TRANSFORM is the result of an iterative process of co-creation involving experts and practitioners from southern and eastern Africa. This manual is based on a document prepared by Valentina Barca (Oxford Policy Management) and Luca Pellerano (ILO), with contributions from Stanfield Michelo.

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>BFP</td>
<td>Bolsa Familia Program</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>Citizen-Based Monitoring</td>
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<td>CLIC</td>
<td>Community LEAP Implementation Committee</td>
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<td>CONEVAL</td>
<td>National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies</td>
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<td>CRF</td>
<td>Core Result Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>Child Support Grant</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>DPME</td>
<td>Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency</td>
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<td>DSW</td>
<td>District Social Welfare</td>
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<td>DSWO</td>
<td>District Social Welfare Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSP</td>
<td>Food Safety Pack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEWEL</td>
<td>Girls Education Women’s Empowerment and Livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRZ</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGD</td>
<td>Decentralized Management Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IMCs</td>
<td>Independent Monitoring Checks</td>
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<tr>
<td>INAS</td>
<td>National Institute for Social Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>Logical Framework Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMU</td>
<td>Leap Management Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MCI</td>
<td>Independent Community Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDS</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
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<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information Systems</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>NSPP</td>
<td>National Social Protection Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPS</td>
<td>National Social Protection Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMF</td>
<td>Operational Management Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Performance Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCM-PS</td>
<td>Civil Society Platform for Social Protection</td>
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<td>PSM</td>
<td>Propensity Score Matching</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSNP</td>
<td>Productive Safety Nets Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSSB</td>
<td>Basic Social Subsidy Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWDs</td>
<td>People Living with a disability</td>
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<tr>
<td>R 202</td>
<td>ILO Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>Randomized Controlled Trials</td>
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<td>RDD</td>
<td>Regression Discontinuity Design</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSWO</td>
<td>Regional Social Welfare Officer</td>
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<td>SASSA</td>
<td>South African Social Security Agency</td>
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<td>SCT</td>
<td>Social Cash Transfer</td>
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1. **WHY M&E IS IMPORTANT FOR EFFECTIVE SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMMING**

The ILO’s R 202 recommends that countries should regularly ‘collect, compile, analyze and publish an appropriate range of data statistics and indicators’.\(^1\) This is critical to safeguarding compliance with existing legislation, ensuring transparency and accountability and building a basis for the continuous improvement of social protection systems.

A good M&E system promotes a continuous learning cycle, fosters transformation in social protection, and improves service delivery. Ideally, it is triggered by a continuous demand for M&E and gives equal importance to monitoring and evaluation functions (see Box below). Moreover, an M&E framework that harmonizes indicators from across social protection programmes can help to overcome potential fragmentation at the policy and programme level, while reaping benefits in terms of cost and capacity synergies.\(^2\)

Specifically, a well-functioning M&E system in the social protection sector can:\(^3\):

1. **Improve policy/programme management and planning** (‘inwards facing’ M&E)

   - Improve policy/programme design: in order to learn about the efficiency and effectiveness of a policy/program so to inform decisions on whether to extend, improve, or eliminate it. The ultimate aim would be to better serve the poor and more efficiently provide services.
   
   - Help solve problems in policy/programme implementation: monitoring execution to detect and correct implementation problems and facilitate evidence-based fine-tuning of the operational design.
   
   - Help prioritize, plan and budget: helping relevant authorities and managers to coordinate and prioritize activities and undertake planning and budget allocation decisions.

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\(^1\) ILO, 2012, Recommendation 202, Section II

\(^2\) Government of Kenya, p. 53

\(^3\) Reorganised by Attah et al (2015)
2. **Enhance policy/programme accountability** (‘outwards facing’ M&E)

- Ensure accountability within the government: monitoring of policy/programme execution to ensure that agents are doing what they have undertaken to do.

- Provide public information for external accountability: providing information to elected officials and the general public to
  (i) legitimize the policy/program through the provision of results and achievements;
  (ii) encourage public choice and voice.

When discussing M&E systems for Social Protection, the standard approach is to lump the two concepts of monitoring and evaluation together, without necessarily distinguishing between the very different objectives these two activities help to achieve.

According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2002) and to the commonly accepted DAC terminology, monitoring can be defined as a “continuous function that uses the systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an on-going development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives, and progress in the use of allocated funds”.

Evaluation, on the other hand, is defined as the “systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed activity, program or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability”.

- **Monitoring** focuses primarily on the relationship between inputs and outputs, with a view at “improving” the efficiency of the implementation.

- **Evaluation** focuses primarily on the relationship between outputs and impacts, with a view at “proving” the effectiveness of the design.

M&E data is not of use in itself, unless it is translated into information, knowledge and ultimately shapes decisions (see Figure 1). Developing an M&E system is about building capacity and practice to gather information from the past course of action, learn from past experience, in way to orient course of action in the future.

The role of M&E is to provide reliable information to enable the decision makers “do the right things” as well as to “do things right”. An M&E system should therefore provide information that allow:

- to **improve control and efficiency** of social protection systems (relating primarily to the “internal” objectives of M&E mentioned above); as well as

- to **prove value and effectiveness** (relating primarily to the “external” objectives of M&E mentioned above).
Figure 1: From Data to Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOOK TO THE PAST</th>
<th>LOOK TO THE FUTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GATHERING</td>
<td>DOING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know - Nothing</td>
<td>Know - Best</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know - What</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Know - How</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know - Why</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**DATA** (numbers, symbols & facts)

**THEORY** (a framework for explaining behaviour)

**UNDERSTANDING** (assign meaning, explain why, apply to analysis)

**EXPERIENCE** (knowledge gained through doing)

**INFORMATION** (data processed & organized to describe who, what, where & when)

**KNOWLEDGE** (collected information instructs how)

**WISDOM** (judgement, evaluated understanding, long-term, proper, good, right)

**EXTRINSIC**
- ANALYZING
- DECIDING
- CONTROL & EFFICIENCY
  - Doing things right

**INTRINSIC**
- EXECUTING
- VALUE & EFFECTIVENESS
  - Doing the right things

Source: adapted from Ackoff (1989)
1.2 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION

1.2.1 M&E and the Policy Making Process

The growing focus on “evidence based policy making” reflects the increasingly central role of credible data and analysis at all steps of the policy making progress. Monitoring and evaluation instruments can play different roles at different stages of the policy design and implementation process (see Figure 2).

*Figure 2: Evidence and the Policy Making Process*

Source: Urban Institute, http://urbn.is/2gQc3hU
Yet, the core business of policy makers is to make decisions whether the credible evidence is available or not. The learning process is shaped by evidence as much as it is shaped by theoretical assumptions and suppositions, as well as previous experience (refer to steps T and E in Figure 1). Moreover, the evidence provided by M&E systems is in direct competition with layman’s opinions, gossip, hearsay and anecdotes, long held prejudices and beliefs. Even in the presence of unbiased high quality M&E information, decisions can be made based on prior opinions, perceptions and experience, in addition to, or even disregarding the evidence available.

Decision making is a complex process which brings together a constellation of a number of variables including political considerations. Decisions are not made in a linear manner and usually are a product of a number of interests, influences and agendas working in isolation or in tandem. To a large extent the success or failure of an M&E system depends on the interplay between evidence and such other factors in shaping the policy making and policy implementation process.

Political considerations intrude in three major ways, and the evaluator who fails to recognize their presence is in for a series of shocks and frustrations (Weiss, 1970):

- First, the policies and programs with which M&E deals are the creatures of political decisions. They were proposed, defined, debated, enacted, and funded through political processes, and in implementation they remain subject to pressures-both supportive and hostile-that arise out of the play of politics.

- Second, because M&E is undertaken in order to feed into decision-making, its reports enter the political arena. There evaluative evidence of program outcomes has to compete for attention with other factors that carry weight in the political process.

- Third, and perhaps least recognized, M&E itself has a political stance. By its very nature, it makes implicit political statements about such issues as the problematic nature of some programs and the unchallengeability of others, the legitimacy of program goals and program strategies, the utility of strategies of incremental reform, and even the appropriate role of the social scientist in policy and program formation.

Box 1: The Role of M&E in influencing the SCT scale-up in Zambia

In October 2013, the Zambian Parliament discussed and approved the 2014 government Social Cash Transfer Budget, which represented a sheer eightfold increase in the government budget to the programme—ZMW 150 million, up from ZMW 17.5 million in 2013.

In retrospect, it is evident that a number of factors came together to drive the scale-up decision. No single factor was by itself sufficient to trigger the increase. It was the coming together of a number of factors in time that created an environment conducive for an increased budget allocation.

First, the new Patriotic Front (PF) government that had been elected in November 2011 put strong emphasis on social protection approaches to tackle poverty and inequality. Its 2011–16 Manifesto has a dedicated chapter on Social Protection, which announces an NSPP and mentions the importance of increased government budget allocations for sustainability of the cash transfer programme.

Secondly the sustained criticism of Zambia’s subsidy programmes for fertilizer, maize, and fuel created an opportunity to channel resources to pro poor programmes as pointed out by the Presidents Office.

Third, the Ministry started the drafting process of the policy. The Ministry also made a presentation to the Secretary to the Cabinet and a number of permanent secretaries in May 2013 and covered the findings from the Child Grant impact evaluation.
Upon taking power in 1994, Nelson Mandela’s new government set out to rebuild a nation that had been torn apart by apartheid. Among its first moves, the new government looked to address widespread poverty and reform unfairly distributed social services. Reforming the child welfare system became a top priority, made even more urgent by the growing burden of AIDS within already disadvantaged communities.

To kick-start reform, the minister of welfare and provincial leaders convened experts through the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support. In 1997, the committee proposed a new social welfare program, the Child Support Grant (CSG), that would provide ZAR70 (US$15) each month to the poorest 30 percent of children under seven years old. The South African Parliament approved the committee’s recommendations with one notable modification: an increase in the grant’s initial value to ZAR100 (US$21). Conditions for receipt of the grant included participation in development programs and proof of immunization status.

Political pressures pushed the government to expand this programme incrementally. ‘Affordability’ was a constraint at times, but not at others. The government’s commitment to the CSG, bolstered by civil society organizations that actively support the program, has been vital to its expanding coverage and impact. When the program was first launched, the finance minister Trevor Manuel worried that the system was unsustainable and would turn South Africa into a welfare state. Over time he became a firm supporter. The evidence clearly shows its benefits for human development and confirms its critical role within the government’s broader strategy to roll back structural inequality. The level of public investment in the social grants overall, and the CSG in particular, is a testament to the government’s dedication.

The Child Support Grant was adopted and implemented in a short space of time in a contracting fiscal milieu amid skepticism from civil society mainly due the Politicians who were able to garner support from their constituents about the need to promote social and economic justice and to address the legacy of its apartheid past.

Source: Authors based on Davis et al (2016)

Box 2: Political Pressure unlocks resources for Social Protection

In order to achieve the objectives outlined above, M&E systems must be designed in such a way so as to strike a balance between the supply (the capacity needed to produce quality evidence in a timely fashion, and the cost of doing so), and the demand for evidence of particular kinds needed by multiple users for decision making. We discuss how this can be ensured in the remainder of this document.

The supply of good information must be matched by effective demand and use of evidence. These two “forces” mutually enforce one another, resulting in better design of M&E systems for social protection. Data users must know what evidence they need and why, whilst the data providers must know how to generate quality information. Supply and demand of M&E information must work in sync to avoid a mismatch.

Source: Authors based on Attah et al (2015) and Segone (2008)
If evidence that is technically sound is not policy relevant, then it will not be used by policy-makers. The opposite also applies, that is, policy-makers may be forced to use poor quality evidence, if this is the only evidence available that address their policy questions. Getting the right balance between both the principles of professional autonomy and accountability, and the relevance of evidence produced, is paramount. (Segone, 2008)
The following key factors are critical to ensure an effective balance between demand and supply of M&E. They are further discussed in Section 3.

- **Improve the dialogue between policymakers and evidence providers.** To maintain and sustain this balance, deliberate efforts must be made to ensure that there is constant dialogue between the data providers and data users. This is strategic because, at the end of the day, policy-makers know what evidence they need, why they need it, and when they need it. Statisticians, evaluators and researchers know how to provide that evidence. (Segone, 2008)

- **Making evidence “usable” for the policy-making community.** Getting the policy makers to own the evidence needed for effective implementation of policies is critical. Evidence should not be the property of the data gatherers. The evidence supplied must be reliable, trustworthy, well disseminated with wide access for various users and interest groups. A key issue is how to communicate findings to those who need to know.

- **Provide incentives to use evidence.** A key ingredient of ensuring that policy makers are using the evidence is to create an incentive structure that will increase uptake of evidence. This comprise different strategies (see more on carrots, sticks and sermons in section 3), all hinging around the notion of promoting good performance based on demonstrable (evidence based) results.

*Figure 4: Increasing use of evidence by balancing demand and supply*

Many governments and organizations are moving from “opinion based policy” towards “evidence-based policy”, and are in the stage of “evidence-influenced policy”. This is mainly due to the nature of the policy environment as well as national technical capacity to provide good quality and trustworthy evidence. Box 3 below describes four possible situations.
Box 3: From Opinion Based to Evidence Based policy making

**Vicious circle countries.** Evidence is weak and policymakers make little use of it. Evidence-based policy-making is not practiced, which results in poor policy decisions and poor development outcomes. In this case, it is necessary to adopt measures which will simultaneously increase both the demand and supply of evidence, as well as improve the dialogue between producers and users of evidence.

**Evidence supply-constrained countries.** Although evidence is weak, it is increasingly used by policy-makers. However, evidence deficiency reduces the quality of decision-making which results in poor development outcomes. Policy-makers are likely to resent being held to account on the basis of inadequate evidence. The priority is to adopt measures to increase the quantity and quality of evidence, which will require additional technical assistance for capacity development, as well as to improve the dialogue between producers and users of data. The challenge is to strike a balance between generating improvements to evidence quickly, while laying the foundations for better performance of the national monitoring and evaluation system in the long run.

**Evidence demand-constrained countries.** The quantity and quality of evidence is improving, but it is not used for decision making because policy-makers lack the incentives and/or the capacity to utilize it. In this case, priority should be given to the adoption of measures to increase the demand for evidence, as well as to improve the dialogue between producers and users of data.

**Virtuous circle countries.** The production of good (or at least improved) evidence is matched by its widespread (or at least increased) use in decision-making. These two processes mutually reinforce each other, resulting in better policy design and better development outcomes.

**Figure 5: Dynamic of Policy making**

Source: Segone (2008)
1.3.1 Understanding information needs

Critical to the successful uptake of evidence generated through M&E is to assess the stakeholders various interests, specific information needs and the influence that they wield and incentives at play.

Three major categories of stakeholders can be distinguished in relation to social protection systems:

- the national authorities with its various components (the executive, the legislative, the control and oversith bodies), both at national and at decentralized government levels. These different national stakeholders may have discordant interests and cannot be considered as one homogeneous group;

- national civil society (which also is not a homogeneous group either, it comprises NGOs, churches, research institutes, beneficiary groups etc.);

- the international community (donors and cooperating partners), where relevant.

In terms of M&E accountability and learning each of these groups has its own interests (see table 1 below).

### Table 1: Key stakeholders - standard information needs

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<tr>
<th>LEVEL</th>
<th>STAKEHOLDERS</th>
<th>INFORMATION NEEDS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
<td>Mainly interested in information on their own constituency. Want to know about impact and scale-up plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Interested mostly in budget and efficiency/effectiveness of programme, as well as impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Ministries</td>
<td>Interested in resource allocation and impact (especially when related to their core area); some interest in coordinating operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>Strong focus on impact, sustainability, Value for Money, efficiency and effectiveness of operations and overall accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Want to know what is happening when; often information misused for sensational reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning Unit within the lead Ministry</td>
<td>Mostly interested in information for planning and budgeting purposes (number of recipients, total amounts disbursed, etc.) as well as ad-hoc responses to parliamentary queries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Management Unit within lead Ministry</td>
<td>Focus on all information above + indicators useful for programme management (cost-efficiency and effectiveness, compliance with Service Standards, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province/district</td>
<td>Provincial/district authority</td>
<td>Interested in impact and overall number and types of beneficiaries at province/district level; information for coordination and management of lower levels: staff, budget and Quality Control;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Community level social workers; Local leaders; Civil Society Organisations</td>
<td>Interested in number and identity of beneficiaries in their area and any other information to hold program accountable (e.g. citizen perceptions of programme)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors

5 Bamberger (1991)
The following questions are critical in assessing the relevance of M&E for different stakeholders:

- What decisions, if any, is evidence from the M&E system expected to inform? What would stakeholders do differently because of the evidence provided by the M&E system?
- When would decisions be made? When must M&E information be available to be timely and influential?
- What information is needed as a priority to inform decisions?
- Who will use the evidence from the M&E system, that is, who has the willingness, authority and/or ability to put learning from the M&E system to use?

1.4 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

- **Recommendation 202** suggests that countries should regularly ‘collect, compile, analyze and publish an appropriate range of data statistics and indicators’.

- Decision making is a complex process involving different variables including political interests and this process does not happen in a linear manner. As the capacity to generate and use quality evidence increases, many governments are moving from opinion based policy making to evidence based policy making.

- Good M&E is critical to safeguarding compliance with existing legislation, ensuring transparency and accountability (both internal and external) and building a basis for the continuous improvement of social protection systems (improve policy/program design; solve problems in policy/program implementation; help prioritize, plan and budget).

- M&E systems perform two very different functions: they provide evidence for both proving that the programme is “doing the right things”, and for improving so to ensure the programme is “doing things right”. Both functions should be given adequate importance.

- In order to achieve its objectives, M&E systems must be designed in such a way so as to **strike a balance** between the capacity (and cost) to produce evidence in a timely fashion and with quality – i.e. **supply** data, and the **demand** for evidence of a particular kind or nature for decision making according to the needs of multiple users.
ENSURING SUPPLY OF M&E DATA

Indicators, M&E approaches, data sources and institutional arrangements, discussed in depth below, are the main building blocks of an M&E framework – helping to evaluate programs against their Theory of Change and related Results Framework.

2.1 DEVELOPING A THEORY OF CHANGE

The Logical Framework Approach is an analytical process and set of tools used to support project planning and management. According to the World Bank (2000), “the Logical Framework has the power to communicate the essential elements of a complex project clearly and succinctly throughout the project cycle. It is used to develop the overall design of a project, to improve the project implementation monitoring and to strengthen periodic project evaluation”. It provides a set of interlocking concepts which are used as part of an iterative process to aid structured and systematic analysis of a project or programme idea, or its Theory of Change.

Standard practice, as articulated in project planning or logical framework approaches, describes a ‘development project’ as inputs (financial and other resources), which are translated by an implementing agency into specified activities to produce useful outputs. These outputs have the goal of outcomes and impacts of higher well-being for the intended beneficiaries (Pritchett, 2013). See Figure 6 below for a schematic representation of the logical framework structure.

Inputs, activities and outputs are under the control of the programme managers, as their relationship depend on the implementation model and organization. Outcomes and impacts are outside the control of the programme managers, as they depend on contextual factors and the behavioral response of intended beneficiaries (and other actors) to the intervention.

\(^6\) This section draws largely from Attah et al (2015)
A representation of a stylized theory of change for a social protection programme is provided in Figure 7 and a concrete example of a logframe, with a definition of inputs, outputs outcomes and impacts for a cash transfer intervention in Ghana is discussed in Box 4.
ENSURING SUPPLY OF M&E DATA

Figure 7: A stylised cash transfer conceptual framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL CONSTRAINTS AND ENABLERS</th>
<th>LOCAL-LEVEL CONSTRAINTS AND ENABLERS</th>
<th>COUNTRY-LEVEL CONSTRAINTS AND ENABLERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Household asset base (including land ownership)</td>
<td>• Sociocultural norms and context</td>
<td>• Institutional capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pre-CT income, income sources and livelihood strategies</td>
<td>• Poverty levels and specific vulnerabilities</td>
<td>• Role of donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Household size and composition</td>
<td>• Infrastructure and supply of services</td>
<td>• Political economy and policy priorities nationally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Labour capacity of household members</td>
<td>• Local institution (formal and informal)</td>
<td>• Budget fiscal space and programme costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Overall levels of human and social capital</td>
<td>• Aero-ecological context</td>
<td>• Fragility and conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Existing time/risk preferences, intra-household dynamics</td>
<td>• Economic opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Idiosyncratic shocks</td>
<td>• Local markets and prices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: A stylised cash transfer conceptual framework

CASH TRANSFER
Individual, intra-household and household level (MICRO)

FIRST ORDER OUTCOMES (examples)
- Expenditure on education
- Expenditure on health
- General household expenditure (e.g. clothes, soap, furniture)
- Expenditure on food
- Saving and access to credit
- Investment and disinvestment

SECOND ORDER OUTCOMES (examples)
- School enrolment, attendance and retention
- Utilisation of health services
- Self-acceptance, pride, dignity, hopefulness
- Food intake, dietary diversity, food security
- Farm and non-farm asset building and diversification of strategies
- Labour participation and sector of work

THIRD ORDER OUTCOMES (examples)
- School learning, performance and progression
- Health status
- Nutrition (stunting and wasting)
- Psychosocial wellbeing and social capital
- Livelihood strategies diversification, productivity, income earning potential
- Resilience (coping with shocks), adaptive capacity

CHANGES TO:
- Time and risk preferences
- Intra-household dynamics and decision making
- Gender relations and empower effects

CASH TRANSFER DESIGN FACTORS
- Core design features (e.g. level of transfer)
- Conditionality
- Targeting
- Payment system
- Grievance mechanisms and programme governance
- Complementary and supply side services

Local/community level (MESO)
- Changes in local labour markets
- Changes in local economy and goods and services markets
- Changes in social networks, social cohesion and peer-effects

Aggregate level level (MACRO)
- Poverty and inequality reduction productivity and growth; social relations and social cohesion

Source: Bastagli et al (2017)
Box 4: Ghana LEAP results framework from inputs to impacts

The LEAP cash transfer is the flagship programme of Ghana’s National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS). The main objective of LEAP is to reduce poverty by increasing consumption and promoting access to services and opportunities among the extreme poor and vulnerable. The specific objectives of LEAP are:

- To improve basic household consumption and nutrition among children below two years of age, the aged (65 years and above without productive capacity) and people with a severe disability;
- To increase access to health care services among children below five years of age, the aged (65 years and above without productive capacity) and people with a severe disability;
- To increase basic school enrolment, attendance and retention of beneficiary children between five and 15 years of age; and
- To facilitate access to complementary services among beneficiary households.

Figure 8 below captures the different stages of the implementation process from inputs to impact. It identifies the key stages involved in order for LEAP to reach its objective of reduction in extreme poverty. This results framework is the outcome of a series of discussions held with the LEAP management team and forms the starting point for the development of the M&E system.

Figure 8: Results framework for the Ghana LEAP programme
The four key components of the theory of change are described below:

**Inputs** are the resources required to undertake the intervention’s activities. In the context of LEAP, inputs relate to numbers and capacity of staff and flow of funds across the different tiers of implementation agencies. Programme funders and implementers have direct responsibility for acquisition, control and use of inputs; therefore, reaching the optimal benefit of resources is strictly an internal issue. These inputs are to be used for activities to achieve a range of outputs.

**Outputs** are the direct evidence of an intervention’s activities. The output results are a function of the actions of programme implementers, and are therefore within their control. In the context of LEAP, effective service delivery relies on seven core output dimensions: 1) effective targeting; 2) payment and case management systems; 3) financial management; 4) coverage; 5) the existence of linkages with other interventions; 6) the presence of effective M&E; and 7) Management and Information (MIS) systems. As outputs are under the control of the programme, its monitoring provides a direct reflection of the programme’s performance.

**Outcomes** respond to questions relating to the effectiveness of LEAP activities and outputs. In this context, this area helps to capture the effectiveness of LEAP. There are five expected outcomes envisaged under the LEAP programme. These are: 1) improved household consumption; 2) better health status of the beneficiaries; 3) increased school attendance; 4) observation of the other co-responsibilities and 5) increased access to complementary services. Outcomes are differentiated from impacts in terms of timeframes. Compared to impacts, outcomes require a relatively short time to assert that the intervention has led to the desired results.

**Impacts** refer to long-term changes in beneficiaries’ conditions. In the context of LEAP, the expected impact of LEAP’s intervention is poverty reduction.


### 2.2 DEFINING THE INDICATORS

Each country should develop their indicators based on country/policy/program specific information needs:

- **The policy/program objectives**, Theory of Change, Logical Framework (see previous Section) and specific Service Standards (see Section 4). For example, what information do I need to assess whether Input, Activity, Output or Outcome X in the Results Framework has been achieved and to what extent? What indicators enable me to measure whether I am performing in terms of my Service Standard targets?

- **The needs of different actors and stakeholders**. For example, what does Actor X want to know about the policy/program and for what purpose? What information does Actor X need to adequately fulfil his/her duties in relation to the policy/program? (See also Table 1 above)

- **The functioning of key policy/program processes**. For example, what are the main steps involved in Process X (e.g. registration and enrolment)? What could go wrong at each of those steps? What information is needed to monitor each of those steps?

While different countries develop very different systems, Grosh et al (2008) advise that a comprehensive M&E System will track indicators capturing inputs, processes, outputs, intermediate and final outputs, and performance of its programs. In detail:

- **Inputs**: budget, staff time and other administrative resources (though very difficult to quantify and operational costs are often not broken down by the type of activities staff engage in).

- **Output**: number of beneficiaries, typology of beneficiaries, number of transfers and other services provided to them.

- **Outcome/Impact**: Indicators to measure improvement in beneficiaries’ consumption, incomes, wages, etc (depending on programme Theory of Change) and satisfaction with the programme – note that these are difficult to collect for standard monitoring activities and pertain mostly to the realm of evaluation. Nevertheless, some form of outcome monitoring is possible (e.g. using data from national surveys).
ENSURING SUPPLY OF M&E DATA

- **Performance or efficiency** indicators, so as to capture the programme’s cost-effectiveness. These indicators do not just focus on what was inputted or on outputs alone, but compares inputs and outputs to the goals that need to be achieved (e.g. keep costs under a certain amount). Performance indicators are therefore tied to goals and objectives and serve simply as ‘yardsticks’ by which to measure the degree of success in goal achievement. Performance indicators are usually expressed as a rate, ratio or percentage.

- **Procurement efficiency**: whether the program achieved value for money in relation to purchases of inputs. E.g. average cost of food procured for school feeding programmes (outputs – food procured – related to overall delivery cost)

- **Efficiency of service delivery**: how efficiently inputs were employed to produce service outputs. E.g. applications processed per staff member or per US$1,000 of administrative costs (output – applications processed – related to staff inputs or cost)

- **Effectiveness**: programme’s results (the change in outcomes) per unit of output. E.g. reduction in poverty gap per US$1,000 in transfers (outcome X related to unit of output)

The selected indicators provide the ‘content’ of the M&E system, (i.e. ‘what’ is being measured, monitored and evaluated). They should be: precise and unambiguous; appropriate to the subject at hand; available at a reasonable cost; provide a sufficient basis to assess performance; and, amenable to independent validation (Schiavo-Campo, 1999). Indicators should provide a basis for an M&E system to perform the both functions of internal performance improvement and external accountability. In some countries (see for example a case study on Ghana in Box 5) social protection M&E frameworks differentiate between:

- Indicators with an operational and management focus, that are most useful to programme managers (serving an internal performance improvement function);

- Indicators that provide an overview of the programme’s performance, that are most useful to external stakeholders (donors, government (etc.) (serving an external accountability function).

**Box 5: M&E Framework for the LEAP cash transfer project in Ghana**

The Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP) cash transfer is the flagship programme of Ghana’s National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS).

The development of an M&E system is justified on the basis of multiple objectives: a) improving LEAP operations, b) facilitating evidence-based decision-making; c) encouraging lesson learning, and d) ensuring accountability.

The availability of routine and up-to-date monitoring information should:

- allow programme managers to improve LEAP programme performance by planning the required resources to achieve the expected results of the programme;

- provide the necessary information for decision-making purposes;

- ensure that lessons learnt feed back into programme design and operations; and

- keep stakeholders updated about the impact and effectiveness of the programme.

In this process, an implicit tension emerges between two sets of objectives. This is because programme managers have different informational needs compared to external stakeholders. The M&E framework has been designed to find a balance between these two objectives.

In order to respond to all these objectives at one time, the LEAP M&E framework consists of two key tools: the Core Result Framework (CRF) and the Operational Management Framework (OMF).
Table 2 below summarises the distinction between the two tools of the M&E system.

**Table 2: LEAP two M&E indicators framework at a glance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
<th>CORE RESULTS FRAMEWORK</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose &amp; Audience</td>
<td>Provide overview of programme performance to external stakeholders (such as public, government, development partners)</td>
<td>Provide detailed information on programme operation to LEAP managementnet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>Covers all areas relevant to programme performance, such as targeting, payment performance, case management and other output components, as well as impact, outcomes, and inputs (total of 15 components)</td>
<td>Focuses on operational procedures (Operational Manual). Provides in-depth process information with respect to each of (eight) output components and (two) income components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Indicators</td>
<td>Consists of 55 indicators at national level</td>
<td>200 + indicators available at district level. Summary of 15 key management indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodically</td>
<td>Annual Report</td>
<td>Quartly report summary of indicators at national and regional level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The LEAP Core Result Framework (CRF) consists of 55 indicators mapped against the 15 areas of the results framework (Figure 9). These indicators measure the level of change brought about by the programme in each of the results areas. This tool provides information which enables the general public, civil society, various stakeholders, taxpayers and other sponsors to know whether or not funds have been used efficiently and effectively. In other words, the CRF is an accountability tool, and performs an outward-looking function within the M&E system. Indicators are reported every year where data is available in an annual LEAP report.

The indicators in the CRF have been ranked and prioritised jointly with the DSW with respect to relevance to the programme and likely data availability. This list has been further revised in view of accessibility of data, internal consistency, and indicators already measured in the impact evaluation studies and by a proposed Independent Monitoring exercise. The distribution of indicators across components is shown in Figure 9 below.
The LEAP Operational Management Framework (OMF) consists of more than 200 indicators which enable programme implementers to monitor a range of operational processes as set out in the LEAP Operational Manual. For this reason, the indicators relate to the eight output and the two input areas of the results framework. This set of 200 plus indicators will be generated periodically as a national-level aggregate. Given the wealth of information (many indicators can be considered for each district), a more manageable subset of key management indicators has been identified to provide an easy access to the vast set of information. It will provide regional and district-level operational performance information. Looking at these will generate questions (why is this region doing better than that region?). These questions can then be explored by investigating indicators in the OMF that are related to the question and the region. In this way, the key management indicators help to define which information should be gathered from the OMF.

The OMF will enable programme managers to get more regular and more detailed information about LEAP's day-to-day performance in order to facilitate organisational learning. The OMF is therefore an operational management tool, which facilitates an inward-looking function within the M&E system.

Many of these indicators can be disaggregated to the regional, district level, and in some cases even the community level. These indicators will be run periodically at national level, to shed light on LEAP performance across the eight output and two input components. A summary sheet with the key management indicators has been developed to enable managers obtain the key information quickly. This should make the vast set of indicators and information contained in the OMF more accessible. It provides an entry point for managers to spot issues that need further exploration. It then allows the possibility of delving back into the larger set of indicators and information on a district level for more information about certain implementation issues if needed.

For full information on the scope and characteristics of indicators included in the LEAP strategic and management M&E framework you can consult detailed documentation available here:

Certain elements of the LEAP M&E framework are available to the general public as part of an online dashboard that can be consulted at: http://leap.gov.gh/dashboard/.

2.3 PRIORITIZING, REFINING AND ORGANIZING

Indicators should also be prioritised, refined and organised as an iterative process (an extensive mapping of information needs can lead to a number of indicators that is extremely large and unmanageable). This includes:

- **prioritising indicators** based on a realistic assessment of their feasibility and usefulness (e.g. during participatory workshops with all key stakeholders).

- **refining each indicator** to make sure it fulfils the ‘CREAM’ and ‘SMART’ criteria (see more in Box 6) and can be effectively calculated. This involves mapping each indicator back to its constituting formula (numerator and denominator) and potential data source, as well as defining how often that indicator will be collected and by whom. For example, see Table 3 below.

- **organising indicators** based on their use. For example, distinguishing between those focusing on programme operations (‘management’ or ‘operational’ indicators, that could be used by managers at all levels to assess the overall functioning of the policy/programme), and those focusing on results (‘analysis’ or ‘results’ indicators, used by high level managers to measure progress against outcomes and for external accountability). Within each of these, indicators can then be organised by process and by Log frame level (input, output, etc.). See more in Box 5 above.

Table 3: Indicator mapping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFO</th>
<th>INDICATOR 1</th>
<th>INDICATOR 2</th>
<th>INDICATOR (etc)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of indicator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification (why needed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formula for calculation (x=y/z)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data sources needed to calculate (source x and y)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional responsibilities (collected by X, analysed by Y, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periodicity (every x month)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of disaggregation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors
ENSURING SUPPLY OF M&E DATA

Box 6: SMART and CREAM indicators

CREAM and SMART principles are used to select good performance indicators. SMART and CREAM describe desirable properties of M&E indicators. Defining indicators that are CREAM and SMART amounts to an insurance policy, because the more precise and coherent the indicators, the better focused the measurement strategies will be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMART</th>
<th>CREAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPECIFIC</td>
<td>CLEAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEASURABLE</td>
<td>RELEVANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTAINABLE/ACHIEVABLE</td>
<td>ECONOMIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEVANT</td>
<td>ADEQUATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMEBOUND</td>
<td>MONITORABLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SMART**

- **SPECIFIC**: An indicator measures only the design element (output, outcome or impact) that it is intended to measure and none of the other elements in the design.
- **MEASURABLE**: Has the capacity to be counted, observed, analyzed, tested, or challenged.
- **ATTAINABLE/ACHIEVABLE**: The indicator is achievable if the performance target accurately specifies the amount or level of what is to be measured in order to meet the result/outcome.
- **RELEVANT**: An indicator must be relevant. It should be a valid measure of the result/outcome and be linked through research and professional expertise. There is no reason to create an indicator which does not relate to the larger outcome.
- **TIMEBOUND**: The indicator is attached to a time frame. The indicator should state when it will be measured.

**CREAM**

- **CLEAR**: Precise and unambiguous.
- **RELEVANT**: Appropriated to the subject matter at hand.
- **ECONOMIC**: Available at reasonable cost.
- **ADEQUATE**: Able to provide sufficient basis to assess performance.
- **MONITORABLE**: Amenable to independent validation.

*Source: Kusek and Rist (2004)*
Box 7: Prioritizing Indicators for Ghana LEAP M&E framework

In late 2010, Ghana’s flagship LEAP programme initiated a process to develop a new (M&E) system with the support of development partners. The new system built on existing workflows and data as much as possible, seeking to improve them by providing key information and at the same time reducing the burden on front-line managers, namely the district officers in charge of implementation. Developing indicators for the LEAP programme included:

- agreeing with government and a wide range of stakeholders on a programme Theory of Change and developing a Results Framework to prioritise indicators on that basis.

- field visits to local levels of programme administration so as to map existing M&E practices and assess information needs at these levels. This revealed that higher level managers were often not aware of the challenges and decision-making needs of lower levels.

- a set of workshops within the central agency in charge of implementation to identify any gaps, prioritise indicators and develop consensus. Consultations were also extended to other ministries that were engaged in the programme prompting discussions about the role of M&E in improving linkages with other social programmes.

- tracing core business processes (e.g. registration and enrollment, payments, etc) for each programme being monitored so as to make sure that each aspect of programme implementation could be assessed within the M&E framework.

- designing indicators and targets for each business process, linking these to Service Standards.

The outcome of the original consultation process was a set of 100+ indicators, reduced to 55 following iterative negotiations within workshops (a relevant consideration in the prioritising indicators was the accessibility of the underlying data sources). This refined set of indicators was mapped back to its constituting formula (numerator and denominator) and potential data source (including defining how often that indicator would be collected and by whom), as well as the appropriate logframe frame level (input, output, etc.).

The main data sources and institutional arrangements for Ghana’s revised M&E system built on existing processes and structures (e.g. standard reporting was made more useful by introducing feedback and benchmarking), while also introducing a temporary Excel based MIS while the full application software was being developed and identifying capacity gaps and training needs.

Source: Authors

2.4 DEFINING MONITORING AND EVALUATION APPROACHES

There are a wide range of monitoring and evaluation approaches that can be adopted to different circumstances, at different stages of the policy implementation cycle, depending on the information needs amongst different external and internal stakeholders and the critical issues for decision.

2.4.1 Untangle the differences between monitoring and evaluation

When discussing M&E systems for Social Protection, the standard approach is to lump the two concepts of monitoring and evaluation together, without necessarily distinguishing between the very different objectives these two activities help to achieve. Table 4 below summarizes the complementarities between monitoring and evaluation approaches.
ENSURING SUPPLY OF M&E DATA

- **Monitoring** is necessary for efficient administration and decision-making, for improving quality of service provision, and for the dissemination of information to bolster institutional learning and accountability. The basic principles for high quality monitoring include the following:
  
  - It should be simple and useful;
  - It should be timely, relevant, dependable, credible and accurate;
  - It should be participatory and inclusive of all relevant stakeholders;
  - It should be flexible, reoccurring, and routinized without being rigid;
  - It should be based on pragmatism and focus on improving services for citizens;
  - It should be cost-effective.

- **Evaluation** is necessary to increase in-depth knowledge about one or several aspects of the intervention for learning, informing decision-making processes, and enhancing legitimacy. Sometimes the term evaluation is refers to assessing changes in outcomes resulting from an intervention. This is only one type of evaluation: impact evaluation (more in Section 2.4.5).

**Table 4: Monitoring and Evaluation for Social Protection compared**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONITORING</th>
<th>EVALUATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Focus of monitoring is to understand and fix programme failures and assess the functioning of key programme processes, for better programme management, and to provide continuous program improvement and accountability. This can include outcome monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation is necessary to increase in-depth knowledge about one or several aspects of the intervention for learning, informing decision-making processes, and enhancing legitimacy. Sometimes the term evaluation is refers to assessing changes in outcomes resulting from an intervention. This is only one type of evaluation: impact evaluation (more in Section 2.4.5).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>Utility of evaluation is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a social protection policy or program. Provides information for major decisions such as starting, ceasing, expanding, or reducing a program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency of monitoring is a continuous, routine activity that should be an integral component of any programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of evaluation is infrequent undertaking (done at certain key moments in time), if impact evaluation baseline is before program starts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadth</td>
<td>Breadth of monitoring is comprehensive – aimed at all aspects of programme implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadth of evaluation is less comprehensive – aimed at specific aspects of a programme theory of change or implementation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>Cost of monitoring is involves low annual costs, however set up costs can be large.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of evaluation varies largely depending on the evaluation methodology that is used.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4.2 Choosing the right evaluation approach

Evaluation approaches can differ largely in terms of the evaluation questions addressed (see Box 8 below) and the methodological approaches adopted. In broad strokes there are two main families of evaluations:

- **Evaluation for formative purposes**, to inform decisions about programme or policy improvement. Formative evaluation is considered useful at two levels:
  - **Programme Level**: in order to improve the efficiency or effectiveness of specific programme delivery mechanisms (e.g., grievance mechanisms), the appropriateness of the service delivered (e.g., size of the cash transfer or the nature of farming inputs) or integration/mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues (e.g., integration of nutrition, gender, or disability in a programme);
  - **Policy Level**: in order to improve the functioning of the social protection system (e.g., horizontal or vertical coordination), strategy/policy or implementation plan.

- **Evaluation for summative purposes**, assessing the merit and worth of a programme or a strategy, in order to inform decisions about expanding, downsizing, merging, phasing out or redesigning it.

**Box 8: Examples of key questions according to the OECD DAC Criteria**

**Relevance**
- Is the policy/programme consistent with the needs of its target group?
- How well does the policy/programme align with priorities of key stakeholders, such as the government?
- How appropriate is the programme strategy to achieve the programme objective?

**Effectiveness**
- To what extent is the programme/policy achieving the intended outcomes?
- How can programme/policy implementation be improved to deliver its outputs more according to plans?
- To what extent is the programme/policy reaching its intended target population?

**Efficiency**
- To what extent does the programme acquire/use inputs (human and material resources) of appropriate quality and quantity at the lowest possible cost?
- To what extent are maximum outputs produced for any given set of inputs?
- Can the costs of the policy/programme be justified by the results?
- To what extent has the programme delivered outputs in time?

**Impact**
- To what extent can a specific impact be attributed to the programme/policy?
- How did the programme/policy make a difference on the lives of the target population?
- What are unintended, positive or negative, outcomes of the policy/programme?

**Sustainability**
- To what extent will changes produced by the policy/programme be maintained?

Source: Pellens (2017)

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References:

1. Pellens (2017)
ENSURING SUPPLY OF M&E DATA

Table 5 below discusses how different types of evaluation could be relevant and appropriate in different circumstances.

**Table 5: Alternative Evaluation Approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION TYPES</th>
<th>WHEN TO USE</th>
<th>WHAT IT SHOWS</th>
<th>WHY IT IS USEFUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formative Evaluation</td>
<td>• During the development of a new program</td>
<td>• Whether the proposed program elements will be understood and accepted by the pop</td>
<td>• Allows modification to the plan before implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• When modifying an existing program</td>
<td>• Extent to which an evaluation is possible based on the goals and objectives</td>
<td>• Maximises likelihood of success of program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Evaluation</td>
<td>• As soon as program implementation begins</td>
<td>• How well the program is working</td>
<td>• Provides an early warning for any problems that may occur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• During an operation of an existing programme</td>
<td>• The extent to which the program is being implemented as designed</td>
<td>• Provides insight on implementation processes and how they can be improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Evaluation:</td>
<td>• At the beginning of program (ex-ante)</td>
<td>• What resources are being used and their costs (direct and indirect) compared to the outcomes</td>
<td>• Provides ex-ante considerations as to whether the intervention is worth undertaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Analysis</td>
<td>• During operation of program</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Provides managers a way to assess the costs relative to the results and improve performances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Benefit Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Unit Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Evaluation</td>
<td>• During the operation of a program at</td>
<td>• The degree to which the program meets its ultimate goal e.g. reduction of food insecurity</td>
<td>• Provides evidence on “what works” in a specific context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>appropriate intervals</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Proves the goodness of a concept/design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• At the end of the program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematic Reviews</td>
<td>• When evidence about a given intervention is</td>
<td>• Gives a conclusions on a research question that was contested by summarizing evidence from all available studies</td>
<td>• Provides evidence on “what works” across a variety of contexts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>available from impact evaluation studies across a</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Allows to compare results across countries in a systematic way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>wide range of contexts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Boaz et al. (2002)
While the purpose sets out the rationale for an evaluation, the objectives and scope define what the evaluation should focus on and which elements of the policy evaluation needs to cover (and which not). The focus of the evaluation could be the policy as a whole, a specific programme, a pillar or strategy, or a theme (e.g. gender, disability). Objectives and scope can be discussed with stakeholders at the same time as purpose and use are reviewed during a scoping exercise. Prioritisation will probably be necessary to establish a feasible evaluation agenda. Box 9 below presents criteria that can be used to decide which programmes or elements of a social protection system to prioritise for evaluation.

**Box 9: Prioritisation criteria to support decision making on evaluation focus**

- **Utility**: To what extent will the findings feed into policy decision making or programme improvement?
- **Evidence base**: Does the evaluation address an evidence gap? Is there need for additional evidence or does sufficient evidence already exist?
- **Strategic importance in terms of funding**: How important is the programme for the policy in terms of funding that it absorbs?
- **Strategic importance in terms of objectives**: How important is the programme for the policy in terms of contributing to the policy’s objectives?
- **Evaluability**: Is it feasible to evaluate the programme/policy? Evaluability is looks at:
  1) adequacy of the policy/programme design,
  2) availability of information to answer evaluation questions, and
  3) conduciveness of the context to implement an evaluation.²
- **Timeliness**: Can the evaluation be conducted in time for the findings to be useful for decision making and action? Have programmes been implemented during a sufficient time period to be able to answer the evaluation questions?

Source: Pellens (2017)

A case study presented in Box 10 describes the approach adopted for the development of the M&E framework for the Zambia national social protection policy. The remainder of the section discusses in more detail specific monitoring and evaluation approaches: participatory monitoring, spot checks and impact evaluation.
The Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) passed the National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) in June of 2014. The NSPP defines SP as “policies and practices that protect and promote livelihoods and welfare of people suffering from critical levels of poverty and deprivation and/or are vulnerable to risks and shocks.” The policy seeks the realization of a comprehensive and integrated SP system clustered around four pillars: social assistance, social security and social health insurance; livelihood and empowerment; and protection. In addition, the NSPP identifies a cross-cutting pillar focused on the challenges of people living with a disability (PWDs).

The policy underscores the role of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems in creating a social protection sector which is integrated and allows for operational synergies and complementarities between programmes. Indeed, the NSPP acknowledges that the absence of comprehensive and robust M&E system has perpetuated the implementation of costly and ineffective programmes with limited demonstrated evidence of poverty impacts.

The NSPP M&E framework includes three components:

- **A results framework** which represents the development hypothesis or theory about how an intended change will occur. It is based on a causal argument that says ‘if we do a, b, and c it will lead to x, y, and z’. There are many ways to design a results framework and a variety of terminology that can be used to describe the path of change. One common way of describing this type of change in the SP sector is to define levels of results in the form of a visual representation which describes how inputs (resources) and activities of stakeholders will lead to specific shortterm achievements called outputs, which in turn lead to longer term outcomes and ultimately to the programme or policy's key goal or intended impact.

- **A monitoring framework** which expresses the results and intervention processes that will be regularly monitored and potentially evaluated. It defines indicators that will be used to measure these results and processes and includes information on how the evidence will be collected, frequency, responsibility and targets. The monitoring framework is based on the results framework.

- **An evaluation plan** which identifies ‘what’ will be evaluated via the formulation of evaluation questions. The evaluation plan defines the scope and focus of a more detailed evaluation and also uses the results framework as a guide.

There are many uses for an M&E framework such as planning, communication, consensus building, learning, management, and evaluation. In the case of the NSPP, we identified three priority uses which are to:

- **provide structure** around what the GRZ wants to achieve within the social protection sector (as defined by the NSPP), aiding in the planning and implementation of SP programmes;

- **monitor and evaluate** progress towards the implementation of the NSPP;

- **assist with decision-making** and building of consensus, coordination, and ownership around SP policies and programmes via the reporting coming out of the system.

**1) The results framework**

The NSPP states what it wants to achieve: “To contribute to the wellbeing of all Zambians by ensuring that vulnerable people have sufficient income security to meet basic needs and protection from the worst impacts of risks and shocks.” The specific policy objectives and measures identified in the policy together with the policy’s guiding principles and implementation plan provide insight in the intermediary steps of change (outputs and outcomes). The roadmap of change is described in the results framework as depicted in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Zambia NSSP Results Framework

**Goal**

All Zambians experience improved wellbeing and protection from vulnerability through increasing financial security and by being better equipped to participate in economic, social, and political life.

**Outcomes**

- Improved social protection service delivery
- Vulnerable households and individuals enhance their all-year-round access to essential goods and services and can access protection against disasters
- Vulnerable households and individuals improve and diversify their livelihood strategies through enhanced access to different forms of capital
- Vulnerable groups are better protected from abuse, violence, discrimination and able to participate in society

**Outputs**

- A functional integrated and sustainable social protection system
- Better performing/enabling social protection processes, institutions and programmes
- Improved social protection service delivery

**Activities**

- Mobilise, allocate, and disburse adequate resources
- Enable stakeholder participation in social protection decision-making and implementation
- Design, implement and conduct comprehensive M&E, and periodic assessments
- Develop and implement sensitisation strategies on social protection programmes and issues to generate demand
- Provide training and orientation to strengthen capacity
- Design and implement integrated and decentralised delivery strategies, mechanisms and procedures
- Operationalise coordination and oversight structures and mechanisms at all levels
- Enact enabling policies, legislation, regulation and procedures
- Improved access and use of social insurance mechanisms
- Increased awareness about rights and access to protection mechanisms
- Public perception and attitudes towards vulnerable individuals and groups change

**Goal**

Reduction in poverty and extreme poverty

Improved individual, household, and community resilience and security against environmental, economic and social shocks/risks

Vulnerable groups and individuals are able to equitably and inclusively claim and realize their rights

Production in poverty and extreme poverty

Improved financial security and by being better equipped to participate in economic, social, and political life.

**Outputs**

- Improved food and nutrition security
- Improved access and use of shelter and clothing
- Improved access and use of education and vocational and entrepreneurial skills
- Improved access and use of productive (land, livestock) and financial capital and technology
- Improved access and use of social capital
- Improved access to disaster relief and mitigation mechanisms
- Improved access and use of essential health care, education and WASH
- Improved access and use of savings mechanisms
- Improved access and use of social insurance mechanisms
- Reduced poverty and extreme poverty
- Public perception and attitudes towards vulnerable individuals and groups change

**Activities**

- Increased awareness about rights and access to protection mechanisms
- Mobilise, allocate, and disburse adequate resources
- Enable stakeholder participation in social protection decision-making and implementation
- Design, implement and conduct comprehensive M&E, and periodic assessments
- Develop and implement sensitisation strategies on social protection programmes and issues to generate demand
- Provide training and orientation to strengthen capacity
- Design and implement integrated and decentralised delivery strategies, mechanisms and procedures
- Operationalise coordination and oversight structures and mechanisms at all levels
- Enact enabling policies, legislation, regulation and procedures
- Improved access and use of education and vocational and entrepreneurial skills
- Improved food and nutrition security
- Improved access and use of shelter and clothing
- Improved access and use of essential health care, education and WASH
- Improved access and use of social insurance mechanisms
- Increased awareness about rights and access to protection mechanisms
- Public perception and attitudes towards vulnerable individuals and groups change
2) The monitoring framework

For each level of the results framework a series of possible indicators was proposed: this included include the indicator description, the means of verification or how and where to acquire the evidence to measure the result, possible disaggregation, and the proposed frequency of data collection.

The structure of the monitoring framework is provided in Table 5. The full detail of the proposed monitoring framework can be found here.

Table 6: NSPP proposed impact-level indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Indicator Name</th>
<th>Means of Verification</th>
<th>Data Collection Frequency</th>
<th>Disaggregation</th>
<th>Baseline Value</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3) The evaluation plan

The preparation of the NSSP M&E framework also comprised an evaluation scoping exercise. This expected to result in the establishment of a rolling NSPP evaluation agenda which identifies a pipeline of evaluations for the next years and is reviewed annually after a stakeholder discussion about purpose, use, objectives and scope of evaluation. This resulted in the proposed evaluation agenda that is described in Table 7.

Table 7: Proposal of NSSP Evaluation Agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVALUATION</th>
<th>RATIONALE OF THE EVALUATION</th>
<th>EVALUABILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Formative evaluation of SCTs delivery mechanisms</td>
<td>Purpose: improve SCTs service delivery mechanism, such as electronic payment mechanism or grievance mechanism. Rationale: SCTs coverage expansion makes it timely to learn how mechanism function in new districts and at expanded scale.</td>
<td>SCTs has relatively good data available, objectives are clear and there seems to be demand to improve delivery mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Formative evaluation of SCTs linkages to other social services (e.g. nutrition &amp; HIV)</td>
<td>Purpose: improve SCTs linkages with other social services, assess the assumption that through stronger service linkages household level impact can be improved. Rationale: creating systemic linkages with other services may increase the impact of the SCTs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Impact evaluation of GEWEL’s Supporting Women’s Livelihoods (SWL) component</td>
<td>Purpose: mix of formative, summative &amp; knowledge focused evaluation. Rationale: can add to growing international evidence base on SP graduation programmes</td>
<td>Evaluability seems adequate to the extent that primary data collection is funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Evaluation of the Food Security Pack</td>
<td>Purpose: summative evaluation in order to decide on redesign, continuation or phase out. Rationale: FSP has been in existence for a long time without evaluative evidence about results</td>
<td>Evaluability would need to be assessed in terms of information availability &amp; resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Formative evaluation of the NSPP coordination (or NSPCS)</td>
<td>Purpose: improve coordination/synergy function of NSPP (or improve performance of the NSPCS) Rationale: Anecdotal evidence that coordination is not functioning. The new coordination strategy may require adjustment after initial implementation.</td>
<td>Systematic &amp; objective assessment can add value.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Simon et al (2016)
2.4.3 Participatory monitoring approaches

Several approaches have been used to enhance civic engagement and incorporate the views of programme beneficiaries into programme monitoring and design, promoting transparency and accountability. For example, in South Africa, the Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency (DPME) has initiated a ‘Framework for Strengthening Citizen-Government Partnerships for Monitoring Frontline Service Delivery’, involving a Citizen-Based Monitoring (CBM) Pilot. ‘This Government initiated accountability mechanism represents an effort to include citizens’ experience of service delivery into their overall monitoring, evaluation and performance frameworks.’ The most common tools to carry out participatory monitoring include:

- **Citizen Report Cards and Beneficiary Satisfaction Surveys**: participatory surveys that provide quantitative feedback on user perceptions of the quality, adequacy and efficiency of public services. They go beyond just being a data collection exercise to being an instrument to exact public accountability through the extensive media coverage and civil society advocacy that accompanies the process.

- **Community Score Cards**: qualitative monitoring tools that are used for local level monitoring and performance evaluation of services. By including an interface meeting between service providers and the community that allows for immediate feedback, the process is also a strong instrument for empowerment.

**Box 11: Social Protection Community Monitoring in Mozambique**

The Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection (PSCM-PS) is a network of 35 Civil Society Organizations, whose general objective is to contribute to influence the decision-making processes that can make Social Protection services accessible to Mozambican citizens, but especially to the most vulnerable population groups.

One of the main activities developed by PSCM-PS is **Independent Community Monitoring (MCI) to the Basic Social Subsidy Program (PSSB)**. This MCI is being carried out in partnership with the Government through the National Institute of Social Action (INAS) at national and local level, with the aim of contributing, promoting the voice of the beneficiaries and improving the quality and impact of the program.

The methodology used, with the use of payroll of INAS is composed of 3 tools that help in a simple way:

- **Listen to the beneficiaries through the Community Citizen Report Card** - Tool 1 (F1) with 13 questions about the functioning of the PSSB that are made to the beneficiary individually and anonymously;

- **Identification of the main problems through the Community Scorecard** - Tool 2 (F2) where the results obtained with F1 are compiled in the different communities where the survey was carried out;

- **Looking for solutions at the local level with the Focus Groups discussion** (composed of beneficiaries of the program and one with community and permanent leaders) where the 3 questions with the highest negative and 3 positive of F1 are selected; and finally

- **Developing an Action Plan** - the action plan is discussed with the community, leaders and community volunteers at community level in the focus groups, and presented at a District Meeting with key stakeholders in social protection at the district level.

This monitoring mechanism allows to incorporate proposals for solutions to the various problems encountered in communities coming from the beneficiaries themselves. It promotes citizens’ participation and responsibility in the improvement of this public service, creates a space for dialogue among government officials and facilitates advocacy for the increase of quality and impact of service provision and is considered by the Government of Mozambique as an instrument for improving the quality of the services provided whose implementation is at the national level.
ENSURING SUPPLY OF M&E DATA

2.4.4 Spot Checks or Independent Monitoring Checks

Independent monitoring checks (IMCs) are a way to randomly verify the data generated at the decentralized level on social protection implementation (e.g. district payment forms, case management, and district quarterly forms). IMCs provide a structured methodology to ensure that programme operational procedures are being followed in the field. The data from the IMCs can also be used to supplement and triangulate other data. The IMC instruments are specifically designed to check field compliance and programme procedures at the institutional and household level. These instruments provide controls and follow-up actions for all programme processes.

The IMC instruments are in the form of a series of yes/no questions that are easy and fast to administer (approximately 10-15 minutes at the most) and easy to enter into a database for analysis. These checks cover a range of themes, such as payment, perception of services, registration, programme understanding, enrolment, complaint procedure etc. Different IMC instruments address different programme stakeholders, for example, community members, district welfare officers, service providers.

The data collected and calculated from the IMC process can be used to inform a range of output indicators (targeting, payment, case management, fraud) and some outcome indicators (food security, complementary services). See for example the areas covered by different proposed IMC instruments in the case of the LEAP programme in Ghana in Table 8 below. An example of the IMC process as well as copies of the forms used in the case of the LEAP programme in Ghana can be found here. 

Source: Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection (PSCM-PS)

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This section draws largely from Government of Ghana (2013)
Table 8: Focus of proposed Spot Checks instruments in the case of the Ghana LEAP programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEME</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLD INSTRUMENT</th>
<th>CLIC INSTRUMENT</th>
<th>DSWO INSTRUMENT</th>
<th>PSP INSTRUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Fairness/Corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Understanding of Eligibility Rules</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Understanding of Exit &amp; Graduation rules</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment Process</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment Site</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Management (updates)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complaints and Grievances</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Perceptions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENSURING SUPPLY OF M&E DATA

The independent monitoring checks should be administered and results reported by an external organization. The argument to use an external organization is twofold. First, an outside organization provides needed objectivity and perspective as it is not submerged in the day-to-day operations of the programme. Second, one reason cash transfers programme work effectively is often the strong relationship between the national office and the regional and district offices. Random and unanticipated visits by managers can threaten and degrade these relationships to the detriment of the programme as a whole. The locations for the checks should be randomly selected to provide a sufficient sample size to provide results for annual reporting.

2.4.5 Impact Evaluation

Impact evaluation aims at assessing the changes that can be attributed to a particular intervention. The objective of an impact evaluation is to ascertain the extent to which a given intervention contributes to a change in the behaviour and state of its beneficiaries (impact and outcome level), or in other words, to impact evaluation is to estimate the causal effect of the intervention on a given outcome variable.

The term causal effect is key to understanding the key focus of an impact evaluation. Causal effect means that some change has happened, and such change can be attributed to a specific intervention, and not to any other factor, initiative or characteristic of the context. The whole purpose of an impact evaluation is to isolate change that is due to the intervention from change that may be due to other “confounders”.

Key to the analysis of a causal effect is the concept of counterfactual. The counterfactual represents how participants would have performed in the absence of the intervention. In a situation where beneficiaries of a universal pension are having three meals per day, the question one would ask is that how many meals would the beneficiaries been having, had they not been receiving the pension.

• Assessing the impact of an intervention by comparing what happened to the beneficiaries (the traditional before-after analysis) can be very misleading as the change observed may not be due to the intervention but to other factors.

• The question an impact evaluation aims to answer is not “what happened with the beneficiaries” but rather “what would have happened if the beneficiaries had not participated in the intervention”. This is the so called “counterfactual”.

• The problem is that it is not possible to directly observe the “counterfactual”, as it is not possible to observe simultaneously a beneficiary receiving and not receiving the intervention.

A counterfactual can be found among the non-beneficiaries in the form of a control group. It is not difficult to find a control group, what is difficult is to find a good control group. The goodness of a control group depends on its comparability with the beneficiaries (treatment group). If the two groups are not comparable the evaluation can mistake differences in characteristics between the groups for the real (causal) impact of the programme. For instance in a district with cash transfers one could have the control group drawn from households with higher literacy levels because they live in an area serviced by a school while the beneficiary group is from an area with no school facilities. The evaluation would find that the control group had higher literacy levels, suggesting the cash transfer had negative impacts on schooling, when in fact the difference has nothing to do with the programme.

Much of the challenges with impact evaluation design have to do with ensuring that control and treatment groups are comparable. In order to eliminate differences due to the selection process, the ideal approach is to allocate units to the treatment or the control group based on a random allocation process (lottery). By design (due to the law of large numbers) the treatment and control group will be fully comparable (in both observable and unobservable characteristics). This is the approach used for so called Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT) which are commonly used in the medical field (i.e. to test the effectiveness of new drugs) and have increasingly been used to test also the impact of public policies, including in the field of social protection.
Table 9: Impact Evaluation Designs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESIGN</th>
<th>KEY FEATURE</th>
<th>TECHNIQUES</th>
<th>WHEN TO USE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experimental Design</td>
<td>Randomly assigned intervention and control groups</td>
<td>Randomised Control Trial</td>
<td>When you want comparability of treatment and control groups by design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi Experimental Design</td>
<td>Quasi-experimental designs identify a comparison group that is as similar as possible to the treatment group in terms of baseline (pre-intervention) characteristics.</td>
<td>There are different techniques for creating a valid comparison group, for example, regression discontinuity design (RDD) and propensity score matching (PSM),</td>
<td>Where ethical, political or logistical constraints, like the need for a phased geographical roll-out, rule out randomization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Experimental</td>
<td>Not statistically matched groups or group compared to itself</td>
<td>Often takes the form of ex-ante ex-post comparison for a group of beneficiaries only, with no consideration of the “counterfactual”</td>
<td>When there was no control group. Causal attribution is in this case very difficult to determine though quantitative methods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from H. White and S. Sabarwal (2014)

Box 12: Are Impact Evaluations the Silver Bullet?

Impact evaluations have become extremely popular in the development field (see figure below), and particularly in the social protection field. Practically all major social cash transfer programmes in southern and eastern Africa have been subject to an impact evaluation during the last 10 years and this has contributed in many cases to their coverage expansion and establishment as national programmes (see for example Box 1 for Zambia).

Yet impact evaluation are only one of the various M&E tools and approaches that are available (see table 4 above). Impact evaluations perform extremely well in regards to the specific question they aim to answer: the causal effects of an interventions. Depending on circumstances such a question may be appropriate, or too narrow.

In considering whether an impact evaluation is the appropriate instrument in a given circumstances, the following limitations of the impact evaluation approach have to be considered:

- Impact evaluation are generally not equipped determine circumstances under which an observed impact could be replicated, other than the specific ones under which the study took place (often called problem of external validity). They are not based on any theory that can be used to model and anticipate impacts ex-ante, but can effectively determine impact only ex-post;
- Impact evaluations can be expensive as they require most of the time collection of dedicated information at repeated points in time for both treatment and control groups;
• Impact Evaluation may be considered \textit{unethical} or \textit{unfeasible} under certain circumstances. They may not be accepted by policy makers and the target population who may resist the idea (or it may not be technically possible) that a programme withholds benefits from a certain group (the control group) in spite of the deep pressing needs to receive support. Conversely gradual expansion of social protection programmes is often a necessity as governments don’t have capacity to expand country wide at the same time: control groups can be effectively identified as part of a staggered programme roll-out plan (those areas or individuals who will enter the project at a later stage);

• Impact Evaluations are often deemed as being \textit{“black box” evaluations}, producing very rigorous evidence on what was the change under given circumstances, but not sufficient understanding of the process leading to that change and the critical implementation factors that led to that change. Impact evaluation does not necessarily explain the why and how the result has (or has not) been achieved. Impact evaluations are more versed to “proving” the goodness of a given intervention, rather than providing learning so as to “improving” the design or implementation of such intervention.

Rigour stands as the principal standard empirical evaluations have to fulfill. However rigour is sometime only defined in relation to proving what works. The left panel of Figure 12 below describes empirical evaluation according to the rigour of the evidence they provide on whether a given intervention will achieve a particular impact. RCTs clearly stand as the most rigorous approach to evaluation.

Yet assessing the impact (doing the right things) is not always what policy makers need. Questions of rigour similarly apply to other kinds of empirical evaluation that focus at generating evidence to improve implementation (doing things right).

\textit{Figure 12: A better way to think of rigour in empirical evaluation}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure12.png}
\caption{A better way of assessing rigour of empirical evaluations}
\end{figure}

Source: Kleinfeld (2015), Deaton and Cartwright (2016)
2.5 DEFINING THE DATA SOURCES

Original data collection for M&E can be an extremely time-consuming and costly activity. For these reasons, identifying existing data sources (i.e. ‘where’ data comes from), establishing their usefulness for M&E purposes, and planning them carefully to deliver exactly the indicators needed is an important task.

So what are the most useful data sources for a social protection M&E system? Table 10 below outlines the potential strengths and weaknesses of the main data sources available for this sector. These need to be assessed against a countries’ context (e.g. institutional set-up, existing databases, etc.).

Table 10: Strengths and weaknesses of selected data sources for a Social protection M&E system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program Management Information Systems (MIS) (see also Module MIS)</strong></td>
<td>• Routinely and readily available&lt;br&gt;• Large sample size (e.g. all households registered)&lt;br&gt;• Low cost&lt;br&gt;• Easy to add additional reports and potentially import data from other sources&lt;br&gt;• Can generate useful performance indicators&lt;br&gt;• Allows longitudinal tracking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard periodic administrative reporting from visits, spot-checks, audits, etc.</strong></td>
<td>• Simple and often already in place&lt;br&gt;• Can be useful to sort out ongoing implementation issues&lt;br&gt;• Generates information all the way to beneficiary level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qualitative ad-hoc studies</strong></td>
<td>• Low cost&lt;br&gt;• Essential to follow up on issues raised by analysing numbers and to understand why and how things are going wrong&lt;br&gt;• Can provide insights on how problems could be addressed and solved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other administrative databases</strong></td>
<td>• Integrating data from with HR and Accounting information for performance indicators&lt;br&gt;• Link with Civil Registry and other sectoral databases for integrated M&amp;E&lt;br&gt;• Bank/payment provider database for monitoring of payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Statistics data (Census, Household Budget Surveys, Living Standard Measurement Surveys, Labour Force Surveys)</strong></td>
<td>• Can guarantee a wealth of information (household income, consumption, education, health status, etc.) at a very low cost&lt;br&gt;• Comprehensive national data from Census or representative surveys could be used to calculate caseload, poverty levels, coverage, etc.&lt;br&gt;• Could be used to assess impact and targeting effectiveness if extra question on program receipt added</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10: Continued

| Externally contracted impact evaluations | • Important for understanding causal relationships and generating counterfactuals  
| | • Needed for indicators analysing targeting effectiveness, impact on consumption, poverty, etc | • Very high costs (require independent external evaluators)  
| | | • Results available late in the policy process  
| | | • Seldom feed into programme improvement and planning |

| Community Monitoring | • Very important to gain bottom up monitoring and assess satisfaction with service delivery (e.g. Citizen Report Cards, Perception Surveys, etc)  
| | | • Setting up incentives to make this happen; institutional arrangements, etc.  
| | | • Costly, requires capacity and could be unsustainable |

**Source: Authors**

It is important to evaluate and select these potential data sources based on four main criteria:

- **Mixing monitoring and evaluation components:** ensuring that monitoring functions do not get over-shadowed by evaluation objectives;

- **Building on existing data sources:** helps to reduce cost, makes a system more sustainable, requires less active management and avoids duplication of work. Such sources can be classified as internal (generated and managed by the programme) and external (managed by external actors – require coordination). For example:
  - Internal: Programme MISs and integrated systems for information management in the social protection sector can be programmed to offer a vast array of standard M&E reports (see MODULE MIS);
  - External: Official Statistics data could offer great insights by simply adding one question on receipt of benefits to existing surveys (e.g. household budget survey);

- **Ensuring triangulation** of several types of data sources, both internal and external to the programme. This can enhance analysis potential (see boxes below in this section for an example);

- **Minimising the burden of data collection and analysis:** ensuring the data for the system is primarily designed to be generated as an integral part of normal administration rather than as an additional task;
  - Ideally an M&E system will feed to the largest possible extent from data that is generated in any event as part of normal operational procedures, so to minimize data collection efforts that are specific to M&E processes. For example, data are entered from the PMT questionnaire into the MIS for the purposes of beneficiary selection and can be used for M&E without any additional effort;
  - This also implies automating reporting functions where possible (for example within a program MIS). Other than the strengths and weaknesses discussed above, a country wishing to set up an M&E framework should also consider each data-source’s: main uses and focus (which areas and indicators within the framework it would address); accessibility (how easy is it to use in practice, especially in the short and medium term); recommended frequency (frequency with which data from that source should be collected and analysed); sample size and; potential cost.
Box 13: Data Sources in the Proposed M&E System for INAS in Mozambique

The proposed M&E system for the social protection programme of the National Institute for Social Action (INAS) in Mozambique is based on three main data sources:

- **The Management and Information System** (e-INAS) allows to collect, collate and manage all information relevant at different stages of programme implementation (selection, payments, case management, etc.) in this way allowing effective and permanent monitoring of programme implementation and outputs.

- **The National Statistics Institute** (INE) will collect and analyze information through national surveys that can be critical to perform monitoring and evaluation of INAS programmes.

- **Complementary evaluations and surveys** will be conducted by external stakeholders and INAS own staff, to provide additional insights on specific topics of interest, including the perceptions of beneficiaries and the impact of INAS programs. This will also include a community based M&E system (see more on this in Box 11 above).

As reflected in Figure 13 below, the three M&E instruments will feed into two critical processes for INAS continuous improvement: a) supervision and follow up to decentralized implementation levels, and b) strategic and operational planning.

*Figure 13: The basic components of INAS M&E system*

*Source: Government of Mozambique (2014)*
Box 14: M&E tools in a low-capacity setting

Ethiopia exemplifies the difficulties of running an M&E system in a low-capacity, low-income country and the need for continuous adaptation and simplification. Its Productive Safety Nets Program (PSNP) has a good M&E system, designed to track progress on a range of inputs, activities, and outputs for accountability purposes as well as to allow prompt corrective action as bottlenecks are identified. The system aimed for simplicity to account for the low capacity of the program’s frontline units.

However, implementation of the monitoring plan encountered numerous logistical obstacles, with only 40 of 232 districts reporting (with delays) during the first year of program operation—and the remainder not reporting at all. The major stumbling blocks included the lack of local staff, the poor qualifications and high turnover of existing staff, and the poor infrastructure in some districts (for example, about 20 percent lacked electricity). To generate a minimum amount of monitoring data, a number of additional systems were put in place.

• First, to assess the program with respect to the number of beneficiaries and actual disbursements, the program instituted a sample based emergency response system, where information was collected via telephone from around 80 districts on a twice-weekly basis.

• Second, four- to six-person rapid response teams were formed to perform spot checks (four times a year at the federal level and eight times a year at the regional level).

• Third, the Food Security Coordination Bureau instituted a system of roving audits to investigate compliance with financial rules, disbursements and payments, and appeals and complaints to provide more timely information on compliance than the normal annual auditing system.

• Finally, some 80 PSNP public works projects were reviewed twice a year to investigate the quality of planning and implementation.

In the meantime, the program further simplified its monitoring system through such steps as halving the length of the M&E manual and investing more resources in training staff involved in M&E activities. The simplification of the M&E system and the development of a less ambitious emergency response system were appropriate responses to low capacity. Even though the formal monitoring system is now starting to show some improvement and provide more reliable data on basic program operations, the additional monitoring instruments have been kept in place, as they provide more in-depth and often more qualitative information on overall program performance.


Box 15: Triangulating administrative and census data: South Africa’s research on take-up of social assistance benefits

A good social protection system should reach the eligible, make data on take-up rates available, and undertake research to identify the factors that influence take-up. In South Africa, for example, the Taylor report investigated the effectiveness of the social grants programme. The ‘Taylor Committee Report’ into the Social Security System, published in 2002, reported estimated take-up rates of 90 per cent for the Disability Grant, 85 per cent for the State Old-Age Pension and only 20 per cent for the Child Support Grant.9

Through effective targeting, the Department of Social Development wanted to maximize take-up among those eligible for social protection assistance. Using a combination of geo-coded administrative data on grant recipients (for the numerator) and census data (for the denominator), eligibility and take-up rates of the Old-Age Grant and Child Support Grant were calculated and mapped at municipality level to identify areas with low take-up rates.10 11 The findings were used by the Department of Social Development to focus its efforts on promoting take-up. Despite a significant increase of 3.79 percent in the take-up of the Child Support Grant in 2012, SASSA partnered with UNICEF to locate the children still excluded from the programme and identify reasons for some age groups. It was found that urban and peri-urban exclusion was higher than rural exclusion12 and resulted in a door-to-door campaign to raise awareness for the Child Grant among the relevant population before the Integrated Community Registration Outreach Program (ICROP) visited the area.13

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9 Taylor, 2002
10 Noble, M., Barnes, H. Wright, G and S. Noble, (2006), p. 2
11 Noble et al (2005)
12 Noble, M., Barnes, H. Wright, G and S. Noble, (2006), p. 20
13 SASSA (2014), p. 9
2.6 DEFINING INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The institutional arrangements for Social Protection M&E should describe the roles and responsibilities of different organizations and actors within the system, while also outlining ‘how’ the information will be collected, compiled, analysed, reported and used. Guiding principles include the following:

- Duplication of reporting lines, parallel or dual reporting within government structures, in some cases including parallel reporting to external funders/implementers (e.g. NGOs, Donors)

- Information extraction, limited feedback provided to decentralized levels and beneficiaries

- Weak link to decentralized decision makers (district, province administration)

- Inward looking M&E system
  - Limited/unstructured role for external independent stakeholders (civil society and media)
  - Weak link with external partners that undertake relevant M&E work (Statistical Office; Research institutions)

- Ensuring the institutional arrangements of the M&E system reflect the overall institutional structure of the implementing organisations (at all levels of decentralisation), while filling any gaps.

- Aligning all activities with the National Planning Framework, with guiding legislation based on the government-wide monitoring and evaluation framework.

- Working as much as possible with existing systems, staff and processes and helping improve them (build capacity, etc), based on an initial Capacity Assessment (see MODULE ADM)

- Building institutional arrangements with new actors for M&E purposes: requires time, dedication and in some cases legal frameworks or memoranda of understanding (e.g. adding an extra question on benefit receipt to national survey by Statistics Bureau)

- Explicitly budgeting for M&E activities from the outset and thinking through related staffing needs

- Tasking one person at all levels of management (central, province, etc) specifically with M&E duties as a priority and possibly not as an add-on to other responsibilities (creating role of M&E officer);

The main actors in a typified social protection M&E process, and their key roles, include:

- National level (e.g. ‘Social Development Ministry’/‘social welfare Ministry’): Within the relevant Ministry, a dedicated M&E Unit should have oversight of each Social Protection program and provide strategic advice on the policy and system’s overall direction. It should also evaluate the work of the institution and the quality of service delivery. Its overarching purpose would be to ensure efficient and effective social protection administration, while fostering transparency and accountability and providing oversight and support to cabinet and parliament.
MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) SYSTEMS

Its responsibilities include:

- **M&E plan** development and management (formulating plan, overseeing its implementation, ensuring sufficient resources, mobilising relevant technical assistance where needed, etc)

- **Data collection** (coordinating supervision activities, overseeing data collection by lower levels and providing feedback, ensuring adequate data sources e.g. MIS, liaising with partner data-providing institutions, etc)

- **Analysis** and reporting (regularly analysing and using information collected, ensuring timely decisions are taken based on findings, signing off periodic reports by lower levels and compiling national reports, coordinating responses to queries from researchers, parliament, civil society organisations, media, etc)

- **Dissemination** (facilitating the wide dissemination of M&E reports and other outputs to all relevant stakeholders)

- **Decentralised level** (e.g. District) At the provincial/district/decentralised level dedicated M&E officers should liaise regularly with the Ministry. Their role should be focused on overseeing implementation of M&E activities in the field as specified in the M&E plan, and making suggestions for improvements. This includes checking consistency of reports from lower levels and following up where discrepancies exist; ensuring timely submission of forms and standard reports to Central level; ensuring correct use of MIS; undertaking supervisions; managing relationships with other stakeholders at decentralised level in relation to M&E; participating in training and ensuring training of lower levels, and; responding to any ad-hoc requests from central level.

- **External actors** (e.g. NGOs, evaluation council/agency, academia, external evaluators, etc) M&E of social protection programme operations and performance is not necessarily only conducted by programme implementers. In some cases, it can be important to formally or informally involve external actors. For example:

  - NGOs may be contracted to perform community monitoring functions, ensuring external accountability.

  - A national ‘evaluation council’ may be created to ensure performance is independently evaluated adopting state-of-the-art methodology (e.g. in Mexico).

  - External evaluations can similarly be carried out by externally contracted consultants/researchers or academia. National academics can further be involved to support analysis of existing data.

  - The national Statistics Bureau could play an important role in providing and analysing relevant data.

It is not common practice to perform summative evaluations in-house because of a) lack of capacity, b) need for an independent evaluator. Externally contracted evaluators can perform this function at a cost which increases with the level of ‘rigour’ of the evaluation methodology. Some countries have tackled the lack of in-house capacity and the issue of high costs of contracting-out evaluations by establishing national councils mandated to conduct sectoral evaluation for social protection. While they are public bodies, these councils have autonomy from the rest of government and often bring together specialists with high capacity in evaluation (e.g. Mexico, see Box 18 below). Conversely, the participation of in-house staff in formative evaluations is critical to support the learning process (see more in Section 3.2.2 below).
When an assessment of the overall institutional context and M&E situation for the LEAP programme was conducted in 2013, it revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the system that are common to many similar projects in the region:

- The MIS system was able to support basic operational processes. However, overall, the current nature of M&E remained highly unsystematic.
- There were no clear lines of responsibilities established for data collection, analysis, reporting and dissemination.
- There was no consistency in reporting tools:
  - Reporting by the LEAP programme both at district and national level was found to be inconsistent and unstructured, with limited use of a standardised reporting format.
  - The reporting process was often triggered by payments and targeting, meaning it is not necessarily done on a regular basis.
  - While the reports were activity based and descriptive in nature, they lacked some of the contents needed for analytical purposes.
- Limited feedback was provided to implementers at decentralized level, who saw little value in reporting information.
- The capacity for undertaking M&E was generally very weak.
- There was a minimal use of M&E information for decision making.

A new M&E system was designed to help systematise M&E activities by establishing clear reporting lines, improving tools for data collection and reporting and promoting the use of M&E information for planning and decision making. The DSW articulated clearly the ideal M&E system for the LEAP programme to be one that: reflects current reality in terms of capacity and staffing levels; is responsive and reflects the evolving nature of LEAP programme; is designed for the short term and with a plan for the longer term, where different components are progressively incorporated; is simple and easy to use yet innovative; is integrated and feeds into and used by other stakeholders, and generates a sense of demand for data.

**Principles of the proposed M&E system**

The LEAP M&E system is based on two key principles:

- **To build on existing systems:** Building on existing systems helps to improve these systems and make them more sustainable, and avoids duplicating work. For example, District Social Welfare Officers were already sending quarterly report forms to the LEAP Management Unit, but not all did this and relevant information were not even asked for. Hence, a starting point for the work was to understand why not all District Social Welfare Offices, what could be done to improve this, and which information should actually be collected.

- To develop tools that minimise the burden of data collection: M&E requires the collection of data, which can be burdensome for those who are supposed to provide it. Hence, a successful M&E system works best if the data-gathering effort is minimised and those who gather data can see the benefits of doing so. Ideally an M&E system feeds to the largest possible extent from data that is generated in any event as part of normal operational procedures, so to minimize data collection efforts that are specific to M&E processes. For example, data are entered from the PMT questionnaire into the MIS for the purposes of beneficiary selection and can be used for M&E without any additional effort.
The three dimensions of the proposed M&E system

Any system that provides information on a programme’s progress and success will need to state which information (indicators) need to be tracked, their data sources, and the process by which the information is used. The proposed M&E system has thus developed along three dimensions:

- **The M&E framework**, which provides the ‘content’ of the M&E system, namely the indicators (i.e. the ‘what’). This looks at what the M&E system will measure and monitor;

- **The M&E platform**, which describes the data sources, how they relate to each other and the instruments used for data collection, compilation, analysis and reporting (i.e. the ‘where’); and

- **The M&E process**, which describes how information is used as well as how the entire M&E system operates. The latter refers to the roles and responsibilities around the different components of the M&E system, with respect to the question of how information is collected, compiled, consolidated, analysed and used (i.e. the ‘how’).

In summary the M&E system of LEAP is built summarized in Figure 14 below.

**Figure 14: Overview of the LEAP M&E system**

The M&E process – Reporting

The M&E system has to report on key indicators and provides information and feedback for policy making, planning, budgeting and implementation. It also has to ensure that the lessons learnt are used to improve the effectiveness of the programme.
Standard reporting formats which respond to stakeholders’ information should be institutionalised and used by all M&E actors. At national level, reports are generated quarterly and yearly, in line with current frequency of report production at the Leap Management Unit (LMU). This should minimise any additional burden on staff. At district level, quarterly forms and bimonthly payments forms should also be produced, again building on existing frequency of report production.

Four main reports should be produced and circulated by the M&E system at district and national levels: (i) District Quarterly Forms; (ii) District Payment Forms; (iii) LEAP Quarterly Report; and (iv) LEAP Annual Report. The first two reports are generated at the district level and fed to the national office for the calculation of the indicators that feed the latter reports produced by the LMU.

Figure 15: LEAP reporting process

The M&E process - Supervision and Feedback

The supervision process puts regional and district officials at the forefront of improvements in LEAP operational processes. It enables operational weaknesses to be addressed swiftly, preventing them from becoming larger operational challenges. However, supervision visits can also be seen as an opportunity to acknowledge good practices on the programme.

Districts should receive regular feedback from the LMU in the form of the LEAP Quarterly Report. This report will be shared with all RSWO and DSWO each quarter.

The LEAP quarterly report reports on all operational indicators from the Districts Payment Forms and the District Quarterly Report Forms. It reveals the operational performance of the district, while allowing some comparisons between districts. Where urgent and substantive operational issues emerge, the LMU should follow up to help solve this challenge. This process of feedback can therefore be seen as the main mode of communication between the LMU and the districts.
The M&E process - Institutional arrangements

A prior assessment of the M&E situation for the LEAP programme showed how the lack of clearly defined roles, responsibilities and reporting lines led to key M&E functions being side-lined.

Figure 14 below shows the key actors in the proposed LEAP M&E system. Two categories of M&E actors can be identified according to their main role performed: actors who are mainly producers of information and actors who are mainly consumers of information. In addition, four key areas of responsibilities can also be identified in the M&E system: M&E Plan development and management, data collection and analysis, reporting, and dissemination. Actors who are mainly information producers are shown in green. The actors who are purely consumers of data are shown in red.

Figure 16: LEAP M&E actors

2.7 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

Adequate supply of evidence from and M&E system can be achieved when:

- **Indicators have been agreed, prioritised and refined** as the result of a participatory and iterative process that accounts for the information needs of stakeholders at all levels, as well as reflecting the programme’s objectives, Theory of Change, Service Standards and core business processes.

- **A range of data sources (both internal and external) is adopted**, making sure these build on existing sources, minimise the burden of data collection and reporting, and prioritise monitoring over evaluation at the initial stages of programme maturity. Key data sources include: Management Information Systems (MIS); standard periodic reporting from visits, spot-checks, audits, etc; qualitative ad-hoc studies; other administrative databases; Official Statistics data (Census, Household Budget Surveys, Living Standard Measurement Surveys, Labour Force Surveys); externally contracted impact evaluations; Community Monitoring.

- **Institutional arrangements** of the M&E system reflect the overall institutional structure of the programme, work with existing systems, staff and processes, and are built acknowledging the need for time, dedication and in some cases legal frameworks or Memoranda of Understanding.
ENSURING DEMAND FOR M&E DATA

3.1 ENHANCING DEMAND FOR M&E

A study conducted by the CLEAR initiative\(^4\) on demand and supply of M&E information and services in anglophone sub-saharan Africa\(^5\) concluded that "none of the governments is described as having established a government-wide culture that supports M&E and Performance Management (PM) and the use of M&E and PM findings (...). M&E is often viewed as a control and policing tool or extractive activities, because of how they have been used in the past. This has led to a lack of ownership and little interest in using their findings to inform decision-making. This seems to be most true at governments’ local levels, but also is reflected in line ministries." (CLEAR, 2013)

Unless decision makers actively seek evidence to support policy making and programme management, M&E practices are unlikely to take hold. Demand for – and use of - M&E data will be enhanced when:

- At macro-level, the national policy environment
  - is ‘enabling’ (performance oriented),
  - offers an overall institutional culture that fosters linkages between different stakeholders and has actors focused on planning,
  - allows for Civil Society (and Donors) to play an active role in fostering M&E practice.

- At meso-level, implementing agencies
  - have a sufficient level of autonomy in decision-making to ensure M&E activities are perceived as useful and not frustrating (i.e. they are allowed to act on their findings),
  - maintain a strong liaison between central and decentralised levels based on mutual feedback and awareness of location-specific constraints (M&E perceived as learning rather than judgement),
  - backed the process of developing an M&E system in the first place, and have a culture of benchmarking performance across different locations,
  - adopt Standard Service Agreements that help to transparently frame objectives in terms of service delivery (see Section 1 below),

14 https://www.theclearinitiative.org
15 The study reviewed M&E practices in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
ENSURING DEMAND FOR M&E DATA

- understand the potential usefulness of it,

- do not ‘fear’ M&E as a ‘controlling’ function,

- have sufficient capacity to perform their functions (it is not an added burden to other activities and they have the resources to perform their job).

At the micro-level, individuals responsible for M&E

- understand the potential usefulness of it,

- do not ‘fear’ M&E as a ‘controlling’ function,

- have sufficient capacity to perform their functions (it is not an added burden to other activities and they have the resources to perform their job).

Best practice internationally includes a balance between ‘carrots, sticks and sermons’, as summarized in Table 11 below.

**Table 11: Incentives for utilisation of M&E - carrots, sticks and sermons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARROTS</th>
<th>STICKS</th>
<th>SERMONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Shift the focus of M&amp;E from ‘controlling’ to ‘learning’</td>
<td>• Enact laws, decrees, or regulations mandating M&amp;E &amp; formal requirements for the planning, conduct, and reporting of M&amp;E</td>
<td>• Use of examples of influential M&amp;E to demonstrate its utility and cost-effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Build forums for local and central level administrators to compare and contrast their experiences (e.g. benchmark across jurisdictions!)</td>
<td>• Withhold part of funding from units that fail to conduct M&amp;E</td>
<td>• Frequent repetition of message of support to and use of M&amp;E at all meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High-level recognition of good or best practice</td>
<td>• Achieve greater transparency by regularly publishing information on all programmes’ objectives, outputs, and service quality</td>
<td>• Awareness-raising, network building and training on M&amp;E function and its use to deliver better services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Budgetary incentives for high performance</td>
<td>• Set challenging but realistic performance targets</td>
<td>• Support for M&amp;E from multilateral and bilateral donors in their loans to governments—highlights and endorses M&amp;E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Performance contracts for civil servants &amp; M&amp;E as one criterion for staff recruitment, promotion, and certification</td>
<td>• Involve civil society in M&amp;E of government performance—results in pressures for better performance and accountability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ensuring that data providers understand how their data are used and the importance of providing accurate and timely data</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Training for programme managers and staff</td>
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</table>

*Source: adapted from Mackay (2007)*
ENSURING DEMAND FOR M&E DATA

In Moldova, for example different raions (regions) were compared against each other in the Quarterly Monitoring Reports generated automatically through the programme’s MIS, highlighting high performing and low performing Social Assistance Departments and allowing to generate a discussion around why that was the case.

In Mozambique INAS Delegations (local offices) have a certain degree of autonomy with expenditure and planning with social assistance programmes, but budgets are determined based on historical expenditure, rather than performance or needs in the specific geographical area of operation – hampering the usefulness of M&E.

Some examples of strategies to enhance demand for M&E data for decision making in the social protection sector are reported in the boxes below.

**Box 16: Case study - the Monitoring and Evaluation system in SASSA**

SASSA operates an organization-wide, centralized Monitoring and Evaluation System, which was developed based on a Stakeholder Information Needs Analysis. This aimed to ensure that only relevant information was being collected. Indicators were selected in a consultative indicator workshop with inputs from the World Bank. The ultimate selection also benefitted from the experience and indicators used by local and international social protection institutions.

The M&E indicators used by SASSA are based on a baseline study covering implementation, administration and policy management. The number of selected indicators was intentionally kept low, focusing on clear operational objectives and logic for SASSA’s operations. All indicators are valid, reliable, sensitive, periodical, and can be disaggregated.

*Source: Authors*
Brazil is a federative republic consisting of the Union, states, municipalities and the Federal District. In order to correctly implement public policies in the context of this challenging federative arrangement, appropriate strategies are needed to ensure cooperation and coordination between the various actors. The Federal Constitution rules that Social Assistance is a universal social right embodied in those public policies that apply to the entire country and for which different stakeholders share responsibility. It follows that in the Social Assistance sphere all entities are tasked with implementing the relevant policies, including the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) and the Unified Registry.

There are two core strategies on which interfederative coordination of the BFP and the Unified Registry is based: (i) formal commitment to the scheme by federal entities, and (ii) provision of financial support for decentralized management. These mechanisms have enabled the Bolsa Familia Program to expand systematically over the last ten years in all the municipalities and to ensure that benefits are paid to more than 14 million extremely poor Brazilian families.

The signature of a Term of Adhesion confers BFP membership on Brazil’s 26 states, 5,570 municipalities and the Federal District. This document sets out the standard obligations and responsibilities of each entity that participates in the program.

The Decentralized Management Index (IGD) has been adopted by the MDS to support and encourage the federative entities to invest in maintaining and improving the management of the BFP and the Unified Registry. The IGD allows federal government co-financing to be earmarked for states and municipalities, and thus to partially reimburse the costs involved in running the BFP and the Unified Registry. Central government funds feature as revenue in state and municipal budgets and can therefore be directly applied to managing the BFP.

In addition to confirming the obligations entered into under the Term of Adherence, the IGD serves as an indicator for tracking the quality of BFP and Unified Registry decentralized management, as well as a benchmark control for the MDS to release funds to states and municipalities. The higher the value of the IGD, the greater the amount of funds eligible for transfer.

The index serves as a baseline for calculating the value of funds to be transferred directly from the federal government to the municipalities, states and the DF. The following figure shows the IGD as a cooperation strategy for the decentralized management of the BFP.

**Figure 17: How the Decentralized Management Index (IGD) works**

Source: WWP (2016)
ENSURING DEMAND FOR M&E DATA

Box 18: The case of CONEVAL in Mexico

CONEVAL is a credible independent agency ensuring transparency in social policy monitoring. In 2001, Congress decided for the first time in Mexican history that all subsidy programs from the federal government would have an annual evaluation. Here, mistrust was a critical aspect. The opposition wanted to prevent the government from using social programs for political purposes. Toward this end, CONEVAL was instituted as an independent agency, answering to Congress, to monitor poverty and conduct social program evaluations.

CONEVAL sees the production of evidence as more than just technical work, emphasizing the importance of national dialogue. According to the CONEVAL Director “We started from the basis that if we wanted a poverty indicator to be used by political actors, we could not just request a technical team to deliver a formula and then instruct the politician to ‘use this methodology’. In Coneval we say, building a measurement and evaluation system is a political challenge with technical elements, not the other way around. Because if you only take into consideration the technical standpoint – which has to be there - but not the actors, that methodology may be perfect, but nobody is going to use it. There has to be a lot of dialogue”.


Box 19: Using M&E Incentives to Improve Performance – Malaysian Experience

Malaysia implements an approach that focuses on national priority areas and a limited range of outcomes, which include tackling the low income levels through social protection.

Ministerial score cards are developed, tied to the overall planning process in Malaysia and is characterized by a high level commitment from the Prime Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister. In addition to the simple structure for reporting, there is a high level of political support and action. Where there is a low level of performance, Malaysia has introduced an approach to managing the consequences of non-performance called “consequence management”. Ministers are ranked according to performance which in practice enhances competition among the different Ministries. Operationally the system is linked to performance meetings between the Prime Minister and Ministers within which scores are mediated. The Prime Minister holds bi-annual Performance Review meetings with Ministers and gives feedback to his Ministers. Annual targets are tied to the 5 years National Development Economic Development Plan and the 10 year Government Transformation Programme.

The system also includes a Ministerial peer review process which is carried out in a systematic manner with Ministers commenting directly on the performance of their peers. As part of the consequence management, there has been instances where Ministers are put in “cold storage (given another post until departure from the service) and others have been removed. Malaysia also has a system of annual reviews of their M & E work and results done by an International Review Panel.

3.2 ENHANCING THE UPTAKE OF EVIDENCE

Data providers can take explicit efforts to stimulate evidence uptake, by improving:

- **Credibility** can be improved by enhancing the validity, relevance, feasibility, or precision of the M&E information that is generated (see discussion on how this translated in the selection of indicators, data sources and evaluation approaches in Section 2 above)

- **Usability** of evidence refers to the tailor made packaging of the information for the user so that it can understood and be used. If a report meant for the Minister is written in technical jargon, it may not be used and will just be “tossed” aside. Thus the data collects would have wasted their time and resources. It is important to distil the information and tailor the message, medium and communication strategy to different types of target audience.

Box 17 summarizes key lessons learned on how to improve the usability of results from impact evaluations of cash transfer programmes, based on the experience from evaluations supported by the Transfer Project\(^6\) in eight countries\(^7\) in the southern and Eastern Africa region. Figure 15 further below showcases the power of packaging evidence from M&E by indentifying critical policy messages and utilizing effective communication approaches, in this case focusing on challenging false myths and perceptions regarding social assistance programmes.

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**Box 20: The Role of M&E in influencing Social Protection policy making processes – Lessons learned in Africa**

A number of factors have been identified as having positive effect on the influence of the evidence on SCT impacts on policy decision in the southern and eastern Africa region:

- Evaluations embedded in national policy processes
- Relationship-building and multi disciplinary research teams
- Messaging and packaging of evidence
- The relationship between demand and supply of evidence (particularly timely availability of key information all along the duration of evaluations)
- The creation of a regional learning agenda, including the establishment of a regional community of practice

While there is considerable diversity across the case study countries, an analysis of the process across the countries suggests that evidence produced by the national evaluations and relates research contributed to:

- Building the overall credibility of an emerging social protection sector;
- Strengthening the case for social protection as an investment, not as a cost, and addressing public perceptions and mis-conceptions;
- Supporting learning around programme desing and implementation to inform program improvement in key areas such as targeting, access, transfer size, and the role of complementary activities; and
- Shaping policy discussions beyond the national context and informing regional social protection agendas.

Source: Davies et al. (2016)

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\(^6\) https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/
\(^7\) Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi and South Africa
ENSURING DEMAND FOR M&E DATA

- **Access**: In some cases the data users may want to use evidence for decision making but don’t know where to find the information. M&E data must be readily available to the different users. The information may be uploaded on a website or portal so that both internal and external users can use it to make decisions. The transparency ensured by Kenya’s online data from the Single Registry for is a good example of improving access to M&E data (see Box 21).

**Box 21: Enhancing Access to Information from the Single Registry of Social Assistance Programmes in Kenya**

The Single Registry of Social Protection Programmes in Kenya is a software platform designed to manage and provide integrated oversight of the principal social assistance cash transfer programmes in Kenya. The Single Registry has evolved as part of the broader social protection policy framework.

The Single Registry consolidates data from programme management information systems (MIS) of Kenya’s largest social cash transfer programmes, into a unified beneficiary MIS that aggregates and analyses this information to support planning, coordination, accountability and both programme and policy-level decision-making.

The data will be most used by local and national government, policymakers, safety net programme designers and managers. The Single Registry also provides an accessible reporting system and easy-to-use dashboards that generate reports on many aspects of the programmes’ performances. It can show if beneficiary needs are being met, and how targeting of beneficiaries and cash transfers might be better harmonized and aligned and overlap reduced. This information is critical for effective management of the cash transfer programmes and for continued development of social assistance policy.

Anyone can use the Single Registry as a tool for searching data on Kenya’s social protection programmes and beyond. Data from the Kenya Single Registry, including summary statistics, information on beneficiaries, payments, the complaint systems, maps and report can be accessed online at http://mis.socialprotection.go.ke:20301/.

The introduction of the Single Registry has increased the transparency, accountability and the functioning of the social assistance programmes in Kenya. Previously, managers were unable to answer the simple of question of who was receiving what within each social protection programme. The registry has now linked data from the disparate programmes into one coherent viewing platform, providing a means of managing and cross-referencing the information.

Similarly information from the Ghana LEAP cash-transfer programme M&E dashboard is available online (read more in Box 5 above).

*Source: http://mis.socialprotection.go.ke:20301/*
### MYTHS VS. REALITY: CASH TRANSFERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MYTHS</th>
<th>REALITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cash will be wasted on alcohol and tobacco</strong></td>
<td>Alcohol and tobacco represent 1-2% of food expenditures. Across 6 countries, no evidence of increased expenditure on alcohol and tobacco. In Lesotho, alcohol expenditure actually decreased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfers are just a ‘hand-out’ and do not contribute to development</strong></td>
<td>In Zambia, evidence shows cash transfers increased farmland. As more agricultural inputs were used, overall production increased by 36% and farmers engaged more in markets. Majority of programmes show significant increase in secondary school enrolment and in spending on school uniforms and shoes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cash causes dependency, laziness</strong></td>
<td>In several countries, including Malawi and Zambia, research finds reduction in casual wage labour, shift to on-farm and more productive activities. There is little evidence transfers lead to reduction in work effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfers lead to price inflation and disrupt local economy</strong></td>
<td>No inflation detected in 6 case study countries. There is little evidence transfers lead to reduction in work effort. In fact, cash transfers lead to positive multiplier effects in local economies and significantly boost growth and development in rural areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Child-focused grants increase fertility rate</strong></td>
<td>In Zambia, cash transfers showed no impact on fertility. Early pregnancy reduced by 34% in Kenya, 10.5% points in South Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Why not?**
- Beneficiaries are a small share of community, typically 15-20%.
- They come from poorest households, with low purchasing power and thus don’t buy enough to affect market prices.
- Local economies cannot meet the increased demand.

**In Ethiopia, for every dollar transferred by the programme, about $1.50 was generated for the local economy.**

Source: Transfer Project, [https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/](https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/)
ENSURING DEMAND FOR M&E DATA

3.3 EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING AND THE LEARNING ORGANISATION

Under the traditional M&E approach most projects, including in the social protection field follow a standard practice as articulated in project planning or logical framework approaches and define a ‘development project’ as inputs (financial and other resources), which are translated by an implementing agency into specified activities to produce useful outputs. These outputs have the goal of outcomes and impacts of higher well-being for the intended beneficiaries.

In the last ten years there has been an accelerating rise in the criticism of traditional M&E and a corresponding rise in the prominence given to the use of rigorous techniques for project evaluation. The criticism is of M&E practice that has two key elements: a) evaluation was too ex ante and needed to be more ex post, b) evaluation should be more focused on the impact on outcomes not just inputs, and based on a rigorous counter-factual. This has led to the significant rise of focus on rigorous impact evaluations (see more in Box 12 above).

There are three fundamental reasons why both the traditional M&E approach and the more recent impact evaluation approach fall short of learning needs of most organizations:

- High dimensional and complex design space implies that learning ‘what works’ has to be flexible and dynamic.
- Many development problems are problems of implementation—moving from inputs to outputs (for which an impact evaluation that measures outputs to beneficiaries is not yet needed)
- Like human beings, organizations and systems actually learn through experience, and not (only) through evidence

3.2.1 Learning through Experience

People learn through a circular process of action, conceptualization and evaluation. It involves referring to previous experiences as well as anticipating outcomes. What we do is the result of observation, action, and reflection. Our behavior reflects how we compare experience from the past, deeming them good or bad, successful or unsuccessful. We also look at others - what actions of theirs are good? And last but not least, we develop unique strategies that apply best to our specific situation. Experiential learning is the process of experience, and is more specifically defined as “learning through reflection on doing” (Kolb 2014).

Figure 19: Experiential Learning Cycles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACT</th>
<th>REFLECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concrete Experience</td>
<td>Reflective Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facts (What Happened?)</td>
<td>Feelings (What did I Experience?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of Action</td>
<td>Assess Behavior &amp; Consequences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPLY</th>
<th>CONCEPTUALIZE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Experimentation</td>
<td>Abstract Conceptualization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Futures (What Will I Do?)</td>
<td>Findings (Why Did This Happen?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement Revised Theory</td>
<td>Revise Theory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This Section is based on material from Pritchett (2013) and the PDIA initiative available at [https://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/](https://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/)
Development practitioners are well aware that a lot of learning from a project happens after the design, but well before any formal ‘evaluation’ but as it is this learning is often haphazard and below the radar.

**The goal is to bring the currently informal processes of experiential learning, from project implementation, explicitly into the overall strategy of development organizations.** Pritchett et al. (2013) propose to explicitly add a new ‘e’ in MeE, defined as **structured experiential learning.** This is the process through which an organization learns during the period of project implementation.

### 3.2.2 Towards structured experiential learning

Many implementing agencies (or at least significant proportions of the people in those agencies) want to do what they want to do, and do it well if possible. The difficulty is that the idea of ‘independent evaluation’ often arises when a principal (e.g. funding agency) wants to select among alternatives and provide more support over time to ‘what works’. When organizations (correctly) perceive that the role of evaluator is to be an instrument to cut their budget if they are ‘ineffective’ rather than help them be effective, the enthusiasm for evaluation naturally wanes (Pritchett 2002). Therefore implementing agencies often are less than enthusiastic (even subversive) of rigorous impact evaluations of outcomes.

**However, implementing agencies are often interested in evaluation of what works to produce outputs.** The management of an implementing agency has some control over the outputs of a development project by managing inputs and activities. Organizations would allow evaluations which focused on outputs is that outcome data is more costly than output data because it nearly always involves engagement with actors who are external to the development project.

**Structured experiential learning is the process of disaggregating and analyzing data on inputs, activities and outputs chosen to be collected by the project to draw intermediate lessons that can then be fed back into project design during the course of the project cycle.** The idea is to take the key insight about using randomization and other rigorous methods to identify impact and expand it dramatically—at lower cost—by using the development project itself as a learning device. Variations in alternatives within the design space within the project can be used to identify efficacy differentials in the efficacy of the project on the process of inputs to outputs, which can be measured at low incremental cost at high frequency intervals, for real-time feedback into implementation, at key decision junctures. Rather than thinking of projects as a single element of the design space, projects that are intended to be innovative are authorized strategic evidence-responsive crawls over (part of the) design space.

In order to maximise experiential learning it must be anchored on an organizational learning strategy which consists of a project specific mix of Monitoring, Experiential Learning and Evaluation (M&E) (see Figure 20 below).

**Figure 20: The role of Experiential learnign in M&E**

- **Monitoring** provides needed fiduciary & organizational accountability as well as real time information for active management
- **Experiential Learning** creates dynamic feedback loops at key decision junctures, that allow adjustments to the original programme plan, in order to find the one with the highest impact
- **Rigorous Impact Evaluation** provides the most rigorous estimates, of the casual impact of projects on outcomes possible, given the nature of the project.

Source: Prichett et al (2013)
ENSURING DEMAND FOR M&E DATA

Often the implicit model behind an impact evaluation approach is that the management of the implementing organization will change design on the basis of *entirely technocratic ‘evidence’* and that implementation will change by edict from above. An alternative is that implementing agents will change their behaviour when they are convinced that the new behaviour furthers their objectives, which include both self-interest but also some concern for the organization’s outputs and outcomes. If this is the case then involvement of the implementing agency and agents in the learning process is essential to the impact of the learning (see Figure 21).

*Figure 21: Top-down versus bottom-up learning*

The reality is that with complex endeavors no one can know *what will work in advance*. Development project managers do not know if the inputs will lead to useful outputs (internal area within their control) or if the outputs created will in turn lead to outcomes and impacts (not within their control). As we have argued above, given the level of granularity at which projects have to be designed one cannot be ‘evidence based’— even if one draws on all of the available information. Development projects are not like chemistry—which is complicated but not complex—where we can predict exactly how interactions will work under specified conditions because we have empirically validated invariance laws that cover all the relevant contingencies.

Some projects really are just logistics, the solutions have been tried out and proven in context (both overall and organizational), and hence the purpose of the project is just scaling. However, not all projects are just the logistics of implementing known solutions and hence processes that insist that all projects present themselves either as logistics or as small scale pilots or field experiments create unnecessary fictions and confusions.

Dealing with complexity requires a different approach to programming as well as to monitoring and evaluation, challenging the traditional wisdom that change happens linearly. It requires embedding in the process opportunities for iteration, feedback and continuous learning (see Figure 22). From an M&E perspective dealing with complexity required to overcome rigidities of the traditional logframe approach and adopt a more flexible framework for searching and assessing solutions based on continuous practice (see Box 22).

Read more about ‘Doing Problem Driven Work’ and Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation here: https://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/

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Source: adapted from Prichett et al (2013)

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Read more about ‘Doing Problem Driven Work’ and Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation here: https://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/
Although the benefits of experimental iteration and learning process seem very apparent to most people, many development organizations make it difficult for staff to pursue such approaches, given the rigidity of logframe and other linear planning methods. Funding organizations demand the structured, perceived certainty of a logframe-type device and will not allow projects to be too adaptive. In response to this concern, we propose a new logframe-type mechanism that embeds experimental iteration into a structured approach to make policy or reform decisions in the face of complex challenges called the **SearchFrame**.

The SearchFrame facilitates a transition from problem analysis into a structured process of finding and fitting solutions. An aspirational goal is included as the end point of the intervention, where one would record details of ‘what the problem looks like solved’. Beyond this, key intervening focal points are also included, based on the deconstruction and sequencing analyses of the problem. These focal points reflect what the reform or policy intervention aims to achieve at different points along the path towards solving the overall problem. More detail will be provided for the early focal points, given that we know with some certainty what we need and how we expect to get there. These are the focal points driving the action steps in early iterations, and they need to be set in a defined and meaningful manner (as they shape accountability for action). The other focal points will reflect what we assume or expect or hope will follow. These will not be rigid, given that there are many more underlying assumptions, but they will provide a directionality in the policymaking and reform process that gives funders and authorizers a clear view of the intentional direction of the work.

Figure 22: How to go about experiential learning?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Reverse engineer from goals back to instruments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Design a project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>Admit we do not know what will work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>Identify key dimensions of the design space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>Select new alternative project variants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 6</td>
<td>Strategically crawl your design space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 7</td>
<td>Implement the approved sequential crawl and learn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Box 22: **SearchFrames for Adaptive Work (More Logical than Logframes)**
The SearchFrame does not specify every action step that will be taken, as a typical logframe would. Instead, it schedules a prospective number of iterations between focal points (which one could also relate to a certain period of time). Funders and authorizers are thus informed that the work will involve a minimum number of iterations in a specific period. Only the first iteration is detailed, with specific action steps and a specific check-in date.

Readers should note that this reflection, learning and adaptation make the SearchFrame a dynamic tool. It is a tool to use on the journey, as one makes the map from origin to destination. It allows structured reflections on that journey, and report-backs, where all involved get to grow their know-how as they progress, and turn the unknowns into knowns. This tool fosters a structured iterative process that is both well suited to addressing complex problems and meeting the structural needs of formal project processes. As presented, it is extremely information and learning intensive, requiring constant feedback as well as mechanisms to digest feedback and foster adaptation on the basis of such. This is partly because we believe that active discourse and engagement are vital in a complex change processes, and must therefore be facilitated through the iterations.

Source: Andrews et al. (2017), see also https://buildingstatecapability.com/2016/06/06/searchframes-for-adaptive-work-more-logical-than-logframes/

3.4 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

- M&E systems must be designed in such a way so as to **strike a balance** between the capacity to produce quality evidence in a timely fashion and the demand for evidence of a particular kind needed for decision-making by multiple users.

- To maintain and sustain the supply and demand balance, there should be **constant dialogue** between data providers and data users coupled with ensuring that the evidence is made usable for the policy making community and providing incentives to the data users to stimulate uptake of evidence.

- On the demand side of M&E it is important to create a **culture of learning** and not blame and in this way it ensures the usefulness of the M&E framework to its key users.

- A good M&E system is critical to safeguarding compliance with existing legislation, ensuring transparency and **accountability** and building a basis for the **continuous improvement** of social protection systems. A good M&E system promotes a continuous learning cycle, fosters transformation in social protection, and improves service delivery.

- To maximise learning during implementation, organisations should use structured **experiential learning**. In the face of complex challenges change is generally not a linear process, requiring experimental iteration and frequent feedback loops.
4.1 SERVICE STANDARDS AND SERVICE CHARTERS

Service Standards outline the specific delivery targets established by an organization, and are made up of a set of commitments that an organization promises to honour when delivering a service. They also describe what a client or user can expect to receive from the service, and the manner in which the service will be delivered. A well-designed performance management system associated with those Standards (and adequately monitored by the M&E system, see Section 1) is essential to ensure a cost-effective and high-quality service that meets the needs of service users. Specifically, Service Standards aim to:

- support the provision of consistently high quality service delivery
- encourage continuous improvement and identify specific areas for improving service quality
- assist service providers to self-audit the quality of their service
- foster a collective commitment to quality through a common set of clear and measurable criteria
- assist users in knowing what to expect from service providers in relation to the quality of service delivery
- maximise staff satisfaction and confidence with the service
- meet reporting, transparency and accountability requirements
- assist with monitoring and evaluation processes.

Best practice in the establishment of standards in this sector include the following:

- Tailoring the standards to their focus. As useful guidance in the social assistance sector, see the World Bank's (2011) suggested “governance and service quality” standards and related indicators for Safety Net Programmes, focusing on human resources, financing and resource management, operational procedures, organizational performance and overall quality of delivery.
• Ensure standards guarantee (World Bank, 2011):

  • **Service accessibility**: extent to which social assistance services are physically, spatially and socio-culturally accessible to all individuals in the target population, regardless of their age, gender, ethnicity, language, disability condition, location, and so on (See Table 6 below for some examples of rough indicators for this).

  • **Privacy, dignity and confidentiality**: extent to which each beneficiary is treated with the same level of privacy, dignity and confidentiality.

  • **Cultural awareness**: delivery of non-discriminatory services which are sensitive to social and cultural values of the individuals, their families and community.

  • **Complaints and appeals**: existence of publicized and easy-to-use complaints/grievance procedure, including a commitment to deal and solve complaints within a time limit. See MODULE ADM.

  • **Exit and re-entry**: extent to which individuals are assisted to plan for exit from assistance and assured that reentry is available, if required.

  • **Service integration**: development of links with other social assistance service providers at local, state and national level to ensure access to complementary services.
Table 12: Example of potential dimensions of service accessibility to monitor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>SUB-DIMENSIONS AND ROUGH INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Service accessibility               | **Accessibility policies**  
• Existence and application of equal opportunities and disability policies, procedures and training for service delivery  
• Extent to which target population is defined, their needs regularly identified and services are planned and delivered to meet those needs |
|                                    | **Affordability**  
• Availability and use of different means to reduce the cost of program information and application (e.g. mobile offices, toll-free phone numbers, etc.)  
• Travel time and transportation costs to facilities  
• Application and enrollment costs  
• Average time required for program application and enrollment  
• Individual’s perception of ease of service accessibility and paperwork required |
|                                    | **Physical, spatial and functional accessibility**  
• Convenience of location and access (% of facilities in close proximity to public transport, with clear signage, level access, that are compliant with accessibility regulations for people with physical disabilities)  
• Convenience of facilities (e.g. % of facilities with adequate waiting areas which accommodate children, are properly maintained, sanitary, completely operational, fully stocked and supplied)  
• Extent of use of technology to provide information and access to services (if appropriate)  
• Posting and observance of operation hours (e.g. % of facilities with posted operation hours, % of facilities with posted operation hours, % of facilities with posted operation hours)  
• Convenience of operation hours (% of beneficiaries who consider operation hours convenient) |
|                                    | **Socio-cultural accessibility**  
• Availability of information materials in different languages and formats  
• Ratio of the number of beneficiaries who have difficulties communicating in the official language and the number of trained interpreters or bilingual staff  
• Availability of information and tailored service access for individuals with special needs (people with visual or hearing difficulties, those who have difficulties understanding or reading the official language, and people with learning difficulties)  
• Individual’s perception of service provision in a manner sensitive to the age, sex, ethnic, and linguistic background of each person |

Source: World Bank (2011)

- **Ensuring standards measure** what matters to service users (through research and consultations).19

- **Involving staff at all levels in determining the standards and their related measures.** Measures that are seen by staff as irrelevant, unrealistic, inappropriate or unfair will be counterproductive. For example, they may focus on the measure given at the expense of other more important factors, they may try to get round the system, or they may sub-optimise or concentrate on short-term issues.

- Making sure there is a **balanced assessment and set of measures**, to avoid managers focusing all of their attention on one aspect of service delivery, rather than on the bigger picture.

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19 See also Moullin, 2004; Osborne, Radnor and Nasi, 2013
• Developing performance measures and related indicators based on the following principles:
  • Including both perception measures and (‘objective’) performance indicators.\textsuperscript{20}
  • Using a combination of outcome and process measures.\textsuperscript{21}
  • Ensuring benefits outweigh the costs of obtaining/calculating them.
  • Developing clear systems for translating feedback into a strategy for action that can be communicated to staff.

Service Standards can be also translated into a ‘Service Charter’ that includes and defines the key values of the administration (for instance: citizen friendliness and service-oriented attitude, sensitivity, humane attitudes, efficiency, transparency and integrity), while also defining citizen’s rights and responsibilities and key performance targets in terms of service delivery (see also Box 7).\textsuperscript{22}

Box 23: Case Studies - Service Charters

In Namibia, a Service Charter is made available as a pamphlet and includes telephone numbers and contact details for a ‘complaints coordinator’ at the relevant ministry. It also includes postal addresses and phone numbers for regional and local offices and sub-divisional heads in the parent ministry.\textsuperscript{23} The Namibian Service Charter clearly stipulates the processing times for certain activities.

Table 13. Extract from the Namibian Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare’s Service Charter\textsuperscript{24}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>PROCESSING TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Payment of Old Age Disability grants attestation with</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes of pay points and modes</td>
<td>60 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effected address changes</td>
<td>24 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalise re-instatement</td>
<td>90 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of insurance claims</td>
<td>48 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handle enquiries</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal with queries</td>
<td>14 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{20} Perceptions measures are obtained directly from service users and other stakeholders, while performance indicators are recorded directly by the organisation. For example, measuring the average time patients wait in a GP’s surgery – a performance indicator – is important, as this will show whether the actual waiting time has improved. However, this will not tell the surgery how satisfied, or irritated, a particular patient is with the length of wait. A carefully designed patient questionnaire or a focus group (examples of perception measures) would give an indication of this, and therefore both types of measure are needed. Another advantage of perception measures is that they can pinpoint changing expectations.

\textsuperscript{21} Measuring outcomes (e.g. whether an ill patient recovers) is important because they are of vital importance to patients and service users. Similarly, process measures are important because they measure the way service is delivered, which also matters to patients and service users. One problem with outcome measures is that they may only be available several months or years following a particular treatment, by which time the personnel or the treatment regime may have changed. They also cannot be used to detect near-misses. However, there is also a danger in using process measures if these are not clearly linked to outcome measures or to patient/user satisfaction. A service may then conform to process measures used, but bear little relation to patient outcomes or satisfaction.


\textsuperscript{23} ILO, 2014, p. 159

\textsuperscript{24} p. 160
In South Africa, delivery of public services follows the principles of ‘People First’, which encompasses nine core values for guidance of public servants: consultation with citizens; setting service standards; increasing access to information; ensuring courtesy; providing information; openness and transparency; redress; and value for money. In an effort to contribute to service improvement, People First requires departments to benchmark the standard of service delivered to citizens. Service standards are measured by public satisfaction inquiries regarding services delivered.

In Kenya, the HSNP’s programme Service Charter was widely communicated using a simple visual support (see image below).

---

**PROGRAMME SERVICE CHARTER**

1. The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) is a joint government of Kenya and DFID programme that seeks to reduce extreme poverty in northern Kenya. This service charter is to let you know what you can expect from the organizations managing the programme and sets out how they plan to ensure that the programme charter of rights and responsibilities is respected.

2. We promise to help you understand the targeting, payments and complaint procedures as well as the rights and responsibilities around each programme.

3. We promise to provide opportunities for you to comment on the programme and to take part in its design and to be part of the learning process and to share with you what we have learnt so far.

4. We promise that HSNP staff will treat you with respect at all times and will refrain from discrimination based on sex, ethnicity, language or ability.

5. If you believe you have been unfairly excluded during targeting, we promise to provide access to an appeal process managed by an independent organization.

6. We promise to ensure that the programme is managed in a transparent and fair manner to assign discrimination and to abide by strict targeting and registration procedures based on eligibility.

7. We promise to ensure that the programme is accountable to all irrespective of sex, age, educational attainment or disability. We also promise that registration points will be within easy reach of your home and that payments are made in a reasonably accessible, secure and safe place.

8. If you feel that we have not kept any of the promises made in this charter, we promise to provide you with an independent complaints procedure. You can submit your complaint to any organization involved in the HSNP or to the Rights Committee who will pass on the complaint for you. We promise to ensure that you are treated with respect and that a response is as soon as possible. If necessary, your complaint will be referred to the HSNP National Coordinator for adjudication.

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Source: Namibian Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare Service Charter, HSNP Service Charter, South Africa ‘People’s First principle’s

**4.2 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING**

Implementing Service Standards implies linking these to Strategic Plans and Performance Management: which help to ensure that service goals are consistently being met in an effective and efficient manner. This is not an easy task, often resulting in resistance on behalf of those who are being ‘evaluated’. Box 8 explores some of the reasons why this is the case.
Box 24: Resistance to performance management linked to service standards

Programme managers often fear that elected officials, interest groups, and the media may use service quality and programme outcome information as fodder for attacks on them. They are “concerned that such information stands a good chance of being misused and that they will be blamed for any negative findings” (Hatry, 1992).

This resistance can translate into several types of behaviour including (Moullin, 2009; Brooks, 2007; Hechman et al., 2002):

- **Tunnel vision**: for example, if the standards focus on Outcome X, staff will have less incentives to pursue Outcomes Y and Z – even though they may be just as important.

- **Gaming**: this implies changing behaviour to cheat the system and not to improve performance. For example, when the NHS in England introduced waiting time targets in emergency departments, patients were made to wait in ambulances.

- **Data mis-representation**: actively (and misleadingly) changing the data that is shared with higher levels to comply with standards.

- **Complacency or ‘convergence’**: for example, the assumption that standards set the boundaries of best practice and not striving to perform better. In the case of social assistance, this can mean a 25 day wait for processing an application is deemed ‘acceptable’ because it is within the 30 day range set by the standards.

- **Cream-skimming**: selecting beneficiaries/clients/users based on the likelihood with which these will help to reach targets rather than their actual needs. For example, if a target involves bringing X% of people over the poverty line it will be easier to do so by cream-skimming those who are relatively richer.

- **Sub-optimisation**: the pursuit by managers of their own narrow objectives at the expense of strategic coordination.

- **‘Ossification’**: a disinclination to experiment with new and innovative methods. For example, shallow and narrow teaching in pursuit of gains in test results, or cutting funding for R&D.

- **Myopia**: i.e. not focusing on the long term (this is a variation on the ‘tunnel vision’ above). For example, if targets for new applicants for a benefit need to be met there will be a tendency to disregard people who are applying a second time (making them wait).

These attempts to force the system are not necessarily the fruit of bad-will on behalf of the staff involved. In some cases, these attitudes are due to performance standards that are applied inflexibly without taking into account external factors such as local conditions and challenges (i.e. things that are not within programme control) (Hatry, 1992).

According to the literature, best practice implementing service standards dictates the following:

- **Apply performance standards consistently**, but with some flexibility - allowing for managers to provide explanatory information with the programme performance data.

- **Involves as many staff** as possible in the process of developing and refining the service standards and related performance system (building ownership).
Develop a relevant, useful and timely reporting system (see Section 1 on the M&E system):

- Making sure performance measurement against standards is reported regularly (and at useful times for the manager: i.e. when a decision needs to be taken);
- Making sure data is presented in an adequately disaggregated way to reflect managers’ needs at that level and to dig deeper into how outcomes are linked to demographic and service characteristics in a given area;
- Allowing for the comparison of performance across different units and across time so as to generate benchmarking and ‘yardstick competition’;
- Adding depth of interpretation to the information by linking it to additional qualitative research or efforts to identify more specifically where the strengths and weaknesses of the services are located;
- Reporting the data in a clear and interesting way (bar graphs can work better than tables as they have a visual impact, etc); and
- Continuously training managers and staff to interpret and use that data (this cannot be a one-off exercise).

Focus the measurement system on continuous improvement for service users, not on a ‘blame culture’. If performance on a particular measure is below the bar, the emphasis needs to be on establishing what went wrong and how this issue can be addressed in the future.

Link incentives to performance evaluation and management (bonuses, etc)

4.3 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

- Service Standards outline the specific delivery targets established by an organization, and are made up of a set of commitments that an organization promises to honour when delivering a service. They also describe what a client or user can expect to receive from the service, and the manner in which the service will be delivered.

- In designing these it is essential to ensure standards measure what matters to service users (through research and consultations) and involve staff at all levels in determining the standards and their related measures.

- Service Standards can be also translated into a ‘Service Charter’ to be widely circulated. Most importantly they should be linked to Strategic Plans and Performance Management, helping to ensure that service goals are consistently being met in an effective and efficient manner.
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

In MODULE ADM we discussed the core accountability function played by a programme-specific or sector-wide Complaint and Appeal Mechanism for social protection delivery. A wide variety of further internal and external measures can be set up to increase the overall accountability of service provision in the social protection sector, in combination with a strong M&E system (described in Section 1 above). Two key objectives are served by these measures: ensuring and improving quality service delivery as well as enhancing the impact of social protection provision. We discuss the most important below.

5.1 INTERNAL MEASURES

5.1.1 Spot-checks, Supervisions and Inspections

Beyond the complaints and appeals mechanism, other internal procedures can be set-up to ensure compliance with standard policies, legislation, processes, service standards and norms: these include spot-checks, supervisions (also relevant for M&E, see above) and internal compliance inspections to be undertaken on a regular basis.

The social protection institution’s watchdog can take the form of an Inspectorate – as is the case in South Africa, for example. Its aim is to: investigate the integrity of social assistance’s legal and operational frameworks and ensure that regulatory frameworks are upheld; conduct internal financial audits and audits of the implementing body in order to ensure that laws and policies are adhered to; and investigate fraud, corruption and mismanagement within the implementing body.

5.2 EXTERNAL MEASURES

5.2.1 Tribunals, Courts and Ombudsmen

Some countries (such as South Africa) have developed independent tribunals for social assistance that can re-examine decisions of the implementing body. These tribunals also disseminate standardized rules and regulations of social assistance and interprets legislation.25

A similar role can also be played by existing courts - an expensive and slow, yet important option for independent redress26. ILO Convention 128 of 1967 inscribes the right of any applicant to adequate professional representation or support before the courts.27

25 http://www.paralegaladvice.org.za/docs/chap07/01.html
26 The following considerations should be kept in mind when adopting courts as a redress option: a) Legal decisions may create negative externalities if the overall impact of decisions on the system is not considered; b) Use of courts as the primary grievance mechanism can create huge backlogs, politicisation and inefficiency; c) Use of courts can be regressive, as the poor and marginalised have less access to the court system. Public defenders, NGOs and CSOs can help to bridge this gap.
Ombudsmen typically exist outside the formal bureaucratic apparatus and have an advisory role; their recommendations are non-binding but are generally respected. Ombudsmen are most effective when referral procedures to them and up to higher escalation are well publicized and understood.

5.2.2 Financial Audits

Financial audits can provide oversight of financing, with the goal of warranting the appropriate use of funds and improving management. Typically, an audit aims to ensure that: disbursement procedures and systems are correct; accounting records are maintained and updated regularly; internal control systems are adequate regarding payments, authorizations and reconciliation; and that expenditures comply with budget provisions. Compliance and internal auditing units and inspection authorities should be independent. They monitor compliance with laws and fight social grant fraud, as well as investigate cases of financial or service mismanagement and criminal acts within the institutions.

The national auditor-general should conduct independent audits of the financial and account statements of the institution. Annual budgets, corporate plans, annual reports and audited financial statements should be prepared and submitted according to the applicable legislation. Annual Audit Coverage Plans could be used to inform the institution about auditing schedules, to ensure that audits are regularly conducted. An internal audit unit could also be set-up.

5.2.3 Social Audits

Social audits have become increasingly popular as a tool to allow beneficiaries and communities to review and provide feedback on programme implementation. They are often conducted by a local civil society organisation, which reviews process compliance, and operational rules and regulations, and present results in a public hearing. For example, India’s MGNREGS public works programme has legally mandated the use of social audits, which have been successfully used to improve programme implementation (see Box 9).

Box 25: Social Audits in India’s MGNREGS

The first step in conducting the social audit is a notification to the relevant sub-district office regarding RTI (Right to Information) obligations and requesting unrestricted access to relevant MGNREGS documents. A team comprising state and district auditors will, upon their arrival in the sub-district headquarter, first recruit and then intensively train village social auditors. In each Gram Panchayat, the social audit team verifies official labour expenses by visiting labourers listed in the worksite logs. Then a sub-district level public hearing is held with implementing officials to discuss the audit findings. Here, complaints will be read-out, testimonies verified and accused officials given an opportunity to defend themselves. After the public hearing, a Decision Taken Report (DTR) is created in which the responsibility for each confirmed wrongdoing is pinned on a programme functionary (or on multiple functionaries).

Source: Ayliffe, Aslam and Schjødt (forthcoming)

5.2.4 Integrity Frameworks and Anti-fraud Campaigns

Fraud can be understood as the misrepresentation of interests to gain access to benefits illegally. It is mostly ascribed to immoral and unethical behaviour. Anti-corruption and fraud efforts should be integrated into operations and be among the strategic functions of the organization. These may include:

- Developing an internal integrity framework, which should be based on clearly defined principles, such as honesty, fairness in operations, transparency and accountability; the framework needs to be available for everyone who is interested and be a compulsory part of staff training and sensitization.
- Prevention measures including the production and dissemination of ‘Principles and Values’ statements stipulating expected behavior, which should guide public servants in any professional activity or role.
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

- Proactive forms of engagement including public anti-fraud campaigns, launched with the support of high-profile actors/champions, such as the presidency

All of the above should:

1. Give clear ethical standards for public sector employees
2. Give ethical guidance for public employees
3. Inform public servants about their rights and duties when detecting offenses
4. Make clear that political commitment supports the ethical behavior of public employees
5. Expect managers to demonstrate and promote ethical conduct
6. Promote ethical behaviour and conduct through management policies, procedures and practices
7. Promote ethical conduct through public service conditions and management of human resources
8. Provide adequate accountability mechanisms
9. Provide for decision-making processes that are transparent and open to scrutiny
10. Outline clear guidelines for collaboration between the public and private sectors
11. Posit that misconduct should be sanctioned and solved through appropriate procedures.

5.2.5 Scrutiny by Parliament (e.g. Public Accounts Committee)

Sectoral Committees may be appointed within government to scrutinize spending and delivery within the social protection sector. A cross-cutting example is the creation of a Public Accounts Committee responsible for overseeing government expenditures, and to ensure they are effective and honest.

5.2.6 NGOs and Media: Stimulating Demand for Accountability

The role of NGOs and media is important in facilitating and ‘stimulating’ access to complaint and appeal mechanisms, providing independent oversight and shoring up citizens’ rights to entitlements and quality services.

NGOs and CSOs can sponsor and facilitate access to a redress procedure by aggregating or making claims for collective redress, providing information to citizens and by providing legal aid to help access courts and legal redress mechanisms. CSOs and NGOs can also play an important role in increasing the ‘rights consciousness’ of people who might not think they are entitled to a decent service or to complain. Similarly, NGOs and CSOs may team up with government to support participatory monitoring of programmes.

In Chile, a private foundation is instrumental in aggregating and publicising common complaints about public services for use by journalists and other NGOs. In the UK and the Dominican Republic, NGOs have been successfully ‘contracted’ and formed by government to fulfill their role more effectively. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Helpage International has been active in several countries fostering Older-Citizens Monitoring - involving older people at the grassroots level to monitor the implementation of policies and services that affect their lives, and using the evidence to advocate for change.

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21 Pope, 2000, pp. 178
The media provide a two-way route to enhance accountability of social protection provision. The media can be used by service providers to disseminate information on programme entitlements and existing Complaint and Appeal Mechanisms. An independent media can also serve an important watchdog function by publicising significant failures and complaints and appeals in service delivery and generating pressure to redress them.

However, the media can magnify news-worthy aspects of complaints and appeals, rather than what is primarily in the public interest. In Brazil, for example, publicity of fraudulent attainment of benefits is frequent and seen as ‘scandalous.’ Therefore, partly as a result of this, policy makers are far more likely to anticipate ‘inclusion errors’ in policy design rather than ‘exclusion errors’, which attract less attention.

5.3 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

- Most programmes have established some form of complaints and appeals mechanisms at community levels or more formally through tribunals, courts and ombudsmen. These play an important role in ensuring the accountability of the system. Other accountability mechanisms include spot checks, supervision, inspection and social audits.

- Accountability systems for social protection programmes serve the dual objective of a) ensuring and improving quality service delivery, and b) enhancing the impact of social protection provision.

- A wide variety of internal and external measures can be set up to increase the overall accountability of service provision in the social protection sector, in combination with a strong M&E system.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


The TRANSFORM Learning Package is organized in a modular structure, and reflects the key building blocks of a holistic & interdependent social protection system.

The TRANSFORM modules that are currently available are listed below. Other modules are under development and will be added to the curriculum.

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All TRANSFORM materials are available at:
http://socialprotection.org/institutions/transform
WHAT IS TRANSFORM?

TRANSFORM is an innovative learning package on the administration of national social protection floors in Africa. The prime objective of TRANSFORM is to build critical thinking and capacities of policy makers and practitioners at national and decentralized levels to improve the design, effectiveness and efficiency of social protection systems. TRANSFORM aims not only at imparting state-of-the-art knowledge that is appropriate for the challenges faced by countries in the region, but also to encourage learners to take leadership on the change and transformation of nationally defined social protection systems.

WHY TRANSFORM?

Many training curricula exist in the field of social protection and thus fundamental ideas, concepts, approaches and techniques are accessible. And yet, institutions and individuals struggle with the complexity of developing a broad, encompassing social protection system.

This complexity requires a transformational approach to teaching and knowledge sharing. It is far from enough to impart knowledge, to fill heads. It requires learners to grapple with the features of complexity, to stimulate creativity, to appreciate diversity and uniqueness, to be involved as a key element of ownership—elements which are at least as important as the factual knowledge itself. This learning package aims at just that: TRANSFORM!

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