions on wording and focusing on function: what are we trying to collectively achieve?

<sup>38</sup>O'Brien et al (2018 a/b)

<sup>39</sup>Beazley et al 2019 – see full publications [here](#)

<sup>40</sup>Bahadur et al, 2015

<sup>41</sup>Ulrich and Slater 2016

<sup>42</sup>World Bank. 2018

<sup>43</sup>SPaN (2019)

<sup>44</sup>For example, see a recent blog by ITAD on the topic [here](#).

# 2

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## TRANSFORM SHOCK RESPONSIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK: UPDATING AND BUILDING ON PAST FRAMEWORKS


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This Section is organised into three sub-Sections, each critical to answer the question: ‘what role can and should social protection play’ in preparation for and response to covariate shocks (summarised in Figure 3)?

- Section 2.1 starts by setting out **what outcomes we are collectively trying to achieve** (across sectors), and how we can achieve these
- Section 2.2 provides some answers along a **spectrum of potential roles for the social protection sector** (in coordination with other sectors) that may be more or less relevant in different contexts (more depth can be found in Section 3).
- Section 2.3 closes by explaining the **contextual factors that should inform any strategic** decision/s (e.g. the type of shock)
- Section 4 is complementary to this Section, organising these concepts into ‘key steps’ that need to be broadly followed to implement this.



Figure 3. SRSP Framework



## 2.1 WHAT ARE THE OUTCOMES WE ARE COLLECTIVELY TRYING TO ACHIEVE, AND HOW CAN WE ACHIEVE THEM?

Shock responsive social protection is about working better within the social protection sector, and together with other sectors that are mandated to prepare for and respond to shocks, to jointly and comprehensively address needs before, during and after a shock occurs – and pre-empt the needs imposed by potential future shocks. This brings the spotlight on the **key outcomes we are collectively trying to achieve<sup>45a</sup> across sectors – e.g. improved food security and nutritional outcomes, decreased mortality, decreased negative coping strategies, etc.**

Covariate shocks negatively affect individuals, households and communities via loss of household members, disease, injury, loss of income, loss of assets and loss of access to essential services (among other impacts). This leads people to cut down on consumption, use up savings, sell off assets, migrate, pull children out of school (etc.), with the long-term negative impacts these behaviours entail. These are broadly the same types of difficulties and consequences they may face via an idiosyncratic shock, with **the main differences being that: a) people cannot count on informal support from family and neighbours as most are affected; b) the collective shock is more likely to overwhelm existing systems and capacity<sup>45b</sup>.**

When evaluating alternative strategies to achieve these outcomes, we should always be **assessing any proposed strategy against the following eight criteria<sup>46</sup>:**

<sup>45a</sup>This notion of “collective outcomes” has been placed at the centre of the commitment to the New Way of Working and focused on “reducing people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities and increasing their resilience”. See: <https://www.un.org/jsc/content/new-way-working>

<sup>45b</sup>Source: *10 Tips on Shock-Responsive SP*

<sup>46</sup>Adapted from O’Brien et al 2018 a/b; SPaN 2019; UNICEF 2020 based on consultation with key stakeholders.

**a. Better meeting people’s needs by extending the:**

**1. Coverage of assistance.**

*Ensuring greater coverage of population where it is needed:* increasing the absolute number of people reached (ideally all of those who have been negatively affected), or decreasing the relative share of those in need of assistance – see Box 3 to fully unpack this concept

**2. Adequacy of assistance.**

*Ensuring greater levels of financial protection* for affected populations, for example via a support of a more appropriate nature, higher level of support (e.g. transfer value), higher frequency or longer duration of support. Remember: sectors often view the term 'adequacy' differently. The needs and therefore transfer value required will be much higher if it is identified to meet lifesaving needs as part of an emergency response.

**3. Comprehensiveness of assistance.**

*Ensuring a greater range of services/benefits offered* to fully cover complex and multi-dimensional needs. E.g. linking benefits and services together to enhance resilience, as well as recovery.


Importantly, these first three criteria align with the **three ‘tenets’ of Universal Social Protection** and are increasingly at the centre of social protection system strengthening work globally (see Figure 2).

**(a) Better meeting people’s needs:**

If the North of your country has been affected by devastating cyclones, meeting needs will require a combination of the following: a) covering the households that have been affected (who may not already be social protection recipients); b) ensuring they receive sufficient/adequate support over time; c) ensuring their multidimensional needs are covered (e.g. by different types of interventions). Social protection is one of the sectors that can help to achieve these outcomes.



Figure 4. The three tenets of Universal Social Protection are relevant for shock responsive social protection



Source: adapted from BMZ (2019)

\* Adequacy is linked to the type/modality, level (value), frequency, duration and timing of transfer

**b ...via an approach that better addresses the needs of vulnerable/affected households than the status quo or any alternative.**

**4. Timeliness.**

*Ensuring timeliness:* delivering a more timely response, avoiding interventions being delivered too late to be of use for the phase of the shock they were intended to address (otherwise the efforts may be in vain);

**5. Cost-effectiveness.**

*Enabling cost-efficiencies, eliminating duplicated delivery systems and processes, minimising gaps in provision, and leveraging the most cost-effective systems;*

**6. Accountability.**

*Ensuring accountability to affected populations:* abiding by humanitarian principles where relevant, ensuring dignity, and ensuring community acceptance, etc.

**7. Predictability.**

*Ensuring predictability* of funding for implementing agencies and of assistance to households;

**8. Ownership & sustainability.**

*Leading to greater government ownership and sustainability,* as well as strengthened government capacity over time.

**(b) ...via an approach that works better...**

...whatever strategy you have developed to meet needs ensuring coverage, adequacy, comprehensiveness in the North of the country, you will have not been fully successful unless your support predictably arrives when it is needed, at a cost that is reasonable (and does not duplicate efforts), while also ensuring accountability to affected populations. If this strategy also leads to longer-term capacity building (of government), that will enable governments to better address needs when future shocks occur.

**EXAMPLE**



**In other words, across sectors (e.g. social protection, humanitarian, DRM), we would want to better meet people’s needs (via a greater coverage, adequacy and comprehensiveness of assistance)**



**with an approach that ensures timeliness, cost-effectiveness, accountability, predictability and ownership & sustainability compared to the status quo and compared to any alternative.**

Sounds easy? The problem is how to achieve this in practice across sectors! Whilst we are aiming to improve across all these criteria, it is unlikely we will achieve all, **as there are trade-offs in any strategy** (see Section 2.3.3).

**2.2 WHAT ROLE CAN SOCIAL PROTECTION PLAY TO ACHIEVE THESE OUTCOMES?**

The **key question** we should be asking when assessing emerging needs is the following:

- Can social protection Programmes and/or systems be strengthened and leveraged to extend the coverage, level of assistance, and/or range of services to shock-prone/ affected households and, by collaborating with the DRM/ humanitarian sector, help to better meet the needs of shock prone/affected people?

**Looking at global evidence, the answer – in short – is yes. However, HOW this can/should be achieved in practise depends.** On what? An assessment of country context (explored further in Section 2.3), including:

- a) *The type/s of shock/s* (see Section 2.3.1) Ultimately, there are some types of situations that are the full responsibility of the social protection system to address, while others will require coordination with other sectors, or no role for social protection;
- b) *Your existing systems and capacities:* e.g. maturity/capacity of the social protection sector, DRM/humanitarian sectors (see Section 2.3.2)
- c) *The opportunities, challenges and risks of different options against the key desirable outcomes* set out above (see Section 2.1 and 2.3.3)

The overarching concept is that **social protection could have an important role to play – but to very different degrees depending on context.** To a certain extent, social protection by definition is already ‘shock responsive’<sup>47</sup> (it provides assistance in areas which may reduce their vulnerability to an idiosyncratic or covariate shock). Depending on context, it can be strengthened to better encompass a focus on covariate shocks (and not just idiosyncratic shocks) and take into consideration individuals’, households’ and communities’ exposure and vulnerability to those shocks. **This does not necessarily require a dramatically different approach to designing and implementing social protection! Simple changes may make a big difference,** as further explored in Section 3.

In practice, what does this mean for the social protection sector (see summary in Table 1)?

1. Always pursuing routine system strengthening.



**The stronger the underlying systems, the more potential to reach needs through those systems**

(whether as part of extended social assistance or as part of emergency assistance). The core TRANSFORM curriculum is a great starting point for this and pursuing Universal Social Protection (increasing coverage of populations, adequacy of benefits and comprehensiveness of risks that are covered) will set a very strong foundation.

2. Doing what you already do, better (design and implementation tweaks).



**Ensuring routine social protection programming is based on a solid understanding of the risks, shocks and stressors that your country (and its regions) typically faces** (and is likely to face in the future).

In practice, this also means pursuing the ‘full’ meaning of universal social protection: a system (encompassing a range of interventions) that fully and adequately covers the multidimensional needs of individuals and households, no matter how these are generated. This will involve (see also Section 3):

- **Designing Programmes to reduce vulnerability / increase resilience.** Ensuring Programme design that contributes to enhancing the resilience of individuals, households and communities to future shocks. Examples could include a watershed management approach to Public Works Programmes. Of course, this is not something that social protection can achieve alone.
- **Adjusting social protection routine provision in light of (risk) context.** Ensuring Programme design – and implementation – encompass a focus on vulnerability to (covariate) shocks (beyond just chronic poverty or categorical, life-cycle criteria). Examples include: expanding routine coverage in areas frequently affected by shocks (permanently); incorporating further vulnerability criteria into routine targeting; etc.
- **Enabling dynamic inclusion of new caseloads in need, regardless of the shock type.** Strengthening on-demand registration systems that enable dynamic inclusion of new caseloads; addressing barriers due to quota systems; addressing barriers due to qualifying conditions; etc.
- **Enabling further flexibility in the system** e.g. potential to increase transfer amounts, waive conditionalities etc.
- **Ensuring continuity of service delivery for routine Programmes in shock-affected contexts, at the moment when recipients need support the most.** This is often referred to as ‘resilience building of systems’ to future shocks, adopting the principles of contingency planning.

**These actions will be especially critical in areas that are RECURRENTLY affected by PREDICTABLE shocks, where temporary and chronic needs significantly overlap!**

<sup>47</sup> some also refer to this as being ‘risk informed’ or ‘shock-sensitive’

Box 1. Case Study: long term design and implementation tweaks in Malawi

For just under 10 years, Malawi has been supporting on average 1.73 million people each year with emergency food assistance, i.e. about 10% of its population. With widespread chronic poverty and high vulnerabilities, even predictable, recurrent lean seasons and minor weather variations develop into emergencies.




This has led the Government and development partners to more sustainable ways of preventing and addressing recurrent food crises. Through the Malawi National Social Support Programme II (MNSSP II), the government has made a commitment to design and implement a social protection system that covers more people, provides complementary support to respond to the multiple and compounding needs of the population, and that is sensitive to shocks, i.e. that contributes to mitigate, respond to and recover from shocks, in collaboration with the humanitarian sector.

Source: Govt of Malawi, Malawi National Social Support Programme II (2018)

3. Coordinating with – and supporting – sectors that are mandated to respond to covariate shocks.

**Coordinating – in advance of a shock – with sectors that are mandated to respond to shocks (DRM and humanitarian) to understand whether there is any further role to be played by social protection in response to increased needs.** In practice, this will involve a wide set of actions (discussed in Section 3) to jointly accommodate new populations and needs as a result of future shocks. E.g. one/more of the following, as relevant (see also Box 2):



**Systems strengthening so systems can be leveraged by temporary or emergency programmes that 'leverage' 48 existing systems** (e.g. data, capacity, delivery mechanism such as registration or payments system) where these are better than alternatives. Emergency Programmes could be led via a) the social protection and/or the DRM sector (e.g. a nationally run Emergency Cash Transfer that leverages the systems of existing Programmes); b) by external actors, in close coordination with social protection actors (e.g. a Humanitarian Cash Transfer that leverages the systems of existing Programmes)



**Preparedness to temporarily increase the value or duration of assistance for households already on a Social Protection Programme, if relevant and feasible.** This is known as a 'vertical' expansion' and helps to address adequacy of assistance in line with heightened needs.



**Preparedness to temporarily increase the number of recipients in an existing Social Protection Programme if relevant and feasible.** This is known as a 'horizontal' expansion', and helps to address coverage of assistance in line with heightened needs.



**Preparedness for any other form of coordination with the social protection sector (e.g. 'alignment').** For example, this could be an alignment of objectives, targeting method, transfer value or delivery mechanism, using parallel (non- social protection) infrastructure.



**Remember that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet!** Different countries have used these terms differently. For example, in Kenya a horizontal expansion means extending the current Programme to shock-affected households, but the Programme design (e.g. adequacy of transfer) does not necessarily meet emergency needs. Meanwhile, in Malawi, social protection systems are being leveraged to meet lifesaving needs - currently, when additional support is provided to existing households (by leveraging the social protection system) to meet heightened needs it's called a vertical expansion, and when support is provided to new households (by leveraging the social protection system) it's called a horizontal expansion.

<sup>48</sup> In the original OPM work (O'Brien et al 2018), this term is called 'piggybacking'. This means they 'leverage' those systems, building on what is already there

Box 2. How does this framing advance the discussions on 'Shock Responsive Social Protection'?

In 2016-2018, OPM and DFID developed a framework for shock responsive social protection. For more details on this, including a summary of pre-requisites, opportunities, challenges and risks of each key strategy ([here](#)), see the "[Shock Responsive Social Protection Toolkit](#)."

The framework in this document aims to advance the OPM/DFID framework. This is because practitioners/colleagues that have been working to operationalise this framework in country in recent years have been struggling with some of its **limitations**, which are often due to its **misinterpretations**, some of which include:



- It does not give sufficient attention to 'simply doing social protection better' - core systems strengthening in pursuit of 'universal social protection' and the significant role this can play in equipping households to deal with shocks
- It risks centralising the role of social protection in response to covariate shocks without questioning the appropriateness (e.g. when should social protection play a role, and when should it not), and does not sufficiently acknowledge the fundamental role of other sectors (e.g. Disaster Risk Management and Humanitarian)
- Its emphasis on the importance of ex-ante responses to shocks, which was explicit in the framework, was easily overlooked, resulting in users perceiving a primary focus on post-shock response. It also explicitly chose to avoid a focus on resilience, while acknowledging its importance
- It conflated different criteria together: the 'amount' given, the 'coverage' reached, and who is responsible for it (these may be mixed and matched in different ways). It also missed other important criteria (see below).
- It was interpreted with excessive focus on 'vertical' expansions, whereas these have several limitations, and insufficient focus on the range of options for leveraging existing Programmes and sub-systems ('piggybacking')
- It has been primarily used with a focus on specific 'flagship' Programmes and not across the social protection system and its myriad of interventions.
- It is often used 'aspirationally' and risks setting unrealistic expectations of what the social protection sector is able to do
- Also, it hasn't incorporated a gender perspective and other vulnerable groups' specific needs into the approach

This guidance sets out to address some of these issues. See also Annex B for more details.

Source: [O'Brien et al. \(2018b\)](#), also adopted within *SPaN (2019)* and others

<sup>3</sup> See [Kidd and Huda \(2013\)](#) for a comprehensive description of Brazil's social security system.

Table 1. Summary of key strategies


<p>Social protection sector</p>	     	<p><b>Routine systems strengthening</b> (not the focus of this module, but essential for all strategies)</p> <p><b>Doing what you already do, better (design and implementation tweaks)</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Include the reduction of vulnerability to shocks and explicitly aim to increase resilience as part of routine Programmes</li> <li>Adjust social protection routine provision (e.g. geographical coverage) in light of (risk) context (especially for situations that are being treated as emergencies when they're not)</li> <li>Enable dynamic inclusion of new caseloads in need, regardless of the shock type (e.g. overcome barriers to continuous registration and enrolment)</li> <li>Enable further flexibility in the system e.g. transfer amounts</li> <li>Ensure continuity of service delivery in the aftermath of a shock and/or in fragile contexts</li> </ol> <p><b>Coordinating with – and supporting – other sectors (DRM, humanitarian in particular), depending on context...</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Preparedness for emergency Programmes that 'leverage existing systems (e.g. data, capacity, delivery mechanism such as registration or payments system) where possible</li> <li>Preparedness to temporarily increase the value or duration of assistance for households already on a social protection Programme, if relevant and feasible.</li> <li>Preparedness to temporarily increase the number of recipients in an existing social protection Programme if relevant and feasible.</li> <li>Preparedness for any other form of coordination with the social protection sector (e.g. 'alignment').</li> </ol>
<p>DRM and Humanitarian sectors</p>		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Routinely deliver against core mandate to meet lifesaving needs</li> <li>Coordinate with social protection to understand how/whether to leverage capacity/Programmes/systems vis-à-vis different shocks</li> </ol>

Source: adapted from O'Brien (forthcoming)

To some extent, these different strategies (or combinations of strategies) fall along a spectrum of different levels of social protection 'involvement', depending on your assessment of shocks, sectoral strengths and weaknesses, and trade-offs between desirable outcomes and their criteria (see also Section 2.3 and Annex B)!

**A useful way to think of this is also the following (Figure 6): while Social Protection may not always be 'leading', there may be many cases where it makes sense to leverage its capacity and systems – and vice versa. Exactly how and what will depend on country context (see Section 2.3) and a lot can be done to strengthen government social protection systems to play a bigger role. This is the core focus of this curriculum (Section 3).**

Figure 6. Leading vs leveraging capacity and systems



Source: adapted from inputs by Roehm (2019)

Box 3. CHEAT SHEET example: Extending coverage can be achieved in many ways – social protection may or may not have a role to play in achieving this!

There is a *continuum of potential approaches to extending coverage beyond current recipients of social protection* – and not all of these options involve the social protection sector (or are limited to ‘horizontal expansions’ of existing Programmes). Each offers a set of opportunities, risks, and challenges – and the potential for each is affected by what countries have in place in advance of a shock. See also Section 3.2.2.

1. **Extending coverage via new ‘emergency’ Programmes** (led by DRM and humanitarian sectors) that are completely **parallel** to the social protection system (**‘parallel’**), meaning that there is no interaction with social protection
2. **Extending coverage via new ‘emergency’ Programmes** (led by DRM, humanitarian or social protection sectors) that **align** to the social protection system (**‘alignment’**) meaning there is a point of convergence (e.g. emergency intervention pegs the transfer to social assistance).
3. **Extending coverage via new ‘emergency’ Programmes that leverage existing delivery systems** and deliver temporary support to new caseloads (**‘piggybacking’**). The leveraging of systems does not just need to be DRM/ Humanitarian leveraging social protection system; the leveraging can go both ways:
  - *Leveraging existing data* (e.g. from a Programme database/social registry);
  - *Leveraging registration/enrolment approach and capacity*. A good example is Chile, where capacity for registration of social protection Programmes is used for data collection in the aftermath of a shock.



#### 4. Extending coverage via existing social protection Programmes ('horizontal expansion'):

- *Via extending Programme/s' geographical coverage:*
    - *Temporary (no examples) or longer-term geographical expansions* – Examples include cash transfer Programmes in El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru in response to the 2008/09 global financial crisis.
  - *Via enrolling additional beneficiaries who are eligible but were excluded from the original support.* This is likely to lead to expansions that are long-term/permanent (not temporary).
    - *Newly eligible households* because of changed household conditions. On-demand registration systems (such as those in Brazil and Chile, for example) theoretically have the capacity to flexibly accommodate these new caseloads<sup>49</sup>
    - *Eligible households* excluded because of quotas/budget restrictions. For example, this was how the Programmes Pension 65 and Prospera in Peru and Mexico responded to recent disasters
    - *Eligible households* excluded because of a wide range of other reasons (e.g. direct, indirect, and opportunity costs of applying, etc.)
    - *Former beneficiaries* who had left the Programme. This was recently the case in Mexico and is a simple and swift option as operational data is already available for former beneficiaries.
  - *Via temporarily or permanently modifying the eligibility criteria.* In practice, this may be operationalised via either:
    - *A new registration/enrolment process* (either census survey or potentially on-demand) aimed at identifying affected households and assessing eligibility on the basis of the revised criteria. This has often been done in recent crises.
    - *Utilising existing social protection data* (e.g. non-beneficiary information from a social registry) and applying new criteria. This is an option that was often considered and discarded in the Latin American region.
  - *Via enabling temporary access to those who are already enrolled, but who are not receiving because of requirements/qualifying conditions.* A common example is the waiving of conditionality, embedded in legislation in some countries (e.g. Mexico, Philippines and Colombia, or the requirement to work in a public works Programme (PWP).
5. **(Longer-term) extension of coverage via permanent social protection Programmes.** Many countries in Latin America have responded to large crises – most notably the economic crisis of 2008/09 – by developing new social protection Programmes (e.g. Argentina, El Salvador, Honduras, Belize, and Guatemala).

Sources: Beazley et al (2019); Beazley (2018a); Beazley et.al. (2016); Barca and Beazley (2019); Grosh et.al, (2014); and O'Brien et al (2018 a/b).

## 2.3 DECIDING ON A STRATEGY: A CONTEXT DRIVEN ASSESSMENT

So far, we've looked at what criteria we are focusing on to achieve better outcomes for shock-affected/prone households, and that the appropriateness of any decision, short and long term, should be based on a careful assessment of context. This section discusses **the three key factors to assess your context when analysing the suitability of shock responsive social protection (see also Figure 3).**

<sup>49</sup> This is not always the case, however, as on-demand systems present numerous barriers to access (Barca, 2017).



### 2.3.1 Better understanding shocks

There are a wide variety of hazards, shocks and stresses (sometimes degenerating into crises/emergencies/disasters when un/mis-managed) affecting individuals, households and communities. **These all have very different features/characteristics (see Section 1.4).**

**All of these features/characteristics, when analysed in combination, affect the possible design and implementation choices faced by governments and their counterparts** (national and international) – including the potential role for social protection<sup>50</sup>. These include:

- The **characteristics, needs and challenges faced by vulnerable/affected populations** – including the overlaps between routine social protection caseloads (e.g. the chronically poor/vulnerable) and vulnerable/affected populations. These have implications for ‘targeting’ choices.
- The **funding** that is made available (e.g. size, speed, duration and conditions attached to the flow of funds);
- The **mix of stakeholders** involved in responding to needs and their potential for **coordination**;
- The **codes of conduct/standards/principles** required of those involved in giving assistance and the broader **political economy**;
- The **potential to leverage capacity and systems from different sectors** (e.g. Early Warning Systems)
- The **feasibility of providing different services** (e.g. extent of market disruption, destruction of service delivery infrastructure, etc)
- The relevant **legal and policy frameworks** (e.g. a refugee response will need to respect national legislation on the topic)

The official ‘paradigm’ is that emergency response is to meet temporary, life-threatening and urgent needs – yet in recent years this has often not been the case<sup>51</sup>. For example, as stressed in the introduction, the vast majority of humanitarian funds are allocated to (non ‘urgent’ and non-temporary) protracted crises and often met through international humanitarian interventions. The question, going forwards, is the extent to which national social protection could help to relieve some of this pressure<sup>52</sup> – especially for certain types / characteristics of shocks. Table 3 therefore summarises some of the key implications for responding to shocks via – or in coordination with – the social protection sector, based on key shock characteristics.

**Any country deciding on a ‘shock responsive social protection strategy’ needs to first understand the range of shocks the country is prone to, and what the various characteristics of those multiple shocks mean for the social protection sector (and other sectors)** – see also Section 3.1.

<sup>50</sup>Adapted from Levine and Sharp (2015)

<sup>52</sup>Ibid.

<sup>53</sup>International humanitarian agencies are increasingly under pressure to stop funding responses to the kind of high frequency, lower impact shocks that governments ought to be absorbing for themselves. Governments need to be prepared to take on these risks and should work out how to do so in the most cost-effective and impactful way possible. Moreover, government emergency response tends to be funded mainly to coordinate post-disaster response, often without the resources to handle disaster prevention or recovery. It would be more efficient for the overall government budget to increase the attention on prevention and recovery. Social protection has a role here and this role needs to be clarified.





**Discussing the potential role of social protection in a context of increasing covariate shocks does not mean that emergency DRM and Humanitarian operations are ‘bad’ or ‘wrong’.**

It simply means there are certain contexts and types of shocks – e.g. recurrent, predictable shocks and seasonal stresses – where social protection can and should play a greater role as needs are chronic and not temporary. On the other hand, there are other contexts where national capacity is overwhelmed and it makes complete sense for emergency actors to take the lead -potentially leveraging social protection Programmes and systems where relevant and feasible. See also Section 1.3.2.

**Ultimately, international humanitarian responses can ‘make itself redundant’ over time by strengthening national capacities, but only in certain contexts and not for all shocks! Even then, it may be that DRM actors are better placed than social protection to respond.**

Table 3. Broad implications for shock response via the social protection system<sup>53</sup>

Shock characteristics	Major 'consequences' (most relevant examples for each)	Some broad implications for shock response via or in coordination with the social protection system
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>RAPID/ SUDDEN ONSET</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Highly 'visible' and often receive more funding</li> <li>May cause widespread displacement, splitting up of households/settling in IDP camps/the loss of key documents</li> <li>Likely to significantly affect household material circumstances/assets</li> <li>Likely to also affect the non poor (while hitting the chronically poor harder)</li> <li>Likely to affect local markets</li> <li>Likely to disrupt the functioning of existing systems (including SP)</li> <li>Timeliness of assistance becomes a priority (period between impact an intervention small)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Only use SP systems if they are immediately functioning to address need</li> <li>Important to work to address possible impacts on the functioning of the SP system (to ensure routine payments/possible leveraging as part of the recovery)</li> <li>Potential to leverage humanitarian funding for SP sector, particularly as part of recovery efforts once systems are functioning</li> <li>Importance of ensuring portability of benefits and revalidation exercises</li> <li>Importance of enabling dynamic inclusion for affected households and potential (temporary?) changes in eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions</li> <li>Importance of ensuring/adjusting adequacy of support</li> <li>Transfers (if provided through SP) should be adequate to meet heightened need, otherwise emergency actors will not 'count' the assistance (i.e. leading to less cost-efficiency/more duplication)</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>SLOW ONSET</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Less 'visible' and often under-financed</li> <li>Often, strong overlap between chronic poverty and vulnerability to the shock</li> <li>Trigger for response can be less obvious and more political (gradually worsening situations), leading to delay – early Warning Systems particularly relevant</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Importance of ad-hoc, ex-ante financing strategies</li> <li>Routine caseloads and emergency caseloads may have high overlaps: strong potential to strengthen routine system so it can be leveraged as part of any response</li> <li>High potential to appeal to routine SP funding to cover heightened need (e.g. SP donors to protect their investments)</li> <li>Potential to link to Early Warning System</li> <li>Transfers (if provided through SP) should be adequate to meet heightened need, otherwise emergency actors will not 'count' the assistance (i.e. leading to less cost-efficiency/more duplication)</li> <li>Etc.</li> </ul>

<sup>53</sup> Note, this does not aim to be a comprehensive Table – it outlines a useful way of thinking.

Shock characteristics	Major 'consequences' (most relevant examples for each)	Some broad implications for shock response via or in coordination with the social protection system
RECURRENT/ AND/OR PROTRACTED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Higher potential to budget for contingencies &amp; risk-financing</li> <li>Strong overlap between chronic poverty and vulnerability (not 'really' a shock!)</li> <li>Very strong rationale for long-term resilience building and linkages across services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Importance of ad-hoc, ex-ante financing strategies</li> <li>Essential to pursue routine social protection systems strengthening and preparedness measures (administrative costs offset, predictable context, overlap in core caseloads, etc.)</li> <li>Call for permanent rather than temporary expansion of social protection Programmes (increasing caseloads – on-demand – to respond to growing needs)</li> <li>Potential to explicitly pursue resilience enhancement and lowering of needs</li> <li>Importance of coordination with humanitarian actors in country (to avoid duplication/gaps and enhance longer term national capacities), including on level of assistance</li> </ul>
OCCASIONAL STRESS	(or truly unpredictable): Inverse to considerations above	
SEASONAL STRESS	Similar to 'recurrent' above – overall, social protection can and should play a lead role in addressing vulnerabilities due to seasonal stresses (these are not even 'shocks'). This falls entirely within sectoral mandate, except for cases where the 'magnitude' of the need exceeds national capacities. Also, humanitarian principles do not 'fully' apply. In cases that have been experiencing recurrent needs met through emergency systems at a much higher level than the existing SP system, it may take time to transition these caseloads over to routine SP (e.g. time to identify the predictable funding, agreement that regular SP coverage should increase etc.).	
ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most individuals and households affected across the country, across income levels</li> <li>Slow onset and long term consequences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Even more than for other shocks they call for permanent rather than temporary expansion of social protection Programmes (increasing caseloads – on-demand – to respond to growing needs)</li> <li>Social insurance can potentially play a bigger role</li> </ul>
NATURAL HAZARD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More 'visible' and often receive more funding, especially when they are sudden/rapid onset. Funding also available from Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund.</li> <li>Early Warning System (EWS) triggers are most developed for natural hazards</li> <li>Likely to significantly affect household material circumstances/assets</li> <li>Potential 'protection' concerns</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential to leverage humanitarian and climate change funding for SP sector</li> <li>Linkages with climate activities such as forecast based financing and early warning system(EWS) can be leveraged for SP</li> <li>Potential to conduct "climate smart targeting" for existing social protection Programmes</li> <li>Potential to explicitly pursue resilience to climate change enhancement and lowering of needs</li> <li>Etc.</li> </ul>

RECURRENCE<sup>54</sup>

TYPE OF SHOCK

<sup>54</sup>(also linked to predictability)

Shock characteristics	Major 'consequences' (most relevant examples for each)	Some broad implications for shock response via or in coordination with the social protection system protection system
<b>CONFLICT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential security and protection concerns &amp; importance of humanitarian principles</li> <li>Risk of short-term trouble shooting rather than longer-term perspective</li> <li>Likely to cause widespread displacement (IDPs and refugees) and splitting up of households</li> <li>Likely to widely affect the non poor and introduce new forms of vulnerability</li> <li>Likely to significantly affect household material circumstances/assets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High care must be taken not to exacerbate underlying conflict and ensure interventions Do No Harm: may call for impartial/neutral/independent ('parallel' or 'aligned') response, and no role for SP</li> <li>Should be influenced by a proper conflict-analysis that assesses underlying and overt causes of conflict, power structures and possible implications of aid, rather than correlation with underlying poverty/vulnerability for SP</li> <li>Importance of ensuring portability of benefits (within and across countries) and revalidation exercises</li> <li>Importance of explicitly addressing security, protection and accountability concerns</li> <li><b>Specific to conflict-affected states:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New forms of vulnerabilities – disability, health etc. require changes to selection criteria, introduction of new Programmes, linkages, etc</li> <li>Access to existing data and systems more complex (partly due to lack of trust and potential collapse of underlying Social Protection system)</li> </ul> </li> <li><b>Specific to Host countries, refugees, asylum seekers:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy and legal provisions to extend social protection to -non-citizens may not exist</li> <li>No data on refugees and non-citizens within existing systems, for host countries (importance of cross border agreements, IDs etc)</li> <li>'Political' challenges related to equal treatment for host communities</li> <li>Other complex political economy and funding challenges</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>PANDEMIC</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>More 'visible' and may receive more funding</li> <li>Likely to widely affect the poor as well as the non poor, with ripple effects due to 'panic'</li> <li>New vulnerabilities linked to temporary or longer term ability and opportunities to work may arise</li> <li>Social and financial access to services may be restricted</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential to leverage humanitarian funding for SP sector</li> <li>Importance of ensuring dynamic inclusion of new caseloads</li> <li>Potential to leverage digital technologies if offered by SP (avoiding physical proximity)</li> <li>Etc.</li> </ul>
<b>HIGH</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large percentage of population affected</li> <li>Large death toll and other impacts, requiring urgent action in first 24 hours and beyond</li> <li>Overwhelms national capacity and financing to respond (as capacity also heavily affected)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unlikely that the social protection system will be able to play a major role, beyond complementing and supporting humanitarian efforts (e.g. leveraging SP capacity, knowledge and systems)</li> <li>Longer-term social protection and livelihood support may result in more lives saved than a short-term emergency operation</li> </ul>
<b>LOW</b>	<i>Inverse to considerations above</i>	

Source: author, building on Barca and Beazley (2019), UNICEF (2020), Levine and Sharp (2015)

**Recurrent needs, an example!**

The coverage of social assistance in some countries is a political one – it implies a Government financial commitment (or future financial commitment if the current system is donor funded) to meet the needs of the population. In many contexts, countries are facing recurrent seasonal needs met by humanitarian actors as the coverage of SP is too low in comparison to need – even in years without a significant climatic shock. Whilst this could/should (depending on the country) be taken up by social protection to ensure the provision of predictable assistance over this time period, this may take time! Identifying funding, changing contracts, hiring staff, preparing the system and other functions is a timely endeavour.



Until the point when SP can take up this assistance, the country could choose to use different shock responsive approaches to reach the emergency need – leveraging parts of the SP system, increasing the transfer value for households on SP with the humanitarian sector reaching the remaining needs, and most importantly strengthening the SP system for use in future years! SRSP can therefore be seen as a pathway to enhanced SP, an effort to work collectively to shift from needs of the same households being met year after year by an international humanitarian system, to enrolment within routine social protection Programmes to better meet their needs before, during and after recurrent shocks.


2.3.1.1 The shock cycle: differing needs, roles and actions

**As the literature on DRM/humanitarian programming amply stress, 'shocks' are also characterised by very distinct phases.**

As for the shock characteristics above, each broad 'phase' is very different – especially in terms of:

- Different needs of vulnerable/affected populations
- Different roles played by actors who have a mandate to support
- Different actions that may be relevant

Figure 7. Key – stylised – stages of a shock cycle



The key stages are stylised in Figure 7, stressing the beginning of a new stage does not necessarily mean the end of the previous. Of course, this stylisation will look very different for different types of shocks e.g. a protracted crisis.

**Section 4 explores key actions for social protection actors along this cycle,** building on the actions discussed in Section 3.

**It also stresses how different shocks often overlap in country and follow distinct patterns (e.g. recurrences) over time –** meaning any strategy to address these needs to look across different shocks and their cycles in the short, medium and long term (e.g. Figure 11).

### 2.3.1.2 Climate change and long-term changes

**Analysing past trends, stresses and shocks can be an important starting point when thinking about ‘shock responsive social protection’.** However, in the medium to long term, not all shocks a country is prone to will remain fixed over time. Climate change and other trends (population growth, urbanisation, etc.) are likely to affect future hotspots of vulnerability.

Social protection has the potential to improve or support households' adaptation to climate change, if Programme planning, design and implementation follow these principles<sup>55</sup>:

1. Recognise climate change uncertainty;
2. Prioritise food security and nutrition considerations;
3. Support households' long-term adaptation strategies;
4. Avoid the risk of maladaptation.;
5. Understand trade-offs;
6. Define resilience objectives in the theory of change;
7. Consider unintended spill-over effects on the environment;
8. Adjust Programmes to context;
9. Acknowledge even small contributions from individual interventions;
10. Work across disciplines (especially climate change activities).

Future-proofing the social protection system to changing risks – via medium and long term ‘planning for uncertainty’– is an integral part of being shock responsive (see also Section 3). Similarly, focusing routine social protection on enhancing resilience and discouraging maladaptation<sup>56</sup> will also be critical.

#### Key climate activities that could be linked to social protection

- **Climate change projections and models** can inform vulnerability assessments, including effects on food security and malnutrition. They can also inform better targeting and Programme options, taking into account different future scenarios, and avoid maladaptation.
- **Early Warning Systems (EWS)** can help to build resilience by responding to crises before they occur.
- If properly linked with national social protection systems, forecast based financing has the potential to not only help smooth climate-related shocks, avoiding set-backs in development, but also to enable poor and vulnerable people to manage climate risks more effectively and in a proactive manner.
- **Climate risk insurance** could play an important protection role to poor households exposed to climate risk, protecting people from different types of shocks and levels of vulnerability and enabling people to boost their productivity.
- **Social Behavioural Change and Communication interventions (SBCC)** can be linked to social protection Programmes with the purpose of addressing some of the values, preferences and social norms that influence a behaviour, including maladaptation.

Useful information/guidance:

- (Solórzano and Cardenas, 2019) Social Protection and Climate Change [here](#)



### 2.3.2 Understanding and leveraging the strengths of each sector

**What each sector (social protection, DRM and humanitarian) is capable of offering will vary from country to country, depending on that sector’s ‘capacity’, ‘maturity’ and the country’s broader political economy.** That is why some form of ‘System Assessment’ (see Section 3.1) is so important to inform any decision on who should be leading and/or involved in a response, and how – i.e. leveraging what systems.

<sup>55</sup> Solórzano and Cárdenes, 2019

<sup>56</sup> Activities that “foster adaptation in the short-term but negatively affect systems’ long-term vulnerability and/or adaptive capacity to climate change” (ibid).





For example, as the TRANSFORM curriculum stresses, the provision of social protection varies widely across countries. Broadly, countries with an effective mix of Programmes – across social insurance and social assistance – and core systems are better positioned to respond to shocks, as they possess a broader toolbox to draw from and build on. Key criteria to assess social protection system ‘maturity’, include<sup>57</sup> :

Policy:

- **Strong government leadership**, as well as **legal and policy backing** (see Section 3.3)
- **Institutional capacity** supported by well-functioning vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms (see Section 3.2)
- Sustainable **funding/financing** (see Section 3.4)

Programme (design)

- An **integrated system of Programmes** that offer **high and equitable coverage** of population and needs, with low potential for exclusion (see Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2)
- Programmes that offer **adequate support** (type, level, frequency, duration of transfers/services) (see Section 3.5.3).


Administration

- **Established administrative systems** for service delivery, integrated across Programmes where possible, user-centric and supported by strong capacity (see Section 3.6)
- Robust systems for **informed decision-making and accountability** enhancement (grievance mechanisms, M&E systems, information systems etc) (see Sections 3.1 and 3.7)

These could all be viewed as ‘building blocks’ that could be strengthened and/or leveraged (‘piggybacked’ on) individually or collectively! Imagine it as a ‘dial’ that goes from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ (Figure 8):

- if specific social protection building blocks are **‘weak’** it will make sense to a) not leverage them in the short term (i.e. build on experience and expertise from the humanitarian/DRM sectors, either national or international); b) strengthen them in the medium term
- if they are **‘strong’**, it may make sense to leverage these where possible within the overarching response strategy

Figure 8. ‘Pick’n’mix’ of existing systems, an example



Source: Adapted from Seyfert et al (2019). Note: the positioning of the ‘dial’ for each element is just an example. Any country would need to build its own based on a System Assessment

<sup>57</sup> O’Brien et al 2018 a/b; Barca 2018; UNICEF 2020

From a practical perspective, the ‘maturity’ of the social protection system and the strength of each of its ‘building blocks’ will therefore inform:

- the *medium to long-term* system strengthening and preparedness measures that will be necessary.
- in the *short-term*, the most adequate options for responding to shocks via, or in coordination with, the social protection sector.

A similar assessment can of course be conducted for other relevant sectors in the country.



**Social protection systems are continuously evolving, and shocks are an opportunity to ‘beat on the iron while it is hot’.**

It is important to stress that decision-making is not entirely constrained by the existing design of the social protection system and of the interventions it encompasses.

In a longer-term perspective, this means countries can carefully assess the constraints and opportunities inherent to existing systems and build on those over time. We should remember that many of the Programmes we know of today were initially born as a response to a specific shock (or sequence of shocks), where the limitations of existing systems are often starkly felt. This is the case for BISP in Pakistan, introduced with the objective of addressing the impact of rising food prices in 2008. Similar patterns have been seen in a wide range of countries, including in the Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Ethiopia to mention a few. Large expansions of coverage of existing Programmes have similarly been achieved as a response to prior shocks – with notable examples from Latin America<sup>58</sup>.



### 2.3.3 A collective focus on better outcomes

Section 2.1 extensively discussed what we are collectively trying to achieve, across sectors. However, putting that into practice requires some tough – and political – decision-making and negotiations. To operationalise that ‘wish list’, it is **helpful to think through the appropriateness of different strategies (or combinations of strategies) against the 8 criteria**. These are organized within Table 4 below to support the assessment (see Annex E for an example on how to fill this).

<sup>58</sup> SBarca (2018); UNICEF (2020)

Table 4. Assessing the appropriateness of different strategies against key criteria

Criteria	Possible indicator	For any selected strategy, consider		
		Potential positive impacts (and likelihood)	Potential negative impacts/risks (and likelihood)	Strategies to mitigate negative impacts/risks <sup>59</sup>
1. Coverage	Level of coverage (vs affected population)			
	Appropriateness of targeting			
2. Adequacy	Relevance of type of support (e.g. modality <sup>60</sup> )			
	Adequacy of support (meeting needs?)			
	Anticipated impacts on affected populations			
3. Comprehensiveness	Supporting different multidimensional needs			
4. Timeliness	Timing of response in line with the purpose and phase (e.g. able to meet the lifesaving needs in the time they are required)			
5. Cost-effectiveness	Extent of harmonization of systems and coordination, resulting in reduced costs (eliminating duplicated delivery systems and processes for everyone, not just routine SP beneficiaries)			
	Trade-offs, compromises, disadvantages of increased coordination			
	Minimisation of gaps in provision			
6. Accountability to affected populations	Respect for humanitarian principles			
	Enhanced dignity of affected populations			
	Understandable and accepted by communities			
7. Predictability	Predictability of funding			
	Predictability and strengthen support to households			
8. Ownership and sustainability	Extent to which design and delivery of Programme/s is embedded in long-term government systems			
	Government ownership of the agenda			
	Exit/phase-out feasibility for temporary scale ups			
Overall assessment:				

Source: adapted from SPaN (2019) and O'Brien et al (2018 a/b)

<sup>59</sup>Note: in some cases a mitigation strategy may include adopting another response strategy to 'fill in the gaps'.

<sup>60</sup>I.e. you might be able to give the right cash amount, but if people can't buy intended items e.g. because markets are disrupted or because of hyperinflation, the assistance is not adequate.

Additionally, it will be essential to:

- Acknowledge there is **no universal recipe or blueprint**: What may work well in one context may be detrimental in another. Throughout this document we stress certain actions should be pursued only where 'relevant and feasible' (based on a prior assessment).
- Consider inherent **trade-offs** between these objectives and address them ex-ante where possible (with strategies for mitigating risks): e.g. timeliness vs a 'better targeted response' or the potential for overburdening the administrative capacity of existing social protection systems, undermining longer term sustainability, etc. Any strategic decision will affect all seven objectives simultaneously and no policy decision can affect all of them in a positive direction.
- Understand there may be cases where one of these objectives may be explicitly **prioritized** over others (e.g. timeliness), but this should be done based on a comprehensive analysis of the implications for the other criteria – and how to address these.
- Understand that the opportunities and risks of each strategy, and roles and responsibilities across stakeholders, **will change at different stages of a response** – as the needs of affected populations also change over time.
- Understand whether the type of shock and prevailing context calls for 'impartial', 'neutral' and 'independent' interventions that fully abide by **humanitarian principles** (see document [here](#), short [video](#) and Humanitarian Charter and Associated Standards [here](#)).



### Possible tradeoffs and the importance of coordination, a scenario!

In Hangu, a province in Jimbal country, 1000 households have been identified as requiring emergency food assistance for a period of 5 months at a transfer value of 25 USD a month. Hangu has a functioning SP system in the same geographical area which reaches 700 households, receiving a much lower transfer value.

Practitioners have shown through evidence that households targeted on the SP Programme are amongst those most in need of additional assistance following a shock. However, the SP system has no capacity/financing to include new beneficiaries. From a SP perspective, it may seem simple to appeal to donors to provide assistance to meet the heightened needs of those 700 households directly to their existing bank accounts (via a 'vertical expansion').

However, this may not be the best strategy overall. First of all, it's important to ensure this is coordinated with the emergency response – otherwise Jimbal runs the risk of two parallel responses to the same need! One by social protection, and one by DRM/humanitarian actors. Secondly, practitioners should assess how this is helping reach all needs identified. The 8 criteria may show very positively if only assessing against the 700 households. But, what about the other 300 households who need lifesaving assistance?

In practice this can get complicated! For the international humanitarian community, the cost per beneficiary may now be higher (it's a small caseload) so the entire response may be less cost-efficient. There are also increased challenges in making sure humanitarians don't accidentally target the same households. Also, how do you explain this to the community in a way that doesn't marginalise SP beneficiaries?

**It is extremely important to look at the SRSP framework from a total needs perspective when assessing the appropriateness of different SRSP strategies.**

## 2.4 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

- Collectively, across sectors (e.g. social protection, humanitarian, DRM), we would want to reach certain outcomes via a strategy that better meets people's needs – (1) greater coverage, (2) adequacy and (3) comprehensiveness of support\* - that ensures (4) timeliness, (5) cost-effectiveness, (6) accountability, (7) predictability and (8) ownership & sustainability compared to the status quo and compared to any alternative strategy.  
*\*These first three criteria align with the three 'tenets' of Universal Social Protection!*
- Social protection can play a role to help achieve the desired outcome(s) to meet the needs of the shock-prone/affected households, but that role will depend on an assessment of:
  - a) the types of shock and their characteristics: predictable and recurrent shocks broadly fall under social protection's core mandate, while others may call for different capacities. In cases that have been experiencing recurrent needs at a much higher level than the existing SP system, it may take time to transition these caseloads over to routine SP.
  - b) your existing systems and capacity: e.g. maturity/capacity of the social protection sector, DRM sector and humanitarian sector. It is important to assess the 'building blocks' of each system to understand what can be leverage.
  - c) the opportunities, challenges and risks of different options against the key desirable outcomes set out above. There are tradeoffs between these that lead to difficult decisions!
- No matter what, it will be essential to strengthen routine systems, ensure routine social protection programming is based on a solid understanding of the risks, shocks and stressors that your country (and its regions) typically faces (and is likely to face in the future), coordinate with sectors that are mandated to respond to shocks (DRM and humanitarian) to understand whether there is any further role to be played by social protection in response to increased needs. Discussing the potential role of social protection in a context of increasing covariate shocks does not mean that emergency DRM and Humanitarian operations are 'bad' or 'wrong'.




# 3

## IN PRACTICE: SYSTEM STRENGTHENING, PREPAREDNESS AND PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY

Having better understood our contexts and what drives the decisions for the adoption of different strategies, this section focuses on what we can do to strengthen our social protection Programmes and systems to help address the needs and vulnerabilities that are derived from hazardous events, shocks or stresses. This will involve a process of **'risk informing' and enhancing social protection preparedness for future shocks, no matter what strategy we have decided to adopt in country.**

In order to do so, we adopt a **'systems strengthening' lens**, as discussed in Section 2. For each of the key pillars of a social protection system as defined by the TRANSFORM curriculum, we suggest a set of potential actions that should be considered by governments that want to **'risk-inform' their social protection system in advance of any shock.** These are summarised in Table 7 below and discussed in detail in the following sections.

'We are focusing in this section on what needs to be done differently, beyond doing good SP'

Our focus	What is relevant for covariate shocks	Routine system strengthening for SP
		
$\Delta y$	$=$	$y_2 - y_1$



### 3.1 M&E – EVIDENCE AND LEARNING

Table 4. Continued

<p>Routine system strengthening</p>	<p>The <a href="#">TRANSFORM M&amp;E Module</a> extensively discusses why and how to better incorporate evidence -and learning from prior experiences into social protection decision-making (related to planning, day to day management, changes to Programme/system design features, etc). <i>Strengthening M&amp;E and evidence informed decision making for the social protection sector are fundamental systems strengthening steps for any country.</i></p>	
<p>What is the 'delta'? (How is this different from 'business as usual'?)</p>	<p>What the core Module does not do is encompass a focus on the type of evidence needed to inform decisions on whether and how social protection could work alongside other sectors to better pre-empt, prepare for and respond to hazardous events, shocks and stresses. This section briefly addresses that gap.</p>	
<p>Why is this important?</p>	<p>Because basing policy and operational decisions on data, evidence and past learning is more effective – and focusing on socio-economic indicators relating to 'poverty' alone will not give a full picture of individual, household and community vulnerabilities and their evolution over time.</p>	

**Key ACTIONS that may be relevant in your country include<sup>61</sup>:**

- **Familiarising with the risk profile and shock cycle of your country and its diverse regions,** building on available information and expertise from humanitarian, climate change and DRM colleagues. Annex D provides key examples of existing resources that may be helpful – noting this will depend on your country.
- **Familiarising with how humanitarian needs assessments are done each year and when**
- **Based on these, prioritise the shocks to be addressed through social protection.** It might not be possible to include all shocks and risks factors relevant to a country. Therefore, it would be important to reflect upon what shocks and risks are more relevant, feasible and why.
- **Not only basing social protection strategic decisions on historical data from the past, but also projections for the future.** How will the country's risk profile evolve over time? What will the implications be on poverty, vulnerability, mobility, livelihoods, etc.? It will be essential to 'stress test' current decisions and strategies against a range of potential future outcomes: preparing for the future, taking advantage of emerging opportunities and mitigating future risks. This may include:
  - Developing scenarios for future evolution of shocks (e.g. via [climate change modelling](#)).
  - Adopting some of the tools and techniques of 'Strategic Foresight' (see this [useful Toolkit](#) by Save the Children for some ideas)
  - Building on these scenarios to develop microsimulations of policy alternatives (e.g. varying the design of different Programmes), to inform longer term strategic thinking



“The purpose of looking at the future is to disturb the present.”  
Gaston Berger, French Futurist

<sup>61</sup>This section extensively builds on UNICEF (2020)



**Climate change is likely to lead to changing patterns and new ‘hotspots’ of vulnerability.**

This means that social protection in the context of climate change and disaster risk needs to be carefully designed to ensure that it serves a long-term function, and not only in relation to the current climate/risk scenario (WB 2013).

**Given how the specific effects of climate change are difficult to predict, social protection practitioners must learn to plan for uncertainty.** Climate change projections and models can help assess current and future climate variability, enabling a better understanding of current and projected vulnerabilities – essential for longer term social protection targeting and Programme design (Solórzano and Cárdenes 2019).

**• Incorporating evidence on risk and vulnerability to covariate shocks into routine monitoring and evaluation activities, to inform planning and programming.**

- Find or create the evidence needed.
  - Share data with/from other sectors, including DRM and humanitarian – building on existing information and adding indicators/information where these are missing. It is rarely the case that social protection actors need to be leading on this exercise.
  - Incorporate relevant indicators into routine national surveys e.g. modules on shocks/crises and coping strategies or ad-hoc surveys (see e.g. Box 4)
  - Incorporate relevant indicators into social protection administrative information systems (see Section 3.7).
  - Better encompass dimensions of vulnerability to covariate shocks into routine vulnerability analysis at community level e.g. via an intersectional approach (include data on poverty, ethnicity, gender, age, disability, etc.<sup>62</sup> )
  - In contexts with regular, predictable shocks, develop and consolidate district seasonal calendars (to understand shocks at the micro-level, not just national)
- Use existing evidence more effectively.
  - Conduct country-specific analysis to better understand the intersections between monetary poverty, multi-dimensional deprivations and vulnerability to covariate shocks (of different nature).
  - Layer data across sources (e.g. using geographical units of analysis) to capture the ‘risk/hazard’ dimensions of poverty. Area- and household-level data on exposure to natural hazards are needed to distinguish transitory from chronic poverty in places where crises are likely to occur<sup>63</sup>.
  - Learning from best-practice in countries where similar analyses have been pursued – e.g. via regional learning forums

*Box 4. Case Studies: Use of National Statistics and surveys to better understand shocks*

**Crisis Module in Nicaragua’s Labour Force Survey.** With the support of the Rapid Social Response Fund, Nicaragua is developing a crisis module in the permanent labour force survey to provide frequent indicators of climate and other shocks to households. This Programme encourages the Government’s current efforts to collect data on its labour force, while also taking advantage of its coverage on both rural and urban population as well as its frequency in collecting information on household shocks and crises.



<sup>62</sup>Chaplin et al., 2019  
<sup>63</sup>Solorzano and Cardenas (2019)



**Panel survey in Nepal to understand layering of shocks.** Nepal conducted a three-year panel survey between 2016 and 2018, using a stratified random sample of over 6000 households following the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS) design. The study helped to showcase how, each year, 25-50% of households in Nepal experience at least one 'shock' (idiosyncratic or covariate), quantifying differential effects in terms of incidence, average loss and impact on coping strategies. Overall, it showed that households across the wealth spectrum are vulnerable to shocks, but the poorest are most exposed and that shocks have large and prolonged impacts on welfare.

Source: Solorzano and Cardenas (2019); Walker (2019)

- **Conducting a social protection system assessment that specifically focuses on 'shock-readiness'.** As discussed in Section 2.3.2, the "maturity" of existing social protection systems (and their underlying building blocks) in country affect the extent to which existing Programmes (cash transfers or others) and their systems can be leveraged for shock preparedness and response. In many contexts, these are not resilient to shocks and lack the capacity to absorb shock related expansions. Development partners have been developing and testing assessments that can support you in this process – helping to identify key gaps and priority actions for system strengthening. In assessing your own system you could build on the following:
  - UNICEF's Social Protection System Readiness Tool (forthcoming)
  - WFP's [Basic Country Capacity Assessment](#)

NOTE that different dimensions of these 'system assessments' – informing priority preparedness areas – are those included in this Section 3.

*Box 5. Case Study: A system assessment leading to operational change in the Dominican Republic*

The Dominican Republic is regularly exposed to tropical cyclones. In acknowledgement of this recurrent risk, a simulation workshop was organized by WFP in May 2018 alongside all actors involved in the National Risk Management and Emergency Response Plan, including actors from the Ministry of Social Welfare. This process was accompanied by a ['Shock Responsive Social Protection Country Capacity Assessment'](#), providing further evidence on key gaps and opportunities for action.




Increased awareness of the capacities and instruments offered by social protection led to a longer term capacity-strengthening collaboration and to the drafting of an improved emergency intervention protocol, defining roles, activities and responsibilities across relevant sectors, in an integrated framework and timeframe – as well as accompanying Standard Operating Procedures.

These revised processes were put to the test during the 2019 hurricane season, when government activated the new emergency response integrated protocols, jointly developed with WFP, for the use of the national Social Protection system to deliver assistance.

Source: Bentivoglio and Rovira (2019)

- Building an **evidence base on the use of social protection in emergency contexts**. While case studies and analysis on the broad topic of shock responsive social protection have been increasing rapidly (see Annex A), there are still important evidence gaps with regards to this topic<sup>64</sup> – and the most useful learning for you will come from your own country experiences. Taking time to reflect over past experiences across the broad range of relevant stakeholders will also be an important opportunity to strengthen coordination.
  - Organise workshops and events to discuss and consolidate learning from past experiences;
  - Make adequate resource allocation for evidence generation, M&E and learning on these topics – and strive to document learning and recommendations from past experiences;
  - Develop an M&E framework based on appropriate and robust indicators for this topic (see the Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit, [Section D8 for examples of relevant indicators](#));
  - Use the evidence for planning and programming – while adding to the global evidence base;
  - Understand possible M&E requirements for humanitarian funding (e.g baseline, Post Distribution Monitoring, endline).

### 3.2 COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE

<p>Routine system strengthening</p>	<p>The TRANSFORM Modules on <a href="#">Coordination</a> and on <a href="#">Governance</a> stress that the delivery of routine social protection Programmes is intrinsically intersectoral, yet faces extensive challenges in terms of guaranteeing vertical and horizontal coordination. They discuss many strategies to address these challenges, while also going into depth on the complexity of doing so effectively.</p> <p><i>Strengthening coordination and governance for the social protection sector are fundamental systems strengthening steps for any country.</i></p> <div data-bbox="1102 837 1422 1055">  </div>
<p>What is the 'delta'? (How is this different from 'business as usual'?)</p>	<p>Bringing covariate shocks into this – already complicated – picture complicates matters further, as a broader range of actors are involved, including from the Humanitarian and DRM sectors. Coordination and governance challenges are exacerbated because of lack of understanding of the respective sectors, lack of clear lines of accountability across sectors and levels of governance (national, subnational etc) and sometimes financial disincentives to cooperate. This section therefore discusses some measures that could help to address this complexity.</p>
<p>Why is this important?</p>	<p>Ultimately, the sectors mandated to provide emergency response (DRM and humanitarian, both national and international) and social protection have very strong overlaps in terms of intended outcomes and means to achieve those outcomes. Coordinating and establishing clear roles and responsibilities across these would help to efficiently and effectively meet the needs of affected populations.</p> <p>This is not about social protection replacing the roles of other stakeholders that are responsible for humanitarian/emergency action, but rather about complementing them. For this to be achieved, there is the need for a national strategy involving different sectors, with clear roles and responsibilities, and strategies for cross-sectoral articulation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>in the short term, across different phases of an emergency<sup>65</sup></li> <li>in the long term, addressing all the hazardous events, shocks and stresses that a country is exposed to, including projections of changing vulnerabilities over time as well as evolving capacities.</li> </ol>

Source: Authors

<sup>64</sup>E.g. on the cost-effectiveness of different approaches

<sup>65</sup>Beazley et al, 2019; UNICEF 2020



**Key ACTIONS that may be relevant in your country include<sup>66</sup>:**



- **Creating or strengthening horizontal coordination mechanisms<sup>67</sup> across government, and with non-government actors**, including those who have a mandate to respond to shocks (e.g. humanitarian, DRM) or could play a role (e.g. social protection, actors involved in climate change adaptation, etc.).
  - *Mapping all relevant actors/stakeholders and, on this basis, identifying opportunities for convergence of agenda and collaborative action to address common challenges.* Ultimately, lack of coordination across relevant actors is often due to limited understanding of each other's sectors, priorities, systems and responsibilities. This will include:
    - *Government Ministries/departments/bodies* and their current roles, responsibilities and capacity (e.g. via stakeholder mapping).
    - *Development partners/international and national humanitarian organisations/NGOs* engaged on this in country. Note the coordinating role of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ([UN-OCHA](#))<sup>68</sup> and of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee ([IASC](#)), alongside the global
  - *Creating opportunities for relevant stakeholders to come together on a common agenda, to enhance joint planning and ensuring complementarity, (instead of system overloading). This could include:*
    - Informal channels: joint workshops, conferences, meetings, trainings, exposure visits, etc.
    - Formal coordination arrangements: the creation of multi-stakeholder coordination bodies, including e.g. Humanitarian Cash Working Groups expanded social protection technical committees and the [Humanitarian Cluster System](#)

**!** **The Humanitarian system has a complex – but broadly effective – coordination structure at global and national level.** Leveraging those and ensuring social protection government actors are involved will be an important first step to enhanced coordination. To understand these better, [see this Webinar focusing on global humanitarian coordination](#) and [this Webinar focusing on country and regional level coordination](#). See also the [Building a Better Response Platform](#).

- *Ensuring broad understanding, across sectors, of the key principles underpinning emergency response* (such as the Humanitarian Principles and [Sphere Standards](#)). For example, these require a different mind-set and set of principles from those that underpin routine social protection systems. Also, issues that are embedded in many social assistance schemes – such as conditionalities and targeting accuracy – are far less relevant in an emergency response.
- *Where relevant, creating units (or capacity) with a focus on shock responsive social protection within social protection ministries (e.g. Guatemala and Colombia are investing on this)*

**!** **It is important to stress that the Humanitarian Principles and SPHERE Standards may not always be relevant for social protection actors** (and humanitarian partners supporting them in the transition). This is the case, for example, when the type of 'shock' is not actually an emergency, but a recurrent seasonal stress, or slowly degenerating economic crisis.

- **Institutionalising these coordination agreements and arrangements (via the adaptation of existing Standard Operating Procedures, or the development of new ones, Memorandums of Understanding, etc.) and focusing on achieving key outcomes in the short, medium and long-term.** Giving clarity on roles and responsibilities, across all the relevant stakeholders. Focus on short, medium- and long-term multi-sectoral strategies, noting that this process of institutionalisation will require a few years of trial and error and refining. See for example Box 8.

<sup>66</sup>This section extensively builds on UNICEF (2020), Solorzano and Cardenas (2019); O'Brien et al. (2018b) and the SPaN Operational Note N.3: Stakeholders, [here](#)

<sup>67</sup>See the TRANSFORM Coordination Base Document.

<sup>68</sup>For example, OCHA helps to coordinate Who is doing What Where and When (the 4Ws).



**Ultimately, the objective is NOT to ensure that social protection is able to pre-empt and respond to hazardous events, shocks and stresses alone: it is about better leveraging each sector’s potential to enhance overall outcomes** (see Section 2.3.2). This requires identifying all actors’ key strengths and how their activities fit into wider and longer-term objectives across the ‘development and humanitarian nexus’. For example, for seasonal stresses, social protection can and should take on the lion’s share, potentially with technical support from emergency counterparts. For conflict affected countries or other crises that overwhelm national capacity, emergency actors will play a lead role, while potentially leveraging social protection systems to enhance longer term sustainability.

**Box 6. Case Study: Inter-Ministerial Coordination for Climate Change in Mexico**

In Mexico, the National Climate Change System is a public policy mechanism that coordinates synergies between all the federal ministries and institutions in relation to climate change. This includes the Intersecretarial Climate Change Commission (La CICC) which coordinates the climate change actions of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Development amongst others. A key element of the CICC is their focus on ensuring integration of public policies in all the national and state administrations. There is also an aim to “minimize vulnerability of society and productive sectors, increasing their resilience and the resistance of strategic infrastructure”.



Source: Solórzano and Cardenas (2019)

- **Ensuring vertical coordination<sup>69</sup> within the social protection sector on these topics – and ensuring cross-sectoral coordination at local level.** The delegation of responsibilities and activities from the central to the local level is central to the delivery of social protection. Similarly, responding to shocks requires strong capacity and coordination within shock affected communities. It is therefore clear that local social protection stakeholders, with social assistants/workers on the frontline, can play a fundamental role in supporting shock affected populations: they know their communities well and are trusted, meaning they can support with communications, data collection, psychosocial support and more. Yet ensuring coordination, resource availability and information exchange across levels of government – especially when multiple sectors are involved – is not easy and ‘automatic’ (see Box 7). This needs to be explicitly addressed in advance of a shock by:
  - *Understanding where the mandate for social protection and emergency response lies, across national and subnational authorities.* Who is responsible for which type of decision-making and at what level?
  - *Depending on this, ensuring local levels of administration play an active role in the planning of a response strategy and support clear delegation of ‘shock-related’ roles* and responsibilities to local levels of administration, via job descriptions, manuals of operations, Standard Operating Procedures (including deployment of staff from non-affected areas), and lines of accountability.
  - *Where relevant, supporting the creation of local-level coordinating structures,* for actors across social protection, DRM and beyond (e.g. NGOs, etc.) to start working together to plan localized response strategies based on national guidelines.
  - *Support ongoing training and capacity building of local government staff and allocated contingency budgets at local level.*

<sup>69</sup>See TRANSFORM Coordination Base Document.

**Box 7. Case Study: alignment of vertical coordination structures in Malawi**

Improved alignment of vertical coordination structures is being investigated in Malawi, relating to the district level Civil Protection Committees who support humanitarian functions, and Community Social Support Committees who support social protection functions, amongst many others. These committees manage different Programmes but often include similar/the same members. Likewise, collaboration with the Ministry of Local Government could be considered to integrate social protection concepts and activities into local Socio-Economic Profiles (SEPs), District Development Plans (DDPs), and Village Action Plans (VAPs). Without this, social protection priorities are not taken into consideration at district level, and centralised government resources are not earmarked.



Source: Longhurst and Sabates Wheeler (2019)

**Box 8. Case Study: extensive institutional coordination in the Philippines**

The Philippines has a well-developed social protection system as well as a comprehensive legislation and institutional arrangement governing DRM<sup>70</sup>. The social protection sector is spearheaded by the Department for Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). DSWD is also the lead on disaster response, an uncommon institutional arrangement globally. In short, social protection and DRM are led by two units within the same Department – automatically enhancing cooperation across the two.



These coordinated structures are replicated at the regional and local levels. Disaster response is led by local government units (LGUs) but with national government resources and funding. The social welfare and development officers at the regional, provincial and municipal levels are part of the action teams responsible for supporting disaster response and under the guidance of regional directors and ultimately Governors. DSWD also plays an important role under other phases of DRM and was accorded a central role during rehabilitation and recovery post cyclone Haiyan.

Moreover, humanitarian response in the country is based on a clustered coordination system that is led by Government agencies. The DSWD is the vice chair of the cluster system and government’s lead agency for protection, food and shelter clusters.

It is important to stress that the interlinked institutional housing of social protection and DRM, as well as the strong linkages to the international humanitarian sector, has been developed over time and through an iterative process that has captured learning from previous emergency responses. Central to this adaptive system is high level political commitment, strong legislative and regulatory backing, clear roles and responsibilities and well established coordination structures.

However this hasn’t been without its challenges either, with capacity constraints straining DSWD to effectively manage all its obligations during the shocks, despite surge teams from elsewhere. This has raised some questions as to whether a department such as the DSWD has the capacity required to lead three humanitarian clusters as well as having the primary responsibility of implementing relief operations under large scale shocks.

Sources: Kardan, 2018; Bowen, 2015; Smith et al, 2017.

<sup>70</sup>This is articulated through the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Act of 2010 and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework (NDRRMF) of 2011 that elaborates structures, roles and responsibilities at different levels and places much focus on risk reduction (DRR), as reflected in its DRM financing strategy of the sector where 5% of national and local government budgets are allocated to DRM.


- **Broader regional coordination for portability of social protection entitlements.** Not a focus of this paper, but increasingly important for contexts of forced displacement and migration. For more on this topic, see [here](#) (Global Compact on Migration focus) and [here](#) (OECD focus).

**Useful information/guidance:**

- Guidance on coordination and governance for social protection
  - TRANSFORM “Coordination of Social Protection Systems - Manual” [here](#)
  - TRANSFORM “Governance, Institutions and Organisational Structures – Manual” [here](#)
- Guidance on coordination for the humanitarian sector
  - Sphere Standards [here](#)
  - UN-OCHA [here](#)
- Guidance on coordination for shock responsive social protection
  - SPaN Operational Note N.3: Stakeholders, [here](#)
  - Shock Responsive Social Protection Toolkit, Section D6 on Coordination, [here](#)



### 3.3 LEGISLATION, POLICY AND STRATEGY

<p>Routine system strengthening</p>	<p>The TRANSFORM ‘<a href="#">Legal Frameworks</a>’ Module deals with the core question of how a country can set up a legal framework – and accompanying policy and strategy – that comprehensively provides for the delivery of social protection. <i>Institutionalising social protection this way is a fundamental systems strengthening step</i> for any country. For example, in many countries where social protection is nascent there is often no legal basis for the provision of routine social protection: a fundamental first step in terms of safeguarding rights from political tides (or lack of financial resources due to shocks).</p>	
<p>What is the ‘delta’? (How is this different from ‘business as usual’?)</p>	<p>What the core Module does not do is discuss how best to ensure that a) social protection policy/strategic/legal frameworks include a focus on covariate shocks and stresses, and b) social protection is reflected within similar frameworks for other sectors mandated to respond to these. This section briefly addresses that gap.</p>	
<p>Why is this important?</p>	<p>Because countries’ legal and policy frameworks outline Governments’ statements of intent and sectoral priorities, providing the legal authority for institutions to carry out their tasks and responsibilities. If social protection is envisaged to play a role in addressing the needs created by hazardous events, shocks and stresses (natural or man-made), this should be reflected within these formal statements of intent<sup>71</sup>.</p>	

<sup>71</sup>O’Brien et al (2018) a/b; Kardan (2018).



**Key ACTIONS that may be relevant in your country include<sup>72</sup>:**

- **Reviewing the social protection policy/strategy/legislation from a risk shocks: perspective**, aiming to provide an enabling framework for social protection to support the needs of populations vulnerable to – and affected by –
  - Identifying *gaps and opportunities* in the policy/strategy/legislation in terms of (see Lightbulb Box below for important areas that can be strengthened):
    - the role of existing/routine social protection Programmes?
    - the potential role of ad-hoc emergency Programmes via the social protection sector?
    - complementarities and synergies with the DRM and humanitarian sectors (how social protection Programmes or systems could be leveraged<sup>73</sup> for response via other sectors)?
    - risks and opportunities in terms of upholding Humanitarian Principles?
  - Working alongside relevant stakeholders to *operationalise changes (embedding these in policy/strategy/legislation)* and identify most effective and realistic ways to achieve these, given the broader political economy context in country. See Box 9.



<sup>72</sup>This section extensively builds on UNICEF (2020), as well as O'Brien et al, 2018b; Kardan (2018)

<sup>73</sup>i.e. 'piggybacked' on

**Selected examples of potential areas for inclusion/consideration within social protection Strategy/Policy/Legislation**



- **Provisions to better link routine programming and planning to covariate shocks:**
  - Ensuring a regular *risk forecasting report* or similar (e.g. every 2 years) to identify emerging vulnerabilities and likely impacts, with implications for social protection programming
  - Focusing on a *long-term planning horizon* (e.g. encompassing Climate Change etc.)
  - Embedding *objectives related to resilience building and 'shock sensitivity'* within routine Programmes, focusing on priority actions along the DRM cycle in terms of preparedness, response and recovery where relevant. Starting with 'quick wins' relating to predictable and recurrent shocks, including seasonal needs: e.g. increasing coverage in highly vulnerable and hazard-prone locations, etc.
  - Establishing links with *early warning systems and measurable triggers* for potential responses to shocks
  - Establishing *contingency financing* strategies (see below)
  
- **Provisions to increase coordination with DRM and humanitarian actors who have the mandate to respond to covariate shocks:**
  - institutionalising a *coordination structure/forum* to improve collaboration and communication between humanitarian, Disaster Risk Management and social protection actors, as relevant
  - *Memorandums of Understanding* on roles and responsibilities
  - protocols on *sharing data/information* across sectors.
  
- **Provisions to increase flexibility in the system (and potentially the ability to swiftly respond during shocks), for example enabling:**
  - *changes to routine eligibility criteria* for shock response
  - the establishment of *contingency plans*, involving all relevant stakeholders, to ensure rapid mobilization of human and other resources
  - *access to benefits from different locations* when people are forced to move
  - the use of *additional financial service providers and/or different transfer mechanisms* to reinforce the capacity of existing delivery mechanism
  - *payments to non-routine caseloads* via existing information systems
  - *the receipt of donor funds at the local government level*
  
- **Provisions to increase accessibility of assistance during shocks, via the temporary relaxing/waiving of:**
  - *conditionalities* to reduce the burden on beneficiaries at times of crisis and enable broader access
  - the *documentation requirements* for accessing social assistance to support the inclusion of new beneficiaries, also in view of loss/misplacement of documentation in times of crisis.
  - the *qualifying conditions for access*, such as extended residency or citizenship (enabling extension of assistance to all those in shock-affected locations). In some cases this will go hand in hand with bilateral agreements with other countries in the region to facilitate the social protection of migrants and their families.
  - the *Know Your Customer requirements* for payments via the social assistance system
  
- **Provisions to ensure the upholding of Humanitarian Principles in policy and practice**

Source: UNICEF (2020), building on country Strategies/Policies/Legislation, Beazley et al (2019), Kardan (2018)



Box 9. Case Studies: examples of Social Protection policies and strategies with a focus on shocks

A growing number of countries worldwide have started to incorporate a focus on shock within their Social Protection **Policy and Strategy** documents, many with development partner support. Examples include:



- Malawi.** Under the National Social Support Policy and its [2018 National Social Support Programme II \(MNSSP II\)](#) and Implementation Plan, the government has made a commitment to design and implement a social protection system that covers more people, provides complementary support to respond to the multiple and compounding needs of the population (including resilience building), and that is sensitive to shocks: “that meets seasonal needs, prepares for and responds to unpredictable shocks together with the humanitarian sector, and supports recovery and the return to regular programming”. This is included as a core pillar and extensively discussed in terms of practical implications for existing Programmes.
- Jamaica.** Jamaica’s 2014 [Social Protection Strategy](#) encompasses a section on ‘Response to Crises and Emerging Vulnerabilities’. This focus aims at “protecting residents from the worst effects of national or subnational crises (originating from any source) that threaten their socio-economic wellbeing; engendering proactive approaches to foreseeing emerging social security needs and facilitating appropriate responsive mechanisms”. The Strategy also acknowledges that, as sudden shocks have widespread effects, “the national response must involve multiple sectors, with the SP system playing its own defined role that is complementary to the other sectors and designed for both preventive and ameliorative purposes”. It also critically acknowledges that, “for the social protection sector to maintain effectiveness over time it must have the foresight and flexibility to accommodate any future demands within a reasonable planning horizon”. These statements are accompanied by a set of specific strategies.

There are similarly a handful of examples of these changes slowly making their way into **legislation** (e.g. in Latin American countries), though changing policy and regulatory environment is most often easier to achieve than changes in legislation. In fact, as a note of caution, in many countries where social protection is nascent there is often no legal basis for the provision of routine social protection: a fundamental first step in terms of safeguarding rights from political tides.

Source: UNICEF (2020), country Policy and Strategy papers

- Reviewing the emergency/DRM policy, strategy and legislation and:**

  - understanding the extent to which social protection is reflected;
  - working alongside humanitarian and DRM stakeholders to incorporate a role for social protection, where relevant and feasible given broader political economy and institutional arrangements (see Lightbulb Box below).

**Potential areas for inclusion/consideration within DRM Strategy/Policy/legislation**

- Better recognizing the *differential needs of the poorest and most vulnerable*, and the most appropriate forms of response for these groups (based on learning from the social protection sector)
- Referencing the *complementary role of social protection for risk reduction and mitigation as well as response and recovery*
- Referencing the *potential use of social protection and its delivery systems to support effective shock response* (e.g. information from vulnerability assessments, Social Registries and/or other social protection registries; capacity to collect data; capacity to track and monitor responses; etc.)
- *Delivering emergency Programmes via social protection*<sup>74</sup>, where relevant and feasible



Source: UNICEF 2020

- **Reviewing other national policy and legislation from a shock responsive perspective**, as these may support or hinder the potential role of the social protection sector<sup>75</sup>:
  - *National planning documents*: Documents that set out a country's overarching framework for economic development may provide indications as to how shocks, stresses and crises are expected to be addressed.
  - *Ownership of shock-related contingent liabilities and broader Public Financial Management legislation*: with implications on viable financing strategies. For example, Financial Management Acts of Governments regulate matters related to finance within national and sub-national governments and stipulate the rules and processes for how public money is collected, used and therefore accounted for. These Acts normally supersede any other legislation in matters related to finance and can present challenges to rapidly disbursing resources during shocks.
  - *Data protection/privacy/security*: with implications for data sharing and use
  - *Financial crimes and Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements*: with implications for payment of transfers
  - *Civil registration, national identification and residency status*: with vast implications for migrants, IDPs and refugees
  - *National poverty line and minimum wage*: with implications for setting transfer values
- **Embedding changes into Manuals of Operation, Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs), etc. across relevant sectors.** Whether changes have been incorporated into policies, strategies and legislation or not, manuals of Operation and Standard Operating Procedures represent the de-facto guiding framework for the implementation of most social protection – and DRM/Humanitarian interventions. These will therefore require adapting based on the points above (see Box 10).

**Box 10. Case Study: supporting a Manual of Operations and SOPs in Dominica**

In **Dominica**, UNICEF and WFP supported the vertical and horizontal expansion of the Public Assistance Programme for households affected by Hurricane Maria in 2017. Following a large 'learning workshop' on the Emergency Cash Transfer experience, Government formally committed to strengthening routine systems and preparedness for response to future shocks. One of the key areas of action included developing an "Operations Manual and Standard Operating Procedures for the Social Welfare Division". This was developed by the Ministry of Health and Social Services with support from UNICEF and now contains a section that discusses preparedness actions for future emergencies.



Sources: UNICEF 2020, building on Beazley et al (2019)

<sup>74</sup>For example, in Nepal the new National Disaster Risk Reduction Management policy has the provision to potentially use social assistance schemes in a disaster (Holmes et al, 2019)

<sup>75</sup>Kardan (2018). Note this does not necessarily mean those laws need changing – they simply need to be reviewed in advance of a shock to better understand the 'rules of the game'.



**Useful information/guidance:**

- For social protection:
  - Module 1 of CODI, Key Areas 1-4, [here](#)
  - TRANSFORM “Legal Frameworks for Rights Based Social Protection Floors - Manual for a Leadership and Transformation Curriculum On Building and Managing Social Protection Floors in Africa”, [here](#)
- For DRM:
  - Effective law and regulation for disaster risk reduction, [here](#)
  - For shock responsive social protection
  - Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit, Section C3 ‘The institutional environment’, [here](#)
  - Kardan (2018) Institutions for adaptive social protection systems (forthcoming)



### 3.4 FINANCING

Routine system strengthening	<p>The <a href="#">TRANSFORM Financing Module</a> extensively discusses issues of (non-contributory) social protection affordability, touching on the topics of fiscal (and policy) space; strategies for revenue mobilization; measuring the costs of social protection in the context of the national budget process, and; public financial management and M&amp;E of public expenditure for social protection. Overall, it stresses the importance – and challenges – of guaranteeing long-term, sustainable, predictable and pre-agreed financing for the sector<sup>76</sup>.</p> <p><i>Developing sustainable and nationally owned financing for social protection is a fundamental systems strengthening step for any country.</i> Overall, it is clear that “fiscal space to secure social protection financing in advance of a shock is critical to the maintenance or expansion of social protection, and governments that have built such space are better equipped to respond to crises” (Bastagli, 2014).</p>	
What is the ‘delta’? (How is this different from ‘business as usual’?)	<p>Most importantly, many shocks severely impact the ability of governments to generate revenues, reducing overall fiscal space (and compromising existing budgetary allocations). At the same time, prices may be affected, putting further upwards pressures on delivery costs. Given this context, it is unsurprising that the topic of guaranteeing finances for <i>extra-ordinary</i> needs imposed by a shock is a complex one that countries around the world have been grappling with. Moreover, the financing of covariate shocks is particularly complex as traditional budgeting and insurance approaches do not always apply and potential funding channels may not be appropriate.</p>	
Why is this important?	<p>Because the lack of predictable, timely financing is the number one constraint to effectively addressing the needs of vulnerable or affected populations.</p>	

<sup>76</sup>See also Ortiz et al., 2018

**Key ACTIONS that may be relevant in your country include<sup>77</sup>:**

- **Broadening the focus of social protection financing to include:**
  - Ensuring financing for regular/predictable/recurrent shocks/stresses (i.e. those that should entirely fall under the remit of social protection, not humanitarian programming) – e.g. seasonal food insecurity. These should not be classified as ‘extra-ordinary’ needs and should receive predictable, timely and continuous financing so as to address needs via routine social protection caseloads.
  - Supporting *longer-term resilience building* activities, especially for populations affected by regular/predictable/recurrent shocks/stresses.
  - Ensuring *dynamic and inclusive approaches to registration* that enable access to social protection when in need<sup>78</sup> - and a revolving door for those who have exited Programmes (i.e. not a ‘fixed-list’ or quota approach where budget is fixed in advance). This is aligned with the principles of ‘universal social protection’.
  - Ensuring the *continuity of social protection service delivery in the aftermath of a shock*; (i.e. when additional resources are needed to fulfil routine functions)
  - Where relevant and feasible, *scaling* to support new caseloads and needs (via new or existing Programmes) – *or working alongside the humanitarian and DRM sectors*;
  
- **Pre-empting financing needs across these different areas and pre-establishing a financial strategy to address these in a timely manner.** This may involve<sup>80</sup>:
  - For points a), b) and c) above: incorporating these broader risks and functions into routine social protection financing – via strategies discussed in the TRANSFORM Financing Base Doc. It is cost-effective to invest in early action.



**!** Remember, beyond ‘fiscal space’ this is a matter of **‘policy space’**: policy makers need to understand that this is not an expenditure but an investment! The overall cost of response will be lower if these costs are sustained before rather than after a shock. Supporting financing of routine protection is a system strengthening feature. As an ammunition for you, use the [research by Cabot Venton in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia](#) on the **cost-effectiveness of early action** via existing systems rather than ad-hoc, ex-post responses!

- For point d) above: developing small-scale contingency funding strategies, with the primary focus of ensuring continuity of social protection delivery in the aftermath of shock (e.g. to finance surge capacity, fixing of infrastructure, etc). This will include vertical coordination to ensure funding at local level.
- For point e) above, three key steps may be useful:
  - *Estimating potential costs of response in advance*: by estimating the likely impact of shocks on a) the system and b) target population – and simulating response options. This can help to determine the scale and range of funding required, greatly supporting risk financing strategies. For example, the cost of a response via the social protection sector would be equal to<sup>81</sup>:

**Cost of response = [expected coverage (e.g. based on data from previous shocks) x unit cost of the benefit/transfer x duration] + administrative costs**

<sup>77</sup>This section extensively builds on Maher et al 2018 and UNICEF (2020).  
<sup>78</sup>both because of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks  
<sup>79</sup>See the Section on Graduation in the Administration Module of TRANSFORM.  
<sup>80</sup>Maher et al 2018  
<sup>81</sup>Maher et al, 2018; SPaN 2019f

- **Identifying financial resources and pre-planning the funding required to ensure timely response.** In practice, considering Disaster Risk Financing approaches that are common in the DRM sector: how to spread the risk and cost of financing different shocks through a risk layering strategy. A tiered approach would include: a) Budgetary instruments (e.g. contingency / reserve funds); b) contingent credit, and; c) market-based risk-transfer instruments (e.g. Catastrophe Risk Pools)<sup>82</sup>. These would need to be incorporated into a financing strategy that broadly identifies what, when and how shocks will be financed.
- **Planning for timely disbursements.** When and how funding reaches beneficiaries is as important as securing funds in the first place. There are limited benefits to financing strategies if there are constraints to transferring those funds to the relevant institutions and ultimately to shock-affected communities. Complication can also arise when multiple actors are involved, with different accountability structures and financial reporting requirements. See Lightbulb Box below and Box 11.

### Planning for timely disbursements

Key aspects to consider in advance will include robust processes and agreements for<sup>83</sup>:

- **Triggering of the funding:** e.g. via objective Early Warning mechanisms that are not subject to political interference, such as the HSNP mechanism in Kenya (Box 23).
- **Upstream release of funds.** Both Lesotho and Mali, for instance, have faced challenges in releasing the funds pledged to interventions. In the Philippines, too, despite the existence of contingency financing mechanisms for disaster response, there were administrative delays in releasing the emergency funding allocated to the department overseeing disaster response after Typhoon Haiyan.
- **Release of funds to local levels of implementation,** including “short-cuts” by which international partners can channel funding directly to local levels and plans for moving currency from headquarters and regional hubs to provincial and district distribution networks.
- **Guaranteeing sufficient liquidity at local level** (see Box 12)
- **Delivery to affected populations** (see section 3.6 below)
- **Reconciliation<sup>84</sup>:** donors and/or financial providers and national governments may have different accountability requirements for reconciliation, posing potential challenges that can be ironed out in advance of a shock (Box 13).
- **Tackling any additional legal and administrative blockages that could restrict timely disbursements** (PFM rules, etc).



Source: UNICEF 2020

<sup>82</sup>Ibid; World Bank 2017b

<sup>83</sup>Ibid

<sup>84</sup>This term refers to the process through which the amount paid to the payment provider (whether a private contractor or a government counterpart) is reconciled with the amount that the provider actually disbursed to beneficiaries.

**Box 11. Case Study: ensuring timely flow of funds in Nepal**

As a response to the devastating earthquakes in Nepal in April and May 2015, UNICEF disbursed \$26 million through Nepal’s social protection system in order to expand the existing social assistance cash transfer Programme in earthquake-affected areas in two phases. The Emergency Cash Transfer Programme (ECTP) consisted of a vertical expansion in Phase 1 and horizontal expansion in Phase 2.



Initially, the ECTP roll-out was delayed as the Nepal Cabinet’s approval of the Programme took nearly a month. This was followed by a slow fund-transfer process from UNICEF to the local governments (the District Development Committees ). According to the impact evaluation of the ECTP this was due to a complex administrative processes and low local capacity.

Source: Merttens et al 2017

**Box 12. Case Study: Ensuring liquidity for payments – Kenya**

In 2015 the HSNP in Kenya horizontally expanded in response to drought. Two rounds of emergency payments provided a proof of concept of HSNP’s ability to rapidly scale-up coverage. However they also showed that significant capacity within the payment service provider and their agents is required to deliver emergency payments over a wide and remote area. Payment agents outside of county capitals had genuine problems maintaining liquidity during the scale-up. It was found that advanced planning by bank branches was required, to ensure enough cash is available ahead of payment disbursement dates. A review of the emergency expansion of the HSNP in Kenya recommended that a fixed payment date per month should be agreed for all emergency payments. See also Box 23.



Source: OPM (2017)

**Box 13. Case Study: Reconciliation of funds - Philippines**

The routine reconciliation procedure for the Pantawid Programme in the Philippines includes an Acknowledgement Receipt that each recipient signs. These are produced in triplicate, with one copy retained by the beneficiary, one by the payment service provider and one by the social welfare department for submission to the Commission on Audit. On the vertical expansion of the Pantawid Programme, WFP’s financial procedures required that they also receive a copy of the Acknowledgment Receipt. This was not made clear to the government at the beginning, meaning paperwork was already filed with the Commission on Audit. It took administrative staff over a year to retrospectively address this. In the case of the UNICEF top ups, payments were due to be made in consecutive months between June and December 2014. However, unclear directives from UNICEF on the format for the submission of quarterly financial reports by the government led to delays in reconciliation and delays in the transfer of subsequent funds from UNICEF to the government.



Source: Smith et al, 2017



**Useful information/guidance:**

- Guidance on financing for social protection
  - TRANSFORM “Financing and Financial management Systems - Manual” [here](#)
  - Module 1 of CODI, Key Area 5 on ‘Public Expenditure and Financing’ and Module 2 Key Area 10 on ‘Expenditures and Financing’, [here](#)
  - Fiscal Space for Social Protection and the SDGs: Options to Expand Social Investments in 187 Countries, [here](#)
  
- Guidance on Disaster Risk Financing
  - (GFDRR) Assessing Financial Protection against Disasters: A Guidance Note on Conducting a Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic, [here](#)
  - WB Course: Fundamentals of Disaster Risk Finance, [here](#)
  
- Guidance/information on humanitarian financing
  - Future Humanitarian Financing: Looking Beyond the Crisis, [here](#)
  - Global Humanitarian Systems Report, here and State of the Humanitarian System reports, [here](#)
  
- Guidance on financing for shock responsive social protection:
  - SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 5: Integrated Financing, [here](#)
  - Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit, Section D1 on ‘Finance’, [here](#)
  - Maher et al (2018) Emerging Lessons in Financing Adaptive Social Protection. World Bank. Unpublished.



**3.5 MIX OF PROGRAMMES AND THEIR DESIGN FEATURES: SELECTION AND IDENTIFICATION AND BEYOND<sup>85</sup>**

<p><b>Routine system strengthening</b></p>	<p>A social protection ‘system’ ideally comprises a range of Programmes that comprehensively address the different needs of populations. The design of those Programmes/interventions includes a series of policy choices regarding: a) the types of interventions required, their objectives and the linkages across these; b) the ‘targeting’ design of each intervention (see the <a href="#">TRANSFORM Selection and Identification module</a>); c) the type/modality, level (value), frequency and duration of the interventions. These decisions all affect the three core criteria for improved ‘universal social protection’: comprehensiveness, coverage and adequacy.</p> <p><i>Strengthening the comprehensiveness, coverage and adequacy of routine social protection Programmes is a fundamental systems strengthening step for any country.</i></p>	
<p><b>What is the ‘delta’? (How is this different from ‘business as usual’?)</b></p>	<p>Policy choices that are appropriate for routine programming may be insufficient in contexts that are affected by hazardous events, shocks or stresses – especially in a longer-term scenario. In this Section we analyse each of the core policy design choices in turn, reflecting on system strengthening features that would help to increase resilience to future events, as well as relevance and effectiveness in vulnerable and emergency settings. We offer a primary focus on non-contributory Cash Transfers as these offer the highest potential. However, Annex C provides further food for thought on the implications of different intervention types for resilience programming and shock response.</p>	

<sup>85</sup> This section extensively builds on UNICEF (2020) and Barca (2018).

Why is this important?

Because countries with an effective mix of Programmes that offer high and equitable coverage of population and needs – across social insurance and social assistance – are better positioned to respond to shocks, as they possess a broader toolbox to draw from and build on<sup>86</sup>. Moreover, selected design features of routine Programmes, including cash transfers, can make them more or less ‘useful’ in the context of building resilience to future events and better addressing the needs of vulnerable and/or affected populations<sup>87</sup>.

3.5.1 Intervention types, objectives and linkages – linked to ‘comprehensiveness’

Different social protection interventions (e.g. cash for work, school feeding, unconditional cash transfers, etc.) are designed to play different functions, pursue different objectives and address different risks. When purposely integrated (e.g. targeting the same households, sequenced, etc.) – what is sometimes referred to as “Cash +” programming or ‘linkages’ – Programme impacts on these intended outcomes can be enhanced for recipient households (although, conversely, in the context of budget constraints it may reduce the support available to other households, and therefore reduce coverage)<sup>88</sup>.

For an enhanced role for social protection in the context of hazardous events, shock and stresses, system strengthening ACTIONS could therefore include:

- **Assessing routine Programmes vis-à-vis their current and potential role for addressing the needs generated by covariate shocks.** The peculiarities of each intervention type (see Annex C) will determine their relevance and potential role: e.g. social insurance Programmes such as unemployment benefits are inherently designed to support formal sector workers in the context of economic shocks – however, they will be broadly ineffective to tackle rapid onset shocks affecting the poor (mostly informal workers).
- **Where relevant, ensuring permanent modifications in objectives/function to include better addressing emergency needs (where relevant).** This will be inherently linked to the strategic vision set within the Policy/Strategy/Legal framework (see Section 3.3) and the peculiarities of each intervention type (see Annex C) and **may include the introduction of a new Programme** specifically designed for this. As an example, two of the most ‘famous’ Programmes playing a role to address regular and predictable shocks such as droughts – Kenya’s HSNP (Hunger Safety Net Programme, see Box 23) and Ethiopia’s PSNP (Productive Safety Net Programme) (see Box 14) – are explicitly mandated to play this role.



**Even where modifications in objectives/functions are not possible or relevant, it is still worth prioritizing and strengthening relevant resilience-enhancing dimensions:** e.g. nutrition security, mother & child health, livelihoods promotion, financial inclusion etc.

<sup>86</sup>Grosh et al, 2011; IEG 2012; Marzo and Mori, 2012; O’Brien et al. 2018 a/b.

<sup>87</sup>Note: the whole section draws extensively on a forthcoming/unpublished paper: Barca (2018)

<sup>88</sup>See e.g. Roelen et al 2017.



Box 14. Case Study: Ethiopia's PSNP is explicitly designed to address shocks

The PSNP in Ethiopia, now the second-largest social protection Programme in Africa next to South Africa, was specifically designed to address the needs of chronically food-insecure households and to break the cycle of emergency appeals and assistance. Initiated in 2005, it is now in its fourth phase of operation, providing the longevity needed to assess outcomes and impacts and to learn lessons about both operational and design features that have been tweaked and adjusted through the years to better respond to household needs. The PSNP aims for national coverage (in all but two regions) with an annual total of 10 million beneficiaries (8.3 chronic food insecure households routinely supported and up to 1.7 million additional 'transient' beneficiaries should emergency scale up be needed). The goal of PSNP 4 is: 'resilience to shocks and livelihoods enhanced, and food security and nutrition improved, for rural households vulnerable to food insecurity'



Source: Ministry of Agriculture 2014, adapted in Barca (2018).



In contexts affected by **regular, predictable stresses and shocks, permanent modifications** to the objectives of existing Programmes – or **the creation of new Programmes** with the specific purpose of addressing vulnerabilities induced by that 'shock' – will be essential.

- Ensuring linkages and complementary programming within the social protection sector and beyond, to enhance resilience building ex-ante and a comprehensive response to emergency needs ex-post. Of course, this should be in acknowledgement of the complexities of designing 'cash+' Programmes in emergencies in terms of establishing partnerships, setting up monitoring mechanisms, ensuring adequate capacity and training of service providers, etc. Potential actions to be evaluated include<sup>89</sup>:
  - *Link routine Programmes to knowledge and information* on disaster risk reduction and management (see Box 21 and Section 3.6)
  - *Link to psychosocial support* (fundamental in the aftermath of a shock) and child protection (see e.g. Box 16).
  - *Link to nutrition services* in acknowledgment this is the most critical area of concern in the aftermath of a shock. For example, Home-Grown School Feeding Programmes can provide a platform for delivering other services and reaching schoolchildren, promoting knowledge and innovations, strengthening relevant capacities of households and communities, and help to advance successful outcomes for climate change adaptation.
  - *Link to productive inclusion interventions* (Skills and micro-entrepreneurship training, promotion of and support for saving groups, provision of seed capital and productive grants, linkage to existing value chains and markets, financial education and access to saving options, mentoring, behavioural and life skills, etc.) and broader 'sustainable graduation interventions'.
  - *For public works, promote relevant asset creation Programmes* e.g. Community assets should address key challenges to livelihoods, be relevant to local needs and should support environmental rehabilitation and conservation in order to achieve longer-term impacts. Follow-up maintenance must take place to ensure ongoing functionality.

<sup>89</sup>Roelen et al 2017; Barca 2018; Solórzano and Cárdenas 2019

Box 15 'Building resilience' – how?

**Useful information/guidance:**

For more information and practical guidance please refer to:

- Solórzano and Cardenas (2019) Social protection and climate change, [here](#)
  - Ulrichs and Slater (2016) How can social protection build resilience? Insights from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, [here](#)
  - Agrawal et al 2019. Climate resilience through social protection. Background paper for the Global Commission on Adaptation, [here](#)
- See also Box 20



Box 16. Case Study: linking Child Protection to emergency programming in Turkey

In **Turkey**, the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) was designed to align with and piggyback on the delivery systems of an existing government Programme, while catering to a new caseload: Syrian Refugees and their children. The Programme, led by UNICEF in collaboration with the Turkish Red Crescent and funded by ECHO and others, adopted the same application process and capacity as the routine CCT and leveraged the country's social assistance information system ('ISAS') while maintaining a different payment system. The choice for the conditionality to be retained for Syrian refugees (despite the higher barriers they faced to access schooling) was primarily driven by a desire to guarantee social cohesion. Nevertheless, in an effort to sustain positive education outcomes for Syrian children and address the risk of exclusion due to the conditionality, the CCTE was designed with an add-on Child Protection component for students with low attendance and other vulnerability factors. This was implemented by 37 outreach teams in 15 provinces. The success of the Programme was such that the Turkish Government has been discussing with UNICEF to adopt this as a government Programme.



Source: UNICEF Webinar on Turkish CCTE

- **Link social protection beneficiaries to complementary services** (health insurance, waiving of tuition fees, social services, etc.). Access to services in the aftermath of a shock is particularly problematic, which means that existing linkages and preparedness to keep those running or scale them up can have important impacts.



**When we think of 'Shock Responsive Social Protection' it is important to think across the range of all existing (and potential future) Programmes** and how these work together – not just focus on one Programme and 'strengthen that'. However, it may often be the case that a specific Programme may offer more 'entry points' than others – and starting from there could be a good strategy in the short term.

### 3.5.2 Targeting design (eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions) – linked to coverage

Who is being reached by different social protection interventions – a function of their targeting design (eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions) and subsequent coverage – affects their potential role in addressing the needs generated by covariate shocks (see also Figure 9). In some cases, targeting is intrinsic to Programme design: for school feeding Programmes routine beneficiaries are school-going children, while cash for work Programmes target able-bodied adults/youth who are willing to work at the Programme’s wage-rate. In others – most prominently cash transfers – targeting is the outcome of a series of policy, fiscal, design and implementation choices. Target populations for routine Programmes tend to fall into two broad categories (sometimes overlapping): a) the chronically—and sometimes also the transient—poor and b) the “categorically vulnerable” (children, older people, people with disabilities, etc). It is rare that the resulting coverage (% of population receiving benefits) is very high - especially as Programmes are also frequently geographically targeted. See also Annex C.

Effective targeting of a shock-response, on the other hand “is based on households’ exposure to, and ability to cope with”, specific shocks – a different ‘target’ group than standard social protection provision (O’Brien et al, 2018 a/b). In many cases, affected households may be up to 100% of population in affected areas – and most shocks affect the near-poor and non-poor to a great extent as well (though it is well established that the poor are often more exposed and affected). Moreover, the ‘principles’ underpinning targeting in humanitarian settings are different than for routine programming, for example prioritizing simplicity and timeliness over targeting accuracy and reduction of inclusion errors – and, of course, the upholding of Humanitarian Principles.



**The poor and categorically vulnerable (women, children, elderly, disabled, marginalised, etc) are disproportionately affected by covariate shocks**, as they have the lowest capacity to cope. Routine Programmes supporting these individuals and households play a fundamental role – and prioritising these in the aftermath of a shock (even in contexts where others are affected) will never be ‘wrong’.

#### Some “principles of beneficiary selection across the humanitarian-development nexus” include the following:

- Targeting should be **acceptable** from both political and social/cultural perspectives.
- Targeting processes should respect **dignity** of population and foresee the participation of population throughout the process.
- Beneficiary identification should be **simple and clear** for all members of a society or community. The costs should be justified, procedures should be as transparent as possible.
- Targeting strategy should be **appropriate** for the type of shock and stage of the response.
- Method(s) should be **feasible** in view of available administrative capacity and operationalisation potential.
- Beneficiary selection should be affordable in terms of financial and institutional constraints.
- Targeting response should be **timely** and contextual depending on the type of shock and short-term or long-term recovery support required.
- Targeting strategy should be **flexible** with a potential of being adjusted to changing environments during a shock or crisis.

What are the implications for system strengthening and for the use of routine Programmes (and their underlying systems) for shock response?

- **Assessing the overlap between existing eligibility criteria/coverage and characteristics of vulnerable and/or affected population, for different types of shocks – including a strong focus on who would be excluded and strategies to overcome that.** In some cases, this may warrant simple design and implementation tweaks such as – see Box 17 and Box 20:
  - collecting and incorporating new variables within routine registration (e.g. social registries) and targeting algorithms- though, of course, only if this does not have negative impacts on the ability of the routine social protection system to do its regular job by diverting resources from its main focus; adopting principles of ‘disaster and climate aware/smart targeting’<sup>92</sup>.
  - pursuing higher coverage in shock-prone areas via tailored geographic targeting (e.g. drought-affected areas, river basins, coastal areas affected by typhoons, etc).



**Expanding routine eligibility criteria and coverage to include individuals and households that are vulnerable to covariate shocks is a good idea in any context. This will be especially relevant in contexts** that are affected by regular, predictable shocks (i.e where chronic and acute caseloads coincide).

*Box 17. Case Study: ‘Climate-smart/-aware targeting’, selected country examples*

- **Pakistan** is including data on climatic vulnerability in its new Proxy Means Test (PMT), while also making efforts to provide geographic coordinates for all registered households. For example, it aims to balance rural–urban and provincial indicators more effectively and to include indicators of agro-climatic zones. This would enable targeting of populations whose livelihoods are vulnerable to climatic shocks, such as floods and droughts.
- In the **Dominican Republic**, the Índice de Vulnerabilidad ante Choques Climáticos (Index of Vulnerability to Climate Shocks: IVACC), which is part of the Sistema Único de Beneficiarios (SIUBEN) social registry, calculates the probability that a given household may be affected by climate shocks. The IVACC index includes three dimensions: i) housing characteristics (walls, ceiling); ii) estimated income; and iii) proximity to a hazardous natural element (river, stream, or ravine).
- In **Malawi**, the questionnaire of the Unified Beneficiary Registry (UBR) (serving as a social registry and an integrated beneficiary registry) has been modified to identify household vulnerability to annual predictable food gaps and climate shocks. However, according to Holmes et al (2017), ‘this is not sufficient for the UBR to serve as an up-to-date targeting tool in case of shocks’.
- A recent study by the World Bank in **Niger** compares two of the most widely used approaches to targeting PMT, designed to identify the chronic poor, and the household economy approach, a livelihoods analysis framework. The paper finds that the former performs better at identifying the chronic poor and the latter at identifying households suffering from seasonal food insecurity. However, it also highlights that they both rely largely on the same type of household-level information. As a result, small tweaks to the type of data collected can make it possible to estimate not only households in chronic poverty but also those vulnerable to shocks.
- **In Bangladesh**, social protection is prioritised in areas where poverty and vulnerability to shocks are strongly intertwined, such as the Monga in the North-West, the Haors (wetlands) in the North-East and the coastal belt.



Sources: Watson et al., 2017; Beazley, 2017; Holmes et al, 2017; Schnitzer, 2016; Bastagli and Holmes, 2014.

<sup>92</sup> Kuriakose et al., 2012/2013, World Bank, 2013; Bastagli, 2014



**Vertical expansions, often means, retain the same eligibility criteria – and caseloads – as routine Programmes, with obvious consequences in terms of exclusion** errors especially. In all other cases (horizontal expansions, new Programmes piggybacking on existing systems, aligned Programmes, etc.) that criteria can be changed for emergency responses, potentially building on existing capacity, systems and data.

- **Assessing routine approaches for social protection eligibility verification and determining the potential for relaxing/ waiving eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions in the context of specific shocks.** See also Section 3.3. For example, this may include relaxing/waiving:
  - *Requirements for citizenship and/or prolonged residence* in a given location as this can directly exclude IDPs and/or refugees.
  - *Requirements for formal national identification* or other documentation (also in view of loss/misplacement of documentation in times of crisis).
  - *Existing conditionalities* (to reduce the burden on beneficiaries at times of crisis and enable broader access)
  - *The obligation to work*, in the case of Public Works Programmes or be in school for School Feeding Programmes
- **Assessing routine approaches for social protection eligibility verification and determining the extent to which the systems, capacities and data generated via routine approaches can be leveraged in the aftermath of a shock expanded coverage via rapid inclusion of a new caseload, given existing administrative processes and requirements (e.g. expanded coverage via rapid inclusion of new caseloads, given existing administrative processes and requirements).** See also Table 5. For example for Ethiopia’s PSNP, the eligibility of ‘new transitory food insecure households’ for scaled up assistance is conducted using the same Community Based Targeting approach as for the PSNP’s core caseload – building on existing capacity and systems (see also Section 3.7).

In **Turkey**, due to the lack of verifiable socioeconomic data on refugees and the need for rapid scale up, it was agreed by government that the eligibility criteria for inclusion in the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Programme would not be based on the socioeconomic criteria used for citizens but would be limited to 6 demographic indicators. During registration, refugee applicants therefore only complete 19 of the 49 questions in the application form. It was also agreed that applicants would not receive a household verification visit until a year after enrolment. Whilst still making use of the same digital data management systems (ISAIS) these changes needed to be reflected in the processes of the local government social assistance offices for assessing needs and conditions for refugees.



Sources: Smith (2018) from Smith (2017b)

Table 5. Routine approaches to eligibility verification and main implications for scaling of coverage, if social protection databases are to be used

Routine approach to eligibility verification	Key considerations ('negative' ones in italics). Note: for all, caseload prioritised for routine social protection is unlikely to fully correlate to shock-affected households	
	Use of existing data	Use of existing capacity and systems
Self-selection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Programmes targeted via self-selection rarely collect/retain data on non-beneficiaries, and often retain very few variables on beneficiaries (existing data less relevant for shock response)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low cost and administrative complexity for scaling</li> <li>Risks of over-demand or excessively low transfer values to counteract this (unrealistic for most Programmes except for cash for work)</li> </ul>
Community Based Targeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Programmes targeted via Community Based Targeting rarely collect/retain data on non-beneficiaries, and often retain very few variables on beneficiaries (existing data less relevant for shock response)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge, relationships, and procedures retained by existing selection committees (local authorities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), etc) can be leveraged in the aftermath of a shock[2]</li> <li>Use of Community Based Targeting constitutes a recognition that local communities themselves may know best who exactly is affected by a shock. In countries where DRM is a function of local government, communities have a more direct link to the authority handling the disaster, which increases accountability</li> <li>Risks of political interference and discretion</li> <li>Complex to adequately supervise</li> </ul>
Proxy means testing (PMT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Socioeconomic information collected to run the PMT can be of use to swiftly support identification of a wider caseload of households (e.g. using different variables)</li> <li>Likely to collect and retain data on non-beneficiaries</li> <li>Targeted category ('poor') are often vulnerable to shocks</li> <li><i>PMT by definition is designed to identify the households whose observable characteristics are most closely correlated with chronic poverty. If it were intended to be correlated with households likely to suffer shocks, both the selected indicators and their weights would be different (e.g. there might need to be greater weight placed on people living in a certain area of the country)</i></li> <li><i>Static in the context of shocks (PMT cannot predict future changes in purchasing power and transient/new poor)—by definition, existing data will be unable to confidently identify people actually affected by a given shock (it can only estimate using proxies)</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Capacities and procedures for data collection can be leveraged in the aftermath of a shock (i.e. the process but not the outcome)</li> <li><i>Complex to swiftly adapt PMT formula in aftermath of shock</i></li> <li><i>Risks of low transparency and lack of public support</i></li> </ul>
Verified means testing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Likely to collect and retain data on non-beneficiaries</li> <li>Targeted category ('poor') are often most vulnerable to shocks</li> <li><i>Static in the context of shocks</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Procedures/interoperability/capacity for verified means testing can be leveraged in the aftermath of a shock</li> <li><i>Risk of cumbersome process</i></li> </ul>
Unverified means testing		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential for simple and swift targeting in the aftermath of a shock based on existing systems</li> <li><i>Higher risk of inclusion errors</i></li> </ul>
Categorical targeting (verification of 'status')	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Targeted categories (children, the elderly, those who are disabled or labour constrained) may be among those that are most affected by shocks</li> <li><i>Categorically targeted Programmes often do not collect/retain data on non-beneficiaries, and retain very few variables on beneficiaries (existing data less relevant for shock response)</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low cost and administrative complexity for scaling (low data requirements: e.g. age, employment status, disability status, etc). Can piggyback on existing systems.</li> <li>Potential to integrate/layer further criteria and categories (geographical, refugee, IDP, etc)</li> </ul>

Source: Barca and Beazley (2019) based on Pelham et al (2011); Marzo and Mori (2012); Bastagli and Holmes (2014). Note: All these types of targeting method could also be used in the event of a standalone emergency response, in which case their relative merits and drawbacks would be different. For example, categorical targeting could be done using the category of, 'People affected by the shock', which is likely to be more accurate than reliance on proxies drawn from static databases.

- Based on these assessments, develop guidance on targeting in emergency settings (linked to an overall 'response strategy' across relevant sectors) – to be adapted in the aftermath of the shock. This will involve inter-institutional coordination and buy-in and will need to build on extensive learning from the humanitarian sector.

3.5.3 Type/modality, level (value), frequency, duration and timing of transfer – linked to adequacy

The extent to which the design of routine benefits (type/modality, level, frequency and duration) respond to emergency needs broadly dictates whether it makes sense to use them in the aftermath of a shock, and if so, the extent to which adaptations will be necessary<sup>93</sup>. System strengthening actions will therefore include the following:

- Assess the type/modality of routine transfers and determine appropriateness (are these appropriate to the needs of vulnerable/ affected populations and the context?). Situations in times of crisis may change temporarily or in the long run. For this reason, a pre-existing modality may not always be the most appropriate solution to support the needs of affected populations. Historical data from previous crises may help in determining the most appropriate modality. This could be reaffirmed with the post-crisis situation and needs assessment. Evidence from the humanitarian sector highlights the appropriateness of cash transfers in many types of crisis in the past decade (see Table 6).

**For more information and resources on cash transfers in humanitarian contexts, see the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) platform:**  
<http://www.cashlearning.org/>

Increasingly, the humanitarian sector is therefore adopting a ‘cash first’ approach – and viewing social protection cash transfers (e.g. social pensions, Unconditional and Conditional Cash Transfers) as useful ‘entry points’ for this. On the other hand, in contexts where the crisis results in rapid food price rises or markets are disrupted, communities may have a preference for food.

Table 6. Cash, vouchers and in-kind transfers, broad comparisons for shock affected contexts

Type	Comparative advantages in shock-affected contexts	Comparative drawbacks
Cash	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can allow for a more relevant, faster and more flexible response that is better able to meet the priority needs of affected populations, while enhancing their dignity.</li> <li>• Cheaper to transfer money than goods (increased cost-efficiency).</li> <li>• Enhanced accountability (tracing how much aid/cash reaches beneficiaries)</li> <li>• Can support local markets, jobs and incomes, extending economic benefits beyond direct recipients (multiplier effects).</li> <li>• The cross-sectoral nature of cash transfers can incentivise greater coordination and integration of planning, response, monitoring &amp; evaluation</li> <li>• Potential for financial inclusion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not appropriate in weakly-integrated or poorly-competitive markets</li> <li>• Not appropriate where markets have collapsed</li> <li>• Not appropriate where access to markets are compromised (e.g. flooded roads)</li> <li>• Cash values, once fixed, are often not adjusted to keep up with price changes, so not appropriate in contexts of high inflation</li> <li>• Often, there is political concern about introducing cash assistance which it may become politically difficult to withdraw later</li> </ul>
Vouchers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Often more politically acceptable than cash transfers (increased control)</li> <li>• Enhanced accountability (tracing how much aid reaches beneficiaries, and what it is spent on)</li> <li>• Can support local markets, jobs and incomes, extending economic benefits beyond direct recipients (multiplier effect)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher transaction costs and lower flexibility for bens</li> </ul>
Food/ in-kind	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Often more politically acceptable than cash transfers (increased control)</li> <li>• Effective for tackling food-insecurity within recipient households</li> <li>• Suitable where there are market functionality/ access / food price inflation issue</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Logistical constraints (procurement, storage, transport, etc)</li> <li>• Higher transaction costs and no flexibility for bens</li> </ul>

Source: Adapted by Barca (2018) on the basis of Rowe (2017); Levine and Bailey, 2015; Gentilini, 2016; Beazley et al 2016; Alderman

<sup>93</sup>Note, again, the focus on shock response – not longer-term resilience building (discussed in forthcoming Guidance). The suggested type/modality, level, frequency and duration of transfers differs across the two.



- Assess the level of routine transfers and determine appropriateness (are these appropriate to the needs of vulnerable /affected populations?). Transfer values for humanitarian assistance are set in different ways from routine social protection interventions – and are most often higher, determined in accordance with the cost of basic needs utilizing a [Minimum Expenditure Basket \(MEB\)](#) approach. Many social assistance Programmes offer benefits that only cover a low share of the poor's income/consumption – 13% on average in low-income countries (World Bank, 2018). While the exact amounts may be challenging to pre-determine, scenario planning using historical data might help with arriving at a methodology and estimates that are acceptable to all relevant stakeholders. In situations of budget constraint, there will be a trade-off between coverage and adequacy, i.e. the number of people who can be supported vs. the amount of support provided to each.

### No matter what the situation, it may be worth ensuring:

- *Lesson learning from the Humanitarian sector* on establishing transfer levels that meaningfully impact individuals and households – increasing their resilience to future shocks.
- *Legal provisions for adjusting transfer levels regularly for inflation – ensuring continued impact over time*<sup>94</sup>. In emergency contexts, where market prices typically increase due to supply constraints, automatic indexation mechanisms could play an important role in securing the adequacy of transfer sizes.
- *Calibration to household size, dependency ratios, poverty levels, ages etc* – increasing the potential to cover needs.



**The level of routine transfers affects their potential for resilience building.** An increasing body of evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa has shown that Programmes including transfers amounting to over 20% of per capita income produce more significant results<sup>95</sup>. On the flip side, lack of impacts across recent evaluations has often been attributed to modest transfer sizes and erosion of value over time due to inflation<sup>96</sup>. A recent systematic review of cash transfer impacts confirms these insights, while also noting “presence of thresholds (where higher transfers may have a particularly strong effect on certain outcomes only after reaching a certain level)”<sup>97</sup>. **Graduation approaches** incorporate asset transfers and/or lump sum payments and additional training, mentoring etc within standard cash transfer Programmes, to explicitly trigger impacts on livelihoods.

- **Assess the frequency and duration of routine transfers and determine appropriateness** (are these appropriate to the needs of vulnerable/affected populations?). The frequency of routine social protection interventions varies widely, depending primarily on administrative constraints and transfer modalities. Most Programmes aim to transfer funds on a monthly basis<sup>98</sup> to enhance consumption smoothing, but many provide transfers less frequently – sometimes because of design choices<sup>99</sup> and sometimes because of implementation failures. In the aftermath of a shock, the priority of ensuring timely, frequent and regular payments may clash with existing Programmes’ payment cycles if and when these are relatively far apart (in Nepal the humanitarian response that leveraged national systems was delayed for this reason). Provisions may be made to adjust the timing of payment cycles in line with predictable crises such that regular payments are at least not delayed and that additional payments can be made in advance to the most vulnerable.

<sup>94</sup>For example, Kenya's Cash Transfer Programmeme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children saw the value of its transfer decrease by almost 60 percent because of inflation between 2007 to 2011 (Daidone et al. 2015).

<sup>95</sup>Examples include Davis, 2014; Daidone et al. 2015; Beazley and Farhat, 2016 (all cited in Barca, 2018).

<sup>96</sup>Examples include Arnold et al 2011; Asfaw et al, 2014; McCord et al, 2016 (all cited in Barca, 2018).

<sup>97</sup>Bastagli et al (2016).

<sup>98</sup>E.g based on data from the Manchester Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database.

<sup>99</sup>E.g. there is some evidence that larger and less frequent payments lead to higher productive impacts (saving, investment) (Bastagli et al, 2016). More broadly, ex-ante adaptations to routine transfer frequency and duration (e.g. ensuring the payment timing of regular social protection Programmes coincides with the moment of most need) may help to support resilience-building objectives, strengthening households’ capacity to cope with future shocks.







**The importance of ensuring predictable benefits – and the risks of disrupted delivery – is extensively discussed across evaluations and reviews of existing social protection interventions<sup>100</sup>.** No matter what the delivery/payment cycle, a regular and predictable benefit can help households to smooth consumption and better plan, while also supporting risk-taking behaviour and securing from disinvestment. These are fundamental to longer term **resilience building**.

*Box 19. Case Studies: problems with delayed payments in Mozambique and Kenya*

- In a recent assessment of **Mozambique's** preparedness for shock response, a key weakness identified within the existing system was the delayed payment of cash transfers during the cyclone season, which coincided with the end of the government's financial year.
- The evaluation of **Kenya** HSNP2's emergency payments to expanded caseloads cites the "irregularity of emergency payments, and the fact that households cannot anticipate in advance who will receive them" as key factors limiting their impact at times of need, partly as beneficiaries find it difficult to factor these into their spending plans.



Sources: Kardan et al, 2017b; Merttens et al. 2017

- **Assess the timing of routine transfers and determine appropriateness** (are these appropriate to the needs of vulnerable/affected populations?). Adequate timing of benefits can enable the achievement of specific outcomes. For example benefits could be usefully tied to households' seasonal needs – such as specific periods in the agricultural production cycle or in the school cycle (for example with a bonus paid at the beginning of the school year. For public works Programmes, the timing of employment could be designed to reflect seasonal variations in food security and local labour demand<sup>101</sup>. These considerations hold valid for emergency contexts, especially where predictable needs (e.g. in periods of drought) could be addressed through careful timing of transfers. Box 20 explores this further in the context of the Sahel.

<sup>100</sup>Fallavier, 2014; Daidone et al. 2015; Bastagli et al, 2016; Solórzano, 2016; Del Ninno Coll Black and Fallavier, 2016; Ulrichs and Slater, 2016; Andrews, Hsiao and Ralston, forthcoming.96Examples include Arnold et al 2011; Asfaw et al, 2014; McCord et al, 2016 (all cited in Barca, 2018).

<sup>101</sup>Beazley, McCord and Solórzano, 2016

Box 20. Case Study: Seasonal cash transfers and resilience: emerging lessons from the Sahel

A number of Cash Transfer Programmes in the Sahel have arisen initially as ‘emergency responses’ to seasonal food deficits, implemented primarily by international NGOs and financed as part of the humanitarian assistance effort within the broader framework of national food security efforts. They could thus be classified as essentially emergency activities rather than social protection per se, except for the fact that such seasonal deficits are recurrent and often (though not always) affect the same households in particularly vulnerable regions across the Sahel. In the medium term, such activities are therefore increasingly being taken over by national governments with humanitarian support. For the time being, seasonal emergency Programmes in the region have been providing a rich body of lessons learned and models for larger national social safety net Programmes to build on – as has been the case for the [Sahel’s Adaptive Social Protection Programme](#):



- Their links with and contributions to national food security response plans and processes:** Seasonal food transfer Programmes in the Sahel link most clearly into the institutional frameworks and mandates for disaster response that are built into ministries of agriculture, food security and early warning and emergency response systems; thus achieving greater synergies with such sectors than most National Social Protection Programmes. At sub-national level, seasonal transfer interventions are often embedded to some degree (or at least monitored) within local disaster response units – such as the regional and local action committees in Chad, which are multi-sectoral fora of decentralized government services and humanitarian/development partners.
- Their eligibility criteria, focusing on households most vulnerable to shocks.** This is a built-in feature of the seasonal Cash Transfer Programmes and takes place on two levels. Programmes are in the first instance geographically targeted (in line most often with national early warning systems and food and nutrition security indicators, based on the [Cadre Harmonisé](#)). Within the geographic area(s) assessed as most at risk of (or affected) by seasonal food deficits, targeting then proceeds most often through a [Household Economy Analysis \(HEA\)](#) approach that attempts to identify households’ status based on their ability to meet food needs. Sometimes categorical criteria are added to eligibility requirements (young children in the household, or pregnant and lactating women).
- Differential programming based on needs.** Distinction is often made between households who are suffering an immediate ‘survival deficit’ (that is those who need the transfer to meet basic food needs – primarily the very poor and sometimes the poor) and those who are suffering more from a livelihoods deficit (that is those who – in the face of the seasonal crisis - are adopting negative coping strategies that are weakening their livelihood bases – this could be the poor or the middle). Different Programmes of support are then designed to meet the needs of each.
- Seasonal sensitivity.** Cash transfers linked to cyclical food deficits in the lean months of rain-dependent rural agro-pastoral production systems are designed to take full account of the seasonal dimensions of vulnerability to food insecurity, which normally peaks in the months prior to harvest when stocks have been exhausted. Cash transfers are provided at that time – usually for a period of about 4 months – as a true safety net responding to scarcity.
- The ‘cash plus’ approach adopted to link support for survival with the building of resilience.** Depending on the situation and on the particular mandate of the operating agency, these could include measures to enhance individual resilience (such as nutritional support for young children) or measures to enhance household resilience (through livelihood inputs as well as through knowledge and capacity building of beneficiaries on household caring skills).

Sources: Barca (2018), building on work by Carol Watson and the World Bank (see also website above)

- **For all the above aspects, assess whether these parameters are likely to change over time**, i.e. the difference between what is needed for an immediate response (which might be the responsibility of emergency response actors) and a later recovery phase (for example, the difference between what might be needed in the first week after an earthquake to support food security, compared with what might be needed three months later to support reconstruction).
- **Understand: (i) the guidelines used by emergency response actors about how the transfer modality, value, frequency, duration and timing will be determined in the event of a shock; (ii) how to participate in discussions on these issues at the time of the shock.** Ensure that the social protection sector is compliant with the agreements of others working on emergency response, or else that, where it diverges, it does so by agreement with those other actors. Leveraging the experience of the humanitarian sector to agree key parameters for how a decision will be made on all these aspects in advance of future shocks – not to waste precious time negotiating design details in the aftermath of any given shock. It will be important to embed these in SOPs, MOUs, etc. to the extent possible, while acknowledging that adaptations may be needed in the aftermath of the shock – based on an assessment of needs and context.

**A realistic approach to setting these parameters in emergency contexts will require ex-ante understanding and/or addressing of:**

- inevitable **trade-offs** between scale and value;
- **political economy** considerations (e.g. around the impact of temporarily higher transfer values on public perceptions of standard/acceptable assistance);
- **coordination and harmonisation challenges** between multiple actors providing assistance<sup>102</sup>;
- **price fluctuations** in shock-affected areas;
- the **financial capacity** of government to mobilize resources in a timely manner.

Source: Barca (2018); O'Brien et al, (2018 a/b)

### Useful information/guidance:

- For social protection:
  - Module 1 of CODI [here](#)
  - TRANSFORM S&I Module [here](#)
- For Humanitarian:
  - [CALP](#) website
- For shock responsive social protection
  - Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit, Section C4 'The potential contribution of specific Programmes', [here](#)
  - SPaN Operational Note No 1: Benefit Modalities, [here](#)
  - SPaN Operational Note No 2: Targeting, [here](#)



<sup>102</sup>For example, through development of common transfer guidelines for government and aid agencies, as in the Philippines and Lesotho (O'Brien et al, 2018 a/b).

### 3.6 ADMINISTRATION<sup>103</sup>

<p>Routine system strengthening</p>	<p>The <a href="#">TRANSFORM Administration Module</a> discusses the key steps involved in delivering social protection services and benefits in a manner that is timely, efficient, effective, accountable and sustainable. These are organised along the 'delivery chain', from outreach, registration and enrolment through to payments/service delivery, case management and grievances<sup>104</sup>.</p> <p><i>Investing in strong delivery systems to administer social protection is a fundamental systems strengthening step for any country.</i></p> <p>Overall, reaping the benefits of well-designed Programmes is impossible in the context of bad implementation.</p> 
<p>What is the 'delta'? (How is this different from 'business as usual'?)</p>	<p>Given the focus of the core Module is on routine programming, no reference is made to the potential role of each of these stages for shock preparedness and response:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• either via the social protection sector itself, or</li> <li>• via other sectors 'piggybacking' on elements of routine SP delivery systems - those that are most 'robust' and 'prepared', and that are 'better' than alternatives offered by other sectors (e.g. including those of the disaster management authority).</li> </ul>
<p>Why is this important?</p>	<p>Because the delivery of 'emergency' Programmes goes through very similar processes to routine social protection. This means that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The strength and overall practical set-up of routine delivery systems for social protection determines the extent to which these can be leveraged for shock response (via existing Programmes or new Programmes that piggyback on them). <b>Routine system strengthening work is a fundamental first step.</b></li> <li>• <b>Routine delivery systems can be 'picked and mixed'</b> to enhance the outcomes of a response via the social protection sector or via external humanitarian actors.</li> <li>• <b>Simple adaptations, simplifications and 'contingency plans' can play an important role</b> in making routine delivery systems better placed for shock response: responding to different objectives and timelines.</li> <li>• It is also <b>important to consider the ways in which shocks impact social protection delivery systems (e.g. underlying capacity, technology, etc.)</b> and what mechanisms are in place to ensure continuity of service delivery and accountability to affected populations.</li> <li>• <b>Compromises will need to be made.</b> On the one hand, achieving humanitarian outcomes and conforming with humanitarian principles is important; on the other hand, implementation of social protection approaches in humanitarian settings should not impact negatively on the implementation or growth of the long term social protection system.</li> </ul>

<sup>103</sup>Note: the whole section draws extensively on a forthcoming/unpublished paper, Smith (2018), and on UNICEF (2020)

<sup>104</sup>A key resource on this topic includes the forthcoming World Bank 'Sourcebook on the Foundations of Social Protection Delivery Systems'.

**Key ACTIONS that may be relevant in your country therefore include the following, organised by each stage of the delivery chain.**



**a. Outreach and communications<sup>105</sup>**

- **Assessing routine communication strategies and strengthening those** (these are often under-funded for routine social protection programming)
- **Reviewing routine communications to ensure service continuity after a shock** – and embedding this in contingency plans and protocols. For example:
  - *Actions to raise beneficiary awareness of any temporary changes or special measures* to ensure the Programme can continue to operate after the shock (e.g. waiving of conditions, procedures to replace lost documentation, accessing benefits in new locations etc).
  - *Modifications to routine communication channels* in case of major disruption (e.g. electricity outage, physical inaccessibility, etc).
  - *Plans for surge capacity and coordination* with other sectors.
- **Ensuring Behavioural Change Communications (BCC)/Communications for Development (C4D)4D messaging<sup>106</sup> is incorporated/adjusted/scaled up.** For example, this may encompass focusing on new topics, such as Disaster Risk Preparedness, adaptation strategies and sustainable livelihoods, for BCC sessions associated with routine social protection Programmes (this was done in the Philippines) or linking new BCC messaging (e.g. on food security and nutrition) to activities in the aftermath of a shock. It may also encompass a broader focus on ensuring active participation and empowerment (addressing the drivers of social exclusion). – via strategies discussed in the TRANSFORM Financing Base Document. It is cost-effective to invest in early action.

*Box 21. Case Study: Tailored Behavioural Change Communication through the Pantawid cash transfer, in the Philippines*

Attendance at Family Development Sessions (FDS), held once a month, is one of the conditions for receipt of 4Ps cash transfers in the Philippines. One of the topics covered teaches beneficiaries to be disaster-ready, including what warning messages to be aware of, and what items should be packed for evacuation, including identification documents, clothes, and other essentials. It represents one way in which a CCTs can be used for ex-ante disaster preparedness at the household level. Post-Yolanda, FDS was also used to deliver information to the 4Ps households on how to recognize and address post-traumatic stress. It is understood that the Department for Social Welfare and Development is currently developing new guidelines and content for family disaster preparedness FDS sessions, to be delivered in disaster prone municipalities.



Source: Bowen (2015), adapted in Barca (2018) and UNICEF (2020).

- **Adapting communications for responses to shocks via the social protection sector** – and embedding this in contingency plans and protocols. Where the social protection sector is expected to play an important role for shock response, it will be important to adapt communications so as to clearly address:
  - *Modification of the key messages to be communicated:* the rationale, institutional partners, revised eligibility criteria and/or transfer amounts, duration and frequency of support – as well as the practical ‘how to’ for receiving the transfers, channelling grievances, etc.

<sup>105</sup>Note: the whole section draws extensively on an unpublished paper, Smith (2018), and on UNICEF (2020)

<sup>106</sup>This can be in the form of communication campaigns, dissemination of information e.g. via instant messaging, trainings and advocacy, among other strategies - in acknowledgement that values, beliefs, attitudes, preferences, habits, costs and benefits assessments, social norms, etc. interact to influence a behaviour. See also Solorzano and Cardenas (2019).



**Not taking communication seriously for emergency interventions can lead to raising of expectations and potential reputational damages to routine social protection Programmes.** Among other aspects, it will be essential to provide extensive communications on:

- **the duration and scale-down strategy**
- **The reasons for the selected eligibility criteria**

- *Ensuring communication mechanisms are accessible to (new) caseloads.* New caseloads may face different communication barriers compared to routine recipients or have different needs vis-à-vis language, literacy (both alphanumeric and digital), mobility, trusted media and organisations, social networks etc.

*Box 22. Case Study: accessibility of communication channels to new caseloads*

In **Turkey**, it was noted in the design of the ESSN and CCTE for refugees that communication materials and channels on the Turkish social assistance system were not accessible to the Syrian population. Printed communication materials were developed in Arabic and other appropriate languages, distributed through SASF, Service Centres, DGMM offices, Community Centres, Temporary Education Centres and NGOs working with refugees. New communication channels were used to expand outreach to the dispersed refugee population. This included an information helpline in six languages, a Facebook page, YouTube and WhatsApp groups.



Source: Smith (2018); CaLP (2018)

- *Addressing potential social tensions* that may arise as a consequence of crisis response through social protection. While most social tensions can be reduced via careful design, communication mechanisms can play an effective role in clarifying the purpose of support, any additional arrangements to ensure continuity of services for host communities/ non-beneficiaries, etc.

**b. Registration and enrolment<sup>107</sup>**

The exact approach adopted for registration and enrolment in country<sup>108</sup> (which depends on the nature of the underlying Programmes and on historical/institutional/capacity factors) – as well as its outcomes in terms of population coverage and extent of inclusion and exclusion errors – strongly impacts constraints and opportunities for the use of existing registration and enrolment systems for shock response.

<sup>107</sup>Note: the whole section draws extensively on an unpublished paper, Smith (2018), and on UNICEF (2020)  
<sup>108</sup>E.g. on-demand or census survey



**For vertical expansions of existing Programmes, registration and enrolment is already complete:**

the caseload of emergency response recipients is the same as the caseload of routine beneficiaries (or a sub-set of these, e.g. in shock affected locations). On one hand, this reduces the costly and time-consuming process of registering new households, assessing their eligibility and enrolling them. On the other, it most often means vertical expansions only reach a small sub-set of shock affected households and will require complementary Programmes to reach remaining caseloads. It should also be noted that:



- Vertical expansions will often **anyway require revalidation of data** (e.g. especially in cases of displacement and loss of documentation)
- To increase coverage, vertical expansions can be **conducted across several Programmes** (e.g. this was the case in Fiji<sup>109</sup>) – this is feasible in contexts where this does not add coordination challenges and significantly addresses the coverage gap (often not the case)

Key activities to strengthen routine registration and enrollment systems to enhance shock preparedness and response will include the following:

- **Assessing existing registration and enrolment mechanisms against their potential use for expanding caseloads – and strengthening these to better ensure dynamic inclusion** (no matter what the cause of increased caseloads). Ideally, routine registration and enrolment mechanisms would be able to expand to new caseloads in response to changing needs (e.g. triggered by any type of shock). However, this is rarely the case:
  - many registration mechanisms, and subsequent enrolment, *are static and based on periodic census surveys*. i.e. they are not able to ‘expand’ to respond to needs unless a new census survey is conducted, or existing data is used in new ways (see below);
  - *on-demand systems struggle to cater to peaks in demand*, especially for rapid onset shocks;
  - there are other factors ‘controlling’ dynamic Programme expansion, such as *quotas*. These are driven by countries’ fiscal constraints.



**Addressing these barriers** to inclusive, on-demand social protection registration and enrolment should be a priority action for system strengthening!

- **Conducting pre-registration and pre-enrollment of potential beneficiaries, if/where appropriate and possible.** Such a policy could help to speed up delivery post-crisis and could be feasible in contexts (e.g. specific areas of the country) that are affected by regular and broadly predictable shocks (e.g. HSNP in Kenya’s drylands)<sup>110</sup> – not elsewhere. These efforts would need to be complemented by a strong communication strategy to clarify the difference between regular and temporary caseloads. Bear in mind the additional costs that this would entail: it would be important to consider whether this is the most cost-effective use of a social protection budget.

<sup>109</sup>It is important to note such a solution increases overall coverage, but does not ensure full coverage of affected households.  
<sup>110</sup>This was identified as a significant challenge in Fiji (Mansur et al, 2018).

Box 23. Case Study: pre-enrolment for Kenya's Hunger Safety Net Programme

In **Kenya**, the Hunger safety Net Programme (HSNP) – led by the National Drought Management Authority – is inherently targeted to the countries' Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASALs), including the four poorest and arid Counties of Turkana, Wajir, Mandera and Marsabit. Within these areas, some 25% of the population (100,000 households) is regularly reached by HSNP transfers. An innovation in Phase 2 of the programme, which started in 2013, was the registration and pre-enrolment of almost all other households in the four participating counties—nearly 300,000. These households do not receive routine transfers, but some of them are eligible for ad-hoc.



Source: O'Brien et al, 2018 a/b

- **Ensuring preparedness for rapid registration of new caseloads, if/where appropriate and possible** (e.g. via contingency plans, SOPs, protocols, etc). In a large majority of cases, existing social protection data will not be usable to support the enrolment of shock-affected populations (see also Section 3.7)<sup>111</sup>. In these cases, it could be useful to prepare routine systems in advance of a crisis to play a role in registering and enrolling households for emergency Programmes, if it is determined that social protection actors are in a better position to do this than others. In particular:
  - *Planning and preparing emergency registration forms*, building on humanitarian expertise and leveraging existing information where possible. Ideally a short/'reduced' form to speed up registration, which may also require modifications to eligibility criteria since decisions will be based only on those data fields collected.

Box 24. Case Study: pre-developing an emergency registration form in Chile

In **Chile**, The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) developed a pre-designed form for emergency registration of new caseloads, called Ficha Básica de Emergencia – Basic Emergency Form "FIBE". In order to receive any kind of government assistance, households need to be registered with FIBE. The FIBE form is very short (one page) and includes many 'perception' indicators (e.g. 'how badly affected was your house?'). Most importantly, it is linked with data from the country's Social Registry (the Registro Social de Hogares (RSH), which has 70% coverage of population), enabling a comprehensive overview of household conditions. Moreover, data for FIBE is collected electronically – significantly speeding up registration times. For example, while data collection for the 2014 Tarapacá Earthquake took 115 days, it took 27 days for the comparable 2015 Coquimbo Earthquake using the shortened (one-page) Ficha FIBE and 'filling in' missing data through the RSH.



Source: Barca and Beazley (2019)

<sup>111</sup>Barca and Beazley (2018)raising unattended expectations on potential receipts of transfers.



- *Developing an emergency registration strategy depending on existing systems:*
  - *In contexts with census-survey approaches to registration:*
    - Training teams of staff (including surge capacity) for emergency census-survey data collection, based on the pre-designed emergency form. Incorporating learning from the humanitarian sector on data collection in shock-affected contexts.
  - Preparing for different needs compared to routine caseloads (language, documentation requirements, etc.)
    - *In contexts with on-demand approaches to registration* (e.g. Box 25).
- Provisions for not over-burdening capacity and for surging capacity.
- Relaxation of standard requirements and processes (e.g. home visits, documentation requirements).
- Making demand-led registration processes more accessible to vulnerable groups, for example, by i) setting up and staffing additional, temporary offices in locations that are safe and accessible for the target group; ii) taking registration activities to communities through addition of registration camps or doorstep services; iii) covering transport costs for vulnerable applicants to travel to social welfare offices elsewhere; iv) catering to different language needs, etc.

### Box 25. Case Studies: Overcoming on-demand registration barriers – Turkey and Kyrgyzstan

- In **Turkey**, Programme monitoring showed that some vulnerable families in remote locations and with mobility constraints were struggling with the process for registration for the ESSN and CCTE. Complementary ‘handholding’ was provided by humanitarian actors (including UNICEF), providing transport or covering cost of transport to take applicants to the local government social assistance offices.
- In **Kyrgyzstan**, following conflict in 2010, the interim government was supported by UNICEF (that had been working on social protection pre-crisis), to horizontally expand existing Programmes. A Temporary Regulation relaxed the proof of eligibility requirements for six months in two affected provinces and established ad hoc local social commissions to rapidly assess applications for households. UNICEF also supported the set-up of mobile outreach services (via additionally recruited social assistants), to take registration to communities making it more accessible for the poorest and speeding up enrolment.



Sources: Smith (2018), citing CaLP (2018) and Smith (2017a and b)

- **Supporting preparedness for rapid enrolment of new caseloads, where appropriate and possible** (e.g. via contingency plans, SOPs, protocols, etc). Registration and enrolment can be conducted contextually in emergency contexts, or sequenced closely to maximize timeliness of the response.

### c. Payment system<sup>112</sup>

Routine Cash Transfer Programmes (the main area of focus for this document) offer two main payment modalities, manual (cash or voucher) and electronic (e-voucher, card or mobile money), each offering opportunities and challenges<sup>113a</sup>. These can be run by the implementing agency, decentralized to a local level government or outsourced to a financial service provider. It is clear that leveraging these existing systems offers high potential in emergency contexts: trust-relations are already built; terms of service already negotiated and there may be some economies of scale if the providers are willing to accommodate the additional caseload<sup>113b</sup>.

<sup>112</sup>Note: the whole section focuses primarily on payments and not in-kind delivery. It draws extensively on a forthcoming/unpublished paper, Smith (2018), and on UNICEF (2020)

<sup>113a</sup>See for example TRANSFORM Administration module. Also note that the two key transfer modalities can be delivered via a variety of payment devices (e.g. POS, ATM, phone) and payment ‘points’ (mobile units, post offices, bank branches, local shops, etc) – also offering opportunities and challenges.

<sup>113b</sup>Remember, in some countries when a shock hits, cash may not be viable! For example, if people are stranded on an Island due to a flood, then in-kind support will be required to meet the needs

Nevertheless, there are also true risks of overburdening existing capacity and infrastructure or introducing rigidities into the emergency response. There can be benefit in intentionally diversifying the range of providers, so as to have more options in the event of a shock.

### Key ACTIONS in this area will therefore include:

- **Assessing existing payment mechanisms against their potential for a) guaranteeing continuity of service delivery, and; b) flexing and scaling to respond to changing needs.**

Assessing the system's capacity - and the interest of current and potential payment service providers - to: withstand the shock, handle larger volumes of cash and at a different frequency, handle new population groups, and ensure accountability (see Lightbulb Box below for important details) - for different crisis scenarios. Include a focus on: technology, infrastructure, human resources and flows of funds/liquidity management.



- **Supporting preparedness measures for use of routine payment systems for shock response.** Based on the assessment, understanding the potential for using or "piggybacking" on the existing system and developing a preparedness strategy alongside government (Lightbulb Box below):

- Pre-defining protocols, roles and responsibilities across all relevant actors via MOUs, standby agreements, Standard Operating Procedures, manuals of operations, etc. This may include setting up new protocols and MOUs with providers who have not previously been used for social protection, to expand the range of options.
- Pre-defining cost-sharing and remuneration structures for additional administrative costs.
- Making changes to the IT/MIS platform for payment delivery, to ensure flexibility.
- Testing new solutions through small pilots and using the monitoring data and experience to inform scale up plans.

### Potential areas for payment system preparedness/adaptation

- **Withstanding and flexing with the shock:**

- Shock-proofing existing infrastructure and technology to the extent possible – strengthening routine payment systems
- Having contingency plans for alternate payment approaches, temporary paypoints and surge capacity, with a strong focus on guaranteeing flexibility, accessibility and security
- Strategy for flow of funds to local level (to ensure liquidity and timeliness)
- Handling larger volumes of cash and at a different frequency:
  - Provisions to enable swift changes to the payment amount and schedule, to meet humanitarian needs
  - Pre-empting capacity implications e.g. via protocols for surge capacity
- Setting up stand-by agreements with new agents ready for the emergency context, and/or increasing the range of options used by routine social protection Programmes to increase flexibility
- Handling new population groups (expansions of coverage):
  - Pre-empting differential needs of different groups (preferences, language barriers, familiarity with technology, etc.)
- Budgeting additional capacity for "hand-holding" and support activities for new caseloads unfamiliar with the system when expanding payments to new geographical areas



- **Ensuring accountability**

- Especially where funding may come from different sources than routine transfers, different reconciliation requirements may be in place than can be set out in advance
- Fully abiding by humanitarian principles, especially in fragile and conflict-affected states

Source: Authors, building on Smith (2018), O'Brien et al (2018a/b), Beazley et al (2019)

**d. Case management, grievances and protection<sup>114</sup>**

These functions are often overlooked within routine social protection programming, but are increasingly gaining importance. The extent to which they are carried out to high standards varies widely across countries, raising questions on their potential role in emergency contexts. Recent evidence shows it is often the humanitarian sector that steps in to perform these “hand-holding” functions, not to overburden social protection capacity (see Box 26 for examples) – or simply because the social protection sector does not have this capacity (this is the case for ‘protection’<sup>115</sup>, especially in conflict situations – [see this webinar](#) on the implications). Nevertheless, there is still a strong rationale to build on existing systems where possible and use the response as an opportunity for social protection systems strengthening.

*Box 26. Case Studies: Case management and grievance functions via external partners*

- In **Yemen**, additional hotline channels were added to the existing complaints mechanism of the government’s Social Welfare Fund. These were accessible for those beneficiaries living in insecure areas, where access to social welfare offices was restricted.
- In **Turkey** a free of charge helpline for the CCTE and ESSN Programmes was created. Complaints can be received in 6 languages including Turkish and Arabic.
- In **Nepal**, the grievance redressal system of the national social transfer system has people communicate their complaints directly to Village Development Committees/ward secretaries. During the horizontal expansion of these Programmes a toll-free phone number and SMS platform were also introduced, however beneficiaries generally preferred to use the traditional and familiar approach of communicating with VDC/ward secretaries.
- In **Kyrgyzstan**, government social welfare officers did not practice a ‘case management’ approach prior to the crisis. As part of their support during the crisis, UNICEF provided skills and methods training and coaching of social protection managers and social workers on additional outreach measures to ensure family welfare. They introduced new documentation – a care and support plan for the family – to monitor needs, referrals to services and progress. This monitoring approach was adopted by the government after this.



Sources: Smith (2018), Smith (2017 a/b) and UNICEF (2020)



**Grievance mechanisms are critical in the context of responses to emergencies** for a few reasons, including: a) needs are more acute and urgent (the cost of ‘non-response’ or ‘mis-response’ is much higher); b) the potential for collusion/corruption and lack of impartiality can be heightened in emergency contexts; c) inclusion and exclusion errors can be compounded when targeting criteria are ‘blended’ across social protection and humanitarian Programmes; d) well functioning grievance mechanisms can help with the reallocation of resources and swift addressing of operational challenges; e) working across social protection and humanitarian programming requires heightened transparency and accountability to build recipient confidence.<sup>116</sup>

**Ultimately, it is imperative that working across sectors raises the level of protection for vulnerable households, rather than introducing the potential for people to fall between the cracks<sup>117</sup>.**

<sup>114</sup>Note: the whole section draws extensively on a forthcoming/unpublished paper, Smith (2018), and on UNICEF (2020)

<sup>115</sup>This is defined by the Humanitarian Protection Cluster as “all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law - ie. Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and Refugee Law - taking into account their age, gender, social, ethnic, national and religious or other background.”

<sup>116</sup>Building on Longhurst and Sabates Wheeler (2019)

<sup>117</sup>E.g. this may be the case where an emergency organisation does not target social protection beneficiaries because they are ‘already receiving something’ – without realising that routine transfer levels are often significantly lower than humanitarian transfers.

**Useful information/guidance for this section on administration and delivery systems:**

- Guidance on delivery systems for social protection
  - TRANSFORM “Administration of non-contributory social protection: Delivery Systems Manual” [here](#)
  - Module 3 of CODI on Programme Implementation, [here](#), together with ISPA tools on Social Protection [Payments](#)
  - World Bank (forthcoming) Sourcebook on Social Protection Delivery Systems
- Guidance on delivery systems for humanitarian programming
  - Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP), [here](#)
- Guidance on delivery systems for shock responsive social protection:
  - SPaN Operational Note N.4: Operations, [here](#)
  - Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit, Section D [here](#)
  - Smith (2018) Responding to shocks: considerations along the delivery chain, OPM background paper for the World Bank (unpublished)





### 3.7 INFORMATION SYSTEMS

<p>Routine system strengthening</p>	<p>The <a href="#">TRANSFORM 'Management Information Systems' (MIS) Module</a> discusses the increasingly pivotal role of social protection information systems such as Programme MISs, and Social Registries and Integrated Beneficiary Registries, for the planning, coordination and administration of social protection Programmes and systems. It also stresses how the exact way in which data is collected, stored and managed at Programme level – and also across Programmes in a country – varies widely across countries, affecting their potential opportunities and risks.</p> <p><i>Strengthening information systems for the social protection sector – so these truly respond to the country's policy and operational needs, while minimising the protection risks for the population – is a fundamental systems strengthening step for any country.</i></p>	
<p>What is the 'delta'? (How is this different from 'business as usual'?)</p>	<p>The same can be said when it comes to leveraging existing social protection information systems for shock preparedness and response (e.g. using existing data to inform targeting, etc). What can be achieved in practice will depend entirely on what is already available in country<sup>118</sup>. One important difference is that where the shock is likely to entail conflict, it is particularly important to consider the privacy and data protection needs of the population in the light of the risks imposed by the collection of data.</p>	
<p>Why is this important?</p>	<p>Because there is a large amount of hype – especially among humanitarian actors – on the benefits of leveraging data from social protection information systems (e.g. social registries and integrated beneficiary registries).</p> <p>On one hand, (depending on their set up) existing registries/information systems can offer a range of potential uses for shock response:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Before a shock hits, data can inform risk analysis and vulnerability assessments, as well as planning and preparedness measures.</li> <li>• When a shock is about to occur, and immediately after it, early warning systems can enable timely responses by leveraging existing data.</li> <li>• After the shock, data can inform key decisions in relation to identifying who to support (targeting) and the type of support required.</li> <li>• In the long run, data and information can enable learning and inform policy changes – for example by incorporating shock affected caseloads into routine social protection provision<sup>119</sup>.</li> </ul> <p>On the other, the varied nature and quality of social assistance registries and broader information systems means that their role and use in emergencies can only be identified with reference to the particularities of the registries/information systems in the country and context under review. Moreover, in some contexts the existence of data on certain population groups or individuals can, if it ends up in the wrong hands, be a matter of life or death to those people, if it is used as a basis for discrimination.</p>	

<sup>118</sup>Barca and Beazley (2019)  
<sup>119</sup>Barca and Beazley (2019)



In practice, in country **ACTIONS** could therefore focus on the following (see also this [infographic](#) on the topic):

- **Assessing existing information systems against their potential for shock preparedness and response.**


Depending on their set up, social assistance data (from cash transfers or other Programmes) can offer a range of potential uses for shock response. For instance, as a source of household and individual level data; comprehensive socio economic data; operational data (that is useful to identify, trace and deliver benefits); geo referenced or geographically disaggregated data; and (in an increasing number of countries) data that can help to capture shock vulnerability in advance of a shock. They also sometimes feature interoperability or data sharing arrangements with other government registries and are underpinned by established capacity to collect, store, and manage data.

Nevertheless, their role and use in emergencies will broadly depend on the following six features<sup>120</sup>. Note that there is a trade-off between the first two (completeness and relevance) and the other four. In other words, the more information is held on more people, the harder (and more expensive) it is to keep that data accurate, up to date and secure, and the more complex the access arrangements:

- **Completeness.** This refers to the level of data coverage and number of records compared with what would be perceived as a full set of records—for instance, 100 percent of the population in affected areas, or 100 percent of those in need. An existing social assistance registry may assist an emergency response if the data cover all of those affected by the shock, or a high enough proportion. Important distinctions need to be made between data on beneficiaries and registered non beneficiaries, acknowledging that neither are likely to offer full coverage of populations affected (see Figure 2).
- **Relevance.** Data are relevant if they contain the variables required for the intended purpose. Data collected for the provision of long term social assistance (i.e. another purpose) may not always be relevant for shock response if they do not contain variables that comprehensively identify households in affected areas, and ideally that assess household needs and enable an immediate response.
- **Currency.** Data currency is the degree to which data are current (up to date), and thus represent households' real circumstances at the required point in time. It is, of course, impossible for standard social protection data to reflect the reality after a disaster, meaning some form of post disaster revalidation is always required. The relevant factor is how up to date existing data are overall – often an issue for concern in many countries reviewed.
- **Accessibility.** This refers to the ease with which potential users most likely national or local government agencies and departments, or their partners can obtain the data. Accessibility can vary widely depending on who the users are and what processes and authorisation levels are in place for data sharing; the underlying policy and legislation; whether or not data are maintained and stored digitally; existing provisions for data security and privacy; what type of data interfaces are provided; the data architecture for interoperability, etc.
- **Accuracy.** Data are considered to be accurate if they are free from errors and omission. Accuracy means that a high level of confidence can be placed in the data, affecting their wider credibility and ultimately their usability.
- **Data protection.** Data are secure when they are protected against unauthorised access, misuse, or corruption. Data privacy is guaranteed where data are utilised while protecting an individual's privacy preferences and their personally identifiable information. In emergency contexts, concerns regarding misusing or losing such information – potentially exposing households to further vulnerability – are heightened.
- **Deciding how existing data and its underlying systems will be used, if at all.**

Depending on the outcomes of the assessment, understanding whether there is scope to support vertical and horizontal expansions, or new Programmes piggybacking on existing data, data-collecting capacity and information systems. See Figure 9.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid



Source: Barca and Beazley (2019)

- Supporting preparedness measures for use of routine data and information systems for shock response.**

Based on any decision (above), preparedness measures will be required not to compromise the timeliness of the response – or meeting of other outcome areas. These will include:

  - Strengthening routine systems, with an eye to potential use for shock response. E.g.:**

    - Auditing systems to strengthen data quality (and trust)
    - Conducting 'privacy impact assessments' or the equivalent, to identify any potential protection risks imposed by the existence of the database and to make adjustments that mitigate any harmful consequences
    - Increasing currency of social protection data (e.g. via on-demand or periodic registrations), especially in shock affected areas
    - Increasing coverage of data in shock affected areas
    - Supporting the digitization of all data collected for routine programming
    - Adapting the variables collected to better capture vulnerability to shocks
    - Ensuring geographic data, ideally geo-localised and/or geographic information system (GIS) data is collected and stored
    - Increasing interoperability and standardization of data across Programmes and actors
    - Linking information systems to Early Warning triggers
    - Ensuring durability and flexibility of hardware and software
    - Processes for informed consent (including use of data for shock-response purposes)
    - Processes for reaching new population groups (see section on Registration)
  - Ensuring clarity on processes, roles and responsibilities for shock response, via**

    - Protocols and standard operating procedures on how data will be used
    - MoUs and standby agreements for data sharing
    - Training/guidance for all stakeholders, especially at local level
  - Testing and piloting new approaches and developing detailed action plans** accompanied by resource requirements
- Exploring whether it is appropriate for processes, systems, data and lessons from previous shocks to be incorporated into routine information systems.**

Whether an emergency response was run by a humanitarian partner or by government actors, there may be value in retaining these, provided that does not violate privacy agreements. For example, caseloads supported via emergency response could be integrated into routine programming, or data from past responses could be used to inform planning. At the same time, principles for good data collection require that such data should be allowed to expire after a certain period if not used; and that data cannot be used for purposes for which people did not give their consent. These good data principles should not be violated.



- **Ensuring that alternative forms of data collection and storage are available**, such that households are not prevented from receiving support if they do not wish to share certain information (especially biometric data) which they feel might compromise their security.
- **Strengthening and linking other, relevant, information systems – such as Early Warning Systems** (developed by other sectors).

### 3.8 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

- Every single ‘building block’ of the social protection system can be strengthened and designed so as to better encompass the typical risks a country faces – and is likely to face in the future.
- Many of these are simple ‘wins’ that can be achieved in the short term. Others will require higher levels of effort and long-term planning.
- Preparedness measures also play an important role, based on the overarching response strategy agreed across sectors.

Table 7. Summary table: key actions across social protection ‘building blocks’

	Description of key actions (details in Sections below)
M&E, evidence and learning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Familiarising with the risk profile of your country and its diverse regions</li> <li>• Not only basing social protection strategic decisions on historical data from the past, but also projections for the future (e.g. future hotspots of vulnerability).</li> <li>• Incorporating evidence on risk and vulnerability to covariate shocks into routine monitoring and evaluation activities, to inform planning and programming</li> <li>• Conducting a social protection system assessment that specifically focuses on ‘shock-readiness’</li> <li>• Building an evidence base on the use of social protection in emergency contexts: implement, learn, adapt.</li> </ul>
Coordination and governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creating or strengthening horizontal coordination mechanisms across government, and with non-government actors, including those who have a mandate to respond to shocks (e.g. humanitarian, DRM) or could play a role (e.g. social protection).</li> <li>• Institutionalising these coordination agreements and arrangements (e.g. via Standard Operating Procedures, Memorandums of Understanding, etc.) and focusing on achieving key outcomes in the short, medium and long-term. Also: Give clarity on roles and responsibilities, across all the relevant stakeholders; focus on short, medium- and long-term multi-sectoral strategies</li> <li>• Ensuring vertical coordination within the social protection sector on these topics (all the way to district and municipal level) – and ensuring cross-sectoral coordination at local level.</li> <li>• Broader regional coordination for portability of social protection entitlements.</li> </ul>
Legislation, policy and strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reviewing the social protection policy/strategy/legislation from a risk perspective, aiming to provide an enabling framework for social protection to support the needs of populations vulnerable to – and affected by – shocks.</li> <li>- This may include provisions to: a) better link routine programming and planning to covariate shocks; b) increase coordination with DRM and humanitarian actors who have the mandate to respond to covariate shocks; c) increase flexibility in the system and ability to swiftly respond during shocks; d) increase accessibility of assistance during shocks (temporary relaxing/waiving of existing criteria/requirements); e) ensure the upholding of Humanitarian Principles in policy and practice.</li> <li>• In parallel, reviewing the national emergency/DRM policy, strategy and legislation and: a) understanding the extent to which social protection is reflected; b) working alongside humanitarian and DRM stakeholders to incorporate a role for social protection, where relevant and feasible</li> <li>• Reviewing other national policy and legislation from a shock responsive perspective, as these may support or hinder the potential role of the social protection sector</li> <li>• Embedding changes into Manuals of Operation, Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs), etc. across relevant sectors.</li> </ul>







	Description of key actions (details in Sections below)
Financing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Broadening the focus of social protection financing.                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- This may include: a) Ensuring financing for regular/predictable/recurrent emergencies (these should not be classified as ‘extra-ordinary’ needs); b) Supporting longer-term resilience building activities; c) Ensuring dynamic and inclusive approaches to registration that enable access to social protection when in need (i.e. not a ‘fixed-list’ or quota approach where budget is fixed in advance); d) Ensuring the continuity of social protection service delivery in the aftermath of a shock; (i.e. when additional ‘contingency’ resources are needed to fulfil routine functions); e) Where relevant and feasible, scaling to support new caseloads and needs (via new or existing Programmes) – or working alongside the humanitarian and DRM sectors.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Pre-empting financing needs across these different areas and pre-establishing a financial strategy to address these in a timely manner: a) Estimating potential costs in advance; b) Identifying financial resources and pre-planning the funding required; c) Planning for timely disbursements (pre-empting potential challenges)</li> </ul>
Mix of Programmes and their design features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Intervention types, objectives and linkages – linked to ‘comprehensiveness’</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assessing routine Programmes vis-à-vis their current and potential role for addressing the needs generated by covariate shocks.</li> <li>- Where relevant, ensuring permanent modifications in objectives/function to include better addressing emergency needs (where relevant).</li> <li>- Ensuring linkages and complementary programming within the social protection sector and beyond, to enhance resilience building ex-ante and a comprehensive response to emergency needs ex-post.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Targeting design (eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions) – linked to ‘coverage’</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assessing the overlap between existing eligibility criteria/coverage and characteristics of vulnerable and/or affected population, for different types of shocks – including a strong focus on who would be excluded and strategies to overcome that.</li> <li>- Assessing routine approaches for social protection eligibility verification and determining the potential for relaxing/waiving eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions in the context of specific shocks.</li> <li>- Assessing routine approaches for social protection eligibility verification and determining the extent to which the systems, capacities and data generated via routine approaches can be leveraged in the aftermath of a shock</li> <li>- Based on these assessments, develop guidance on ‘targeting’ in emergency settings (linked to an overall ‘response strategy’ across relevant sectors and shocks) – to be adapted in the aftermath of any shock.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Type/modality, level (value), frequency, duration and timing of transfer – linked to adequacy.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assess each in turn and determine appropriateness (are these appropriate to the needs of vulnerable/affected populations and the context?). Focus on strengthening impacts on resilience and minor design and implementation tweaks to enhance relevance for covariate shocks.</li> <li>- Develop guidance for suggested emergency transfer modality, value, frequency, duration and timing (if different from routine) – and ensure cross-sectoral agreements.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Outreach and communications</b> (important to embed any changes in contingency plans and protocols)                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assessing routine communication strategies and strengthening those (these are often under-funded)</li> <li>- Reviewing routine communications to ensure service continuity after a shock</li> <li>- Ensuring Behavioural Change Communications (BCC)/Communications for Development (C4D)4D messaging is incorporated/adjusted/scaled up</li> <li>- Adapting communications for responses to shocks via the social protection sector (key messages to be communicated, addressing potential social tensions, etc)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Registration and enrolment</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assessing existing registration and enrolment mechanisms against their potential use for expanding caseloads – and strengthening these to better ensure dynamic inclusion (no matter what the cause of increased caseloads)</li> <li>- Conducting pre-registration and pre-enrollment of potential beneficiaries, if/where appropriate and possible (regular, predictable shocks)</li> <li>- Ensuring preparedness for rapid registration and enrolment of new caseloads, if/where appropriate and possible (e.g. contingency plans, SOPs, protocols, etc)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Payment system</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assessing existing payment mechanisms against their potential for a) guaranteeing continuity of service delivery, and; b) flexing and scaling to respond to changing needs. Assessing the system’s capacity to: withstand the shock, handle larger volumes of cash and at a different frequency, handle new population groups, and ensure accountability – for different crisis scenarios</li> <li>- Supporting preparedness measures for use of routine payment systems for shock response (e.g. pre-defining cost-sharing and remuneration structures)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <b>Case management, grievances and protection</b> – strengthening systems in the long term and filling gaps via support from the humanitarian sector</li> </ul>



## IN PRACTICE: SYSTEM STRENGTHENING, PREPAREDNESS AND PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY

	Description of key actions (details in Sections below)
Information systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessing existing information systems against their potential for shock preparedness and response. Evaluate a) completeness; b) relevance; c) currency; d) accessibility; e) accuracy; f) data protection</li> <li>• Deciding how existing data and its underlying systems will be used, if at all (based on the assessment). Evaluate whether there is scope to support vertical and horizontal expansions, or new Programmes piggybacking on existing data, data-collecting capacity and information systems</li> <li>• Supporting preparedness measures for use of routine data and information systems for shock response (e.g. clarity on processes, roles and responsibilities)</li> <li>• Ensuring processes, systems, data and lessons from previous shocks are incorporated into routine information systems</li> <li>• Ensuring that alternative forms of data collection and storage are available in contexts where there might be protection concerns</li> <li>• Strengthening and linking other, relevant, information systems – such as Early Warning Systems</li> </ul>



# 4

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## IN CONCLUSION, KEY STEPS TO STRENGTHEN/ BUILD SHOCK RESPONSIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION

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This Section provides an extreme summary of actions that will be relevant and possible timelines for these. Some of these may already be at an advanced stage in your country! Also, it is important to distinguish two different ‘cycles’ at play: the first is a medium-long term policy cycle, the second is a short-term ‘shock cycle’ (with possible overlapping cycles where shocks overlap). See Figure 11.

### 4.1 WHY ARE WE HERE? SET THE FOUNDATIONS.

- Make sure the message travels far and clear: both globally and in your country there has been a **change in context that means ‘business as usual’ is no longer viable**. Historic – and projected – needs of our populations are increasing, and so is their vulnerability profile. The hazards, stresses and shocks we are exposed to are often overlapping, and they significantly compound existing vulnerabilities. (Section 1.3.1).
- Help to build the **evidence base** on what has already been changing and will be changing in your country (in the medium-long term) and how that affects needs (Section 3.1 and Annex D).
- **Advocate for change:** anticipating future shocks will be much more effective than trying to aackle increased needs down the line! Also, there is a strong interest and commitment from the humanitarian sector to work together.

### 4.2 WHO ARE “WE” AND WHAT ARE WE DOING ALREADY IN SHOCK RESPONSIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION? UNDERSTAND OUR ‘BUILDING BLOCKS’ ACROSS SECTORS.

- In order to ‘start the conversation’, we need to **start by better understanding each other’s sectors:** what are our mandates, systems, processes, principles and ‘tools’? We call these ‘building blocks’ (Section 1.2 and 2.3.2).
- **We also need a strong understanding of who is currently addressing what needs and with what?** What specific roles and responsibilities do others already have (national/ international & across sectors)? What Programmes are already running and with what design features and timelines? What already works well in those systems? Are there aspects that need improving?



- A solid understanding of ‘what is already there’ and **how ‘strong’ and ‘ready’\*** existing Programmes and their underlying systems (building blocks) are will help to understand what can be leveraged and/or strengthened going forwards.  
\* N.B. ‘Ready’ to a) weather shocks (i.e. not collapse when they are most needed) and b) respond to changing needs and vulnerabilities due to shocks.
- **How?** This TRANSFORM training is a starting point and it focused primarily on Social Protection! You can continue the conversation with workshops, meetings, exchange of documentation, etc... and you can also leverage the WFP and UNICEF Social Protection ‘System Assessment’ tools!

### 4.3 HOW CAN ‘BUSINESS AS USUAL’ IN SOCIAL PROTECTION BE IMPROVED UPON? FOCUS ON: A) OUTCOMES, B) COORDINATION AND C) DEFINING AN OVERARCHING STRATEGY

- Ensure your *overarching* strategy focuses on all the hazards, shocks and stresses your country typically faces (retrospectively) and is likely to face (looking forwards, in the medium-long term). You need to be **‘future-ready’ and ‘planning for uncertainty’!** Different shocks will also have very different implications for the social protection sector (Section 2.3.1).
- Focus, collectively, on what **problems we are trying to address and key outcomes we are trying to achieve** – including the gains that can be made and possible trade-offs between those, depending on your choices. You may need to explicitly prioritise one over the other and have mitigation strategies in place for those you choose to ‘sacrifice’ (Sections 2.1 and 2.3.3).
- **Coordinate**, over time (Section 3.2) ... and think of how to **build on the strengths of each sector**: there is a lot that can be leveraged across these (Section 2.3.2)! The result will be larger and stronger than the sum of the individual components...
- Understand **broader ‘appetite’** for change across the relevant sectors – including on the basis of [Political Economy Analysis](#). Identify initial **‘entry points’** (you can also think of these as ‘easy wins, or ‘low hanging fruits’). Remember it is best to start small and simple and build from there.
- For the **social protection sector** specifically, key strategies that should be evaluated will include (Section 2.2, discussed in more detail in Section 3 for each ‘building block’):
  - *Routine system strengthening*, for each of the ‘building blocks’. A stronger system will serve you better going forwards!
  - *Design and implementation tweaks* to ensure routine SP provision can improve its relevance to covariate shocks: a) explicitly tackling resilience; b) adjusting provision to risk context (e.g. increasing coverage to support non-emergency caseloads); c) enabling dynamic inclusion of new caseloads in need, regardless of the shock type; d) enabling further flexibility in the system; e) ensuring continuity of service delivery for routine Programmes in shock-affected contexts.
  - *Coordinating with – and supporting – other sectors that are mandated to respond to shocks.*
- **Start the groundwork** for turning your strategy into action: who will do what and when. You will not have ‘Guidelines’ from Day 1, as this will be an iterative process... but you need to start somewhere. Also, remember some things are slower to change than others (e.g. policy and legislation, financing strategies, etc).


### 4.4 START IMPLEMENTING THAT STRATEGY, TESTING IT THROUGHOUT MULTIPLE, OVERLAPPING ‘SHOCK CYCLES’

- Your overarching strategy is designed to help you respond to several, **overlapping shocks** that your country will be facing over time. Each of those shocks is an opportunity to refine different aspects of that overarching strategy.
- We represent a **‘typical’ shock cycle in Figure 10**, stressing some of the main actions that will be relevant for the social protection sector along that cycle.



## IN CONCLUSION, KEY STEPS TO STRENGTHEN/ BUILD SHOCK RESPONSIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION

Figure 10. Key actions for the Social Protection sector along a specific shock cycle




Source: Adapted from Beazley et al (2019). For more on these individual actions, see [here](#).

- Strengthen your approach across those continuous and overlapping shock cycles!

### 4.5 ITERATIVELY REFINE THE STRATEGY... BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE, LEARNING, ETC

- Along the broader '**policy cycle**', it will be important to **take a step back** (after a couple of years) to understand whether the overarching (not shock-specific) strategy requires changing, based on emerging evidence on vulnerabilities and needs, as well as broader changes in context (new 'entry points' etc).
- The key steps outlined in Section 4.2.1 are all relevant! And the cycle can start again...

Figure 11. The policy cycle and the shock cycle



### 4.6 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

- You can take a staged approach to making your social protection system 'shock responsive', see the key 'steps' above!
  - 1) Why are we here? Set the foundations.
  - 2) Who are "we" and what are we doing already in shock responsive social protection? Understand our 'building blocks' across sectors.
  - 3) How can 'business as usual' in social protection be improved upon? Focus on: a) outcomes, b) coordination and c) defining an overarching strategy
  - 4) Start implementing that strategy, testing it throughout multiple, overlapping 'shock cycles'
  - 5) Iteratively refine the strategy... based on new evidence, learning, etc.
- You don't need to develop final 'guidance from Day 1 – start from identifying key 'entry points' and take it from there.
- The 'policy cycle' and the 'shock cycle' are two different things, with different implications for the sector.

## NOTES

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## NOTES

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SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 1: Benefit Modalities  
SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 2: Targeting  
SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 3: Stakeholders  
SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 4: Operations  
SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 5: Integrated Financing  
SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 6 (Missing/forthcoming)  
SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 7: Nutrition Security  
SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 8: Vulnerable Groups  
SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 9: Fragility  
SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 10: Forced Displacement
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# ANNEX A: KEY RESOURCES ON THE TOPICS

Relevant literature on this topic has been expanding rapidly in recent years. Below is a selection of some of the most important materials (synthesis reports, toolkits, case studies, etc.) published in recent years. For continuous updates, join the [SocialProtection.org Online Community on “Social Protection in Crisis Contexts”](https://www.socialprotection.org).

Name and link	Type/function	Date	Institutions involved	Regional focus, if any
Synthesis and toolkits				
<a href="#">Climate resilience through social protection</a>	Synthesis document	2019	IIED and OPM ASIA	Global
<a href="#">Strengthening the capacity of ASEAN Member States to design and implement risk-informed and shock responsive social protection systems for resilience (Regional Synthesis Report)</a>	Regional synthesis document	2019	WFP, UNICEF, FAO, EU and OPM	ASIA
Aligning Humanitarian Cash Assistance with National Social Safety Nets in Refugee Settings - Key Considerations and Learning <a href="#">here</a> & accompanying mapping of Safety Nets for refugees <a href="#">here</a>	Reference document/toolkit	2019	UNHCR	Global
Shock Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean, <a href="#">Synthesis Report</a> and <a href="#">video</a>	Regional synthesis document, video	2019	WFP and OPM	Latin America and Caribbean
<a href="#">Building Shock Responsive National Social Protection Systems</a> in the MENA region	Regional synthesis document	2019	UNICEF and UNDP-IPC	MENA
<a href="#">Social Protection across the Humanitarian-Development Nexus</a> . A Game Changer in Supporting People through Crises	Reference document/toolkit	2019	SPaN/European Commission	Global
<a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 1: Benefit Modalities</a> <a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 2: Targeting</a> <a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 3: Stakeholders</a> <a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 4: Operations</a> <a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 5: Integrated Financing</a> <a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 6 (Missing/forthcoming)</a> <a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 7: Nutrition Security</a> <a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 8: Vulnerable Groups</a> <a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 9: Fragility</a> <a href="#">SPaN Guidance - Operational Note 10: Forced Displacement</a>	Reference document/toolkit (NOTE: will need access to <a href="https://transformsp.org">https://transformsp.org</a> Community for these – see above)	2019	SPaN/European Commission	Global
<a href="#">Building on government systems for shock preparedness and response: the role of social assistance data and information systems</a> with accompanying <a href="#">infographic</a> and <a href="#">webinar</a>	Synthesis document, infographic, webinar	2019	DFAT and OPM	Global
Social Protection: Delivering on Humanitarian Emergencies and Crises	Position paper	2018	European Commission	Global
<a href="#">Humanitarian Capital? Lessons on Better Connecting Humanitarian Assistance and Social Protection</a>	Synthesis document	2018	WFP and World Bank	Global



Name and link	Type/function	Date	Institutions involved	Regional focus, if any
<a href="#">The Role of Cash Transfers in Social Protection, Humanitarian Response and Shock Responsive Social Protection</a>	Academic working paper	2018	IDS	Global
6 Background papers for the forthcoming World Bank position paper on Adaptive Social Protection (financing, information systems, delivery systems, institutions, Programme design)	Synthesis documents, position paper	Unpublished (2018)	OPM and World Bank	Global
<a href="#">Bridging Humanitarian Responses and Long-Term Development through Transformative Changes—Some Initial Reflections from the World Bank's Adaptive Social Protection Programme in the Sahel</a> – accompanied by two ITAD blogs - <a href="#">Five key principles for Adaptive Social Protection programming</a> and <a href="#">Is my social protection Programme 'shock responsive' or 'adaptive'?</a>	Journal article; blogs	2018	CIAT and ITAD, building on World Bank Sahel work	Africa
<a href="#">Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit</a>	Toolkit	2018	DFID and OPM, supported by ODI and CALP	Global
<a href="#">Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems Synthesis Report</a> , accompanied by a <a href="#">webinar</a> and <a href="#">VIDEO</a>	Synthesis document, webinar, video	2018	DFID and OPM, supported by ODI and CALP	Global
<a href="#">Evidence on Social Protection in Contexts of Fragility and Forced Displacement</a>	Synthesis document	2018	UNICEF	Global
<a href="#">Final Conference Report</a> and <a href="#">Livestream Recordings</a> of the International Conference on Social Protection in contexts of Fragility & Forced Displacement	Position paper; Webinar/live recording	2018	Multi-stakeholder	Global
<a href="#">Shock Responsive Social Protection Systems Research Literature Review (2nd edition)</a> – also in <a href="#">French</a>	Literature review	2017	DFID and OPM, supported by ODI and CALP	Global
<a href="#">Social protection and resilience. Supporting livelihoods in protracted crises and in fragile and humanitarian contexts</a>	Position paper	2017	FAO	Global
Shock Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean – <a href="#">Literature Review</a> (in Spanish <a href="#">here</a> and French <a href="#">here</a> )	Literature review	2016	WFP and OPM	Latin America and Caribbean



Name and link	Type/function	Date	Institutions involved	Regional focus, if any
<a href="#">Working with cash based safety nets in humanitarian contexts</a> : Guidance note for humanitarian practitioners	Toolkit/Guidance	2016	CALP	Global
<a href="#">TOPIC GUIDE: Anticipating and responding to shocks: livelihoods and humanitarian responses</a>	Toolkit/Guidance	2015	ODI	Global
<a href="#">Responding to a crisis: the design and delivery of social protection</a>	Synthesis document	2014	DFID and ODI	Global
<a href="#">Shockwatch: Shock response readiness appraisal toolkit</a>	Toolkit	2013	DFID and ODI	Global
Country case studies and other materials				
<a href="#">Building resilience to climate change through social protection Lessons from MGNREGS</a> , India	Case study	2019	IIED	Asia
<a href="#">Approaches to Providing Cash Based Assistance in Protracted Crises</a> : Lessons from Turkey	Case study	2019	UNICEF	MENA/Europe
Malawi Shock Responsive Social Protection (SRSP) <a href="#">Case Study</a>	Case Study	2019	IDS and Irish Aid	Africa
SPaN case study - Yemen, in <a href="#">English</a>	Case Study	2019	SPAN/European Commission	MENA
SPaN case study - Uganda, in <a href="#">English</a>	Case Study	2019	SPAN/European Commission	Africa
SPaN case study - Ethiopia, in <a href="#">English</a>	Case Study	2019	SPAN/European Commission	Africa
SPaN case study - Lebanon, in <a href="#">English</a>	Case study	2019	SPAN/European Commission	MENA
SPaN case study - Bangladesh, in <a href="#">English</a>	Case study	2019	SPAN/European Commission	Asia
SPaN case study – Iraq, in <a href="#">English</a>	Case study	2019	SPAN/European Commission	MENA
SPaN case study - Kenya - Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), in <a href="#">English</a>	Case study	2019	SPAN/European Commission	Africa
SPaN case study - Somalia, in <a href="#">English</a>	Case study	2019	GIZ	Africa



Name and link	Type/function	Date	Institutions involved	Regional focus, if any
SPaN <a href="#">podcast</a> and <a href="#">case study</a> - Mali	Podcast/Case study	2019	SPAN/ECHO	Africa
<a href="#">Evaluation</a> of the DG ECHO funded Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey ( <a href="#">blog</a> too)	Evaluation	2019	WFP, OPM and Development Analytics	MENA/Europe
The potential of Nepal's social security allowance schemes to support emergency flood response, in <a href="#">English</a>	Assessment	2019	UNICEF, DFID and ODI	Asia
Case Studies on Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Dominica, Peru and El Salvador <a href="#">here</a>	Case studies	2017-2019	WFP and OPM	Latin America and Caribbean
Cash Transfers for Disaster Response: Lessons from Tropical Cyclone Winston (Fiji)	Case study	2018	Australian National University	Pacific
<a href="#">Delivering social protection in the midst of conflict and crisis</a> : The case of Yemen	Case study	2019	World Bank	MENA
<a href="#">How to Target Households in Adaptive Social Protection Systems?</a> Evidence from Humanitarian and Development Approaches in Niger	Case study	2018	World Bank	Africa
<a href="#">Webinar</a> Shock responsive social protection in practice: perspectives from Kenya and Mozambique	Webinar	2018	DFID and OPM	Africa
<a href="#">Webinar</a> Shock responsive social protection in practice: experiences in Pakistan and the Philippines	Webinar	2018	DFID and OPM	Asia
<a href="#">Webinar</a> : Managing Disaster Differently: Shock-Sensitive Social Protection in Malawi	Webinar	2019		Africa
Cash Transfer Programmes (CTPs) in Challenging Contexts: Case study on CTP and risks in northern Mali - <a href="#">Final Report</a> , French <a href="#">here</a>	Case Study	2018	CALP	Africa
Mali, in <a href="#">English</a> , <a href="#">French</a> and <a href="#">Policy brief</a>	Case study	2018	DFID and OPM	Africa
Kyrgyzstan <a href="#">Supporting national social protection systems to respond to needs at times of crisis: lessons from Kyrgyzstan</a>	Case study	2017	UNICEF	Asia
Lesotho, in <a href="#">English</a> , and <a href="#">Policy brief</a>	Case study	2017	DFID and OPM	Africa
Mozambique, in <a href="#">English</a> , <a href="#">Portuguese</a> and <a href="#">Policy brief</a>	Case study	2017	DFID and OPM	Africa
Sahel, in <a href="#">English</a> , <a href="#">French</a> and <a href="#">Policy brief</a> – accompanied by a Working Paper on <a href="#">Shock Responsive Social Protection in the Sahel: Community Perspectives</a> also in <a href="#">French</a>	Case study	2017	DFID and OPM	Africa
Pakistan, in <a href="#">English</a> , and <a href="#">Policy brief</a>	Case study	2017	DFID and OPM	Asia
Philippines, in <a href="#">English</a> , and <a href="#">Policy brief</a>	Case study	2017	DFID and OPM	Asia

# ANNEX B: OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING COVERAGE, FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND RANGE OF SERVICES

Addressing the additional needs imposed by shocks requires an appropriate combination of three expansion strategies. This table discusses these against the DFID 2016 shock-responsive typology, showing they are two ways of framing the same discussion.

	<b>Coverage:</b> Extending coverage to support more people (ideally all of those who have been negatively affected)	<b>Adequacy:</b> Increasing the level of financial protection for affected populations, for example, via a higher level of support (e.g. transfer value) or longer duration of support.	<b>Comprehensiveness:</b> Increasing the range of services offered to fully cover complex and multi-dimensional risks
<b>Parallel response</b>	New registration and enrolment for standalone response and little/no coordination with social protection, leading to overlaps in caseloads, etc.	Transfer value set using humanitarian criteria (e.g. MEB)	Potential to link to complementary services
<b>Aligned response</b>	New registration and enrolment for standalone response, coordinated with social protection sector to ensure coverage of needs across caseloads	Transfer value set in coordination with the social protection sector (often a compromise and lower value than parallel humanitarian responses, for political economy reasons)	Potential to link to complementary services
<b>Piggybacking</b>	A new Programme (implemented by the social protection sector or by humanitarian actors) could reach new caseloads while piggybacking on existing systems: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- existing data on "potential beneficiaries" e.g. from a social registry</li> <li>- registration/enrolment approach and capacity</li> </ul>	New Programmes that are designed for emergency purposes are usually designed to have a higher transfer value than routine social protection – unless there are strong political economy reasons to maintain the same level of transfers	Potential to link to complementary services
<b>Vertical expansion</b>	NA (only reaches existing beneficiaries: no expansion of population)	By definition, vertical expansions entail the delivery of a higher amount than routine Programmes	A vertical expansion could also be linked to other complementary services, offered by the social protection sector or by externals
<b>Horizontal expansion</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Via extending the Programme's geographical coverage</li> <li>• Via enrolling additional beneficiaries who are eligible but were excluded from the original support <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Newly eligible households because of changed household conditions</li> <li>- Eligible households previously excluded because of quotas/budget restrictions</li> <li>- Eligible households excluded because of a wide range of other reasons (e.g. direct, indirect, and opportunity costs of applying, etc.)</li> <li>- Former beneficiaries who had 'graduated' out</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Via temporarily or permanently modifying the eligibility criteria</li> </ul> Operationalised via: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A new registration/enrolment process (either census survey or potentially on-demand) aimed at identifying affected households and assessing eligibility on the basis of the revised criteria</li> <li>- Utilising existing social protection data (e.g. non-beneficiary information from a social registry) and applying new criteria</li> <li>• Via enabling temporary access to those who are already enrolled, but who are not receiving because of requirements/qualifying conditions. A common example is the waiving of conditionality, or the requirement to work in a public works Programme</li> </ul>	A horizontal expansion could also encompass the delivery of a higher amount than routine Programmes – unless there are strong political economy reasons to maintain the same level of transfers	A horizontal expansion could also be linked to other complementary services, offered by the social protection sector or by externals



Table 2 below summarises how these actions fall along a spectrum in very broad-brush terms, showing that social protection could have an important role to play – but to very different degrees depending on context. Also, the answer is unlikely to ever fit 100% in one category:

- it will always be possible to start small (identifying ‘entry points’) to gradually increase where suitable/feasible.
- different shocks within a country may require different and complementary approaches.

Table 2. A spectrum of options

	<b>Coverage:</b> Extending coverage to support more people (ideally all of those who have been negatively affected)	<b>Adequacy:</b> Increasing the level of financial protection for affected populations, for example, via a higher level of support (e.g. transfer value) or longer duration of support.
<b>Not at all</b>	Fully ‘parallel’ stand-alone humanitarian or DRM response –with an eye to aligning prospectively over time (see below)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contexts with very low/inexistent SP capacity and ‘maturity’</li> <li>• Contexts with very high DRM (and humanitarian) capacity</li> <li>• Contexts/shocks where there is a high risk of compromising humanitarian principles<sup>121</sup></li> </ul>
<b>Prospectively</b>	‘Alignment’ of external approaches with a view that emergency response will integrate with the social protection system or build on prior system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contexts with a lack of SP capacity/maturity due to collapse of prior system and/or nascent new system</li> <li>• Contexts/shocks where there is some risk of compromising humanitarian principles</li> </ul>
<b>Partially-substantially</b>	External (DRM/humanitarian) actors ‘leveraging’ ( or ‘piggybacking’) on one or more components of the existing social protection system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contexts with sufficiently high SP capacity and ‘maturity’, or strong delivery systems</li> <li>• Contexts/shocks where there is a low risk of compromising humanitarian principles</li> <li>• Contexts where it may be more timely, cost effective (etc) to have a humanitarian/DRM led response</li> </ul>
<b>Substantially-completely</b> (note this does not preclude a complementary, or technical support, DRM/humanitarian role)	Routine ‘system strengthening’; ‘Design and implementation tweaks’ to routine Programmes; new emergency Programmes led by the social protection sector and leveraging (i.e. ‘piggybacking’) its own systems; or increasing the adequacy or coverage of existing Programmes (‘Vertical’ and/or ‘horizontal’ expansions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contexts with sufficiently high SP capacity and ‘maturity’, or strong delivery systems</li> <li>• Contexts/shocks where there is a low risk of compromising humanitarian principles</li> <li>• Contexts where it may be more timely, cost effective (etc) to have a humanitarian/DRM led response</li> <li>• Contexts with sufficiently high SP capacity and maturity (including financing), and strong delivery systems</li> <li>• Contexts/shocks where there is a very low risk of compromising humanitarian principles</li> <li>• Contexts with strong SP sector leadership &amp; ownership or desire to shift in this direction (favourable political economy)</li> <li>• Contexts where shocks are recurrent/predictable and temporary/chronic needs overlap significantly</li> </ul>

Source: author, building on SPaN (2019a); UNICEF (2020)

<sup>121</sup>These should not be seen as ‘definitive’ and you may find country contexts that fit somehow in-between.


<sup>122</sup>E.g. Situations where international humanitarian law applies or where international humanitarian agencies have chosen to apply those principles in non-humanitarian contexts.

We represent this visually in Figure 5, while noting how this fits within the overall framing in Figure 3.

Figure 5. To what degree do we work via routine social protection?

## ...To what degree do we work via routine S.P.?

Not at all, prospectively, partially, substantially, ....completely





# ANNEX C INTERVENTION TYPES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Different social protection interventions offer different opportunities and constraints in terms of flexing and scaling for shock response and for resilience programming. The tables below give a broad overview of how key design and implementation features of different interventions types determine what can and cannot be done with them in shock-affected contexts. They are based on a yet-to-be published Background Paper for the World Bank's Adaptive Social Protection book (Barca, 2018).

## 4.6.1 Social transfers (non-contributory)<sup>123</sup>

Cash transfers

Table 8. Types of interventions and implications: cash transfers.

	Cash transfer core characteristics	Implications for flexing and scaling up (challenges in italics)
Programme Design	<b>Eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large variation, depending on cash transfer objectives (e.g. focus on children, elderly, disabled, labour constrained, 'poor', etc.)</li> <li>Qualifying conditions vary (e.g. ID, residence).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Eligibility criteria can be relaxed</li> <li>Qualifying conditions (e.g. ID requirements, residence requirements, conditionality) can be waived</li> <li>Can be <i>politically controversial and perceived as 'handouts'</i></li> <li><i>Underlying eligibility criteria will affect level of overlap with affected population</i></li> </ul>
	<b>Coverage</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large variation, but in many countries cash transfer provision is highly rationed</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not a comprehensive crisis response measure in contexts with low or geographically patchy cash transfer coverage</li> </ul>
	<b>Benefit design (focus on level, frequency and duration)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Distribution of cash</li> <li>Level and frequency are set to respond to chronic needs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Standard values often not sufficient to meet emergency needs</li> <li>Can be scaled in order to respond to temporarily meet higher needs (vertical expansion): e.g. top-up amounts, increased frequency or longer duration - especially if approach is defined ex ante</li> <li><i>Cash-distribution not advised when/until markets are disrupted</i></li> </ul>
	<b>Approach to eligibility verification</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Varies: e.g. Categorical, CBT, Means test, PMT, geographic (and combinations of these)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The specific approach to eligibility verification – which also dictates registration and enrolment processes – will affect the potential for flexing and scaling.</i></li> </ul>
Programme	<b>Registration and enrolment</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Process partly depends on approach to eligibility verification</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Unless approach to registration and enrolment is inclusive and continuous (e.g. on-demand), challenges guaranteeing intake of new caseload in aftermath of a crisis (horizontal expansion)</i></li> </ul>

<sup>123</sup>N.B. Not including fee waivers or social services.



Cash transfer core characteristics		Implications for flexing and scaling up (challenges in italics)
<b>Benefit delivery</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Payments can be offered through various payment instruments (manual or electronic), using different 'devices' and distributed at a variety of payment points</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cost of delivery lower than food transfers and others</li> <li>• Amounts transferred can be modified quickly in case of increasing needs and price fluctuations</li> <li>• Can be delivered even in disrupted contexts (e.g. conflict, disaster), especially if diversified approach addressing context-specific challenges and needs</li> <li>• Existing payment systems can be leveraged for delivery of new Programmes or to temporarily increase the coverage (i.e. horizontal expansion of existing ones)</li> <li>• Electronic transfers offer potential for technological leapfrog</li> </ul>
<b>Accountability and management systems; financing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Often underpinned by strong information management systems, payment reconciliation, etc.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If systems have been adapted ex ante, they can support implementation of emergency response (e.g. information system requirements)</li> <li>• Transparent system for payment reconciliation can be leveraged by international actors (compliance with reporting requirements)</li> <li>• Potential for strong M&amp;E</li> </ul>
<b>Communications</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most often, capillary system for communications at community level (local committees, etc.)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Potential to use well-known and trusted network for communication to shock-affected population and psychosocial support</i></li> </ul>
<b>Implications for resilience</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highest flexibility for beneficiaries in terms of use/responding to needs (often preferred)</li> <li>• Proven to deter the use of harmful coping strategies and ensure consumption smoothing while also supporting asset accumulation, productive activities and productivity, livelihood diversification and savings</li> <li>• Can help revitalise local economies by promoting trade and stabilising market supplies prices, as traders know they can count on stable customer bases</li> <li>• Can support longer term resilience via human capital accumulation</li> <li>• Can be linked to complementary programming, to enhance resilience impacts ('Cash +', graduation approaches, etc.)</li> </ul>	

Sources: Barca (2018), based on Asfaw & Davis (2018); del Ninno, Coll-Black and Fallavier (2016); Grosh et al. (2014); Marzo & Mori (2012); McCor, (2013); Pelham et al. (2011); and Vakis (2006).

### Food and in-kind transfers

A recent wave of evaluations has shown that, on average, in-kind transfers are less cost effective at delivering resources to households than cash transfers (Gentilini, 2016; Alderman et al., 2017). In shock-affected contexts, they also face significant logistical constraints (procurement, storage, transport, etc) and offer less fungibility than cash to affected households (Bastagli, 2014; Beazley et al., 2016). This has led many humanitarian agencies to initiate a shift of their operations from food transfers to cash transfers (Gentilini, 2016). Yet food and in-kind transfers – through complex public distribution systems – are still a dominant transfer modality in many countries (e.g. India, Indonesia, Egypt and Sri Lanka), and for important reasons. For example, they help to tackle food-insecurity within recipient households, while being broadly politically acceptable to non-recipients and performing broader functions (such as supporting agriculture and managing price fluctuations and supply risks<sup>124</sup>). In terms of shock response, moreover, they offer an essential alternative to cash in contexts of 'weakly integrated markets or high food prices' (Alderman et al., 2017).

<sup>124</sup>Based on administrative data from Programmes in 108 countries, food and vouchers Programmes cover 20.4 percent of the population in those settings. This is 13 percentage points higher than unconditional cash transfers (UCTs)."<sup>124</sup> (Alderman et al., 2017).

Table 9. Types of interventions and implications: Public Works.

		Public works, core characteristics	Implications for flexing and scaling up (challenges in italics)
Programme Design	Eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Primarily those in working age and able to work</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The requirement to work can act as a qualifying condition that imposes excessive burden on beneficiaries at times of crisis</li> <li>The focus on those who are in working age and able to work can exclude the most vulnerable categories in need of support</li> <li>There can be tension between the social protection objective of the interventions, and the stabilisation objectives (e.g. target youth)</li> <li>Appropriate in contexts of high unemployment after the collapse of labour markets</li> <li>Politically acceptable (building tangible assets)</li> <li>Requirement to work itself can be waived in response to a shock.</li> </ul>
	Coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Depends on country/context (large variations, yet very few with high coverage of labour force)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low coverage can undermine impact. Established Programmes aside, many PWP's are too small in scale in both immediate operation and in potential expansion to provide an effective shock response, given the binding administrative technical and fiscal implications of large-scale provision</li> <li>Simple to target geographically in affected regions</li> </ul>
	Benefit design (focus on level, frequency and duration)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wage often set below minimum wage, to enable self-selection</li> <li>Often time-limited support (e.g. maximum number of days)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low wage can act as an impediment in a crisis context in terms of adequately addressing needs</li> <li>Duration of support can be easily extended in a crisis (one approach to vertical expansion); wage rate can be increased</li> <li>Easy to scale-down</li> </ul>
	Approach to eligibility verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Most often: self-selection into the Programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ongoing self-selection process enables easy targeting in the aftermath of a crisis, including for ex-novo Programmes. Lower administrative burden for registration/enrolment</li> <li>Risk of over-demand (e.g. where chronic poverty is widespread and employment opportunities scarce)</li> </ul>
Programme design	Registration and enrolment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Given self-selection, two phases are effectively merged into one</li> <li>Ongoing process</li> </ul>	
	Benefit delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wages paid based on muster roll and attendance sheets, often in cash at set day/time/place</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For ex-novo Programmes, time taken to develop/procure/implement can result in significant delays</li> <li>Cost of transferring resources through a PWP higher than through cash transfers because of the administrative and capital budgets they require</li> </ul>
	Accountability and management systems; financing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No need for electronic storage of data on non-beneficiaries: use of muster rolls etc</li> <li>Often little focus on M&amp;E of the quality &amp; usefulness of assets produced</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Can be implemented under social fund and other flexible arrangements. (e.g. resources can be quickly mobilised)</li> <li>Large-scale implementation of workfare not easy to safeguard from fiduciary risks, especially if there is no prior implementation infrastructure.</li> <li>Small scale and temporary financing of many short-term public works pilots do not enhance government capacity</li> </ul>



Cash transfer core characteristics		Implications for flexing and scaling up (challenges in italics)
<b>Communications</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On-the-job</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential for ad hoc communications</li> </ul>
<b>Implications for resilience</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Building of community assets, enhancing community resilience</li> <li>Before a shock occurs, e.g. activities with risk reduction and adaptation benefits (e.g. environmental conservation and rehabilitation works, soil and water management, etc.)</li> <li>After a shock, e.g. for clearing of debris and reconstruction (roads, water supply and sanitation, etc);</li> <li>Resilience-building effect through the wages provided (see 'cash transfers')</li> <li>Potential transfer of skills, with impacts on future employability</li> <li>Can function to address both labour market and inflationary challenges</li> <li>Potential impacts on community cohesion. For example, used in post-conflict situations to provide employment to ex-combatants (e.g., Bosnia, Senegal, Ivory Coast).</li> <li>'Public works plus' model can provide additional training, access to credit or linkages with intermediate services, with impacts on livelihood strategies</li> </ul>	

Sources: Barca (2018), based on Bastagli (2014); Beazley et al. (2016); Costella & Ivaschenko (2015); del Ninno, Coll-Black and Fallavier (2016); Grosh et al., (2014); Marzo & Mori (2012); McCord (2013); Pelham et al. (2011); and Subbarao et al. (2013).

#### School feeding

Table 10: Types of interventions and implications: School feeding.

Public works, core characteristics		Implications for flexing and scaling up (challenges in italics)
<b>Eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Varies across Programmes, most often tied to school attendance</li> <li>Targeting is progressive, an outcome often achieved by focusing resources first on schools in poorer areas and on lower grades</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Challenges expanding to households with no school-aged children, or to areas with no schools or schools that cannot comply with minimum hygiene standards.</li> <li>Risk that children enrolled and attending school are not those who are the most vulnerable.</li> <li>Potential for temporary increases in coverage to reach more learners by changes to eligibility requirements and qualifying conditions (e.g. horizontal expansion): take-home rations, temporary inclusion of out-of-school children, expansion of age-limit criteria, etc</li> </ul>
<b>Coverage</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Varies widely, but many countries have broad coverage targeted geographically (e.g. food insecure areas)</li> </ul>	
<b>Benefit design (focus on level, frequency and duration)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Delivery of food (nutritional snacks/meals)</li> <li>Daily, when school is open</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Broad potential for providing more adequate assistance: increasing number of meals (per day, or extending to weekends and holidays), increasing/improving quantity and quality of meals (i.e. vertical expansion)</li> </ul>

Programme Design





Programme Implementation		Public works, core characteristics	Implications for flexing and scaling up (challenges in italics)
<b>Approach to eligibility verification, registration and enrollment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Automatic if student of eligible school. Very few are poverty targeted</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No need for formal registration and enrolment process in the aftermath of a crisis – can be fast to implement in contexts that have established systems.</li> <li><i>Very difficult to implement ex novo where programme not pre-existing: too much start-up-logistics and training required.</i></li> </ul>	
<b>Benefit delivery</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Either distribution of pre-prepared snacks or preparation of meals</li> <li>Either procured and prepared locally or ‘imported’</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Logistical constraints in scaling-up: a) procurement of food-stuffs, b) lack of labour force for preparation and distribution, c) damage to key infrastructure (buildings/water and sanitation)/closed schools</i></li> <li>Potential to reach out-of-school children through pre-identified child safe spaces</li> </ul>	
<b>Accountability and management systems; financing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Often not linked to social protection information systems, but school E-MIS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Often different accountability structure and institutional housing to other social transfers Programmes – potential coordination challenge</i></li> </ul>	
<b>Communications</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In-school presence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Broad potential for targeted/strategic communications</i></li> </ul>	
<b>Implications for resilience</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discourages parents from taking children out of school (can improve children’s attendance and enrolment in school, triggering longer term human capital impacts)</li> <li>Can address short-term hunger and longer-term nutrition (e.g. through micro-nutrient-fortified food), ultimately contributing to the physical and mental development of children.</li> <li>Take-home rations specifically can contribute to broader household food security (and reduced expenses on food)</li> <li>Local procurement can trigger ripple local economy effects</li> </ul>		

Sources: Barca (2018), based on Beazley et al.( 2016); Grosh et al. (2014); Fafo (2017); McCord (2013); WFP (2007); and WFP (2013).

Table 11. Types of interventions and implications: subsidies.

Public works, core characteristics		Implications for flexing and scaling up (challenges in italics)
Programme Design	Eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Often blanket coverage, with exceptions (e.g. targeted subsidies)</li> </ul>
	Coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Often regressive (especially fuel) so not ideal for support to most vulnerable.</li> <li>Subsidies for inferior goods (e.g. cheaper foods) can promote self-targeting</li> <li>Politically popular (benefit middle classes)</li> </ul>
Programme Implementation	Benefit design (focus on level, frequency and duration)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Vast (potentially universal) coverage</li> </ul> <p>Varying implications</p>
	Approach to eligibility verification; registration and enrolment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Operationally easy and swift to roll-out (low administrative burden if untargeted and limited institutional coordination) – good second-best option if no established social protection Programmes in place</li> </ul>
	Benefit delivery	
	Accountability and management systems; financing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Susceptible to leakages and governance challenges</li> <li>Exit strategy problematic, as politically difficult</li> <li>Can represent a heavy burden on government budgets</li> </ul>
	Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No obvious communication channels for shock response</li> </ul>
	Implications for resilience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reducing the price of basic items such as food, fuel, fertilisers and medical treatment can affect households' coping capacity</li> <li>Subsidised sale of specific inputs can support productivity e.g. agro-pastoral inputs</li> </ul>

Sources: Barca (2018), based on Bastagli (2014); Beazley et al. (2016); Marzo and Mori (2012); McCord (2013).

4.6.2 Social Insurance (contributory) – only focused on unemployment benefits and contributory pensions

Table 12. Types of interventions and implications: Social Insurance (e.g. unemployment benefits and pensions).

Public works, core characteristics		Implications for flexing and scaling up (challenges in italics)
Programme Design	<b>Eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inadequate for crisis response in LICs and MICs as no coverage of informal sector (and often the self-employed) – could reinforce existing inequalities, providing benefits to better-off workers in the formal sector.</li> <li>Unemployment insurance not useful in contexts of reduction in working hours, or reduced remuneration subsequent to a crisis</li> <li>In principle, designed as automatic stabilisers (e.g. unemployment), yet revenues from contributions also shrinks in crises.</li> <li>Potential to change qualifying conditions e.g. for large-scale economic crises potential to reduce pension age or minimum number of years of contribution)</li> </ul>
	<b>Coverage</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential to increase frequency, value and duration for existing beneficiaries (i.e. vertical expansions)</li> </ul>
	<b>Benefit design (focus on level, frequency and duration)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential to increase frequency, value and duration for existing beneficiaries (i.e. vertical expansions), often used in high income countries.</li> <li>More complicated to reach to new caseloads (i.e. horizontal)</li> </ul>
Programme Implementation	<b>Approach to eligibility verification; registration and enrolment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Standard delivery methods could be leveraged</li> <li>Possibility for early withdrawal of a portion of retirement funds (e.g. Vanuatu, Fiji)</li> </ul>
	<b>Benefit delivery</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No potential for leveraging non-beneficiary data for scale-ups</li> </ul>
	<b>Accountability and management systems; financing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Complexities communicating changes</li> </ul>
	<b>Communications</b>	
	<b>Implications for resilience</b>	Broadly similar to benefits of cash transfers

Sources: Barca (2018), based on Bastagli (2014); Beazley et al. (2016); Grosh et al. (2014); Marzo & Mori (2012); McCord (2013); Pelham et al. (2011); Williams et al. (2016).

#### 4.6.3 Active labour market policies

Table 13. Types of interventions and implications: ALMPs.

ALMPs, core characteristics		Implications for flexing and scaling up (challenges in italics)
Programme Design	Eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential to relax eligibility or administrative requirements to encourage take-up</li> <li>Inadequate for crisis response in LICs and MICs as low coverage, especially of informal sector</li> <li>Challenges including the extension of eligibility to nonstandard employees (temporary, agency and fixed-term workers) and unemployed</li> <li>The focus on those who are in working age and able to work can exclude the most vulnerable categories in need of support</li> <li>There can be tensions between the short-term objective (to provide support during the crisis) and the long-term objective (increasing labour participation)</li> <li>Facilities to provide trainings or employment services or agreements with the private sector for service delivery are difficult to scale up</li> <li>Appropriate in contexts of high unemployment after the collapse of labour markets</li> <li>Politically acceptable (short- and long-term support)</li> </ul>
	Coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low coverage can undermine impact</li> </ul>
	Benefit design (focus on level, frequency and duration)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Work sharing/STW can have negative influence on longer term recovery (e.g. can disincentivise long-term job search)</li> </ul>
	Approach to eligibility verification; registration and enrolment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential to increase frequency, value and duration for existing beneficiaries (i.e. vertical expansions), often used in high income countries.</li> <li>More complicated to reach to new caseloads (i.e. horizontal)</li> </ul>
Programme Implementation	Benefit delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Standard delivery methods could be leveraged</li> <li>Possibility for early withdrawal of a portion of retirement funds (e.g. Vanuatu, Fiji)</li> </ul>
	Accountability and management systems; financing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potentially adequate for emergency response if linked to unemployment</li> </ul>
	Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Potential for ad hoc communications</li> </ul>
	Implications for resilience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>protect jobs and preserve income</li> <li>can allow for skills development, enhanced productivity and bridge to new employment</li> <li>evidence of their effectiveness to produce short-term results is inconclusive</li> </ul>

Sources: Barca (2018), based on Bastagli (2014); Grosh et al. (2014); Marzo & Mori (2012); McCord (2013).

# ANNEX D ANALYSING RISK – SELECTED TOOLS

This list is not comprehensive, but provides a wide variety of tools that can be used to support an analysis of risks in country (adapted from the [‘Shock responsive Social Protection Toolkit’](#)).

**Table 12. Types of interventions and implications: Social Insurance (e.g. unemployment benefits and pensions).**

Relevant tools	
<b>INFORM index for risk management</b>	INFORM is a national-level composite indicator (combining 53 indicators on three dimensions of risk: Hazards & Exposure, Vulnerability and Lack of Coping Capacity) that identifies countries at risk of humanitarian crisis and disaster that would overwhelm national response capacity. <a href="#">Here</a>
<b>IASC Early Warning Early Action and Readiness (EWEAR) Report</b>	Used for early warning and decision making for the interagency community. The EWEAR report and UNICEF Global Monitoring System inform each other and trigger UNICEF preparedness actions. <a href="#">Here</a>
<b>Multi-Hazard Disaster Risk Assessment, DFID</b>	Carrying out a multi-hazard risk assessment is the first step in preparing a disaster resilience country strategy. This How to Note sets out a framework for undertaking the assessment. A number of approaches and methodologies could be employed for each step, though as far as possible, the process should be light touch and make use of existing information. <a href="#">Here</a>
<b>Global Risk Data Platform</b>	A multi-agency effort to share spatial data information on global risk from natural hazards. It is possible to visualise, download or extract data on past hazardous events, human and economical hazard exposure and risk from natural hazards. <a href="#">Here</a>
<b>The International Disaster Database (EM-DAT)</b>	In 1988, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) launched the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). EM-DAT was created with the initial support of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Belgian Government. The main objective of the database is to serve the purposes of humanitarian action at national and international levels. The initiative aims to rationalise decision making for disaster preparedness, as well as provide an objective base for vulnerability assessment and priority setting. EM-DAT contains essential core data on the occurrence and effects of over 22,000 mass disasters in the world from 1900 to the present day. <a href="#">Here</a>
<b>Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) ThinkHazard!</b>	ThinkHazard! provides a general view of the hazards, for a given location, that should be considered in project design and implementation to promote disaster and climate resilience. The tool highlights the likelihood of different natural hazards affecting project areas (very low, low, medium and high), provides guidance on how to reduce the impact of these hazards, and where to find more information. <a href="#">Here</a>
<b>Famine Early Warning Systems Network (Fewsnet)</b>	The Famine Early Warning Systems Network is a leading provider of early warning and analysis on food insecurity. Created by USAID in 1985 to help decision-makers plan for humanitarian crises, FEWS NET provides evidence-based analysis on some 34 countries. <a href="#">Here</a>
<b>Disaster Risk Index (DRI)</b>	The DRI enables the calculation of the average risk of death per country in large- and medium-scale disasters associated with earthquakes, tropical cyclones and floods, based on data from 1980 to 2000. It also enables the identification of a number of socio-economic and environmental variables that are correlated with risk to death and which may point to causal processes of disaster risk. In the DRI, countries are indexed for each hazard type according to their degree of physical exposure, their degree of relative vulnerability and their degree of risk. <a href="#">Here</a>
<b>World Risk Index</b>	The index evaluates the exposure to natural hazards faced by 171 countries and assesses the inherent vulnerability in the countries towards suffering from impacts when facing these hazards. <a href="#">Here</a>

<p><b>Global Climate Risk Index</b></p>	<p>The Global Climate Risk Index 2017 analyses to what extent countries have been affected by the impacts of weather-related loss events (storms, floods, heat waves etc.). The most recent data available – from 2015 and 1996–2015 – were taken into account.</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>
<p><b>Natural hazards Risks Atlas, Maplecroft</b></p>	<p>The Natural Hazards Risks Atlas, which assesses 197 countries on physical and economic exposure to 12 types of natural hazards, including flooding, storm surge, earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones, wildfires and volcanoes, is produced annually to assist companies and insurers to identify risks to assets worldwide</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>
<p><b>Global Humanitarian Overview, OCHA</b></p>	<p>The Global Humanitarian Overview is the most comprehensive, authoritative and evidence-based assessment of world humanitarian needs. The GHO is based on detailed analysis of comprehensive data from a wide range of sources, and face-to-face interviews with hundreds of thousands of people directly affected by humanitarian crises across the globe. Our global plan facilitates effective, rapid and coordinated responses to humanitarian crises, supporting prompt life-saving action by humanitarian agencies, generously financed by governmental, private and individual donors.</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>
<p><b>ND-GAIN Country Index</b></p>	<p>The ND-GAIN Country Index summarises a country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience. It aims to help governments, businesses and communities better prioritise investments for a more efficient response to the immediate global challenges ahead.</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>
<p><b>Guidance Note on Conducting a Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic, ADB and World Bank</b></p>	<p>The World Bank and Asian Development Bank have worked in more than 50 countries to (i) quantify the economic and fiscal impact of disasters; (ii) take stock of existing mechanisms to finance these costs and analyse their legal and institutional underpinnings; (iii) review aspects of the insurance and capital markets that are relevant for disaster risk finance; and (iv) estimate potential funding gaps following disasters. This note provides guidance on how to conduct such a diagnostic exercise in a systematic and comprehensive manner.</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>
<p><b>SADC Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (RVAA) Programme</b></p>	<p>The RVAA system is widely acknowledged as the main system to track, report and respond to food insecurity in the Region. The Programme produces outputs at the regional and national level, including national and regional vulnerability assessments.</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>
<p><b>Shock Impact Simulation Model, (SISMod)</b></p>	<p>Developed jointly by WFP (VAM) and FAO (Global Information and Early Warning System), SISMod is an economic modelling system that serves as a food security analysis tool, used to measure the impact of shocks on food security in vulnerable countries. It brings new possibilities to allow timely quantitative assessments on the ex ante and ex post impact of various types of shocks (market, economic, climatic) on livelihood and food security. It identifies and profiles the vulnerable groups, and estimates to what extent they are in need. SISMod provides early estimates of the impacts of shocks before field assessments are carried out, informing the initial development of response scenarios.</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>
<p><b>Safety Nets Alert Platform (SNAP), WFP</b></p>	<p>The World Food Programme's (WFP) Safety Nets Alert Platform (SNAP) is an innovative regional (Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia) food price monitoring system with state of the art analytical tools that will serve to enhance food security early warning, risk management and social protection mechanisms. SNAP supports decision-makers to take rapid action and prepare interventions in support of vulnerable populations that are based on best available evidence.</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>
<p><b>RIMA</b></p>	<p>A quantitative approach that enables a rigorous analysis of how households cope with shocks and stressors. Comparisons can be made between different types of households (for example, male-headed versus female-headed or urban versus rural) in a given country or area.</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>
<p><b>Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)</b></p>	<p>The IPC is a set of protocols (tools and procedures) to classify the severity of food insecurity and provide actionable knowledge for decision support.</p>	<p><a href="#">Here</a></p>



# ANNEX E ASSESSING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DIFFERENT STRATEGIES AGAINST KEY CRITERIA

How to use Table 3 from Section 2.3.3

1. Based on an assessment of context decide on a suggested 'response' strategy or combination of strategies. This could be initially organized by each individual shock faced in the country. Over time it could be developed across several shocks with a comprehensive and long-term outlook.
2. Think through the details of that strategy (operationalised in X way)
3. Use Table 4 to list all potential positive and negative impacts of that specific strategy on each of the relevant outcome areas. For any negative impacts, also detail mitigation strategies.
4. Use your findings to refine/improve your strategy or complement it with others.

As an example, if the selected strategy were a 'vertical expansion' of an existing social protection Programme, the Table may look something like this (in a simplified format).

Value	Criteria	For any selected strategy, consider:		
		Potential positive impacts (and likelihood)	Potential negative impacts/risks (and likelihood)	Strategies to mitigate negative impacts/risks <sup>125</sup>
<b>Coverage</b>	<b>Level of coverage (vs affected population)</b>		Very likely to be only a small sub-group of affected households	Will require complementing with other strategies, etc
	<b>Appropriateness of targeting</b>	Broadly appropriate as targeting is X	Given routine eligibility criteria, risks of Y, Z exclusion	Need for strategy to address risks of exclusion, etc
	<b>Relevance of type of support</b>	Cash relevant	Risk of market disruption, etc	Ensure market assessment, etc
<b>Adequacy</b>	<b>Adequacy of support (meeting needs?)</b>		Level of transfer needs to be at least X to cover needs	Pre-agree transfer value, etc.
	<b>Anticipated impacts on affected populations</b>	Enhanced nutrition, etc (details)	(details) – potential for social unrest, etc	Need for clear communications strategy, etc
	<b>Supporting different multidimensional needs</b>		Cash not enough, need to complement with A, B	Need to pre-plan linkages to complementary interventions
<b>Timeliness</b>	<b>Timing of response in line with the purpose and phase</b>	Potentially more timely than other response approaches	Will need extensive preparedness and pre-agreed funding or may not be timely	Extensive preparedness and pre-agreed funding

<sup>125</sup>Note: in some cases a mitigation strategy may include adopting another response strategy to 'fill in the gaps'.



# CURRICULUM OVERVIEW

The TRANSFORM Learning Package is organized in a modular structure, and reflects the key building blocks of a holistic & interdependent social protection system.

The TRANSFORM modules that are currently available are listed below.

<b>LEG</b>	<b>Legal Frameworks</b>
<b>S&amp;I</b>	<b>Selection &amp; Identification</b>
<b>ADM</b>	<b>Administration and Delivery Systems</b>
<b>COO</b>	<b>Coordination</b>
<b>GOV</b>	<b>Governance, Institutions &amp; Organizational Structure</b>
<b>MIS</b>	<b>Management Information Systems &amp; Approaches to Data Integration</b>
<b>FIN</b>	<b>Financing &amp; Financial Management</b>
<b>M&amp;E</b>	<b>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</b>
<b>SRSP</b>	<b>Shock Responsive Social Protection</b>

All TRANSFORM materials are available at:

<https://transformsp.org> and <http://socialprotection.org/institutions/transform>





## WHAT IS TRANSFORM?

TRANSFORM is an innovative learning package on the administration of national social protection floors in Africa. The prime objective of TRANSFORM is to build critical thinking and capacities of policy makers and practitioners at national and decentralized levels to improve the design, effectiveness and efficiency of social protection systems. TRANSFORM aims not only at imparting state-of-the-art knowledge that is appropriate for the challenges faced by countries in the region, but also to encourage learners to take leadership on the change and transformation of nationally defined social protection systems.

## WHY TRANSFORM?

Many training curricula exist in the field of social protection and thus fundamental ideas, concepts, approaches and techniques are accessible. And yet, institutions and individuals struggle with the complexity of developing a broad, encompassing social protection system.

This complexity requires a transformational approach to teaching and knowledge sharing. It is far from enough to impart knowledge, to fill heads. It requires learners to grapple with the features of complexity, to stimulate creativity, to appreciate diversity and uniqueness, to be involved as a key element of ownership – elements which are at least as important as the factual knowledge itself. This learning package aims at just that: TRANSFORM!

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Contact the TRANSFORM initiative at: [transform\\_socialprotection@ilo.org](mailto:transform_socialprotection@ilo.org)  
or visit <https://transformsp.org> and <http://socialprotection.org/institutions/transform>

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the 1990s, the number of people with a mental health problem has increased in the Netherlands. The prevalence of mental health problems is estimated to be 15% in the general population (Van't Hof *et al.* 2002). The prevalence of mental health problems is higher in the elderly population (Van't Hof *et al.* 2002).

There are several reasons for the increase in the prevalence of mental health problems. One of the reasons is that the elderly population is growing. Another reason is that the elderly population is living longer. A third reason is that the elderly population is becoming more socially isolated. A fourth reason is that the elderly population is becoming more dependent on others. A fifth reason is that the elderly population is becoming more vulnerable to mental health problems.

The prevalence of mental health problems is higher in the elderly population because of the reasons mentioned above. The elderly population is growing, living longer, becoming more socially isolated, becoming more dependent on others, and becoming more vulnerable to mental health problems. The prevalence of mental health problems is higher in the elderly population because of the reasons mentioned above.

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