LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADM | Administration and Delivery Systems
AIDS | Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
CCT | Conditional Cash Transfer
CT | Corporate Income Taxes
CODI | Core Diagnostic Instrument
COFOG | Classification of the Functions of Governments
DFID | Department for International Development
DSA | Debt Sustainability Assessments
ECUAMOD | Simulating Tax and Benefit Policies for Development in Ecuador
GDP | Gross Domestic Product
GHAMOD | Simulating Tax and Benefit Policies for Development in Ghana
HIV | Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IFFs | Illicit Financial Flows
ILO | International Labour Organisation
IMF | International Monetary Fund
INAS | National Social Welfare Institute
ISPA | Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessment
LEG | Legal Frameworks
LESDEP | Local Enterprises and Skills Development Programme
LEWIE | Local economy-wide impact evaluation
LIPW | Labour-Intensive Public Works programme
M&L | Monitoring and Evaluation
MicroZAMOD | Simulating Tax and Benefit Policies for Development in Zambia
MIS | Management Information System
MMAS | Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Social Welfare
MOZMOD | Simulating Tax and Benefit Policies for Development in Mozambique
NGO | Non-Governmental Organization
NHIS | National Health Insurance Scheme
NSSP | National Social Support Programme
NYEP | National Youth Employment Programme
ODA | Official development assistance
OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PERS | Public Expenditure Reviews
PIT | Personal Income Tax
PWP | Public Works Programme
SAS | Social Accounting System
SASSA | South African Social Security Agency
SCT | Social Cash Transfer
SIT | Social Inclusion Transfer
SOUTHMOD | Simulating Tax and Benefit Policies for Development
SPP | Social Protection Floor
TAZMOD | Simulating Tax and Benefit Policies for Development in Tanzania
UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund
UNU-WIDER | United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research

INTRODUCTION

Irrespective of the type of programme, administration is the backbone of a comprehensive social protection system. The purpose of this module is to provide a concise and easily understood introduction to critical aspects of social protection financing and financial management with a focus on “non-contributory” social protection schemes.

The module covers a number of important issues, ranging from question of affordability, through establishing determinants of fiscal space, revenue mobilization, measuring costs of social protection in the context of public finance and the national budget process, public expenditure monitoring and evaluation and issues of financial management administration.

While social protection is generally understood to be affordable for all countries at various stages of development and often costs relatively less than other government expenditures, it does constitute a significant monetary investment towards a country’s future. To finance social protection, sufficient and sustainable resources must be efficiently raised without detrimental effects to a country’s economy, administered professionally and distributed amongst various government and private agencies in way that guarantees high levels of accountability and transparency.

Financial policy and the budgetary process are key government processes in the determination of a country’s spending priorities and therefore stakeholders that aim to improve social protection require an understanding of the various processes through which revenue mobilization and expenditure decisions are made and what channels exist to influence them.

More specifically this module on Social protection financing aims to provide:

- Ability to use available data sources to assess costs of social protection programmes and overall social protection systems;
- Understanding of main issues related to the debate of social protection affordability and sustainability and relationships between social protection, public finances and the economy;
- Capacity to identify of determinants of fiscal space for social protection and potential sources of revenue mobilization;
- Understanding of determinants of current and future sustainability of social protection versus its adequacy;
- Understanding of public budgeting process, public social expenditure reviews and social budgeting;
- Understanding of financial administration of social protection.
Having completed this module, the participant will have:

- Capacity to define the scope and analyse levels of social protection expenditure at any given moment;
- Ability to expand the analysis to encompass changes over time and across countries;
- A good understanding of the debates on affordability of social protection;
- An overview of the main challenges of financing social protection from different sources;
- Basic understanding of quantitative tools to be applied for financial governance of social protection.

INTRODUCTION

SOCIAL PROTECTION FINANCING: OVERVIEW

Questions of design, adequacy, costs, possible sources of financing, and resulting affordability and financial sustainability of newly planned individual social protection programmes should not be discussed in isolation from the analysis of the finances and performance of the social protection systems already in place. Instead they need to be assessed taking into account:

- the social values, norms and preferences in a society;
- the economic and social needs for alternative public expenditure programmes;
- the situation and prospects of public finance and the economy;
- the costs of planned scheme and sources of its financing in the next budgetary cycle, as well as the longer-term costs and sustainable financing of the planned scheme.

In the case of “non-contributory” social protection schemes past contribution records are not one of the required entitlement conditions to receive benefits and there is no revenue from contributions of the scheme members (and/or their employers) guaranteed by the law. But that does not mean that all contributory schemes are self-financing. Many of them are subsidised from the general revenue of governments. Therefore, even having non-contributory social protection as a focus, when analysing potential financing sources of such schemes, one has to look at how the overall social protection system is financed and what is the role of taxes and contributions in the overall financing.
2.1 DEFINING SOCIAL PROTECTION EXPENDITURE AND FINANCING

2.1.1 Classifications and statistical definitions of social protection

Every country usually develops for policy, operational and statistical purpose its own definition of what policy areas and functions and what types of programmes are covered by “social protection”. For the purpose of international comparisons, the UN adopted the “Classification of the Functions of Governments” (COFOG) which breaks down government expenditures according to their purpose independently from the nature of administrative unit in charge of this expenditure.1 Under COFOG, social protection is used to cover the following sub-functions:

- sickness and disability;
- old age;
- survivors;
- family and children;
- unemployment;
- housing;
- social exclusion not elsewhere classified.

ILO, OECD, European Union and IMF adopt social protection definitions and programme classifications in their expenditure/financing international databases that are informed by COFOG’s general classification, but with some important variations. For example ILO, European Union and OECD include expenditure on health care in their definition and classification of social protection expenditure. ILO, driven by its mandate and following structure of the Convention No. 102, additionally distinguishes as separate functions employment injury and maternity.

Under these classifications benefits specifically targeted to poor and vulnerable groups are not classified as a separate function of social protection, expenditure on various benefits within these programmes should thus be classified under functions listed depending on the specific objectives and actual target groups of these benefits.

Social protection benefits usually take one of the three basic forms:

- cash payments to protected people;
- reimbursements of expenditure made by protected people - like refunding health expenditure by health insurance, refunds of funeral, partial refunding of housing costs;
- goods and services directly provided to protected people – like free health care or semi-cash like food vouchers.

The latter two types of benefits – reimbursements and direct provision of goods - and services are often categorized as “benefits in kind” (as opposed to “cash benefits”). Benefits, to which entitled are only persons (or households) with income (or available means like income and certain types of assets) below certain threshold, are called income or means-tested benefits. Cash benefits are either periodic (paid, during the whole period of entitlement, weekly, monthly or quarterly) or lump-sum payments.

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1 In national accounts systems, social protection benefits are generally categorized as “social benefits”. The United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA 2008) is the internationally agreed standard set of recommendations on how to compile measures of economic activity. The SNA describes a coherent, consistent and integrated set of macroeconomic accounts in the context of a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and accounting rules. It recommends the use of COFOG for the analysis of government finances. Under the SNA social protection benefits are recorded in the secondary distribution of income accounts and categorized as “social benefits” provided either by social insurance or by social assistance schemes and defined as: “Current transfers received by households, except transfers for capital formation or for the benefit of the informal sector, from the following sources:…”
**Table 1: Information need for a basic financial statement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>BENEFIT EXPENDITURE + ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS + OTHER EXPENDITURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benefit</td>
<td>transfer (in kind and cash) provided to an individual or household on the basis of an entitlement or need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative costs</td>
<td>Any management and administrative expenditure incurred by the scheme directly responsible for the provision of social protection benefits such as salaries or the costs of running an office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenditure</td>
<td>all miscellaneous expenditure incurred by social protection schemes such as interest on loans, taxes on income, and others not recorded elsewhere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL REVENUE</th>
<th>GENERAL-GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS (INCLUDING EARMARKED TAXES + GENERAL REVENUES) + DONOR BUDGET SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General government contribution</td>
<td>Contribution by the government to finance the cost of goods and services provided by the government to protected persons in the form of means tested or universal benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earmarked taxes</td>
<td>This is a sub category of the above. They are levies and specially designated taxes raised to finance specific social benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor budget support or grant</td>
<td>In countries where this is important part of either benefit or administrative support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other receipts</td>
<td>Interests on income from deposits, insurance claims, and other revenue not classified elsewhere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: Authors**

The availability of standardized information regarding key policy characteristics of these different programmes - such as their costs, funding sources, number of people covered, levels, frequency and quality of the provision offered - requires that these institutions keep records of programme activities, inputs, outputs and outcomes according to standardised guidelines (see more in Box 1 below).

Assessing coverage, gaps and impacts of social protection/security programmes and their overall system requires, in addition to information from administrative sources, information collected through household surveys (e.g. income and expenditure/household budget surveys and labour force Surveys) including questions on the coverage of contributory and non-contributory programmes, information on recipients of specific existing benefits and programmes, nature of the benefits, periodicity and amounts/values of benefits. See more on the development of effective monitoring systems for social protection in **MODULE M&E**.

In the UN, the organization engaged in the collection and dissemination of social security statistics is the International Labour Organization (ILO). Statistics provided by ILO include the cost of social security, social protection coverage, coverage of pension schemes and public social security expenditures, among others.

**Box 1: International sources of data on social protection expenditure, coverage and financing**

The ILO’s World’s Social Protection Report annexes include data bases, data and indicators and methodology on social protection coverage and financing. It is mostly based on ILO’s administrative survey based Social Security Inquiry. The latest WSPR is available here http://www.iolo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_604882/lang--en/index.htm

The SSI (Social Security Inquiry) of the ILO, is an online database includes data on social protection expenditure, financing and coverage coming mainly from administrative records and has reached a stage of completeness which enables global and regional estimates. It contains also qualitative statutory information available from ISSA (on institutional parameters and coverage and other sources).

ASPIRE database by the World Bank uses households’ survey data from various countries on access to social protection program to produce key performance indicators, as well as aiming to provide detailed description of survey instruments (for 50 countries, to be expanded to 70 shortly); ASPIRE is currently being expanded to contain data from administrative sources.

Help Age maintains a full comprehensive inventory of social pensions that is available here http://www.pension-watch.net.

Other more or less regularly updated (this is part of the challenge) and well established databases (even if regional) exist: European Union’s Eurostat ESSPROS (European Integrated System of Social Protection Statistics), OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS), and Asian Development Bank Social Protection Index (SPI) and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) databases.

Source: Authors

Social protection/security programmes in any country are usually provided through a large number of different programmes of varying sizes and administered by different government agencies, non-governmental organizations and private sector entities. When preparing an overview of the full social protection system in the country one has to start with the inventory of existing social protection schemes (or programmes). A group of international organizations and development agencies developed a methodology of comprehensive assessments of social protection systems in the framework of Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessment (ISPA) tools: the Core Diagnostic Instrument (CODI) available at: [http://ispatoools.org/core-diagnostic-instrument/](http://ispatoools.org/core-diagnostic-instrument/).
Box 2: Partial inventory of social protection schemes – overview of main non-contributory social protection programmes in Ghana

Table 2: Inventory of non-contributory schemes in Ghana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOOR GUARANTEES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to essential health care</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income security for children, facilitating access to nutrition, education &amp; care</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income security for people of working age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income security for older people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cash Transfers

Leap: orphans & vulnerable children, persons with disabilities or who are chronically ill, elderly persons

Ghana Luxembourg Social Trust (GLST)

Social Security National Insurance Trust

Non-Cash Transfers

Services covered National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)

School uniforms

Exercise Books

School feeding

Subsidies

NHIS contributions for children, the indigent, the elderly.

Capitation grant

Fuel subsidies

Lifeline tariff

Self-Help Electrification Programme (SHEP)

Agricultural input subsidies

Active labour market programmes

National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP)

Social Inclusion Transfer (SIT)

Labour-Intensive Public Works programme (LIPW)

Local Enterprises and Skills Development Programme (LESDEP)

Table 3: Ghana – government expenditure on main non-contributory social protection programmes (in million GH unless otherwise indicated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NHIS (Indigent Exemption)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitation grant</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School uniforms</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise books</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School meals</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>199.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEAP</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIT</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYEP/GYEEDA</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>144.5</td>
<td>227.3</td>
<td>448.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESDEP</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIPW</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total social protection programmes (excluding grants)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>131.3</td>
<td>189.6</td>
<td>281.5</td>
<td>480.3</td>
<td>736.8</td>
<td>416.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• as a percentage of government revenue, excluding grants
  - as a percentage of government revenue, excluding grants: 0.6 0.6 0.8 2.7 3.3 3.6 4.1 4.8 2.0
  - as a percentage of GDP: 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.5
  - as a percentage of spending on poverty: 1.8 1.6 2.2 7.8 10.2 12.0 19.3 21.5

2.2 AFFORDABILITY OF SOCIAL PROTECTION

2.2.1 How much different countries spend on social protection?

According to the ILO estimates presented in World Social Security/Social Protection Reports, on average, on average, countries in the world allocate 11 per cent of their respective gross domestic products to social protection. The size of the population in different countries can also be used as a weight to calculate mean percentages of GDP allocated to social protection: in this case the result shows that for the “average” resident in different countries only 8.4 per cent of the GDP of the country is allocated as social protection benefits in the form of cash and in-kind.

Figure 1: Public social protection expenditure (population weighted)

Note: Total social protection expenditure is estimated as a percentage of GDP & excludes health-related public expenditure.

Figure 2: Public social protection expenditure (population weighted)


A large portion of social protection everywhere is provided through contributory schemes and financed mostly from social security contributions. Only recently larger scale non-contributory schemes started to develop in different parts of the World. As data from the World Bank ASPIRE database show, in Sub-Saharan Africa on very widely defined (including public works and community based programmes but excluding health care) non-contributory social protection programmes countries spend on average 1.5% of GDP (globally, in low-income countries – 1.5% of GDP). At the top of the lists – in addition to countries with large emergency response programmes such as South Sudan and Central African Republic - one can see countries with larger scale universal or quasi universal cash transfers – Lesotho, South Africa, Mauritius and Namibia (Figure 3). On a per-capita basis the level of spending on social assistance in Sub-Saharan african countries is significantly below the global median for the vast majority of countries (Figure 4).

Figure 3: Social Safety Net Spending Variations across Countries and Regions: Africa

While social assistance is primarily externally funded in several countries in the region, the level of domestic funding of non-contributory programmes has increased significantly during the last decades in several countries, as depicted in Figure 5 (e.g. in Zambia, Mozambique, Kenya, Ghana).

After reaching a certain level of fiscal revenue countries can exercise a significant degree of discretion in choosing which public programmes to invest in. Of course this discretion does not mean that choices are easy – there are always opportunity costs behind any such decision and expenditure planning should combine the democratic process, reflecting societal preferences, with a careful quantities analysis of the social cost of benefits for the different alternatives. Figure 6 shows that at any size of government, countries have some choice as to what portion of public resources to invest in social protection; and that even countries with relatively very small government (as expressed by government spending in the range of 20–25 per cent of GDP) differ significantly in their decisions on the share of these resources devoted to financing social protection programmes: one-tenth, one-fifth, one-third or more than half. The Safety Nets Report (2018) concludes that “there is no global relationship between a country’s income level spending on social assistance as a percentage of GDP.”


2.2.2 Social protection as costs and as an investment

ILO, World Health Organisation and the World Bank, joined by other organisations, agreed on promoting universal social protection, including universal health care. The most recent of these international agreements are Sustainable Development Goals. One of the target under Goal 1 of ending poverty in all its forms everywhere by 2030 is: “Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable”.

However, at least until now, despite all the above normative standards and agreed goals and targets, still majority of the world’s population, in particular in Africa and Asia, lacks coverage by comprehensive social protection systems. This lack of coverage, often explained on the grounds of affordability, can rather be explained by lack of sufficient policy space for social protection, than by lack of potential for its financing – so called fiscal space.

Making an economic argument for social transfer requires an assessment of cost-effectiveness as well as cost-benefit in both the short and long-term. Social protection has direct impacts on social outcomes and human development, but it is also linked with economic development and can thus be characterized as an economic investment. Social protection is increasingly seen as “a source of resilience in tough times, as a support for growth and productivity in good times, and as a general mechanism for socioeconomic inclusion” (Cherrier et al., 2013). Since quite a while research shows (see for example World Bank’s World Development Report 2005), that poverty is a risk to security and lack of security is a hindrance to the investment climate. Without basic social transfer schemes that foster health, adequate levels of nutrition and social stability, a country can simply not unlock its full productive potential.

Alderman and Yemtsov (2012) found three main channels through which social protection can support economic growth:

- Individual level - Building and protecting human capital and other productive assets, empowering poor individuals to invest or to adopt higher return strategies.
- Local economy effects - Enhancing community assets and infrastructure, positive spill-overs from beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries.
- Overall economy level - Acting as stabilizers of aggregate demand, improving social cohesion and making growth-enhancing reforms more politically feasible.

Non-contributory transfers directly affect disposable household income and consumption. In addition, such transfers also affect household behaviour as additional – and in particular secure – income enables households to invest in health, education and a variety of productive activities. Improved health and education outcomes increase human capital and therefore labour productivity.

Moreover, productive investments increase physical capital by creating and protecting productive assets as well as reducing the need to rely on harmful coping-strategies, such as selling the most productive assets in time of crisis. Transfers can also work towards increasing labour supply by solving credit constraints and enabling beneficiaries to afford transportation costs. In addition to individual level effects, social transfers have the potential to enhance effective aggregate demand and generate local multipliers (Gassman et al. 2014; Cherrier et al., 2013).

Although this prevailing pattern shows a strong correlation between income levels and amounts of resources allocated to social protection, it cannot be concluded from this that social protection is a “luxury” good. On the contrary, low-income countries with high poverty incidence and large informal economies need social protection even more than other countries, although they may have different priorities with respect to which functions or policy areas should be developed first and how benefits should be financed and delivered. And there are many studies clearly showing that social protection in those countries not only can be made affordable but is also necessary as a factor in development.

Source: Cherrier et al, 2013 based on Mideros et al, 2012. Note: Grey indicates a policy decision; pink a household decision; green refers to economic performance; red represent outcomes. Note that most relations are neither linear nor unidirectional.

The Transfer Project (https://transfer.cpc.unc.org) has demonstrated impacts of social transfers in social outcomes and economic activity in sub-Saharan Africa 3:

- Cash transfers contribute to noticeable improvements in consumption and poverty, such as the ability of households to smooth their consumption within seasons and between-year.
- Cash transfers make people happier and give beneficiaries hope, a precondition for families to want to invest in the future.
- Cash transfers contribute to human capital accumulation. They have a strong and consistent impact across countries on school enrollment, most clearly among secondary age children. They consistently improve food security and nutrition security.
- Cash transfers positively impact beneficiary livelihoods, lead to increased flexibility in household labour allocation and time use and lead to an improved ability to manage risks. Increased investment an engagement in economic activities generates in turn additional income at the household level (household income multiplier).

When beneficiaries receive cash they spend it and the impacts of the transfer are then transmitted to other households that are not eligible who tend to own most of the local businesses. The increase in local demand generates positive local economy multipliers. Each dollar transferred to beneficiaries can increase local income by more than one dollar (see Box 3).

Box 3: Assessments of local income multiplier effects of social cash transfer programmes in Southern and Eastern Africa

Poor households are the focus of non-contributory social protection programmes, but they are also a conduit through which cash enters local economies. As beneficiaries spend their transfers, local demand increases. If production expands to meet this demand, social assistance programmes can create income multipliers; each dollar transferred can increase local income by more than one dollar. For example, beneficiaries of cash transfer programmes spend some of their grants on goods or services supplied by local businesses. As local production expands to meet demand, incomes in households connected with these businesses rise, together with the demand for labour and other inputs. This generates local economy multipliers, additional rounds of spending and income growth in the local economy.

Programmes can create positive income and production spillovers if they raise the demand for goods and services, creating opportunities for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries engaged in their production. Yet, they can also create negative spillovers by driving up food prices, raising costs for consumers and depressing prices for producers.

Local economy-wide impact evaluation (LEWIE) models have been used in Sub-saharan Africa to uncover impacts of cash transfers not only on eligible households, but also on the local economies of which they are part. Studies using the LEWIE models across several countries in the region show that most of the African unconditional cash transfers create large income multipliers in local economies, ranging from 1.27 to 2.52 per dollar transferred to eligible households (Davis et. al 2016).

A recent study for Malawi (Kagin et al, 2018) further explores differences in local economy impacts across a range of different policy options, including cash transfers, public works programmes, and fertilizer input subsidy programmes. In most cases, each dollar invested increases income in rural Malawi by far more than 1 dollar (Figure 8). Impact evaluations that do not consider such spillovers miss many benefits created. There are striking differences between real and nominal multipliers, indicating that the nominal income multiplier can be eroded by inflationary pressures, as prices rise in response to increased demand for goods and services. Instead, programmes that support production or increase productivity, such as well-designed inputs subsidies or public work interventions, impact incomes primarily by increasing supply of goods and services, thus reducing prices.

Figure 8: Income Multipliers by Programme

Income spillovers have also important implications for equity, as some household groups are in a better position to benefit from income spillovers, whatever their cause. Non-poor households tend to benefit most from income and production spillovers. Traditional social protection programs (SCT, PWP) stimulate production, which expands primarily amongst non-beneficiary household, as they are better placed to respond to increased demand in the local markets. Figure 9 shows that multipliers created by the SCT increase production within all sectors, primarily in retail and cropping, and that non-beneficiaries expand production more than direct beneficiaries.

2.2.3 Demography trends and costs of social protection

The majority of African countries have a very young population. This often implies rapidly growing school age population, a large proportion of young adults in the working-age population (over 40 percent) and high rates of workforce growth. These dynamics can be associated with high levels of unemployment, informality of the workforce and political instability when economies are not able to provide the necessary basic social services and to harness the productive potential of the growing workforce. On the contrary it can be an opportunity when countries start a demographic transition, with the progressive decrease in child mortality.

Indeed, child mortality is projected to decline from 116 per 1000 live deaths in 2010 to 75 per 1000 live deaths in 2030 thanks to better incomes, access to improved water supply and sanitation, and better health facilities in Africa. But the number of children a woman is likely to have in her lifetime - the total fertility rate - is still very elevated in the continent by global standards: standards (2.5 children per woman globally and 4.7 children per woman in Africa) and has not fallen as expected contrary to the declines in fertility in Asia and Latin America. The demographic transition consists of a growing workforce relative to the total population. It results from decline of the weight of children in total population and the slow growth of elderly. This will take a longer time in Africa but will happen eventually (see Figure 10 below). See also this video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=28&v=gSiDHdMU3W8

Figure 10: Ratio of Working age on non-working age populations, selected regions in Africa

21
If countries manage well the demographic transition, the increase in the working age population and reduced total dependency ratio provides countries with a window of opportunity, which if properly tapped can generate a “demographic dividend” in the form of higher growth and funding for social protection. The demographic transition or demographic dividend is an opportunity. It will allow to increase GDP and consequently stronger funding basis for social protection for non-working populations. But this supposes that young adults will be effectively employed in productive work. Early childhood development, child care, transfers to families that help maintain children at school and avoid child labour in combination with social services, adequate school to work transition programmes are going to be needed to increase the productivity of jobs in the near future and reduce the number of NEET youths (not in Employment, Education, or Training).

A contributing factor to stronger development could come from increased female labour market participation. Again, social and care policies, cash and in kind benefits need to accompany labour market transitions to ensure the productive inclusion of women (relieving their traditional role in caring for the children, the elderly, chronically ill or disabled).

At the same time, by 2030, average life expectancy in Africa is projected to reach 64 years, compared to 57 years in 2010. That means that developing and ageing societies have to do something urgently to ensure the right to retire in dignity and social security for their older members. Particularly dramatic is the situation of older women, who comprise the majority among this growing number of elderly. Even in the poorest countries, where life expectancy at birth is still much lower than in richer countries due to the high child mortality and also high mortality in certain age groups due to HIV/AIDS and other diseases, those who reach age of 65 will on average live only several years shorter than average persons in richest countries. People everywhere will live much longer. The question is how dignified this life will be and what form of income security they can provide to them.

Box 4: Long term planning of Maternity and Child Benefits: Case of Namibia

An ILO project implemented a maternity grant and a universal child grant in Namibia. The latter followed a phased approach based on age cohorts: starting with children aged 0-4 in 2015 and including children aged 5-10 in 2017 and children aged 11-17 in 2019. This approach is justified by the fact that support to children in their early years of life is found to be crucial to breaking inter-generational poverty transmission. Moreover, younger children are more likely to be poor. As a result of decline in fertility, the cost per GDP falls over the years. The rise in spending for a specific age cohort phases down because of the reduction of child dependency ratios over time. This allows the introduction of a second cohort in the child grant scheme over time.

![Figure 11: Cost of different schemes as a percentage of GDP](image)

Source: ILO (2014) p. 146-147
 Traditionally, projections of social protection revenue and expenditure were (in many countries still are) made mainly for individual social protection schemes (or group of closely related schemes administered by single institution). Social budgeting establishes income and expenditure accounts for all existing social protection schemes in the country and then projects – using actuarial methods – those accounts into the future.

These models (Figure 12) are composed of several building blocks which include:

- **demographic module** providing population projections by age and sex;
- **labour market module** providing projections of labour force by age and sex;
- **macro-economic module** usually providing a consistent set of assumptions and number of alternative scenarios with respect to the future trends in GDP, productivity, employment, unemployment, wages and other incomes, prices, and interest rates;
- **social protection modules** which are actuarial projection models for each of the existing social protection schemes in the country and;
- **public finance/fiscal module** linking social budget to public finance framework and expected future fiscal envelope.

Figure 12: Structure of the social budget model

Social budgeting consists of two main components. The first is the statistical basis and the “methodologically consistent compilation of the revenues and expenditures of a country’s social protection system” (Scholz et al., 2000). This is called the social accounting system (SAS). This part, acts as an accounting concept for compiling the flows of funds of the total of all social programmes. The second component is the forecast of income and expenditure (budget projection). These projections are usually done for a medium-term period. This component is called the Social Budget and also includes simulations of social expenditures and revenues under alternative economic, demographic and/or legislative assumptions.

While details of national Social Budgets vary from country to country, depending on the organization of social protection systems and the range of benefits provided, some core elements are represented in all national Social Budgets. On the expenditure side, these core elements include, among others persons, unemployment and family benefits, tax benefits, social assistance and healthcare. The income side accounts for all resources used to finance social protection expenditure. Amongst the most important revenues are social security contributions, taxes (whether general or earmarked; whether imposed by central, regional and/or local governments) and investment income.

The table below shows a short-term forecast of a Social Budget in a typical middle-income country. Based on such table, the country’s social budgeting specialist could, for example, indicate that the social protection sector’s required income from general revenue is growing faster than GDP, which may have negative impacts on the government budget. It could recommend that the government considers a number of expenditure consolidation measures to contain overall or specific expenditure in the medium-term. On the other hand, the specialist should alert the government to the fact that at present the country’s anti-poverty benefits only consume a very small percentage of GDP, which might be inappropriate given the level of poverty (Scholz et al., 2000).

As modelling entails the attempt to understand the interdependent operations of a system, a well-designed Social Budget model should give early warnings with regards to the impacts of, for instance, legislative changes.

It is important to include in such impact estimation the potential occurrence of second-round effects. These second-round effects may concern changes in total employment, unemployment expenditure, health insurance and expenditure on various forms of social assistance as well as housing and tax benefits. What initially looked like a reduction in expenditure though in one branch of social security could be partially, fully or more than offset by increased expenditures in other branches (Scholz et al., 2000).

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1 Rapid Assessment Protocols were developed and implemented in number of countries (see for example study on Vietnam in Cighton et al. 2012 and on Mozambique in Corra et al. 2013 but approach is being implemented also in countries like Thailand, Indonesia, Benin, Nepal, Jordan, Burundi, and Cameroon). Mozambique study was done jointly with IMF, where ILO focused on actuarial projections while IMF developed part projecting future fiscal envelope and fiscal space.
### Table 5: A typical summary of a national social budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXPENDITURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Pensions</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Pensions insurance benefits</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 Old-age pensions</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 Invalidity pensions</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.3 Survivors’ pensions</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.4 Orphans’ pensions</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.5 Grants</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Administration</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Unemployment expenditure</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Short-term benefit expenditure</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social assistance expenditure</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Health expenditure</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Social expenditure on military personnel</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other social benefit expenditures</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Change of reserves</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **REVENUE** | | | | | | |
| 1. Social insurance contributions | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 |
| 1.1 Pension scheme | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
| 1.2 Health Scheme | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| 1.3 Unemployment scheme | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| 2. Other income (incl imputed contributions) | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 |
| 3. Investment income | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| 3.1 Pension Scheme | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 3.2 Health Scheme | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 3.3 Short-term benefit scheme | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 3.3 Unemployment scheme | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| 4. Income from general revenue | 4.7 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 5.6 |
| **TOTAL** | 10.0 | 10.6 | 10.8 | 11.3 | 11.4 | 11.6 |

Source: Scholz et al., 2000 (Note: Totals may not add up exactly because of rounding)

### 2.3.2 Microsimulation models

Tax-benefit microsimulation models, which combine representative household-level data on incomes and expenditures and detailed coding of tax and benefit legislation, have proven to be an extremely useful tool for researchers and policy makers alike.

Many of the developing countries are now building up their social protection systems and the financing of public spending will need to be increasingly based on domestic tax revenues. In this process, understanding the system-wide impacts of different policy choices is critically important, and tax-benefit microsimulation models are very well suited for this purpose.

“Microsimulation models use micro-data on persons (or households, or firms or other micro-units) and simulate the effect of changes in policy (or other changes) on each of these units. Differences before and after the change can be analysed at the microlevel to show the overall effect of the change.” (Mitton et al., 2000)

The models apply user-defined tax and benefit policy rules to micro-data on individuals and households and calculate the effects of these rules on household income. The effects of different policy scenarios on poverty, inequality, and government revenues can be analysed and compared.

![Figure 13: Structure of a micro-simulation](image)

Source: Authors

The main purposes of microsimulation are to respond to the following questions:

- How does the current tax and benefit system impact upon individuals in different groups (e.g. income groups, family types)?
- To what extent does the current tax and benefit system reduce poverty and inequality?
- What would be the cost of implementing social security policy reforms, for example… universalising an existing benefit by removing the means-test, introducing a new benefit, increasing the monetary value of a benefit …and
- What would be the impact on poverty and inequality of these reforms?

It is important to analyse the distributional effects of taxes and benefits jointly. There are a number of alternative means through which countries can mobilize revenues, each imposing differential burdens on different population sub-groups. Alternative expenditure patterns and levels distribute benefits unevenly throughout society, with some groups of people benefiting more than others. The particular distribution of burdens and benefits amongst various sections of a population defines a government’s fiscal policy. This uneven distribution of burdens and benefits can be designed to either financially favour or hurt the rich and poor, rural and urban, male and female, old and young. For example, although indirect taxes can be regressive (same % of the value of a good is paid regardless of income of consumers), the overall impact on income inequality depends on the nature of spending that the additional revenue allows; for example if indirect taxes are used to pay for subsidies for health coverage of the poor, the overall effect is progressive.

In Europe, EUROMOD has been developed over a 20 year by University of Essex and is currently used in over 25 countries in Europe. See website: [https://www.euromod.ac.uk/](https://www.euromod.ac.uk/). In South Africa, SAMOD is ten years old. It was the first application of the EUROMOD platform in a developing country context. In Namibia, NAMOD was developed in 2012. UNI-WIDER, the EUROMOD team at the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex, and Southern African Social Policy Research Insights (SASPRI) have launched a major research project in which tax-benefit microsimulation models for selected developing countries in Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia) and also elsewhere (Ecuador and Vietnam) will be built in addition to those that already exist for South Africa and Namibia.
Tax-benefit microsimulation models, which combine representative household-level data on incomes and expenditures and detailed coding of tax and benefit legislation, have proven to be an extremely useful tool for researchers and policy makers alike. The models apply user-defined tax and benefit policy rules to micro-data on individuals and households and calculate the effects of these rules on household income. The effects of different policy scenarios on poverty, inequality, and government revenues can be analysed and compared.

While microsimulation models are routinely used by researchers and policy makers in developed countries, few developing countries have access to such tools. Many of the developing countries are now building up their social protection systems and the financing of public spending will need to be increasingly based on domestic tax revenues. In this process, understanding the system-wide impacts of different policy choices is critically important, and tax-benefit microsimulation models are very well suited for this purpose.

This is the backdrop against which UNU-WIDER, the EUROMOD team at the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex, and Southern African Social Policy Research Insights (SASPRI) have launched a major research project in which tax-benefit microsimulation models for selected developing countries in Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia) and also elsewhere (Ecuador and Vietnam) were developed in addition to those that already exist for South Africa and Namibia. Such models can be used for analysing the impacts of different tax and benefit policy scenarios.

The following SOUTHMOD models are freely accessible for non-commercial research use: ECUAMOD (Ecuador), GHAMOD (Ghana), MicroZAMOD (Zambia), MOZMOD (Mozambique), and TAZMOD (Tanzania).

The models are built on the EUROMOD platform. EUROMOD is both a widely-used tax-benefit model for European countries, but has also been found to be an ideal platform with which to develop microsimulation models for other countries.


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**2.4 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS**

- Social protection has major economic impacts and impacts on public finances
- In order to identify and monitor these impacts one needs a sound statistical system
- Investing in social protection in the medium and long-run may lead – through a virtuous circle of higher demand, higher productivity and higher incomes - to enlarged fiscal envelope and increased capacity to meet different social needs
- However, these positive effects materialize only when social protection is adequately designed and its effects and impacts are carefully monitored and evaluated in the continuous process of participative dialogue and reform
- Possibilities of extension of social protection to close the coverage gaps depend to a large extent on the sound financial governance of individual schemes and the overall social protection system
- Affordability can be demonstrated by economic evidence, and with adequate planning including taking into account the demographic evolution and regular monitoring of administrative cost efficiency
- Good financial governance requires monitoring of current and future sustainability of social protection finances through quantitative governance tools like actuarial studies, social budgeting and microsimulation studies
This section introduces the reader to the ways governments manage their public finances, raise revenues, collect receipts and borrow in order to finance the expenditures they have decided to finance. A government’s fiscal policy can be defined as the combination of measures undertaken to mobilise resources and the allocation of those resources to different sectors and activities.

3.1 RESOURCE ENVELOPE, POLICY AND FISCAL SPACE

Fiscal policy is defined by the choices a government makes in mobilising resources and allocating expenditures to meet its various obligations. This policy is normally reflected in national budgets that detail broken-down government expenditures in every fiscal year. The national budget is a government document listing the sources from which financial resources have been or are expected to be mobilised during a financial year and the expenditures to which they have been or are to be directed. The national budget provides the financial framework for the government’s activities. It reflects the priorities of a government and its performance relative to its commitments.

The maximum scale of possible redistribution is determined in the first place by the resource envelope available now and in the future—amount of resources which can be collected through taxes and contributions in the shorter and longer run. In the shorter run fiscal envelope can be also modified by country’s net lending or borrowing as well as through grants received from the rest of the world. The size of overall fiscal envelope is determined by the willingness of the society to pay taxes and contributions [which depends to important extent on quality of public services provided, accountability and transparency of public finance as well as on a degree of democratisation of the budgeting process]. It also depends on the ability and capacity of the government to collect taxes and contributions, enforce in practice legislation imposing them.

In the globalised world, the size of overall fiscal envelope depends also on external actors as well as ability of the government to take autonomous decisions. These external actors are on the one hand international bodies with which countries have some commitments like IMF, World Bank or the EU Commission for European Union member countries. On the other important actors are private institutions acting at the global financial markets, rating agencies, etc.

A recent survey of elites was conducted in Malawi. The research consisted of “semi-structured interviews with members of the elite, defined as individuals holding strategic positions in powerful organisations, such as political, governmental, economic, communication and cultural organisations, donor agencies and social movements. In addition, survey questionnaires, non-participant observation and documentary analysis were used.” Respondents spoke of a ‘culture of poverty’ that explained how the poor might be responsible for their own problems.” This culture among the poor was said by respondents to have a number of components.

- A fatalistic mindset that discourages efforts to escape poverty: ‘...[the poor] are busy living day-to-day arguing that “my parents were poor so I will also end up poor no matter what I try”’. (Principal Secretary)
- Unwise use of resources, leading to wasted opportunities: ‘Some people even make money from growing of tobacco but they will decide to marry another wife rather than building a house with the proper roofing’...
- A culture of dependency involving over-reliance on handouts: ‘They know that if they do not work someone will come to help them.’ (National Coordinator, CSO).

The IMFs regular monitoring of economies and associated provision of policy advice is intended to identify weaknesses that are causing or could lead to financial or economic instability. Country surveillance is the process that culminates in regular (usually annual) consultations with individual member countries. IMF team of economists visits a country to assess economic and financial developments and discuss the country’s economic and financial policies with government and central bank officials. IMF staff missions also often meet with parliamentarians and representatives of business, labor unions, and civil society. Summaries of most discussions are released Press and are posted on the IMF’s website. An important element of these consultations are the so-called indications for priority spending. The effects of IMF-supported programs on social spending continues to be widely debated. Critics argue that during these programs, countries are required to cut public spending to meet fiscal targets, thereby squeezing priority expenditure on education and health and hurting the poor. Recently, “minimum indicative floors on social and other priority spending have been incorporated into programs for low-income countries where appropriate. It is important for ministries of labour and social welfare to engage directly with national financial authorities, for example to help them better understand social protection expenditure and its economic and social impacts, to ensure social protection is adequately protected and expanded during IMF support programs.”
There was thus a great emphasis on “behavioral” explanations for poverty. Individual responsibility was considered a critical factor to lifting people out of poverty, instead of structural constraints. If elite beliefs that strategies such as cash transfers lead to dependence amongst the poor and reduce the incentive to work hard, then they may prefer to withdraw their support or at least to implement such strategies so that they do not reach the less ‘deserving’. These views are shared despite positive evidence of the local impact of cash transfers on social outcomes and its economic multiplier effects (See Box 3 above). However in the absence of national system of social transfers and low benefit levels, these remain local and limited effects; possibly information on technical studies has not permeated more widely in society, including to elites.

Box 8: Political Economy of Redistribution – The Case of South Africa

The initial expansion of social protection in South Africa was not driven by the political elite nor by society views. In fact in South Africa, Seekings (2016) and Bruni (2016) recognize the scepticism by the leading party’s leadership to the expansion of social grants system, based on fiscal constraints and objections on ideological grounds: “conservative skepticism against ‘handouts’ and ‘dependency’ was widespread within the ANC, elite, including Nelson Mandela” (Seekings, 2016:9). Bruni (2016:10) says that “there were differences and disagreements over … the social grant system within the Cabinet…recalling many intense discussions with Finance Minister on the fiscal sustainability and economic effects of its various aspects.” Despite that, a policy and epistemic community joining hands with ministerial leadership could produce politically valuable arguments for a progressively comprehensive social security system (Cassim, 2016; Seekings, 2016, Bruni, 2016). In the case of South Africa, forming a coalition outside government, including with NGOs, Think Tanks, Parliamentarians and the contribution of the legal system was very important in building favorable coalitions within government (Bruni, 2016). Providing timely evidence on the poverty and social impact of cash transfers and using media and the legal system to challenge retrogression ensured sustainable expansion of the social protection system through mutual interest of political community and advocates for social protection.

There is also number of other measures which can expand fiscal envelope – among them increasing coverage and compliance in contribution collection of contributory social protection schemes, successfully fighting illegal financial flows, adopting more direct and efficient government funding, adopting other ones. Individual donor countries also have very often pursued very strategy, involving asking to fund certain types of new social transfer programmes, the formation and development of the social protection system in developing countries, formed after outbreak of financial crisis in 2009 played very important role in broadening policy space for social protection in many developing countries.

The size of the fiscal envelope can be changed through various measures and policies:

- changes in taxation increasing revenue (not necessarily changes in the level of taxes but also changes structure of taxation and changes in effectiveness of the tax collection);
- increasing efficiency of existing spending programmes (including phasing out programmes which are not effectively meeting priority policy objectives) to make space for new programmes;
- borrow or restructure existing public debt;
- lobby to receive grants or similar transfers from the bilateral and multilateral donors.

There is also number of other measures which can expand fiscal envelope – among them increasing coverage and compliance in contribution collection of contributory social protection schemes, successfully fighting illegal financial flows, adopting more accommodating macroeconomic framework (see full detail in Section 3.5 ahead).
Of course applying these different measures involves trade-offs and requires consensus often difficult politically to achieve. Increasing taxation very often faces opposition from business, financial markets, rating agencies and international financial institutions. Attempts to phase out ineffective public programmes usually is met with strong opposition of those who benefit from those programmes. Sometimes compensatory measures need to be put in place to avoid resistance to change in the realization of spending affecting particular interest groups (see boxes below).

Box 9: Phasing-out fuels subsides in Nigeria: the importance of trust and credible compensation measures

In mid-2011 the Nigerian government decided to radically curtail gasoline subsidies, and waged a public campaign the rest of the year to convince the population. The debate on removal of fuel subsidies was initially supported by several state governors, who wanted to free up resources to be able to pay their civil servants the new minimum wage. This proposal was hotly debated in the press, by business and civil society groups. On January 1, 2012, the price of gasoline was raised to a cost recovery level—a 117 percent increase. The price of kerosene, a cooking fuel used mainly by poorer households, was not changed. Despite six months of debate the measure did not enjoy sufficient public support.

The main plank in the government's campaign for the subsidy removal was the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment (SURE) Program. The SURE program was announced only in November. It was preceded by public statements by the president and in budget documents (e.g., the 2012–15 Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and the Fiscal Strategy Paper) highlighting both the costs of the subsidies and the need both to spend on safety nets for poor segments of society to mitigate the effects of the subsidy removal and to spend on the construction of new refineries and the rehabilitation of existing ones. The SURE brochure provided details on the various projects and programs to be undertaken, from the specific road segments to be built to the maternal and child health services to be upgraded.

Government’s attempts to win support for its subsidy reform met with strong opposition from powerful sectors of society. In early December 2011, the National Assembly came out against the removal of the gasoline subsidy, claiming that the measure was premature and not supported by firm data underpinning the size and incidence of the subsidies. In response, the Ministry of Finance presented a Brief on Fuel Subsidies, laying out once again the case for removal, and supporting it with data on the explosive growth of the subsidies and comparing their costs with the government’s capital expenditure and borrowing requirements. In addition, several senior officials gave interviews and speeches during the last two weeks of December.

On January 9, the two large union federations launched a national strike. Certain parts of the country experienced a near breakdown of law and order and there were a number of deaths related to violence and acts of intimidation associated with the strike. On January 13, the president announced that the January 1 price increase would be partly reversed. The SURE program would go ahead but would be scaled back in line with the reduced subsidy savings. The president also announced that the legal and regulatory regime for the petroleum industry would be reviewed to address accountability issues and current lapses. Unions called off their strike that same day.

Mitigating measures:

- "Urban mass transit"—Increasing mass transit availability by facilitating the procurement of diesel-run vehicles (subsidized loans, reduced import tariffs, etc.) to established operators. In the first step of this program, the government intended to import 1600 buses within months.
- "Maternal and child health services"—Expanding the conditional cash transfer program for pregnant women in rural areas; and upgrading facilities at clinics.
- "Public works"—Providing temporary employment to youth and women from the poorest populations in environmental projects and maintaining education and health facilities.
- "Vocational training"—Establishing vocational training centers across the country to help tackle the problem of youth unemployment.

Source: Case studies on energy subsidy reform: lessons and implications, IMF 2013

Box 10: Visibility of Redistribution Policies and Tax-credits

| SOCIAL PROTECTION FINANCING AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS | SOCIAL PROTECTION RESOURCE MOBILIZATION |

Lessons (according to IMF)

A well-thought out public information and consultation campaign is crucial to the success of a reform. While the government campaigned vigorously for removal of the subsidies, the measure was still highly controversial when it went into effect. The backlash had been predicted. The public communication campaign lasted only six months and there was no broad popular consultation. The ministry of finance produced several short briefs to support its proposal, but these were issued several months into the campaign, and there was no comprehensive report. The government must establish credibility for its promise that the proceeds from the removal of the subsidy will actually be used for the benefit of the broad population. Notwithstanding the laudable objectives of the SURE program and the plans for oversight by a highly reputable board of directors, the new administration had yet to establish credibility that it would live up to its commitments. Thorough research on the costs and beneficiaries of subsidies is important to be able to bolster the case for subsidy reform. The absence of good quantitative information on the state of Nigeria’s refining industry and of the fuel subsidy mechanism itself allowed spurious arguments, often made by parties with vested interests, that government investment in the state-owned refineries and/or measures to stop abuse by marketers were preferable to removing the subsidies. In addition, the claim that subsidies mostly benefitted the poor had been based on anecdotal evidence rather than on research based on household survey data.

Lessons (accroding to Mettler 2011)

3.2 THE IMPACT OF TAXES AND SOCIAL SPENDING ON POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

The means through which a government mobilizes resources to finance expenditure and the pattern of this expenditure affect the economic and social conditions of a country’s residents differently. For instance the mix of resource mobilization and benefit allocation has varying effects on different age-groups, income segments, gender or regions.

There is a critical distinction between regressive and progressive taxation policies. A regressive taxation policy places a proportionately greater burden on the lower income groups than on the higher income groups relative to their consumption, income or assets. These policies are termed regressive as they are often worsening existing inequalities and/or are creating new ones. Progressive tax policies, on the other hand, put a higher proportional burden on wealthier individuals, which leads to more favourable distributional outcomes for lower income groups in the sense of reducing inequities.

Tax systems are primarily made up of:

- Direct taxes levied on incomes (such as personal income and corporate profit), property and wealth;
- Indirect taxes levied on goods and services such as consumption taxes (general sales tax/value added tax) and trade taxes (export taxes/import taxes or tariffs).

In a progressive tax system, the average tax rate rises as an individual’s taxable income increases so that people with higher incomes — be that wages, profits or interest earned — pay a higher percentage of their total income in tax than those with less income. The process of determining the total income tax starts with splitting the individual’s income into a number of income ranges and applying different tax rates to the income bands. Income falling in each tax band is subject to a higher rate than the income in preceding band, so that, on average, taxation increases from lower to higher income groups. This ensures that the tax burden on lower-income earning groups is lesser than that of higher income groups and therefore that taxes are more favourable to the poor than to the wealthy.
In many countries the direct tax system is designed to be progressive, mostly through the use of progressive income taxes.

Assessing the progressiveness or regressiveness of indirect taxes is more complicated. Indirect taxes often vary across different goods but are the same regardless of whoever buys a specific product. In contrast to many progressive direct taxes, indirect taxes do not take into account an individual’s wealth. The question whether indirect taxes are progressive or regressive – whether they place a higher relative burden on the rich or the poor – depends on the tax rates levied on certain goods and the income of those that consume them. If high taxes are levied on essential consumptions goods such as rice or wheat, which are consumed by rich and poor alike, the indirect tax system can be considered regressive.

Sales taxes are considered regressive because the tax per good consumed is always the same regardless of income but the relative burden is higher for the poor than the rich, as the tax makes up a larger portion of their relatively small income. Imagine a 10 percent tax on rice, which is both consumed by the rich and poor. Such tax system would be classified as regressive because the amount of taxes paid by the poor is relatively larger to their income than it is for the wealthy. In addition, the share of basic consumption goods relative to other household expenditures is much higher for lower income groups, which further leads to the poor paying a disproportionally higher share of taxes.

However, indirect taxes can also be progressive if they increase the tax burden of higher income individuals. Imposing relatively high taxes on luxury goods or foreign travel affects the rich much more than the poor and thus contributes to an increased tax burden for the former.

In most cases country’s that rely heavily on indirect taxes tend to have more regressive system than countries will fewer or lower indirect taxes. In environments with low savings rates or the potential for capital flight and tax evasion, consumption taxes are most likely to be effective, but also likely to be regressive. In 9 out of 25 countries with household survey data available for circa 2010, the net effect of all government taxing and spending was to leave the poor worse off in terms of actual consumption of private goods and services (Lustig 2016).

It is important to appreciate that the choices a policy maker face between different tax strategies – for instance applying various degrees of progressiveness of regressiveness and determining the relative tax rates of basic consumption goods – have profound implications on a country’s equity.

However, taxes are only half the story. In order to assess whether a country’s fiscal stance is progressive or regressive, one not only has to analyse the revenue mobilization strategies but also examine the distributional effects of expenditures that financed through tax revenues. Expenditure policies have obvious distributional implications as often limited resources are allocated in an environment of numerous competing demands. Expenditure policies can therefore likewise be progressive or regressive, depending on which income segment of a population receives disproportional amounts of government spending.

The fact that both revenue mobilization policies and expenditure patterns can be progressive or regressive implies that ultimately neither can be studied in isolation. In order to examine whether a country’s fiscal position is beneficial for the poor, one has to capture the combined impact of both taxation and spending policies (hence the importance of tax-benefit micro-simulation models mentioned above in Section 2.3.2.).

For instance, a regressive tax system based mostly on VATs may be the only way to finance strongly progressive expenditure, leading to and overall progressive fiscal policy (like in the case of South Africa). Another example of Ghana: indirect taxes are used to pay for subsidies for health coverage of the poor, hence the overall effect is progressive.

For an example of tax and benefit incidence analysis see Box 20 further below.

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One has to stress that to get the full overview of the government fiscal position one has to take into account all the levels of government, that is consolidated accounts of so-called “general government” sector: state and local governments, central government, and non-financial public corporations, like government enterprises, central bank or provident funds, and non-financial like publicly owned enterprises) are not part of the general government, there are part of the wider public sector
While the general structure of the tax is fairly consistent around the world, there are a number of important variations that have significant effects on a country’s economy. The IMF advises developing countries to introduce a VAT that is broadly based, has a single rate and a fairly high threshold. According to proponents, this will allow the tax to raise significant amounts of revenue in a way that does less harm to economic activity than alternatives, supports equity objectives and is relatively simple to administer and comply with (Cottarelli, 2011).

### Table 6: Classification of budget receipts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUDGET RECEIPTS</th>
<th>CAPITAL RECEIPTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxes (direct and indirect)</td>
<td>Receipts from sale of public assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security contributions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits of public sector corporations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue of natural resources extraction</td>
<td>Borrowing from the domestic market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charges for services provided or user fees</td>
<td>Borrowing from abroad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EFR & UNICEF, 2011

When aggregate government spending exceeds total revenues, governments finance this fiscal deficit with non-debt capital receipts (such as receipts from the sale of public assets) and by borrowing from various sources. While borrowing involves commitments to meet interest and repayment obligations in future, sale of government assets involve loss of income from retrenched assets.

To fill the gap between expenditure and revenues, governments can:

- Borrow from the central bank (this finances what is called the ‘monetised deficit’);
- Borrow from the domestic private market, usually by issuing government bonds (normally to banks);
- Borrow from abroad, from private or official sources.

Loans from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or bilateral donors are an important component of foreign borrowing in many developing and low income countries. Governments can also obtain external aid or development assistance in the form of grants, which do not involve future interest or repayment commitments.

The following section will briefly discuss the characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of the most prominent tax instruments in the context of developing economies.

#### 3.3.2 Value added tax

One of the most widely employed tax instruments worldwide is the Value Added Tax (VAT). In countries that have a VAT, a tax is levied at all stages of production and sale. Producers, however, are allowed to offset the tax they paid on their purchases of goods and services used as inputs against the tax they charge on their sales. The cumulative taxes charged at each stage are thus passed on to the final buyer or consumer, making the VAT less a tax on value added than on consumption (EFR & UNICEF, 2011).

According to the IMF, the VAT has established itself as a robust source of revenue, with signs that it has proved a relatively efficient instrument. It typically accounts for around one-quarter of all tax revenue and no country has ever removed a VAT without subsequently reintroducing it (Cottarelli, 2011).

While the general structure of the tax is fairly consistent around the world, there are a number of important variations that have significant effects on a country’s economy. The IMF advises developing countries to introduce a VAT that is broadly based, has a single rate and a fairly high threshold. According to proponents, this will allow the tax to raise significant amounts of revenue in a way that does less harm to economic activity than alternatives, supports equity objectives and is relatively simple to administer and comply with (Cottarelli, 2011).

#### 3.3.3 Personal income tax

Another important tax is the Personal Income Tax (PIT), which, as the name suggest, is a direct tax on an individual’s income. The PIT varies greatly by jurisdiction but is generally calculated by multiplying the tax rate with the taxable income. In progressive tax systems tax rates rise with an individual’s income, meaning that those with higher income are subject to an average higher tax rate (Cottarelli, 2011).

Revenue collected through the PIT are low and stagnant in most developing countries and often come almost entirely from wage withholding on large enterprises and public sector employees (Cottarelli, 2011). Compared to developed economies the PIT in developing countries raises considerably lower revenues as a percentage of GDP. Since the 1980s, the PIT has raised around 1-3 percent of GDP in developing countries, compared to 9-11 percent in developed countries (Peter, Nuttack & Duncan 2010). In developing countries less than 5 percent of the population pay PIT (compared to nearly 50 percent in developed countries), and only about 15 percent of income is reached (compared to 57 percent) (Cottarelli, 2011).

Tax evasion and avoidance by mostly high-income individuals through tax preferences and the use of low tax jurisdictions reduces PIT revenues in developed and developing countries alike. Some of these evasion and avoidance activities are purely domestic (concealing income, exploiting preferential treatments) and other are international (not declaring income from abroad). While the exact loss for government revenue is understandably hard to quantify, one estimate assumes that annually about $50 billion of tax revenue is foregone in developing countries. In addition to reducing the scope for government expenditure, the failure of elites to pay a fair share of taxes undermines support for the wider tax system. One way to improve tax morale amongst a country’s elite is to dedicate units within the tax administration to high-income/wealth individuals, providing a focus for enforcement efforts (Cottarelli, 2011).

#### 3.3.4 Corporate income tax

Corporate Income Taxes (CIT), like the PIT, are taxes on income earned, in this case by a cooperation. CIT tend to play a larger role in the tax mix of developing than in advanced economies and face significant pressure from the forces of globalization. CIT are responsible for 17 percent of all tax revenues in developing countries, compared to about 10 percent in the OECD. Statutory CIT rates have sharply declined worldwide but remain somewhat higher in low income countries (Cottarelli, 2011).

#### 3.3.5 Excise tax

Excise taxes are levied only on a number of key products and while their importance varies greatly across regions, they can be significant source of income to governments. Excise taxes play a more important role in Asia compared to sub-Saharan Africa and Middle Eastern and Central Asia (Cottarelli, 2011).

The idea behind excise taxes is that they enable governments to raise revenues while pursuing wider social goals as well as improve equity. Excise taxes are often levied on luxury goods such as jewellery or perfume, which are almost entirely consumed by the wealthy. However, taxes on luxury goods tend to raise limited amounts of revenues and are often more of symbolic value. The largest portion of excise tax revenue comes from taxes levied on fuels, tobacco, alcohol, cars and, increasingly, mobile phones. The rationale for these charges being not only to tap the revenue potential of a relatively inelastic and readily identifiable base but, to varying degrees, to change behaviour (Cottarelli, 2011).
### 3.3.6 Real estate tax

Real estate taxes are taxes that can be an efficient and equitable way for governments to raise revenues and are particularly suitable for local governments. The location-specific nature of real estate taxes provides a relatively immobile tax base, making it much less vulnerable to tax competition or evasion than other taxes. Such taxes are considered progressive based on the strong positive correlations between property ownership, income and wealth (Cottarrelli, 2011).

The total revenue potential is modest in both absolute terms or in relation to other tax instruments such taxes can be a significant source of income for local governments. Real estate taxes in developing countries often yield less than 0.1 percent of GDP and only in a few countries the percentage is higher than 0.5 percent (Bolivia, Cape Verde, Honduras and Kazakhstan). However, such levies can represent more than half of total local government revenues (Armenia, Lesotho and Peru). Many therefore conclude that real estate taxes can play only a minor role in strengthening national revenues but have considerable potential in improving the provision of local government services as well as the governance and accountability of local governments (Cottarrelli, 2011).

#### Box 11: What are non-tax revenues?

In addition to the revenues raised through various taxes, non-tax revenues can be a significant source of income. The most prominent non-tax revenues are the revenues from the sale of national resources and user fees. User fees are charged for services provided by the state, such as health care, education or water supply. While such charges have traditionally been kept low or set at zero in many developing countries they have increased since the 1990s. It is important to keep in mind that increases in user charges, which often come with privatisation of utility providers, have the potential of resulting in a reduction in the use of important services by low-income households (EFIR & UNICEF, 2011).

Revenues from the sale of national resources are another important non-tax revenue. Worryingly, there are strong signs that oil revenues reduce efforts domestic taxation. Bomhorst et al. (2009) find that an increase in hydrocarbon revenues of $1 displaces about $0.20 of non-hydrocarbon tax revenue. Results for sub-Saharan Africa suggest a similar effect for all forms of resource wealth (Cottarrelli, 2011).

### 3.4 GRANTS - ROLE AND LIMITS OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

In addition to domestic resource mobilization and various forms of borrowing, foreign aid can be an important source of finance for developing countries. While there has been a decline in foreign aid over the last two decades in terms of overall capital flows and as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and investment, foreign assistance remains a significant contribution to most low-income countries and helps finance a large portion of total government expenditure. Essentially, access to external assistance enables governments to spend more, tax less, or borrow less.

The percentage of official development assistance (ODA) relative to a country’s gross national income (GNI) varies considerably amongst low-income countries but has generally declined over the last two decades. It however is important to note that the percentage of social sectors in ODA has risen.

Foreign assistance can play an important role for foreign exchange constraint developing countries and adds to domestic savings, thereby allowing governments and the private sector to increase their investments. In addition, foreign assistance permits greater expenditure in social sectors such as health, education and social protection, where some countries could afford on its own. These donor-supported investments are considered to have a positive productivity and growth implications over the long-term. Furthermore, foreign assistance often helps finance much needed imports and run a deficit on the trade and current accounts.

Source: Authors

The empirical evidence on whether foreign assistance through grants or loans replaces domestic revenues is inconclusive and while some researchers find evidence that grants, especially in countries with high levels of corruption, do replace domestic resources, others stress the diversity of country experiences and empirical results (Moss et al., 2006). Interestingly, the mode of assistance seems to matter as evidence indicates that loans, unlike grants, tend to strengthen domestic revenue collection (Gupta et al., 2004). There is an increasing recognition amongst researchers and policy makers that the degree with which development assistance is integrated into nationally owned development strategies is key in determining the success assistance. Traditionally, and to a large extend still, donors have provided aid on a project basis rather than supporting governments directly. Given the large amount of donors operating in many developing countries, this tends to create a number of problems for governments.

- Each multilateral and bilateral development agency comes with different procedures and mechanisms to identify, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate its activities and different reporting requirements. Dealing with the various agencies’ procedural requirements consumes time and resources from recipient country government officials.
- Each donor implements programmes based on its own policy priorities, which at times contradict those of other donors or those of the government. As a result governments in low-income countries often find themselves in the middle of inconsistent policy reforms.
- Implementing agencies sometimes take a joint-but-piecemeal approach, splitting areas of intervention among them, regardless of the magnitude and reliability of their assistance, which can leave countries with unbalanced support in different areas. For instance, one donor may support the health sector, whereas another funds activities in the education sector. A similar situation of unequal support can emerge when donors allocate their support based on geographic areas or administrative units.
- Each donor has their own disbursement process and funding cycles, which sometimes do not match the budget cycles of the recipient development country. Unreliable disbursements and delayed or discontinued funds often further complicate matters for developing counties’ governments.

Recognizing these challenges and the inefficiencies created through lack of coordination, the OECD launched an initiative on Aid Harmonization and Alignment in 2003. Further, the donor community developed innovative processes to harmonize financial support towards low income countries, such as General Budget Support (GBS) and Sector Wide Approaches (SWAs), which are coordinated at the national level and are delivered through national budgets.

#### Box 12: Towards an Integrated Donor Financing Mechanisms for Social Assistance in Malawi

The implementation of the National Social Protection Programme (NSPP) in Malawi remains fragmented, with limited programmatic or financial coordination within or between programme areas, and little coordination between national and district levels. Whilst some programmes are more coordinated and some stakeholders more aligned than others, reporting structures for financial and programmatic accountability are not systematic, which undermines efforts to assess the sector’s performance or to coordinate activities. None of the five programmes within the NSSP currently has a single, harmonized approach to fund management by its donors, largely due to the varying appetite for risk. District Councils in particular are burdened by the multiple funding mechanisms and related management and reporting requirements. There is widespread recognition among government and non-government stakeholders that addressing programmatic and financial coordination weaknesses, as well as fiduciary risk, could provide the required building blocks for a Social Support Fund in the medium term, which would help achieve:

1. Harmonisation and strategic alignment of activities to government policy
2. Predictability in resource flows
3. Flexibility in implementation (within an agreed framework)
4. Coordination and subsequent reduction in transaction costs

In addition, it would enable stronger government leadership through good quality, up to date information on programmatic and financial activities under each line ministry; reduce the burden on districts to deliver financial accountability and manage funds; and create an incentive for joint management of essential programmatic monitoring tools.
A feasibility assessment for the introduction of a social support fund in Malawi concluded that whilst a common funding mechanism is not considered immediately feasible, common auditing and financial management mechanisms, could harmonise financing within programmes, whilst providing donors with sufficient protection from fiduciary risk.

In the medium to long-term, depending on the GoM’s progress towards lowering fiduciary risk in particular, the following key concerns were highlighted in the feasibility study:

- Any fund should aim to be on budget, regardless of whether it is on treasury. This will help develop Government responsibility and accountability to citizens, as well as contribute towards more predictability in resource flows and harmonisation of activities to GoM policy;
- It may be most practical and achievable to develop the fund initially for one or two programmes which are strongly coordinated (regular, well attended meetings, producing actionable information and ensuring adherence to policy); have clear and systematic targeting, based on Government policy, have reliable monitoring systems (ideally based on timely data for individually identifiable beneficiaries, harmonised between programmes), and, are active participants of the Financial Coordination Forum, with joint workplans and budgets.
- It will be essential to have effective management of fiduciary risk, based on learning from pooled funds in similar contexts, and recent examples in Malawi. This may be delivered through: a. the expansion of an existing model (from within one of the programmes); b. a new fund with a contracted monitoring/fiduciary agent to ensure timely accountability for and disbursement of funds; c. use of an existing fund, possibly still with a monitoring agent for NSSP funds.
- At District level, efforts should be made by NSSP donors to harmonise financial and programme monitoring in order to limit the reporting burden, and encourage capacity building.
- The fund should not be housed in a line ministry responsible for any single NSSP programme. This option would not be viable for donors due to fiduciary risk and would likely create tensions between line ministries.
- A joint fund could include a recommended contribution from all donors, to maintain common tools that are essential to ensuring accountability, monitoring of programmes and rational allocation of funds.

Source: Government of Malawi, (2016)

### 3.5 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION TO CREATE FISCAL SPACE FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION

As in spending decisions, there is a similar disparity in how governments raise resources for social and economic development. Many countries have succeeded in mobilizing significant resources for public investments during downturns. By utilizing all possible options to maximize fiscal space, these countries have achieved a virtuous circle of sustained growth which, in turn, generates further resources; they serve as inspiring examples to others who have been trapped in limited fiscal space, low social spending and weak economic growth.

The uniqueness of each country requires that fiscal space options be carefully examined at the national level and alternatives fully explored in a social dialogue. Most countries adopt a mix of fiscal space policies, usually selected from the combination of the eight options that are available to governments to generate additional resources for social protection, as summarized below:

- Re-allocation of public expenditures: this is the most orthodox option, which includes assessing on-going budget allocations through Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) and other types of thematic budget analyses, replacing high-cost, low-impact investments with those with larger socio-economic impacts, eliminating spending inefficiencies and/or tackling corruption.
- Increasing tax revenue: this is a main channel achieved by altering different types of tax rates e.g. on consumption, corporate profits, financial activities, personal income, property, imports or exports, natural resource extraction, etc. or by strengthening the efficiency of tax collection methods and overall compliance.
- Expanding social security coverage and contributory revenues: in existing social security systems, increasing coverage and therefore collection of contributions is a reliable way to finance social protection, freeing fiscal space for other social expenditures; social protection benefits linked to employment-based contributions also encourage formalization of the informal economy.
- Lobbying for aid and transfers: this requires either engaging with different donor governments or international organizations in order to ramp up North-South or South-South transfers.
- Eliminating illicit financial flows: Given the vast amount of resources that illegally escape developing countries each year, estimated at ten times total aid received, policymakers should crack down on money laundering, bribery, tax evasion, trade mispricing and other financial crimes are illegal and deprive governments of revenues needed for social and economic development.
- Using fiscal and central bank foreign exchange reserves: this includes drawing down fiscal savings and other state revenues stored in special funds, such as sovereign wealth funds, and/or using excess foreign exchange reserves in the central bank for domestic and regional development.
- Borrowing or restructuring existing debt: this involves active exploration of domestic and foreign borrowing options at low cost, including concessional, following a careful assessment of debt sustainability. For countries under high debt distress, restructuring existing debt may be possible and justifiable if the legitimacy of the debt is questionable and/or the opportunity cost in terms of worsening deprivations of vulnerable groups is high.
- Adopting a more accommodating macroeconomic framework: this entails allowing for higher budget deficit paths and higher levels of inflation without jeopardizing macroeconomic stability.

#### 3.5.1 Re prioritizing public spending

Rethinking sector-specific allocations within existing budgets is one strategy to increase social expenditures. The re-prioritization of public spending is usually a contentious and therefore difficult approach. To be successful, there must be strong political will and focus on feasibility. Opposition to restructuring comes obviously from the fact that no extra resources are considered available and, therefore, other sectors or subsectors must be reduced in order to allow for increased social investments—these sectors often represent important vested interests in a country. In other words, this approach presumes that the overall budget is fixed and changes of its structure must obey the rules of a zero-sum game.

The literature on public choice and public finance describes how different interest groups within and outside of government compete to influence public policies and budget allocations (e.g. Buchanan and Musgrave 1999). Very often, both in developed and developing countries, the debate is manipulated by vested interests and/or ideological posturing – for instance arguing that social expenditures are causing unmanageable deficits while not mentioning military or other non-productive expenditures that are much larger. Various studies have highlighted the risks of pro-poor budget items being the most affected during fiscal consolidation and adjustment processes (e.g. Cima et al. 1987, Hicks 1991, ILO 2014, Ortiz and Cummins 2011, Ravallion 2002, 2004 and 2006).

Still there are ways of prioritizing socially-responsive expenditures even when overall budgets are contracting. This re-prioritization requires, first and foremost, that governments have their budget priorities in place. The political and technical challenges of identifying sectors/subsectors that can be reduced to promote fiscal space can be overcome in case of political agreement on the following strategies (see Ortiz 2000a, Scholz et al 2000, for further details):

- Re-prioritizing through Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) and Social Budgets. These are well-developed approaches to public financial management that bring evidence and rationality to public policy-making by showing the impacts of current budgetary allocations.
• Replacing high-cost, low-impact investments. New public investments can be re-examined; for example, the social impacts of many large infrastructure projects or rescue of banking systems tend to be limited however require large amounts of public resources. Budget items with large recurrent costs but small social impacts should also be re-considered, for example, Costa Rica and Thailand reduced military spending to finance needed social investments. Social dialogue that includes relevant stakeholders and public debates one strategic tool to replace high-cost, low-impact interventions, which can help to minimize the possible influence of powerful lobbying groups on public policy-making.

• Eliminating inefficiencies. Although linked to the previous point, deeper analysis of sector investments is required to eliminate inefficiencies. The overall cost-efficiency of a specific program should be impartially evaluated according to various factors, including: (i) coverage (beneficiaries and benefits); (ii) total cost (as a percentage of GDP, public expenditure and sector expenditure); (iii) administrative costs as a percentage of total costs and how the costs compare with other programs; (iv) long-term social benefits and positive externalities; and (v) opportunity cost (how this policy/program compares to alternatives).

• Fighting corruption. Corruption can also be a significant source of fiscal space for socio-economic development, estimated at more than 5 per cent of global GDP (US$2.6 trillion); the African Union estimates that 25 per cent of the GDP of African states, amounting to US$148 billion, is lost to corruption every year. Strengthening transparency and good governance practices, as well as fighting illicit financial flows (see later section) can increase the availability of resources for social and economic development. Nonetheless, while reducing inefficiencies is the most commonly used strategy since it avoids political tensions, expenditure reforms take time to advance and are unlikely to yield significant, immediate resources. While the re-prioritization of public sector spending may be a good starting point to expand fiscal space, other options should also be examined.

### Box 13: Thailand: Reallocation of public sector expenditure

The 1997 Asian financial crisis severely hit the Thai economy and society. With the backing of the 1997 Constitution, civil society calls to address neglected social policies led the government to adopt the Universal Health Care Scheme in 2001. Given that approximately a third of the population was excluded from health coverage at that time, most of which belonged to the informal agricultural sector without regular income, achieving universal coverage through contributory schemes alone was not possible, it needed budget support. Most of the improvements in public health were financed through reduced spending on defense (from around 25 per cent of total expenditures in the 1970s to 15 per cent during the 2000s) and lower debt service payments. The government included the Universal Health Care Scheme as part of a more general fiscal stimulus plan, other measures increased the amount of money in the hands of people with a high propensity to spend, including the creation of a People’s Bank, a debt moratorium for farmers and a village fund.

Source: Duran-Valverde and Pacheco (2012)

### Box 14: Egypt: Reviewing Budget Priorities at the Economic Justice Unit of the Ministry of Finance

After the Arab Spring, an Economic Justice Unit was created at the Ministry of Finance, led by a Deputy Minister of Finance. The mission of the Economic Justice Unit is equitable fiscal policy. The unit reviews budget priorities, attending to three moral principles (participation, distribution, and redistribution) balanced with the 4 Es (economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity). One of the main measures after the Arab Spring was the adoption of the minimum wage for government employees, ten per cent of which are considered poor. Tax avoidance is considered a major source of social injustice in Egypt and the Economic Justice Unit supports increasing tax collection while improving public services, so that taxpayers feel a return from the use of these services. Social justice is not considered to be only about helping the poor, but about providing good universal services to everybody, including the middle classes that are very low-income in a country like Egypt.

Source: American University in Cairo 2014 and Ministry of Finance of Egypt

### Box 15: Brazil: A financial transaction tax to finance public health and social protection

The Contribuição “Provisória” por Movimentação Financeira (CPMF) tax was levied in Brazil from 1997 to 2007. The contribution took the form of deductions from accounts held by financial institutions. The maximum value of the CPMF quota reached 0.38 per cent of the value of financial transactions. For accounting purposes and because the CPMF was designed mainly to finance social protection expenditure, the mechanism was classified as a “social contribution.” During the period in which the tax was applied, 42 per cent of the revenue collected was used for the public unified health system, 21 per cent for social insurance, 21 per cent for Bolsa Família and 14 per cent for other social purposes. By 2007, total revenue from CPMF amounted to 1.4 per cent of GDP, enough to cover the total cost of Bolsa Família and other non-contributory social protection programs. Although pressures from the financial sector led to its rescinding in 2007, a financial transaction tax was re-instated in 2009 at much higher levels (6 per cent) in order to help curb liquidity in international markets and fast capital inflows/outflows that disrupted Brazil’s development. It was repealed once again in 2013, after leaving significant resources to the Brazilian government to implement social policies, a reason driving the ongoing calls from civil society to adopt financial transaction taxes as part of social justice.

Source: Duran-Valverde and Pacheco (2012)
3.5.3 Natural resource extraction taxes

Developing countries that rely on non-renewable natural resources as a main source of wealth should consider ways of distributing effectively and equitably the mineral rent to the society to support social and economic development initiatives. There are also significant environmental and social externalities associated with natural resources, such as the impacts on local communities, which, if not adequately addressed, serve as a subsidy to extracting companies and further distort the true cost of development.

While Norway’s approach of taxing oil profits and storing the revenues in the Petroleum Fund (now called the Government Pension Fund Global) is perhaps the best-known case, developing countries offer several innovative examples of channeling natural resource revenue streams for social development. In Peru, for example, the government recently expanded taxes levied on the mining sector whose proceeds are being invested into health and education programs. The government is aware of the fact that the amount can every year vary substantially, because of mineral prices, operational costs and production levels. In Mongolia the country is financing a universal rights-based child benefit from taxation on copper exports; when copper prices dropped with falling demand in 2009, Mongolia was advised by the international financial institutions to target its universal child benefit, the government refused to do so and it was a correct decision as in 2010/11 copper prices rose again.

Given the volatile nature of primary commodity prices, some governments have created “stabilization funds” based on windfall taxes. Instead of spending the revenue on social and other development programs, governments have accumulated such funds because they allow for smoothing income and expenditure, keeping savings in years of bonanza for “rainy days” when prices of commodity exports are lower, and hence ensuring that investments in social and economic development remain constant. Chile’s Copper Stabilization Fund, Iran’s Oil Stabilization Fund and Papua New Guinea’s Mineral Resources Stabilization Fund stand as examples. During the recent economic downturn, a number of countries have accessed these “rainy day” funds to finance stimulus measures and increase social protection.

In many countries, however, the private sector takes the lead in exploiting natural resources. In these situations, the state is indirectly included in the rents since it receives a portion via taxes. This can include: (i) production-based taxation (per unit or ad valorem royalties, sales taxes, export and import duties, VAT, payroll tax, stamp duty, etc.); (ii) profit-based taxation (corporate income tax, resource rent taxes, taxes on windfalls, profit tax on dividends, royalty based on profit, etc.); and (iii) environmental taxes to compensate for negative environmental externalities caused by the activities of mining companies.

Box 16: Using natural resource for social protection financing

Given the ‘sticky’ nature of public spending – that is, only a very small percentage of the budget gets reallocated to new policy initiatives from year to year – revenues from recent discoveries of natural resources are a great opportunity for the expansion of social protection interventions. In a recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper, Deléchat, C. et al. (2015) conclude that in two of this research’s sample countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone) and two others (Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea), it is feasible for a fraction of new natural resources revenues to be used to expand social safety nets.

Nevertheless, social assistance systems require governments to enter into recurrent long-term commitments that can be politically very difficult to reverse (see below) and therefore require ongoing fiscal space in future years.

It is clear that in order to finance social assistance systems with natural resources revenues one real challenge will be for countries to ensure a stable flow of revenue year after year. Sound macroeconomic management will have to address both the bell shaped curve of the revenues and short-term fluctuations in prices.

Recent estimates for a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa show that if smoothed over 30 years, new natural resources revenues are projected to fall in the same ballpark as the cost of a basic social protection package – in the region of 1 to 5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (see Figure below). It is not suggested that it would be realistic to use all revenues for social protection – and governments need to be aware that once social protection schemes are set up they are politically difficult to reverse if money becomes tight. Nevertheless, there is scope to use smoothed revenues to cover scale-up costs, and even some recurrent costs, while other funding sources are found.

**Figure 15: How do natural resources revenues compare to basic social assistance packages?**

Source: Barca et. al (2015), How to use natural resource revenues to enhance demand for public services through social protection, Flagship Report for the Gates Foundation (available at: : www.NaturalResourcesForHumanDev.org)
Table 7: Other taxes

| PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE TAXES | In many developing countries, higher property taxes could transform into a robust source of funding for local governments. For example, a 2.5 per cent property tax in Thailand has been estimated to be able to finance all local government spending (Hall 2010:41). Campaigns for land taxes have surfaced in many developing countries recently. In Latvia, for instance, a group of economists and other activists argued for the introduction of a land tax as an alternative to deep public spending cuts (Strazds 2010), and there are similar discussions in parts of Southern Africa. |
| AIRLINE AND HOTEL TAXES, TAXES ON TOURISM | Many developing countries have recently increased taxes charged at airports or on the sale of airline tickets. As demonstrated in recent IMF country reports, this has been most commonly observed in small island states, like Antigua and Barbuda and the Maldives, as well as in emerging tourist destinations, such as Dubai, Ghana and Liberia—the latter which increased taxes on airlines and hotels by 3.0 per cent in fiscal year 2012. A number of countries have implemented an air ticket solidarity levy that is charged to all passengers taking off from their national airports. |
| INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION TAXES | Taxing fuel emissions for cargo transports could raise between US$2.0-19.0 billion a year in maritime receipts and US$1.0-6.0 billion a year in aviation receipts (Institute for Policy Studies 2011). |
| EARMARKED TAXES LINKING TAXES TO SOCIAL PROGRAMS | Ghana has also introduced links between taxes and public services: 2.5 per cent of the VAT is reserved for education, another 2.5 per cent of the VAT is allocated for social health insurance, and 50 per cent of a communication service tax is directed to a national youth employment scheme (Hall 2010:40-41). |
| REMITTANCE TAXES | Remittances were subjected to a 0.004 and 0.1 per cent tax rate in Colombia and Peru, respectively; a 12 per cent VAT was applied to remittances in Ecuador; Georgia and Poland imposed income tax rates on remittance inflows; and, in the Philippines, banks deducted withholding taxes for interest earned on deposited remittances (de Luna Martinez 2006). However, a wide body of literature suggests that lowering transaction costs and even subsidizing remittances may do more social good than taxing inflows and directing the revenue to specific development uses. Developing countries should look to other options to create fiscal space before considering remittances taxes. |
| CARBON TAXES | Charging a flat fee for every ton of CO2 emitted could lead to up to US$10.0 billion a year in development financing (Institute for Policy Studies 2011). |
| ARMS TRADE TAXES | A ten per cent tax on the international arms trade could accrue up to US$5.0 billion annually in new development revenue (WHO 2009b). |
| NATIONAL LOTTERY | National lotteries raise billions of dollars annually, examples include China Welfare lottery, Italy’s Lotottomatica, Brazil’s Caixa Econômica Federal; Ghana’s National Lottery Authority; Mexico’s Lotería Nacional para la Asistencia Pública; Morocco’s La Marocaine des Jeux; Spain’s ONCE (National Organization of the Blind). |
| IMPORT/EXPORT TARIFFS | For countries undergoing export-driven commodity booms, fiscal space could be enhanced for social investments by introducing or raising export tariffs. To highlight the overall potential of commodity export taxes, a 2.5 per cent tax on oil exports from nine largest petroleum-exporting developing countries could generate anywhere from US$10 billion to US$26 billion in additional resources to support economic and social investments in 2016. |

3.6 PUBLIC SPENDING, THE DEFICIT AND GOVERNMENT DEBT

3.6.1 Borrowing and debt restructuring

Sound debt management is a key principle of a sound macroeconomic policy framework. Studies have shown that high debt distress or even debt crisis could lead to a loss of capital market access, a disruption of financial intermediation and hindering of economic activities. Yet for countries that have some scope for additional borrowing, this offers another source of financing for social and economic investments. For those countries that may have very high levels of sovereign debt, it may also be possible to restructure existing debt either by debt re-negotiation, debt relief/forgiveness, debt swaps/conversion or debt repudiation, especially when the legitimacy of the debt is questionable and/or the opportunity cost in terms of worsening social outcomes is high.

Loans from development banks and funds, as well as bilateral loans from donors, may be at commercial or concessional interest rates. If debt is perceived as a strategic option to boost social and economic spending, concessional loans are a much better option than loans with commercial rates since they offer beneficial conditions to developing countries. For example, the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) lends money to the poorest countries without interest along with long grace periods (usually ten years) and 35- to 40-year repayment periods. Concessional borrowing is generally available from regional development banks (e.g. the African, Asian, Inter-American and Islamic Development Banks), specialized funds (e.g. the OPEC Fund for International Development or the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development) and from bilateral loans from donor countries.

Government bonds are another market-based borrowing option and generally cheaper when compared to regularly priced commercial bank loans. For example, Zambia and Ghana each raised US$750 million by issuing a 10-year Eurobond in 2012 and 2013, respectively, the former which received more than US$1 billion of orders demonstrating the strong demand from international capital markets for public debt from developing countries. In addition to bonds at the national level, municipal or sub-national bonds are another alternative for local governments, which are typically issued for specific purposes, such as for developing an urban area or expanding school, water supply or transportation systems (Ortiz 2008b).

Table 8: Debt Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOW MUCH PUBLIC DEBT IS UNSUSTAINABLE?</th>
<th>WHICH COUNTRIES MIGHT HAVE ROOM TO BORROW?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The IMF (2010b) uses a 40 per cent long-term debt-to-GDP ratio as the ceiling that developing countries should not exceed in order to ensure fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability. Others suggest a higher threshold (e.g. 60 per cent according to Reinhart and Rogoff 2010). Still, another approach is to view an optimal debt-to-GDP ratio as arbitrary since public debt can be beneficial over the long term if interest payments are less than the annual increase in nominal GDP (see UNCTAD 2011, Chapter 3).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To determine the feasibility of increasing public debt for a given country, it is important to carry out a comprehensive and dynamic analysis. The IMF-World Bank debt sustainability assessments (DSA) framework. But key limitation of DSAs is that GDP growth projections only take into account returns from investments in physical capital (roads, airports, etc.), but not returns from investments in human or social capital (spending on primary/secondary education, health, and social protection), which are vital to sustained growth in the longer run.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors

Debt restructuring is the process of reducing existing levels of debt or debt service. While some developing countries have space for additional borrowing, the majority are indebted. Further, seven years after the global financial crisis, economic imbalances continue to boost external debt and developing economies are increasingly vulnerable (Aykuz 2014 and Ellmers and Hulova 2013). Debt restructuring has become an increasingly common strategy to alleviate fiscal pressures for other countries, especially those suffering from exorbitant sovereign debt levels. When sovereign debt payments crowd out essential social expenditures, there is a strong case for countries to explore restructuring options with their creditors.

In practice, there are five main options available to governments to restructure sovereign debt, which include: (i) re-negotiating debt; (ii) achieving debt relief/forgiveness; (iii) debt swaps/conversions; (iv) repudiating debt and; (v) defaulting.

3.6.2 A more accommodating macroeconomic framework

The goals of macroeconomic policy are multiple, from supporting growth, price stabilization or inflation control, to smoothing economic cycles, reducing unemployment and poverty, and promoting equity. In the last decades, macroeconomic frameworks have placed a strong emphasis on short-term stabilization measures, such as controlling inflation and fiscal deficits, as part of broader efforts of integrating into global markets and attracting investment. While these macroeconomic objectives are not necessarily problematic, there is an increasing risk in many developing countries that other important objectives, such as employment-generating growth and social development, become secondary and underemphasized.

As the multiple shocks of the global economic crisis unfolded and intensified, support shifted from restrictive and narrow macroeconomic frameworks to a more accommodating one. In practice, this means that the conditions for more manoeuvrability in policy-making and resources could be achieved through both fiscal and monetary policy, both of which are described in the following.

The first channel to achieve a more accommodative macroeconomic framework is through expanding government expenditures to influence the economy. As part of the crisis response, there has been a growing recognition of the need to ease budget constraints and allow for an increasing degree of deficit spending, especially to support social investments (IMF 2009). By doing so, more resources can be allocated to address the impacts of the crisis and support poverty-reducing and employment-generating economic growth.

While many developing countries are already running deficits, a number of others are forecasted by IMF to have fiscal surpluses in 2014. In these cases, allocating surplus funds to social protection could lead to extraordinary social gains. Figure 16 below provides and example from the health sector: for 17 developing countries that were projected to benefit from a positive fiscal balance during 2014, surplus budget funds could double current health spending levels, on average.

Figure 16: Fiscal surplus and health spending, 2014 (average values)
The analysis serves to illustrate the potential of any government’s fiscal position deficit or surplus to impact essential social and economic spending. However, it is important to carry out a rigorous assessment of fiscal sustainability within a country, taking into account not only economic aspects such as debt burden, revenue generation capacity and likely GDP growth trajectory, but also the potential opportunity cost of foregoing social spending.

The second channel to achieve a more accommodative macroeconomic framework is through expansionary monetary policy.

There are two schools of thought regarding how authorities should control a country’s money supply (see Table below).

Table 9: Perspectives on monetary policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIRST SCHOOL OF THOUGHT</th>
<th>SECOND SCHOOL OF THOUGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On the one hand, some argue that the ultimate aim of monetary policy should be to achieve low inflation. Here, since high inflation creates uncertainties about the future and depresses investment, low inflation is viewed as a key ingredient to macroeconomic stability and growth, and becomes a goal in itself. Moreover, high levels of inflation erode disposable incomes, making it more difficult for poor households to purchase essential goods and services. In particular, for those who rely on social transfers, inflation poses a continuous threat to their purchasing power. And even when a country’s social protection scheme includes inflation-adjustment mechanisms that are regularly applied, in practice benefits are only adjusted after a significant delay commonly up to six months due to administrative procedures.</td>
<td>On the other side of the spectrum are those who view excessive inflation control as a danger to poverty and economic growth. This camp argues that certain measures, such as higher interest rates or reserve requirements, can lead to increasing unemployment, lower aggregate demand and weaker growth. High interest rates are especially bad for small producers and those who already have limited access to finance, including women and persons with limited assets. The resulting declines in output and employment can also weaken workers’ bargaining positions and depress wages, therefore indirectly increasing poverty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors

Fiscal space depends on available resource envelope but also depends on political will – policy space.

There are numerous ways to mobilize resources necessary to create fiscal space for social protection but important trade-offs and policy decisions are always involved;

Acceptability, authority and ability to implement resource mobilization strategies need to be considered, not only their technical desirability if they are to be effective

The fact that both revenue mobilization policies and expenditure patterns can be progressive or regressive implies that ultimately neither can be studied in isolation. In order to examine whether a country’s fiscal position is beneficial for the poor, one has to capture the combined impact of both taxation and spending policies.
SOCIAL PROTECTION BUDGET PERFORMANCE AND THE BUDGET PROCESS

The annual preparation of a country’s budget is a large and complex exercise that includes the collection of large amounts of information from multiple sources, reconciling different perspectives and dealing with diverse interest groups, all influencing complex decisions (Shah, 2007).

National budgets are the product of a repetitive budget cycle process, involving the processes of planning and policy-making, budget formulation, budget execution, budget tracking and performance evaluation (EFR & UNICEF, 2011).

1. The budget formulation stage involves the drafting of the budget by the executive, typically the budget division in the line agencies and the Ministry of Finance.
2. The budget approval stage involves the deliberation of the budget and its passage into law through a legislative process.
3. The budget execution stage is carried out by the executive over the duration of the fiscal period to which the budget law applies.
4. Budget implementation is typically carried out by administration departments in line ministries with oversight from an accounts department in the Ministry of Finance.
5. At the evaluation stage, an independent auditor reviews the final budget documents and checks the consistency of the documents with the authorisations made by the legislature (EFR & UNICEF, 2011).

Source: Simson et al., 2011

Formal and informal budget processes. According to a DFID note on the state of Public Financial Management (2007), the study of the politics of the actual budget processes indicates that “sound formal rules and procedures are in place but are distorted by informal practices which determine the actual distribution of budget resources”. Budgetary processes can sometimes be seen as “ritualistic façade” that mask real processes of allocation of public spending; this is caused by the centralisation and lack of transparency of budget formulation processes, lack of institutionalization of review and negotiation processes and lack of control and oversight.

4.1 BUDGET PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Budget planning and preparation is at the centre of good public expenditure management and requires four forms of fiscal and financial discipline in order to be effective:

- Control of aggregate expenditure to ensure consistency with the macroeconomic constraints;
- Effective means for achieving a resource allocation that reflects expenditure policy priorities;
- Efficient delivery of public services;
- Minimization of the financial costs of budgetary management (i.e. efficient budget execution and cash and debt management practices).
Budget preparation is the principal mechanism for achieving objectives (1) and (2) and objective (4) is a key issue of budget execution and cash management processes. A thorough and well-executed budget preparation process is very important as no system of budget execution or cash planning can do more than mitigate the problems caused by poor quality or unrealistic budget preparation (Potter & Diamond, 1999).

Preparing the national budget is an extensive process with a number designated agencies working together with clearly defined responsibilities. The main stages in the budget preparation process are the production of the macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks, the issuing of budget instructions, the preparation of budget proposals by line ministries, negotiations on those proposals between the line ministries and the Ministry of Finance, and finally the approval by the legislature (Shah, 2007).

The first step in budget preparation should be the determination of a macroeconomic framework for the budget year & at least the next two years. The macroeconomic projections allow the Ministry of Finance to determine the total level of expenditure that can be afforded without adverse macroeconomic implications, given expected revenues and the level of reserves to be managed by the Ministry of Finance.

The second step should be the allocation of the global total among line ministries, leaving room for negotiations on those responsibilities. The main stages in the budget preparation process are the production of the macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks, the issuing of budget instructions, the preparation of budget proposals by line ministries, negotiations on those proposals between the line ministries and the Ministry of Finance, and finally the approval by the legislature (Shah, 2007).

Figure 18: Basic steps in the preparation of a budget

The next step should be for the Ministry of Finance’s budget department to prepare a budget circular to give instructions to the line ministries, with the indicative aggregate spending ceiling of each ministry. This should include information on the economic assumptions to be adopted, on wage levels, the exchange rate & price levels.

Step 4 is the submission of bids by the line ministries to the budget department. Once received there needs to be an effective challenge capacity within the Ministry of Finance to test and validate the costing of existing and new policy proposals.

Step 5 comprises the negotiations, usually at official & then bilateral or collective ministerial level, leading finally to agreement.

Source: Potter & Diamond (1999)

4.1.1 The role of the macroeconomic and fiscal framework

The most important starting point in the creation of a sound budget is the deliberation of a macroeconomic and fiscal framework, which includes a realistic assessment of resources likely to be available to the government as well as the establishment of fiscal objectives. These projections should cover the current year and the following two to four years (Shah, 2007).

A macroeconomic framework is considered a “tool for checking the consistency of assumptions concerning economic growth, the fiscal deficit, the balance of payments, the exchange rate, inflation, credit growth, and the share of the private and public sectors on external borrowing policies” (Shah, 2007). It typically contains government expenditure information on a very aggregate level. A key element of a national macroeconomic framework is the fiscal framework, which breaks down revenues and expenditures by categories.

Explicit fiscal targets in the preparation of a budget require governments to clearly define it fiscal policies as well as to allow the legislature and public to monitor the implementation of such policies. Fiscal targets could include indicators on the fiscal position (fiscal deficit), the fiscal sustainability (debt-to-GDP ratio) and the fiscal vulnerability (future liabilities and fiscal risk) of the country (Shah, 2007).

After finalization, the macroeconomic framework needs to be made public, as the legislature and the wider public have a right to know the government’s policy objectives, expectations and targets. This improves transparency and accountability and also supports consensus building on what a country can and should include in its national budget (Shah, 2007).

Credibility is of key importance to a good budget and therefore the accompanying macroeconomic framework needs to be credible as well. To safeguard the framework from partisan politics and ensure the credibility of the projects, some countries submit the framework to a panel of independent and respected experts (Shah, 2007).

4.1.2 Budget laws and regulations

While legal frameworks regulating the budget process differ from country to country, it is usually set at several levels, a country’s constitution being at the highest level of the legal hierarchy. The constitution outlines broad principles, such as:

- the relative powers of the executive and legislative branches with respect to public finances;
- the definition of the financial relations between national and subnational levels of government;
- the requirement - in Commonwealth systems - that all public funds be paid into designated accounts, and that these funds be spent only under the authority of a law (Potter & Diamond, 1999).

One step down from the constitution is organic budget law, which usually establishes the main principles of public financial management. Organic budget laws guides budget preparation, approval, execution, control and auditing and gives the government the authority to issue detailed financial regulations and instructions (Potter & Diamond, 1999).

4.1.3 Assessing the soundness of a budget

The soundness of budget systems can be judged by checking it for comprehensiveness, transparency and realism (Potter & Diamond, 1999).

Table 10: Helpful questions in assessing the soundness of a budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HELPFUL QUESTIONS IN ASSESSING THE SOUNDNESS OF A BUDGET</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensiveness</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Transparency</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Realism</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: Based on Potter & Diamond, 1999
4.2 BUDGET EXECUTION AND THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL PROTECTION

After a budget has been approached by the legislature, the government executes the budget by spending funds as allocated. Ensuring that funds are spend effectively and that policy objectives are reached is a challenging task and research on public financial management performance in developing countries indicates that governments score significantly better on budget preparation than on budget execution indicators (Simson et al., 2011).

Public financial management literature tends to take the perspective of the Ministry of Finance in the execution of the budget and focuses on the need to ensure that the budget is executed in accordance with rules preventing corruption and overspending (Simson et al., 2011). The budget execution process can be split into four steps as outlined in the figure below.

Figure 19: The budget execution process

AUTHORISATION & ALLOCATION OF APPROPRIATIONS → COMMITMENT OF FUNDS TO SPECIFIC PURCHASES → VERIFICATION OF DELIVERIES → PAYMENT INDICATORS

4.2.1 Intergovernmental financial management processes and transfers

Political governance structures and financial management processes differ widely between countries. In unitary governments, sub-national governments are subordinate levels of the same government. Federal countries, on the other hand, have sub-national governments with constitutionally mandated independence and tax-collecting authority. Often, in developing countries, sub-national “governments behave much like line ministries: their budgets are incorporated into the national budget and their spending follows the same rules as other spending agencies” (Simson et al., 2011).

While federalism does exist, the biggest source of revenue for sub-national governments in developing countries are central government transfers (Simson et al., 2011). In fact, in such countries intergovernmental fiscal transfers finance about 60 percent of sub-national expenditure (Shah, 2007).

These transfers require clear regulations and mechanisms for determining the “allocation of resources to sub-national governments and the degree of sub-national government autonomy in the management of funds” (Simson et al., 2011). There are a large variety intergovernmental transfers including those made as conditional grants to other spheres of government, or as transfers to public entities, constitutional institutions, NGOs and households (National Treasury, 2000).

Beyond the expenditures they finance, these transfers create incentives and accountability mechanisms that affect the fiscal management, efficiency and equity of public service provision and government accountability to citizens (Shah, 2007). Efficiency, effectiveness, economy and transparency in the use of the money and the end users are as important as they are for central government’s own programme delivery and accounting officers must therefore ensure that entities receiving government money have appropriate financial management and control systems (National Treasury, 2000).

Generally speaking, intergovernmental transfers or grants can be classified into two categories (Shah, 2007):

- **General-purpose transfers** are provided as part of general budget support from central governments to local authorities. These grants come with no strings attached and are typically mandated by law. However, occasionally they are granted on an ad hoc or discretionary basis.

  A version of general-purpose transfers are block transfers, which provide support for a specific area of subnational expenditures, such as education or health, while allowing local authorities discretion in allocating the money amongst specific uses within these sectors. They “provide budget support with no strings attached in a broad but specific area of subnational expenditures” (Shah, 2007).

- **Specific-purpose transfers**, otherwise known as conditional grants, provide incentives for governments to undertake specific programmes or activities, as funding is tied to their implementation. Sometimes conditional transfers include matching provisions, which require grant recipients to fund a certain percentage of expenditures through their own resources. Matching requirements “encourage greater scrutiny and local ownership of grant-financed expenditures; closed-ended matching is helpful in ensuring that the grantor has some control over the costs of the transfer program” (Shah, 2007).

4.2.2 Financial management information systems

In recent years, many governments have started automating various financial management processes, typically starting with accounting and reporting functions. Proponents claim that automation can improve the efficiency of the system, while others argue that the process can be disruptive and require significant reforms of existing processes in addition to new human resource skills, which take time to develop.

An IFMIS can be a tool for governments to support financial control, management and planning by managing a core set of financial data and translating these into information that can be used for management purposes. More narrowly defined, an “IFMIS is a computer application that integrates key financial functions (for example, accounts or budgets) and promotes efficiency and security of data management and comprehensive financial reporting” (Shah, 2007). An IFMIS can be one way of addressing “financial systems that do not talk to each other and do not produce a timely and comprehensive picture of a country’s financial position” (Shah, 2007).

4.2.3 Efficiency in disbursement and payment systems

The flow of funds to social benefits through government systems can be “slow and unpredictable, thus undermining predictable support to poor and vulnerable households” (Republic of Kenya, 2012). As the coverage of social benefits is expanding in many countries, there is a need to address these weaknesses by implementing a number of reforms, some of which are briefly outlined below.

1. **Enhance budget coordination and awareness among the relevant government departments and development partners.** This should ensure that the government’s financial management, budgeting procedures, and timelines are appreciated and understood by all. Better coordination would also facilitate improved planning and the allocation of adequate resources to the social protection programmes.

2. **Adopt innovative reconciliation and approval processes** to reduce the delays caused by the manual processes both in the flow of funds to programmes and in the payment cycle to beneficiaries. Automation of the reconciliation process supported by appropriate technology will greatly enhance the timeliness and efficiency of payments.

3. **While the type of social benefits provided reflect “each programme’s objectives, there is a need to explore the feasibility of a general shift towards unified cash transfers to leverage the relative efficiency of most efficient payment mechanisms.**

   The design of payment system has strong implications on the timeframe and efficiency of disbursement, as is discussed on the case study from Kenya below. For more detailed discussion on payments systems for social benefits see the ADM module.

   These differing timelines in the flow of funds to social protection programmes can lead to delays in payments to beneficiaries and have implications for their predictability. Furthermore, the considerable delays in the flow of funds from the exchequer to the beneficiaries raised “concerns about the ability of the government’s current safety net system to respond to rapid onset crises” (Republic of Kenya, 2012).
4.3 BUDGET ANALYSIS AND REPORTING: DEMONSTRATING EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY OF SPENDING

An assessment of disbursement processes in Kenya observed that social transfers reached beneficiaries considerably faster when they were transferred directly from government or developing partners’ accounts to the implementing agencies (IA). Inefficient government spending has serious consequences for the provision of social protection and other pro-poor and quality of government operations (Shah, 2007).

These differing timelines in the flow of funds to social protection programmes can lead to delays in payments to beneficiaries and have implications for their predictability. Furthermore, the considerable delays in the flow of funds from the exchequer to the beneficiaries raised "concerns about the ability of the government’s current safety net system to respond to rapid onset crises" (Republic of Kenya, 2012).

The above mentioned assessment of the Kenyan delivery channels "suggests that cash payments made through banks, agency networks, or mobile phones are significantly more secure, faster, and more cost-effective than the other payment systems, including those used for food or vouchers" (Republic of Kenya, 2012).

A possible measure is total cost-transfer ratio (TCTR) (i.e. ratio of total programme cost to value of transfers). Unit costs are cost per unit of output; cost per direct recipient (per beneficiary) per period.

Source: Greenslade (2013)

The following word of caution needs to be given in measuring effectiveness: data requirements for effectiveness measures and analytical methods are more demanding than for cost-efficiency analysis, making it necessary to be realistic about what can confidently be measured; effects need to be measurable in the same units, but the multiple nature of the benefits that social transfers are expected to generate and serious deficiencies in data availability can make this very challenging. Cost-effectiveness analysis also ignores impacts that cannot be measured, such as improvements in social cohesion or self-esteem, unless a credible and measurable proxy indicator can be identified.

Table 11: Budget Efficiency and Effectiveness indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>relates to how well inputs are converted to the output of interest, which is transfers delivered to beneficiaries.</td>
<td>relates to how well outputs are converted to outcomes and impacts (e.g. reduction in poverty gap and inequality, improved nutrition, reduction in school dropouts, increased use of health services, asset accumulation by the poor, increased smallholder productivity, social cohesion).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cost-efficiency analysis focuses on the relationship between the costs of a social transfer programme and the value of the transfers delivered to beneficiaries. Cost-effectiveness analysis measures the cost of achieving intended programme outcomes and impacts, and can compare the costs of alternative ways of producing the same or similar benefits.

Cost-effectiveness analysis measures the cost of achieving intended programme outcomes and impacts, and can compare the costs of alternative ways of producing the same or similar benefits.

A possible measure is Cost per measure of outcome or impact (e.g. unit cost of a percentage point reduction in poverty gap, inequality or incidence of severe child malnutrition).

With regard to cash transfer or social assistance schemes cost-to-transfer ratio and administrative cost per recipient are generally used as indicators of cost-efficiency.

There are different types of administrative costs (White and Greenside 2013:27):

- **“Set-up costs,” include generally design, planning and major investments (such as the establishment of an MIS); they are fixed costs that should be concentrated mainly at the start of a programme. Set-up costs will be higher where the programme design is complex (e.g. due to multiple objectives or a multilevel targeting system) requiring greater administrative capacity and often significant external technical assistance and training input; or where the existing ICT infrastructure on which to base an MIS is inadequate.**

- **Roll-out costs, which include the identification (targeting) and enrolment of beneficiaries, are also concentrated during the periods of programme launch and expansion, but are not strictly one-off where an established programme is enroling new beneficiaries or if periodic re-targeting is required. Roll-out costs can be expected to be higher where there is a complex set of targeting criteria, requiring intensively supervised selection procedures involving community committees and/or proxy means tests, and periodic re-targeting.**

- **Recurrent operational costs notably include the costs of delivering transfers to beneficiaries (and in CCTs the costs of monitoring conditionality). These are the long-term running costs of the programme and should become the dominant component of administrative costs as a programme scales up and reaches maturity. Operational costs are likely to be inflated by complex requirements for monitoring compliance with conditions and where there is a lack of a financial infrastructure (e.g. post offices or banks) that can handle payments securely and at reasonable cost and to which the target population has effective access; they benefit from economies of scale with respect to both numbers of beneficiaries and level of transfers.” (White and Greenside 2013: p. 19)

Table 12 below shows that total cost-to-transfer ratios vary from 2.11 (total expenditure more than double the cost of the actual transfer or admin cost equal to 53% of total cost, in fact admin cost exceeding the transfer cost) in a relatively small programme in Ghana to 1.05 (admin cost equalling 5% of total programme cost) in a very large programme in Mexico (White and Greenside, 2013).
### Table 12: Benchmarks for administrative costs – a comparison of various cash transfer programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMME</th>
<th>YEAR OF OPERATION</th>
<th>NO. OF DIRECT RECIPIENTS</th>
<th>COST PER DIRECT BENEFICIARY</th>
<th>COST PER WIDER BENEFICIARY</th>
<th>ADMIN COST PER RECIPIENT</th>
<th>ADMIN COST AS % OF TOTAL COST</th>
<th>TOTAL COST-TRANSFER RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex ante costs (2012 US$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana LEAP, 2012</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>164,370</td>
<td>$155</td>
<td>$40</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>$1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria CDG, 2017</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$107</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>$1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania PSSN, 2018</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>$296</td>
<td>$55</td>
<td>$104</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>$1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia Child Grant, 2015</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>85,502</td>
<td>$237</td>
<td>$47</td>
<td>$60</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>$1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex ante costs (2012 US$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh CLP, 2011/12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17,485</td>
<td>$876</td>
<td>$219</td>
<td>$289</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>$1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia PSNP, 2010/11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7,535,451</td>
<td>$34</td>
<td>$34</td>
<td>$9</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>$1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana Leap 2010</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26,079</td>
<td>$132</td>
<td>$34</td>
<td>$69</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>$2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya CT-OVC, 2008/09</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>$331</td>
<td>$75</td>
<td>$83</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>$1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya HSNP, 2011/12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68,611</td>
<td>$297</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td>$51</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>$1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico Progressa/ Oportunidades 2000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>$314</td>
<td>$63</td>
<td>$16</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>$1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico Progressa/ Oportunidades 2012</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6,500,00</td>
<td>$815</td>
<td>$163</td>
<td>$42</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>$1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia Child Grant, 2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32,643</td>
<td>$251</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td>$111</td>
<td>$1.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


White and Greenslade (2013), however, warn that it is imperative to take into account context, scale, maturity of programme and objectives before making a final judgement on either cost-efficiency or effectiveness. In using these benchmarks, care must be taken with “comparability between different methods of measuring cost:

- Are we comparing like with like? Different contexts with different challenges for delivery (e.g. conflict, geography, government capacity); different programme objectives and designs; difference between pilots and national programmes; difference between different points on the programme cycle – because costs are generally much higher in the early years (see Figure 20 below).
- Are costs too low in relation to total amounts transferred, and likely to reduce performance and cost-effectiveness? Low cost-efficiency does not necessarily mean low cost-effectiveness, and vice versa. Capacity constraints may be key driver of costs. A higher administrative cost may be necessary to improve social outcomes. Choice of programme should not be based solely on cost-efficiency criteria.
- Cost-efficiency analysis faces significant data deficiencies, including a lack of information on government overhead costs.

Figure 20: Cost efficiency measured by the cost transfer ratio declines as schemes mature

Source: White and Greenside 2013; p.32
Box 18: Roll out of Ghana’s Livelihoods Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)

The programme illustrates the extent to which actual cost structure (bottom right) can deviate from that which was planned. Planned costs for the five year pilot phase (2008-12) conform to the expected pattern for a pilot roll-out, with relatively high set-up costs and a small volume of transfers in the first year, but diminishing set-up costs thereafter while roll-out and operational out costs increase in approximate proportion to transfer costs as the programme expands. Actual implementation, however, was beset by staff capacity constraints and financing and delivery delays, so that by the end of 2010 only a fraction of the budgeted amounts had been spent, and the proportion of administrative costs in total expenditure was approaching half.

Figure 21: Composition of expenditure – LEAP programme

Source: White and Greenside 2013; p. 21

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Box 19: Namibia and South Africa grant delivery compared

The Table below shows the total cost-to-transfer ratio for two components of the Namibian social assistance system and compares that to the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), a much larger organisation paying grants to more than 15 million people. The table shows some of the difficulties of comparing different welfare bureaucracies.

The high cost of the grants paid by MoGECW in Namibia can be partly explained by the fact that it is not only a grants payment agency but also has more than 100 social workers in employment. While these social workers are involved in the registration processes for some grants (i.e. the foster care and special maintenance or child disability grant), they also fulfil a number of other functions. In measuring efficiency, part of the cost of social workers should therefore be excluded from the costs of social grant but it is not clear how much.

It is also not straightforward to explain why the SASSA is not able to achieve bigger economies of scale, compared to the much smaller pension and disability grant programme in Namibia. One possible explanation is that the South African system is extensively means tested while the largest Namibian pension and disability benefits are not means tested. The South African cost-to-transfer ratio, however, also exceeds that of equally large programmes in Mexico that are means tested and, in addition, have conditions to police.

Table 13: Cost to Transfer ratio – Comparing Namibia and South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NAMIBIA</th>
<th>NAMIBIA</th>
<th>SOUTH AFRICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Assistance, MoLSW</td>
<td>20010/11</td>
<td>20010/11</td>
<td>SASSA 2011/12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin costs as percentage of total cost</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beneficiaries</td>
<td>137,692</td>
<td>124,351</td>
<td>15.2 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Namibia estimates of expenditure 2012/13; South Africa Budget Review 2013/14

One key component of the cost of social grant delivery in Namibia is the payment for grant delivery by external agents. At the time of the study the Namibian government paid NAD 16.25 per transaction to Epupa and NAD 5 to NamPost. This Epupa payment is therefore 8.1% of the value of the child grants and 2.7% of the value of a basic pension. In South Africa the payment to Cash Paymaster Services per transaction was ZAR 16.44 – comparable to the Epupa payment – and giving slightly lower cost ratios in South Africa given the higher value of grants.

Source: Authors
4.3.2 Towards performance based budgeting

Over the last two decades there has been an increased interest in public sector budgeting reforms in industrial countries, largely in response to public demands for government accountability as well as the desire to improve operational efficiency and promote results-oriented accountability. Generally speaking, budget reforms aim to transform public budgeting systems from control of inputs to a focus on outputs or outcomes (Shah, 2007).

The most fundamental function of any budget is to control public expenditure, which is why traditional budgeting systems are designed to exercise financial control over inputs and revenues. Input control-based budgets are primarily concerned with how much money is spent and how it is spent and often have ceilings or caps on expenditure categories. Sometimes there are ceilings per item of expenditure, which is why these types of budgets are referred to as line-item budgets (Shah, 2007).

While useful in reigniting in expenditure, line-item budgets face challenges in “promoting efficient and effective public planning and management as well as to fostering results-oriented accountability in public sector institutions” (World Bank, 2007). Such budgets provide information on how much money is spend and on what it is spend but do not link inputs to outputs and say little about how efficiently money is being spend. In addition, the focus on detailed line-items can lead to micromanagement of ministerial operations by central budget offices and public managers thus “exercise very limited managerial discretion and cannot be held accountable for the performance of government activities” (Shah, 2007).

In recent years, a renewed emphasis has been placed on performance and accountability, which has led to the creation of performance budgeting. Performance budgeting aims to strengthen the performance orientation in resource allocation and management as well as to achieve operational efficiency and to improve accountability for results (Shah, 2007).

Table 14: Features of alternative budget formats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE-ITEM BUDGETING</th>
<th>PROGRAMME BUDGETING</th>
<th>PERFORMANCE BUDGETING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>Expenditures by object (inputs and resources)</td>
<td>Expenditure for clusters of activities supporting a common objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
<td>Operating and capital inputs purchased</td>
<td>Expenditure by programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Input controls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated management paradigm</td>
<td>Hierarchical controls with little managerial discretion</td>
<td>Hierarchical controls with managerial flexibility over allocation to activities within the programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Shah, 2007

Results-oriented or performance-based budgeting systems are, generally speaking, budgeting systems that link expenditure to specific results. This is done by linking programmes to specific outputs and outcomes. In such systems, the budget indicates the objectives of the expenditure, the costs of the proposed programmes that work towards these objectives as well as indicators measuring expected results for each programme. Performance budget explicitly include performance indicators and costs, which are measured and reported throughout the execution of the budget (EFR & UNICEF, 2011).

Box 20: Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty in Zambia

A recent World Bank study assesses the redistributive impact of fiscal policy, and its individual elements, in Zambia. The study uses an internationally recognized methodology developed by the Commitment to Equity (CEQ) Institute.

The study estimates the impact of fiscal revenue collections (taxes) and fiscal expenditures — direct cash and near-cash transfers, in-kind benefits, subsidies — on household-level income inequality and poverty.

The impact on the fiscal system on poverty and inequality in Zambia is described via an estimation of "pre-fiscal" and "post-fiscal" income measures. The pre-fiscal measure comprises market income before any transfers (including public spending on health and education, farming inputs, fuel and energy subsidies and unconditional cash transfers) or taxes (including personal income taxes, VAT, alcohol and tobacco excises) of any kind have been added. "Post-fiscal" income includes pre-fiscal income and adds to it a subset of fiscal policies executed: subsidies and direct transfers received, direct and indirect taxes paid, and in-kind transfers received through use of services (see diagram below). Poverty and inequality measures then are derived under pre- and post-fiscal income measures and compared.
The study concludes (Figure 23) that Zambian fiscal policy, and many of its elements taken individually, reduces income inequality. The largest reduction in inequality is created by in-kind public service expenditures on education, and the overall decrease in inequality is more pronounced in rural areas. However, the poverty headcount ratio rises when fiscal policy is executed. Indirect taxes—most notably, VAT—increase the poverty headcount ratio, and the direct transfers and subsidies received by poor and vulnerable households are too small to counteract this impact.
The contribution of fiscal policy to increasing poverty is shared by other countries in Africa. In most low-income countries in Africa including Zambia, fiscal policy (excluding in-kind transfers) contributes to an increase in the poverty headcount ratio. Zambia’s fiscal system is weighted toward indirect taxes. As a result, after direct transfers and subsidies are received and direct and indirect taxes are paid, most Zambian households’ net purchasing power is reduced. Without reform, poor households will continue to pay more into the fiscal system than they receive from it in cash.

For information on similar studies on the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty consult the Commitment to Equity Institute website at http://commitmenttoequity.org/.


### 4.4 TAKE-AWAY LESSONS

- The annual preparation of a country’s budget is a large and complex exercise.
- Lack of institutionalization of review and negotiation processes and lack of control and oversight may result in more weight given to informal processes of budget allocations.
- Credibility is of key importance to a good budget.
- Results-oriented or performance-based budgeting systems are, budgeting systems that link expenditure to specific results.
- Effectiveness of social spending measures how well outputs are converted to outcomes and impacts (e.g., reduction in poverty gap and inequality, improved nutrition, reduction in school drop-out...). A key component of public spending analyses is the benefit incidence analysis, which measures the benefits from public policies that are provided to various individuals or groups of individuals in a society.
5

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE CONTROL, MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT

5.1 INTERNAL CONTROL, MONITORING AND OVERSIGHT

In order to maintain internal control over expenditures and monitor financial transactions a robust accounting system is of key importance. Accounting is the practice of recording, classifying and summarising financial transactions and ensuring compliance with budget rules as well as demonstrating that public funds are being used for their intended purposes.

5.1.1 Budget monitoring

To understand and evaluate how governments utilise funds and how those funds contribute to government policies, one needs to monitor the results of expenditures. The need for such monitoring has led to the establishment of government Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Systems. A common element of such M&E systems is the requirement for line ministries and other spending agencies to send regular reports on financial and non-financial performance to the Ministry of Finance. Ideally these should also be made public. Non-financial performance refers to the results of government expenditure, which are usually measured at the levels of outputs, outcomes, impacts or other performance indicators. Governments, in order to assess how far they are progressing on their objectives, need to continuously keep track of these indicators to plan accordingly (Simson et al, 2011).

Internal reporting guidelines in many governments stress the need for regular monthly management reports for submission to the Minister. Such monthly reports will enable executive authorities to monitor performance of their accounting officers and assist Cabinet in monitoring the performance of their government (National Treasury, 2000). See more on this in the Module M&E.

However, while reporting to ministers is an important accountability function, the primary purpose of these reports is to assist departmental managers in discharging their responsibilities. Monthly management reports should focus on performance against budget and against service delivery and alert managers where remedial action is required with regards to programme implementation. Furthermore, regular monthly reporting helps facilitate the compilation of the year-end financial statements and annual reports (National Treasury, 2000).

5.1.2 Internal control

All organisations have systems of internal control, and governments are no exception. Internal or management control systems are policies and procedures implemented by government agencies in order to ensure the agency achieves its objectives while complying with all external laws and regulations. Systems and procedures of internal control are designed to:

- Provide reasonable assurances that the organisation’s objectives are achieved effectively and efficiently, in compliance with applicable laws and regulations
- Ensure reliable financial reporting.

According to the South African Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) of 2000, responsibilities of different stakeholders for internal control can be summarised as follows:

- The departmental management has the ultimate responsibility for the operation and ownership of the system of internal control.
- Members of legislative bodies, in their capacity as representatives of the taxpayers, are to exercise governance, guidance and oversight.
- The Auditor-General will play an important role in making recommendations should any weaknesses in internal control be identified.
- The audit committee should be able to identify and act on instances where management may override internal control or otherwise seek to misrepresent reported financial results.

5.1.3 Internal audit

Internal audit is defined “an independent appraisal function, established within an organisation to examine and evaluate its activities” (National Treasury, 2000). Internal audit exists to support management in carrying out its responsibilities effectively by providing analyses, appraisals, recommendations and advice with respect to the activities of a department. A key element of any internal audit is the requirement to examine and objectively appraise the adequacy and effectiveness of internal control mechanisms in the department, with the aim to highlight potential shortcomings and allow management the opportunity to remedy deficiencies (National Treasury, 2000).

An effective audit committee can assist management in performing its accountability responsibilities, to safeguard assets, operate adequate systems and controls and prepare financial statements by:

- Improving communication and increasing contact, understanding and confidence between management and internal and external auditors.
- Scrutinising the performance of internal and external auditors, thus increasing accountability.
- Facilitating the imposition of discipline and control, thus reducing the opportunity for fraud.
- Strengthening the objectivity and credibility of financial reporting.

An internal audit committee should be strictly advisory and not executive and should not perform any management functions as this would prejudice objectivity.

To improve transparency and accountability and in line with international best practice, some countries (such as South Africa) regularly consolidate and publish these reports in their national Government Gazette.
5.2 LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OVER THE BUDGET

Legislature plays an important role in overseeing public financial management, mainly through ex-ante and ex-post scrutiny of the budget. The role of the legislature varies significantly between countries and especially between parliamentary and presidential systems.

Many former British colonies, for instance, have a dedicated Public Accounts Committee (PAC) overseeing all budgetary matters. While there are significant differences in the exact role of the legislature in financial oversight, legislatures tend to exercise their supervision prerogative primarily by reviewing the budget prior to its approval and scrutinising the final audit report after the budget has been executed (Simson et al., 2011).

It has been recognized that sustainable macroeconomic policies require a sound domestic consensus rather than being solely based on outside advice. In order to create stable fiscal policies and reduce the frequency of policy reversals, financial reforms and budgets need to be owned domestically. Legislatures can play a crucial role in this by facilitating public engagement in the budget process through consultations with their constituents. Furthermore, politicians can raise community concerns in budget debates and during the budget execution scrutiny (Simson et al., 2011).

5.3 EXTERNAL AUDIT

External auditing is another mechanism designed to ensure that the budget is executed in accordance with the law and effectively delivers public services. External auditing is often conducted by a Supreme Auditing Institution (SAI), which is a “public body independent of the government with the powers to scrutinise government transactions, systems and practices” (Simson et al., 2011).

External audits usually scrutinize a government's public financial management system in various specific audits, which are usually distinguished as follows.

Table: Types of external audits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPES OF EXTERNAL AUDITS</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial audit</td>
<td>Is the government's financial statement was a fair and accurate reflection of revenues collected and expenditures made?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance audit</td>
<td>Did agencies act in accordance with law and regulations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance audit</td>
<td>Did agencies performance well against its stated goals?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Simson et al, 2011

5.4 FIDUCIARY RISK CONTROL

It is of key importance for successful government policy and especially the design and delivery of social transfer programmes to address risks that threaten the effectiveness of benefit delivery and the achievement of the programme's primary objectives. Particularly in fragile states, where there is fraud, corruption or inefficiency, there are possibilities for improper allocation of funds and while well-implemented delivery systems as well as monitoring and evaluation address these risk, there is also the need for explicit strategies to address these fiduciary risks. (Samson et al., 2010).

Fiduciary risk can be defined as the risk that government expenditures diverge from those authorized in the budget (Shah, 2007). It is often understood to be primarily concerned with fraud and corruption but most comprehensive definitions often add to the risks of “misappropriation and misallocation the additional risk that the budgeted resources are either wasted or spent ineffectively” (Shah, 2007). This includes the risk of funds being “diverted into another area of government spending; programmes being poorly designed, so that, for example, transfers do not reach their intended targets; mistakes being made by applicants or administrators; and the existence of poor financial management systems” (DFID, 2006).

Fiduciary risk is defined by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) as the risk that funds:

- Are not used for their intended purposes.
- Do not achieve value for money.
- Are not properly accounted for.

With respect to social protection, fiduciary risk is mainly the “likelihood that social transfer programmes fail to achieve their primary objectives, which is the greatest value-for-money risk” (Samson et al., 2010).

Figure 25: Components of fiduciary risk

Source: Based on Samson et al., 2010

5.4.1 Fiduciary risks and budget comprehensiveness

There is now a broad consensus that it is difficult for the government budget to reflect the preferences of society and to incorporate the principles of good governance if it includes only a small proportion of revenues and expenditures, which means that the legislature and the public can scrutinise only some of the activities for which the expenditures are made. This lack of information on other expenditures can lead to abuses of executive power, corruption and even large-scale theft of public resources. The reasons argue for strict adherence to the principle of budget comprehensiveness, as the budget should in principle cover all transactions financed through public financial resources.
If the budget excludes major expenditures, there can be “no assurance that resources are appropriately allocated to priority programs and that legal control and public accountability are properly enforced” (Shah, 2007). In addition, the amount of expenditures that are not included in the budget is itself often uncertain and opaque. This uncertainty makes “macroeconomic programming more difficult and increases the risk of corruption and waste” (Shah, 2007).

5.4.2 Fiduciary risks and social protection programmes

A policy guidance note by DFID on managing the fiduciary risk associated with social cash transfer programmes (DFID, 2016) highlights the following in regards to fiduciary risk issues that are specific to non-contributory social protection:

- cash transfer programmes have inherent fiduciary risk, which can be mitigated most effectively at the design phase of programmes;
- the greatest risk of loss from error or fraud through cash transfer programmes arises from complexity in the eligibility criteria and operations;
- no standard design for cash transfer programmes will mitigate all risks, but programmes should be designed to be as simple as they can be, while still meeting their objectives (there may be a trade-off between the simplicity of a programme and how well it targets the poorest);
- controls to mitigate fiduciary risk have a cost, both to the administration of the scheme, and sometimes to beneficiaries.

There is therefore a balance to be struck in ensuring effective control while meeting policy objectives;
- appropriate monitoring and evaluation of programmes will help to identify any failure in controls; and
- separate fiduciary risk assessments are mandatory for all cash transfer programmes provided from general or earmarked budget support, and should be carried out periodically over the lifetime of a programme.

For social protection programmes to be successful, it is crucial that mechanisms are in place, which ensure that programme delivery is subject to appropriate oversight and redress. Such mechanisms “can offer transparency, reduce corruption and provide avenues for beneficiaries who are denied appropriate benefits” (Samson et al, 2010).

Beneficiaries and the wider public must understand the benefits of social protection interventions and their potential entitlement towards them. In addition, people must appreciate their options for redress when benefits are unjustly denied and understand the channels through which they can do so. Beneficiaries of support interventions often lack the resources to understand and protect their rights and provide necessary feedback to programme implementers and policymakers (Samson et al, 2010). For more on this see Module LEG.

Transparency and effective communications are crucial to ensure that the beneficiaries and the broader population understand and appreciate the objectives of the particular interventions. Increasing the transparency of programme implementation can improve accountability.

5.5 EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE BUDGET PROCESS

5.5.1 Inclusive budget formulation

The budget can be a major tool of accountability to the legislature, the press and the wider public as it can help hold administrators accountable not only for the funds they received but also for their performance (Shah, 2007).

There are numerous ways the budget preparation process can support citizens’ participation and consultation, which can foster a sense of ownership and control over the national budget as well as work towards aligning the budget their priorities. Failure to create an inclusive process can alienate the public by making it difficult to participate in the budget preparation or making budgetary information inaccessible (Shah, 2007).

Governments should try to get feedback on its policies and budget execution from the civil society, organized in various forms. For instance, consultative boards, including representatives from various sectors of society, could discuss budgets and government expenditure policy. In addition, ad-hoc groups may be set up by the government on specific policy issues. User surveys and consultations with stakeholders, civil society and customers when preparing agencies’ strategic plans or programs can enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of such plans or programs (Shah, 2007).

In countries with weak budget execution and monitoring mechanisms, mechanisms for eliciting feedback from citizens can be effective in revealing malpractices such as “ghost schools,” defective infrastructure, incomplete public works projects, theft, and waste. While such monitoring mechanisms are often resented by the executive branches of government, they are remarkably cost-effective monitoring devices and should be supported as such (Shah, 2007).

However finance and budget officials, central bank staff and economic policymakers often assume that ordinary citizens do not understand macroeconomic policy enough to contribute and the poor and marginalized sometimes have little faith in their government’s intention and ability to make the right decisions for them (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2003).

Although the inclusion of more actors in the decision-making process is not necessarily a guarantee of better decisions, a more contestable policy arena tends to be associated with higher levels of legitimacy and cooperation. When procedures for selecting and implementing policies are more contestable, those policies tend to be perceived as “fair” and to induce cooperation more effectively (World Bank, 2017).

Civic involvement with regards to the revenue side of the budget process is mostly concerned with the level and structure of taxes, including discussions on the tax incidence and the degree progressiveness or regressiveness of the tax system. Fiscal policy determines how governments manage revenues, expenditures and debt and therefore has a tangible effect on all citizen’s lives. On the expenditure side, civil society organizations (CSOs) focus on priorities for public spending and how generously those services are funded. Other concerns are efficiency, effectiveness and equity issues related to spending for government services (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2003).

5.5.2 Inclusive budget monitoring

In many governments, external audits are generally conducted and appraised without public participation and audit reports are made available only to the legislature or agencies. These practices mean that most members of the “public have no way of accessing such reports, of knowing what was going on in government, or of helping to improve governance” (Shah, 2007).

The lack of transparency of the auditing process and the absence of mechanisms to demand public accountability for expenditure use significantly reduces the possibility of citizens to participate in financial policies and increases the possibility for corruption fund mismanagement and ineffective service provision (Shah, 2007).

Fortunately this is changing and in many countries audit agencies, in line with governments’ desires promote transparency and good governance, have developed strategies that include “piloting civil society participation in the auditing process or in the scrutinizing of audits” (Shah, 2007). Such reforms, for instance, involved non-governmental actors, such as donors and CSOs, into the budget monitoring process (Simson et al, 2011).

These participatory audits are particularly valuable in settings where SAs lacks capacity to do performance audits. The strengthened participation of citizens in the auditing process, effectively enhances government accountability, transparency and credibility. Civil society participation is in itself an important deterrent against corruption and is expected to “promote more prudence in the use of public resources for projects that would benefit local communities” (Shah, 2007).

Expenditures lie at the core of state accountability. Yet in in many countries citizens have relatively little accessible information on government spending. To bridge this gap, some state and non-state actors have started to produce so-called Budget Briefs, which are essentially easy to understand analyses of expenditure for public services. In order to ensure that budget briefs are accessible to ordinary citizens they are usually short documents with a limited amount of information and key messages. In addition, good budget briefs tend to include simple visual interpretations of the relevant data.

Depending on the focus of the organization drafting the briefs, they may be of general nature and aim to visualize total government spending or focus on specific sectors, such as education, health or social welfare. See Box 21 below for an example of a key message section of a Social Welfare Budget Brief in Mozambique.
Box 21: Key message of the 2014 Budget Brief of the Social Welfare Sector in Mozambique

**Trend:** The budget allocated to the Social Welfare sector - considering the sums allocated to the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare (MMAS) and to the National Social Welfare Institute (INAS) – thus excluding the amount allocated to Social Subsidies (which include the general food and fuel subsidies) – maintained the strong growth trend experienced since 2010. For 2014, 3.9 billion Meticais were programmed, which is an increase of 48% in real terms (discounting the effect of inflation) when the 2014 State Budget Law (LOE) is compared with that approved for 2013.

**Weight of the Social Welfare Sector in the State Budget (OE):** Considering Social Welfare without social subsidies, the sector will have at its disposal 1.64% of the resources made available by the State in the 2014 LOE, strengthening the positive trend displayed in recent years (in 2012 the “weight” of the sums allocated to MMAS and INAS amounted to 0.97% of the OE). In terms of GDP, the resources allocated to MMAS and INAS amount to 0.74% of the GDP projected for 2014. This percentage has tripled since 2010, when it was 0.23%.

**Coverage of the INAS Programmes:** If we exclude the social subsidies, the positive evolution in the allocation to the Social Welfare sector results essentially from an increase in the budgetary allocations to the Social Protection programmes managed by INAS, which has allowed an increase in the number of households covered and of the amount transferred to each beneficiary. In 2014, it is expected that INAS will manage to cover through its programmes 427,384 households, which is 6 times greater than the sum allocated to the INAS programmes. At the same time, it was noted that the subsidies intended to cover the deficits of public companies are considered as Social Welfare sector expenditure. It should be advocated that these subsidies should not be included as part of Social Welfare sector expenditure.

**Value of the transfers:** For 2014, as in 2013, there was an adjustment in the value of the levels of the Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB), to deal with the inflation rate and the fluctuations in the prices of basic foodstuffs. The value rose from 250 MT in 2013 to 280 MT, as the basic sum for a household consisting of just one person (in 2012 the sum allocated was 190 MT). The amount can rise to a maximum of 550 MT for a household with 4 dependents. The value of the food kit distributed through the Direct Social Support Programme (PASD) also increased (from 960 MT in 2013 to 1,200 MT in 2014). Thus, in the case of the PSSB, the value of the transfer rose by 12%, which is higher than the rate of inflation recorded in 2013 (7.5%).

**Social Subsidies:** In contrast to the increase in sums allocated to the INAS Social Protection programmes, in 2014 the declining trend for allocations for Social Subsidies (which are less progressive than the INAS transfers) continued. They fell from 6.6 billion MT programmed in the 2013 LOES to 2.6 billion MT in 2014. This meant that, for the first time since 2011, the sum allocated to the INAS programmes is higher than that allocated to the subsidies (in 2011 the sum allocated to the subsidies was 6 times greater than the sum allocated to the INAS programmes). At the same time, it was noted that the subsidies intended to cover the deficits of public companies are considered as Social Welfare sector expenditure. It should be advocated that these subsidies should not be included as part of Social Welfare sector expenditure.

**Equity:** Taking into account the geographical distribution of the poverty and vulnerability indicators, there is still a weak relation between these indicators and the distribution of resources through the INAS programmes. This could be a factor strengthening inequalities.

The full budget brief and subsequent editions can be downloaded under the following link:
http://www.socialprotection.org/gmi/gess/ShowRessource.action?ressource.ressourceId=49417

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Source: ILO (2014)
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FINANCING AND COSTING SOCIAL PROTECTION: ASSESSING AFFORDABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF SOCIAL PROTECTION


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The TRANSFORM Learning Package is organized in a modular structure, and reflects the key building blocks of a holistic & interdependent social protection system.

The TRANSFORM modules that are currently available are listed below. Other modules are under development and will be added to the curriculum.

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All TRANSFORM materials are available at: http://socialprotection.org/institutions/transform
WHAT IS TRANSFORM?

TRANSFORM is an innovative learning package on the administration of national social protection floors in Africa. The prime objective of TRANSFORM is to build critical thinking and capacities of policy makers and practitioners at national and decentralized levels to improve the design, effectiveness and efficiency of social protection systems. TRANSFORM aims not only at imparting state-of-the-art knowledge that is appropriate for the challenges faced by countries in the region, but also to encourage learners to take leadership on the change and transformation of nationally defined social protection systems.

WHY TRANSFORM?

Many training curricula exist in the field of social protection and thus fundamental ideas, concepts, approaches and techniques are accessible. And yet, institutions and individuals struggle with the complexity of developing a broad, encompassing social protection system. This complexity requires a transformational approach to teaching and knowledge sharing. It is far from enough to impart knowledge, to fill heads. It requires learners to grapple with the features of complexity, to stimulate creativity, to appreciate diversity and uniqueness, to be involved as a key element of ownership –elements which are at least as important as the factual knowledge itself. This learning package aims at just that: TRANSFORM!

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See more on cover page.

Contact the TRANSFORM initiative at: transform_socialprotection@ilo.org
or visit http://socialprotection.org/institutions/transform

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